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ABSTRACT 
 
NEUROSIS OR PERVERSION? A LACANIAN PSYCHOANALYTIC DIAGNOSTIC 
AND CLINICAL APPROACH TO THE TREATMENT OF PARAPHILIA AT A 
FORENSIC OUTPATIENT SETTING: 
A CASE STUDY AND EXEGETICAL METHOD 
 
By 
 
Stephanie Swales 
 
August 2011 
 
 
 
Dissertation supervised by Bruce Fink, Ph.D. 
 
The work of Jacques Lacan (1901-1981) provided clinicians with three main 
diagnostic ontological structures: neurosis, psychosis, and perversion.  All three 
diagnostic structures indicate fundamentally different ways of solving the problems of 
alienation, separation from the primary caregiver, and of castration, or having limits set 
by the law on one‘s jouissance.  Of the three, perversion remains by far the least 
understood and least discussed.  To date, Lacan‘s diagnostic system—not to mention his 
corpus in general—has been largely ignored by psychotherapists in the United States.  
Where Lacan has been taken up within psychotherapeutic discourse, discussions are often 
restricted to the field of psychoanalysis and are usually theoretical, rather than clinical, in 
nature.  There is a shortage in general of published clinical case material utilizing Lacan‘s 
diagnostic structures, and in particular of cases of perversion.  In addition, even in texts 
on Lacanian theory, very little has been written on what Lacan said about perverse 
structure.  In this dissertation, I strive to make Lacan‘s perverse structure—and, by 
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extension, his diagnostic system—not only comprehensible to psychotherapists and 
psychoanalysts alike, but indispensable.  I elucidate perversion by utilizing two main 
methods: qualitative clinical case study and qualitative hermeneutic reading of what 
Lacan said about perversion.  Perversion is compared and contrasted with neurosis, and 
Paraphilia is seen as a descriptive diagnosis that could apply to either perversion or 
neurosis.  Both of the case studies presented here involved an outpatient forensic context, 
and so I also address forensic treatment concerns.  Implications for the psychoanalytic 
and forensic treatment of sexual offenders are discussed by making crucial distinctions 
between neurotic and perverse individuals. 
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Introduction 
The structure of perversion, ―[s]trictly speaking, is an inverted effect of fantasy.  
It is the subject who determines himself as an object, in his encounter with subjective 
division‖ (Lacan, 1973/1998a, p. 185; translation modified).1 
―The aim of my teaching has been and still is the training of analysts‖ (Lacan, 
1973/1998a, p. 230). 
In the United States, Lacan is little-read and often misunderstood—probably due 
to a combination of his trickster style, his allusiveness, and poor early translations of his 
work into English.  Even so, Lacan‘s works—especially for those well-versed in 
Sigmund Freud‘s oeuvre—are much more understandable and relevant than is commonly 
supposed.  Lacan‘s contributions center around the effects of speech and language on the 
human subject.  Like Freud, Lacan considers that ―analysis is in itself a technique of 
speech‖ (Lacan, 1975/1991a, p. 261) such that the fundamental elements of a 
psychoanalytic treatment are an analysand who speaks and an analyst who listens and 
strategically intervenes.  Insofar as the psychotherapeutic medium remains the patient‘s 
speech, it follows that any practitioner of psychotherapy shares common ground with 
Lacan, who, after all, was a clinician himself.  A question of translatability (apart from 
the translation of French into English) is applicable here: to what extent can the theory 
and practice of Lacanian psychoanalysis be applied to psychotherapy situations?  In this 
dissertation, I argue that Lacan‘s diagnostic system is one main aspect of his work that 
can and should be useful to psychotherapeutic practitioners.  Even though my theoretical 
                                               
1 All citations from the English translations of Lacan‘s seminars will use the English pagination, whereas 
all citations from the Écrits will use the French pagination. 
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and clinical focus is on the diagnostic structure of perversion, my descriptions of neurosis 
and psychosis should suffice to allow practitioners to make differential diagnoses.     
The Lack of Perversion 
 
Just how many perverts are there, and how many have sought or been mandated 
to participate in psychotherapy?  Because of the lack of recognition of Lacan‘s diagnostic 
system, there have been no attempts in North America to classify and quantify the 
number of perversely structured individuals.  In our society, quantification is a form of 
legitimization, of being counted as something or for something.  In The Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (2000), there is no such thing as a diagnosis of 
perversion. Therefore, practically speaking, perversion does not exist and is therefore not 
a problem.  Consequently, I cannot comment—as I would with recognized clinical 
phenomena (such as Generalized Anxiety Disorder)—on the effectiveness or 
ineffectiveness of current psychotherapeutic treatments of perversion.  In other words, 
there are no studies based on natural scientific methods from which I might argue that 
there is a need for better understandings of perversion.  If I ground my inquiry in 
mainstream power-knowledge systems, I cannot, then, make four of the usual main 
arguments for the need to study a phenomenon: the ―phenomenon‖ exists, is problematic, 
is widespread and therefore significant, and is inadequately understood by existing 
methodologies.  
It follows that, in this dissertation, I must argue for the current existence or 
ontological status of the phenomena Lacan described as perversion.  In this section, in 
order to make all four arguments for the need to study perversion, I will first roughly 
describe Lacan‘s diagnostic system and then point to where and how perversion appears 
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at the margins of North American mainstream psychological discourse.  My contention is 
that perversion is already in operation—and poses significant problems to individual 
subjects and society as a whole—but that the epistemology of mainstream psychology is 
blind to it as such.  Consequently, I will point out the differences underlying the two 
diagnostic systems and correspondingly argue that mainstream epistemology is ill-suited 
to the ontology of the structure of perversion.  Finally, I will advocate for a different 
epistemology: qualitative clinical case study and qualitative hermeneutic reading of 
Lacan‘s texts.   
Lacan’s Diagnostic Structures 
 
[T]he perversions, such as we believe we discern them in neurosis, are not that at 
all. Neurosis consists in dreaming, not perverse acts.  Neurotics have none of the 
characteristics of perverts. They simply dream of being perverts, which is quite 
natural, for how else could they attain their partner? (Lacan, 1975/1998b, p. 80) 
 
My interpretation of Lacanian diagnostics is primarily influenced by Bruce Fink 
and his multiple books (1995, 1997, 2007) on Lacanian theory and practice.  Unlike 
descriptively-based diagnoses, Lacan‘s diagnostic system provides strong 
recommendations for the direction of the treatment.  This is because Lacan‘s 
understanding of human suffering is ontological—that is, it concerns the types of beings 
people are in relation to language, others in the world, and enjoyment.  Lacan provided us 
with three main diagnoses, all of which involve a certain ontological subjective position 
in relation to the symbolic Other.  The ―Other‖ with a capital ―O‖ always refers to 
Lacan‘s symbolic order, and manifestations of the Other include the law, language, and 
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any person who is perceived as radically different than the self—oftentimes parents, 
educators, and people in positions of authority are related to at this level.  The three 
diagnoses are neurosis, perversion, and psychosis, and, rather than being descriptive 
names referring to particular symptoms, they represent structural positions that indicate 
particular ways of moving about in the languaged world with others.  Roughly speaking, 
all three diagnostic structures indicate fundamentally different ways of solving the 
problems of alienation, separation from the primary caregiver, and of castration, or 
having limits set by the law on one‘s jouissance.   
―Jouissance‖ is a French word and Lacanian term that is difficult to translate into 
English.  The closest literal translation is ―enjoyment,‖ but that misses the sexual 
connotations of the word ―jouissance,‖ which can also mean ―orgasm.‖  Furthermore, 
jouissance is not pure pleasure, but a combination of pleasure and pain.  It is sometimes 
felt by the individual as unsettling, boundary-breaking, anxiety-ridden, and too much to 
bear.  In colloquial terminology, ―getting off‖ is a rough approximation.   
As Lacan tells us in Seminar III (Lacan, 1981/1997a), each structure is constituted 
by a defining and causative ―mechanism,‖ or form of negation: neurosis by repression 
(Verdrängung), perversion by disavowal (Verleugnung),
2
 and psychosis by foreclosure 
(Verwerfung).  These might be understood as three primary defense mechanisms, and 
although psychoanalysis has focused on a dozen or so more—including, to name a few, 
―reaction formation‖ and ―splitting‖—those other defense mechanisms are derivative 
with respect to the three forms of negation that are involved in the structuring of a 
subject.  For the most part, the field of psychoanalysis has focused on repression and 
                                               
2 Verleugnung is usually translated in English as ―disavowal‖ and in French as désaveu.  In his later works, 
Lacan preferred the French term déni for Verleugnung, which means ―denial.‖ 
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foreclosure to the exclusion of disavowal.  In disavowal, the thought related to the 
perception of something is put out of mind, while the person develops symptoms that 
indicate the perception was actually registered and stored in memory.  A famous example 
is Little Hans and his phobic symptom alongside his belief that his sister has a penis, 
despite evidence to the contrary.  Disavowal, then, operates according to a kind of 
both…and logic: at the conscious level of intellect, Hans might say, ―Of course she does 
not have a penis,‖ and nevertheless be unable to stop himself from believing that she does 
have a penis.  Each structure is formed in childhood, so that an adult person cannot 
change from one structure to another.  However, this structural fixity does not exclude the 
possibility of substantive transformation within that structure.   
An individual comes to occupy one of these three structural positions early in life 
in relation to the degree of instatement of the paternal function.
3
  The paternal function 
has two movements.  The first movement corresponds to alienation, or primal repression, 
whereby the person‘s psychical processes are split into conscious and unconscious.  In it, 
the father or someone representing an authority outside of the mother, pronounces a 
prohibition of the jouissance the child obtains from its physical connection with its 
mother.  Once the father (or other authority) has pronounced this prohibition, which has a 
partial separating effect, the child is constituted as the object by which the mOther as 
Other obtains satisfaction.  Alienation, this first movement of the paternal function, does 
not occur completely for the psychotic, but is firmly instated for both the pervert and the 
neurotic.   
                                               
3 What follows in the next two paragraphs is an extremely abbreviated and rough sketch of the theoretical 
elaborations I will describe in Chapter III. 
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In the second movement, which corresponds to separation, or secondary 
repression, the mOther symbolizes, usually in language, her desire and lack, which are 
enigmatic and are not fixated upon one specific object.  It is enough, though, for the 
mother to name a few specific objects that sometimes capture her desire, such as the 
father or her career.  Once the mOther has symbolized her desire for something or 
someone other than the child, it opens up a symbolic space for the child to move into his 
or her own subject position, with his or her own desires.  It is after this movement that the 
paternal function has been firmly and irrevocably instated, and the individual can be said 
to be neurotic.  For the pervert, however, separation does not occur, and he is stuck 
identifying with being the actual object of the Other‘s jouissance.  Most perverts are 
male, and so they identify with the penis as the actual object of the mOther‘s desire.   
Within the structure of perversion, there are a number of substructures, including 
exhibitionism, voyeurism, sadism, masochism, and fetishism.  For Lacan, what makes a 
pervert perverse is not the fact of habitually engaging in specific ―abnormal‖ sexual acts, 
but the fact of occupying a particular structural position in relation to the Other.  In a 
perverse act, the pervert unknowingly constitutes himself as the object that causes the 
Other‘s jouissance.  As object-cause of the Other‘s jouissance, he transgresses an ethical 
boundary between himself and the other person, causing the other person subjective 
distress.  In other words, with all perverse activity, there is the potential for a victim.   
Sinking in the Mainstream: Natural Science Reductions  
 
In contrast to Lacan‘s structural and negation-based diagnoses stands mainstream 
North American psychiatry.  So, what clinical phenomena do our society imbue with 
truth value?  Types of human pathology considered to be meaningful realities by 
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contemporary clinical and forensic professionals are named and described in the last two 
major editions of The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III, 
1980; DSM-IV-TR, 2000), published by the American Psychiatric Association.  Most 
diagnoses in the DSM-IV-TR follow a so-called ―descriptive‖ approach to nosology, in 
which each disorder is defined by a supposedly discrete and quantifiable set of symptoms 
that (usually) cause a person subjective distress.  Human pathology, from this framework, 
is defined in terms of ―pathological‖ and abnormal behaviors and cognitions.  
Accordingly, for someone to meet the criteria for ―having‖ a disorder, her complaints 
must meet rather arbitrary diagnostic criteria in terms of onset, duration, and intensity or 
frequency of a checklist of cognitions and behaviors.  When the DSM-IV was first 
released in 1994, there were almost 400 diagnoses, in contrast to the 66 diagnoses 
described in the 1952 first edition of the DSM.  In the span of those 42 years, either 
substantial advancements were made in defining new or previously unnoticed disorders 
or psychiatry created and gave truth-value to hundreds of new diagnoses.  Although 
descriptive-based diagnoses have achieved some success in legitimating psychological 
suffering to the public and managed health care as evidenced by their widespread clinical 
use, they fail to provide meaningful information about individuals and how to help them.   
The DSM-IV-TR operates according to the natural science method in general and 
the medical model in particular.  In our culture, the scientific method is commonly 
thought to be the only way of arriving at truths, and is exercised in the hope that it will 
give us a privileged view of a static, objective reality.  Its implicit assumptions are 
quantitative and logical positivist; it holds that there is something that is reality, and that 
this reality is quantifiable.  The makers and users of the DSM-IV-TR do not often 
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recognize sufficiently that the DSM-IV-TR is but one way of approaching and viewing 
human beings and their suffering.   
Obviously, the DSM-IV-TR symptom-based classification system has limitations.  
What is needed is a way of understanding human beings and human suffering that is 
attuned to psychological dynamics and the ontological nature of being.  ―Mental‖ health 
workers would then have a better idea of how to orient the treatment.  Therapy might 
correspondingly shift from a model of symptom removal to a model of transcendent ways 
out of suffering.  Lacanian diagnostics provide such an alternative way of understanding 
psychological problems and, crucially, indicate stances the therapist should take in order 
to be helpful.   
In the mainstream power-knowledge structures, there is currently no place for 
psychoanalytic understandings of human pathology.  Recently, however, dissident groups 
such as the authors of the Psychodynamic Diagnostic Manual (PDM) (2006) have 
advocated for a return to psychodynamic understandings of individuals in our 
classification system.  The PDM is based upon understanding descriptive-based 
diagnoses through the framework of ―deeper‖ personality types.  Early on in the manual, 
its authors argue for a move towards the dynamic ontology of human life, saying, 
―[p]ersonality is what one is rather than what one has‖ (PDM Task Force, p. 17).  The 
authors of the PDM attempt to see people at the level of the individual rather than at the 
level of symptoms that can be possessed and potentially excised.  They temper their 
criticisms, though, by saying that the PDM is intended as a ―complement‖ (p. 1) to the 
DSM-IV-TR, and not as a replacement.   
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Furthermore, the PDM makes a number of major claims about human ontology 
that conflict with Lacanian claims. For instance, although the PDM‘s system is based on 
Otto Kernberg‘s theory of personality types—implying that those types are at least 
somewhat stable and enduring—the PDM centers upon a continuum of health in which 
neurotics are the healthiest beings, ―borderline-level‖ individuals are less healthy, and 
psychotic-level people are the most ill.  Briefly stated, Lacanians would take issue with 
defining neurosis as healthier than psychosis, with the existence of the ―borderline‖ 
diagnosis, and with the idea that neurotic individuals have the capacity to undergo 
psychotic breaks.  To date, though, there have been no organized efforts by Lacanians to 
dialogue with mainstream clinical practice in North America.   
The PDM is reflective of an ongoing debate amongst psychoanalytically-informed 
practitioners of all orientations concerning the commensurability between 
psychodynamic diagnosis and mainstream psychiatric diagnosis: to what degree, if at all, 
do descriptive, ―surface‖ traits and behaviors delineated in the DSM correspond to 
―deeper‖ psychodynamic structures?  In addressing this issue, Otto Kernberg—one of the 
authors of the PDM—and Robert Michels (2009) recently argued that even Axis II of the 
DSM, which concerns ―personality,‖ does not correspond to the ―underlying psychologic 
structure‖ (Kernberg & Michels, 2009, p. 505).  Giving another major psychoanalytic 
critique of descriptive nosology, Kernberg and Michels point out that each clinical 
complaint can, depending upon an individual‘s personality, have substantially different 
meanings.  ―[S]ocial timidity, for example, may be a reaction formation against 
exhibitionistic trends, an expression of paranoid tendencies, or a schizoid symptom‖ (p. 
506).  In the same vein, a sexual crime, such as rape, could be committed by a psychotic, 
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a pervert, or a neurotic (Bond, 2009), and correspondingly has varied clinical 
implications.  Furthermore, even within the same diagnostic category, a specific 
behavioral phenomenon is enacted for conscious and unconscious reasons that are always 
particular to the individual and her interpersonal context.   
Paul Verhaeghe, who uses some Lacanian theory in his writings, wrote an 
excellent critique of and alternative to the DSM-IV-TR, called On Being Normal and 
Other Disorders: A Manual for Clinical Psychodiagnostics (2004).  In it, he says the 
following of the difference between natural science medical diagnostics and a Lacanian 
approach to diagnostics:  
Medical diagnostics begins with the particular (the symptom) and moves toward the 
general (the syndrome), based on a semiotic system that is entirely focused on the 
individual‘s complaints.  Clinical psychodiagnostics begins from the general (the 
incipient complaint) and proceeds toward the particular (where N = 1), based on a 
system of signifiers that is part of a wider relationship between the subject and the 
Other. (p. 6)   
Unfortunately, however, Verhaeghe‘s book is not well-known outside of Lacanian 
circles.  Joël Dor (2001), a Lacanian analyst, wrote a similar critique that had similar 
effects.  Perhaps the current dominant power-knowledge institutions, such as the 
American Psychiatric Association, the American Medical Association, forensic 
professionals, and managed care, have so much invested in the current system of clinical 
diagnostics that it will take many more organized and more strategic dissident efforts to 
make significant alterations.  
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As it stands, the DSM-legitimated clinical phenomena that come closest to 
Lacan‘s diagnosis of perversion are the Paraphiliae.  These include Sexual Sadism, 
Sexual Masochism, Voyeurism, Pedophilia, Exhibitionism, Fetishism, Transvestic 
Fetishism, Frotteurism, and Paraphilia Not Otherwise Specified.  The Paraphiliae are 
primarily behaviorally-based diagnoses, corresponding to what are considered to be 
abnormal or unhealthy sexual activities. They clearly do not refer to specific structural 
positions; the DSM-IV-TR states, ―[n]ot uncommonly, individuals have more than one 
Paraphilia‖ (APA, 2000, p. 567).  A Paraphilia, then, is just a sexual preference that could 
be one among many.  In addition, Paraphilia Not Otherwise Specified is a category that 
includes sexual preferences for ―abnormal‖ objects not included in the other categories: 
―Examples include, but are not limited to, telephone scatologia (obscene phone calls), 
necrophilia (corpses), partialism (exclusive focus on part of body), zoophilia (animals), 
coprophilia (feces), klismaphilia (enemas), and urophilia (urine)‖ (p. 576).  
A Lacanian critique of the Paraphiliae is that these diagnoses simply name a 
number of particular things that arouse people‘s sexual desire, and they are therefore 
relatively unhelpful for the direction of the treatment.  In contrast, perversion, neurosis, 
and psychosis are clinically useful diagnoses, indicating the stance the therapist should 
take in order to be most helpful.  In practice, treatment professionals often assume that all 
paraphilic individuals are neurotic, rather than psychotic or ―schizophrenic.‖ From a 
Lacanian perspective, a paraphilic individual could be structured by any of Lacan‘s three 
diagnoses; if society considers a sexual preference to be ―perverted,‖ that does not 
necessarily mean that an individual who has that preference is perversely structured.  
Because the substructures of perversion are identified with particular perverse scenarios 
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and preferences, however, there is likely some overlap in the two diagnostic systems.  
Certainly, the DSM-IV-TR and Lacanian diagnostic frameworks are not mutually 
exclusive; because the DSM-IV-TR is descriptively-based, a practitioner may choose to 
use both diagnostic systems.     
Psychoanalytic diagnostics should separate itself from the reduction to medical 
diagnostics and see a person‘s clinical complaint not as a sign of an objective disorder 
with a universal meaning and a standard protocol treatment—if only it were that easy!—
but as a signifier of an individual‘s dynamically changing intrapsychic and interpersonal 
difficulties.  A likely reason why we so often have great trouble in making a differential 
diagnosis—between, for example, Histrionic Personality Disorder and Borderline 
Personality Disorder or Anorexia Nervosa and Eating Disorder Not Otherwise 
Specified—is not due to inadequacies in our knowledge about the person but to problems 
with the psychiatric diagnostic system itself.  Those problems cannot be solved by 
tweaking the diagnostic criteria, but only by looking at psychological suffering through 
an ontological, contextual, and interpersonal lens such as the one Lacan constructed.   
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Chapter I: Theoretical and Case Study Contributions 
Brief and Selective History of the Term “Perversion” 
 
Our conceptions and practices of sexuality are discursively mediated and shift 
historically as different discourses and power relations emerge.  In the past three 
centuries, the key institutional discourses that have shaped sexuality include religion, 
medicine, psychiatry, education, and criminal justice (Foucault, 1976/1990).  
Correspondingly, the term ―perversion‖ has undergone several major shifts in meaning.4  
―Perversion‖ is derived from the Latin ―pervertere,‖ which means ―to turn around.‖  
Whatever contextual definition of perversion may be used, it always implies the 
transgression of a moral, social, or legal norm or value; norms and values, of course, are 
culturally and historically contextual.  Even contemporary progressive theorists of 
perversion, such as psychoanalysts Joyce McDougall (1995) and Robert Stoller (1991), 
fail in their quest to create value-free definitions of perversion.
5
  
Michel Foucault (1976/1990) points out that in the 18
th
 century, religious 
discourse was dominant.  The corresponding idea of perversion was that of sinful sexual 
behaviors that warranted repentance and punishment.  Thus perverse acts were 
transgressions of religious moral norms that were often punishable by the law.  An 
important shift occurred in the 19
th
 century: the focus was no longer on perverse acts but 
on perverse individuals.  In that vein, Foucault notes that the Catholic confessional 
shifted ―the most important moment of transgression from the act itself to the stirrings—
                                               
4 In this section, I am not referring to Lacan‘s structural diagnosis of perversion, but to the other ways in 
which the term ―perversion‖ has been used in the past few centuries.  
5 McDougall, for instance, in The Many Faces of Eros, tries to avoid the perjorative connotations of the 
―perversions‖ by re-naming them ―neosexualities‖ (McDougall, 1995, p. 174); however, she makes great 
use of the term ―deviant‖ in her theories on the neosexualities.  Likewise, Stoller, in looking for alternative 
terms that would not amount to name-calling, found himself obliged to use words that hardly solved the 
problem, including ―aberration,‖ ―variant,‖ and ―sin‖ (Stoller, 1991, p. 37).  
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so difficult to perceive and formulate—of desire‖ (p. 19).  A person, then, was told by the 
power forces at play in Catholicism at large and by the priest in front of him that he must 
speak—again and again—about his desires, which were sinful, in order to transform 
himself into a good Christian once more.  This shifted the sin from the level of a behavior 
to the level of the being of the subject himself.   
A parallel shift occurred in other institutional sites, such as criminal justice and 
psychiatry.  The danger of sex, though, was no longer constituted in terms of specific 
forbidden sexual acts, but in terms of individuals whose constitution is imbued with the 
will to commit forbidden sexual acts.  The example Foucault gives is of the shift from the 
act of sodomy to the identification of the homosexual.
6
  According to Foucault 
(1976/1990), ―The nineteenth-century homosexual became a personage, a past, a case 
history, and a childhood, in addition to being a type of life, a life form, and a 
morphology, with an indiscreet anatomy and possibly a mysterious physiology‖ (p. 43).  
We focused our scientific gaze on the ―perverse‖ homosexual individual, shifting from 
the practice of the act to ―a kind of interior androgyny, a hermaphrodism of the soul‖ (p. 
43).  Scientific and medical discourses set about a large-scale effort to classify all of the 
perverse sexualities, to constitute subjects as fitting a particular type of sexuality.  In this 
classification process, each name and type of sexuality assigned to the individual made 
these sexualities appear as part of reality.   
The perverse became a new category in the field of sexuality, one concerned with 
a science of health and sickness.  In medical psychiatric discourse, sinners were relabeled 
as perverse patients in need of some kind of medical treatment.  This discourse implies a 
                                               
6 It should be noted that homosexuality is not one of the substructures of the Lacanian diagnostic category 
of perversion.  
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natural biological and therefore fixed norm.  Richard von Krafft-Ebing‘s seminal book on 
perversion, Psychopathia Sexualis, which was first published in 1886, is one major 
representation of the medicalization of the norms of sexuality—norms which still retain 
clear vestiges of religious morality.
7
  In his book, Krafft-Ebing speaks of a human sexual 
instinct, the aim of which is reproduction.  However, even at that time, researchers were 
aware that sexual behaviors that did not aim toward reproduction were commonplace.  
Consequently, Krafft-Ebing differentiated between two kinds of perverts: one whose 
sexual instinct is always misdirected toward non-reproductive sexual activities and one 
who enjoys adding perverse behaviors to his coital activity.   
Similarly, Freud, in his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905/1953a; 
1905/1953b), tentatively perpetuates a belief in ―the normal sexual aim…of copulation‖ 
(1905/1953a, p. 149) when he differentiates between people who engage in non-
reproductive sexual behaviors en route to (as in kissing) or ―merely alongside the normal 
sexual aim and object‖ (p. 161) and pathological people whose non-reproductive sexual 
activities have ―the characteristics of exclusiveness and fixation‖ (p. 161).  In this, 
Freud‘s first theory of perversion,8 pathological perversion amounts to a developmental 
disorder, in which the person has a fixation to a certain non-reproductive sexual activity 
(or partial drive) that gets in the way of the ―normal‖ adult genital sexual relationship.  
This type of clinical differentiation between normal and pathological perversion has 
persisted until the present day in some medical, psychiatric, and forensic discourses.  
                                               
7 Interestingly, Krafft-Ebing was so intent upon restricting his audience to scientific and medical audiences 
that he wrote many sections of Psychopathia Sexualis in Latin so lay readers would be unable to read it.  In 
spite of his efforts, his book became very popular amongst the general public.  Not only did his book have 
12 editions published during his lifetime, but some publishers translated the Latin sections into the 
languages spoken by the public.  This speaks to the intense interest of the public in matters of sexuality—
particularly matters of supposedly abnormal sexuality.  
8 I elucidate Freud‘s second theory of perversion, based on the concept of castration anxiety, in Chapter IV 
of this dissertation.  
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Freud, presumably addressing Krafft-Ebing and the other sexologists of the time,
9
 adds 
that ―[n]o healthy person, it appears, can fail to make some addition that might be called 
perverse to the normal sexual aim; and the universality of this finding is in itself enough 
to show how inappropriate it is to use the word perversion as a term of reproach‖ (p. 
160).  In this sense, the vast majority of people are perverse.   
Given his abovementioned focus on heterosexual coitus, Freud seems to shrink 
from his most radical argument in the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality: we are all 
born with a polymorphously perverse disposition (1905/1953b, p. 191), and socialization 
(largely by way of the successful resolution of the Oedipal complex) is responsible for 
what we call ―normal‖ sexuality.  With this argument, Freud debunks completely the idea 
that there is an innate sexual instinct that draws people together for heterosexual 
reproductive-oriented intercourse to the exclusion of all other types of sexual enjoyment.  
―[T]he sexual instinct and the sexual object are merely soldered together‖ (1905/1953a, p. 
148).  To translate the German ―Trieb‖ into ―drive‖ instead of ―instinct‖—which has 
biological deterministic connotations—is truer to Freud‘s conception of human sexuality 
here.  Furthermore, Freud argues that the sexual drive is not a unified one, but is 
fundamentally a partial drive following the dictates of the polymorphously perverse 
disposition.  In other words, the drives are partial and multiple because they have to do 
with certain pleasurable zones of the body, such as the anal zone, rather than the body in 
its entirety.   
Accordingly, if we assume a polymorphously perverse disposition, then 
perversion is nothing but an uninhibited enactment of the normal human sexual drives.  
                                               
9 At the beginning of the paragraph from which the quote that follows was taken, Freud speaks of the 
―medical men, who first studied perversions in outstanding examples and under special conditions‖ (Freud, 
1905/1975a, p. 160), indicating that they were understandably mistaken about perversions.  
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Perversity, then, is no longer a problematic to be investigated.  As Dany Nobus (2006) 
points out, ―the real Freudian question would be ‗Why and how does anyone ever 
become sexually normal?‘‖ (p. 9).  Freud and his followers, however, have largely 
concerned themselves with ―the (much less radical) issue of why and how a pervert 
remains entrenched in the original mechanisms of polymorphous perversity‖ (p. 9).   
 Although Freud and Krafft-Ebing had already indicated that most people do not 
fit completely into the medical norm of reproduction-oriented heterosexual intercourse, 
the medical and psychiatric discourses about sexual norms did not become substantially 
dismantled until Alfred Kinsey published his influential Sexual Behavior in the Human 
Male (1948/1998).  The Kinsey report, which had a large sample size, empirically 
demonstrated that the vast majority of people deviate from the medical sexual norm.  The 
widespread academic and societal attention the Kinsey report drew influenced the 
educational and moral discourses of the time.  Correspondingly, the dominant discourses 
about sexuality and perversion shifted from religion and medicine to sociology and 
psychology.  Since then, ideas of normal sexuality have become very relative.  The term 
―perverse‖ has become taboo in favor of the more politically correct ―paraphilia‖—
although the two mean roughly the same thing.
10
  Sexologist John Money has even 
created ―Normophilia: a condition of being erotosexually in conformity with the standard 
as dictated by customary, religious, or legal authority‖ (1988, p. 214).   
In the past several centuries, then, people themselves and peoples‘ experiences of 
their selves have been altered by the proliferation of (often scientific) discourses about 
                                               
10 Psychotherapist Wilhelm Stekel (1924/1964) coined the term ―paraphilia‖ in 1924.  Etymologically, 
―paraphilia‖ is derived from the Greek ―para,‖ meaning ―near,‖ ―beside,‖ or ―beyond‖ and the Greek 
―philos,‖ meaning ―love.‖ So, ―paraphilia‖ can be literally translated as the love of something beyond the 
norm.  Vernon Rosario (1997) says that ―paraphilia‖ can be translated as ―love of the perverse.‖   
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sex.  Foucault, commentating on the current discourses, says that the result is that 
―[m]odern society is perverse…in actual fact‖ (Foucault, 1976/1990, p. 47) such that 
there are a considerable number of different things that turn people on, a kind of sexual 
mosaic.  ―These polymorphous behaviors‖ (p. 47, translation modified), according to 
Foucault, are an ―implantation of perversions‖ (p. 48) effected by ―multifarious power 
apparatuses‖ (p. 48, translation modified).  Institutions such as psychiatry and 
pornography have economic interests in perpetuating, revealing, and rigidifying 
sexualities.  Whether or not we agree with Foucault that ―these polymorphous behaviors‖ 
began to be commonplace in the 19
th
 century, and began at that time for the 
abovementioned reasons, it seems clear that contemporary sexual norms are very 
permissive in the Western world.   
Verhaeghe calls the current sexual norm the norm of informed consent, ―meaning 
that everything is allowed, on condition that both partners agree…As a consequence, the 
field of perversion has narrowed down to sexual harassment and to paedophilia and 
incest, that is, to those cases where informed consent is lacking‖ (Verhaeghe, 2001a, p. 
62).  In the present day, perversion, or paraphilia, as the case may be, is therefore largely 
restricted to the forensic field.  Consequently, rather than focusing on underlying 
psychological meanings, the forensic diagnoses are based on illegal behaviors, such as 
rape or voyeurism, and the treatment is oriented toward preventing future occurrences of 
those behaviors.  Interestingly, according to the DSM-IV-TR, the paraphiliae that 
transgress the norm of informed consent—including voyeurism, sexual sadism, 
pedophilia, exhibitionism, and frotteurism—can be diagnosed if the person has acted 
upon his paraphilic sexual urges or if the person experiences marked distress related to 
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his paraphilic urges, whereas the paraphiliae that do not transgress the norm of informed 
consent—including fetishism, transvestic fetishism, and sexual masochism—cannot be 
diagnosed solely on the basis of having acted on one‘s urges but are diagnosed only if the 
paraphilic sexual urges cause the individual marked distress.
11
  Consequently, the DSM-
IV-TR deems the informed-consent-transgressing-paraphiliae as pathological if the person 
commits acts of paraphilia whether or not he is distressed by them, but the same is not 
true for the paraphiliae that do not transgress the norm of informed consent.  In other 
words, if there is a victim, the person is a pathological perpetrator who may be subject to 
mandated psychotherapeutic treatment.  This is evidence that psychiatric diagnosis is 
sometimes based solely on the presence or absence of transgressions of existing civil law.   
Lacan‘s structural ontological approach makes it clear that the Lacanian diagnosis 
of perversion is not synonymous with or reducible to behavioral transgressions of the 
law.  In Lacanian diagnosis, the person‘s structural position in relation to the Other is 
considered first, and (sometimes illegal) sexual behaviors are taken into account 
secondarily, but in context and with regard to underlying psychological motives.  All the 
same, the forensic clinic remains a privileged locus of study even for Lacanian perversion 
because the perverse act is often one that violates the ethical boundaries of the contextual 
situation and therefore one that sometimes elicits the intervention of the law.  In the 
Lacanian framework, perversion implies a turning around of the ―usual‖ structural 
neurotic position in relation to the Other and castration.   
                                               
11 Since the internet became widely used, there have been a large number of sexual offenders so classified 
because they were in ―possession‖ of or traded or sold illegal pornography of minors.  A large number of 
those offenders have never committed a ―hands-on‖ offense and therefore would not be classified as 
pedophilic unless they described distress related to their pedophilic inclinations.  In this case, the 
definitions of informed consent and acting upon paraphilic urges are debatable.   Some professionals see 
the minors depicted in the pornography as unconsenting victims—victims who were created both by the 
makers of the pornography and by those creating the demand for the pornography.   
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For two and a half years, I worked at an outpatient forensic psychotherapy office, 
conducting psychological assessments, individual, and group psychotherapy for male 
―sexual offenders‖ (or sex offenders).  Most of these sexual offenders have been 
diagnosed, according to DSM criteria, with a Paraphilia. Out of the population of sexual 
offenders, though, I hypothesize that only a small portion are perversely structured.   
Even so, I suspect that the proportion of perverts in the population of sexual offenders is 
much higher than in the general population.  That being said, forensic clinicians in 
particular would do well to differentiate perversion from neurosis and psychosis.   
Therefore, if it is the case that forensic psychotherapists are treating perverse 
individuals as if they were neurotic
12—forensic treatment tends to be one-size-fits-all, 
with neurosis as its presumed basis—then a Lacanian analytic framework would have 
much to offer the mainstream in terms of why certain interventions fail or even 
exacerbate the ―offensive‖ sexual behavior.  Both a Lacanian psychoanalytic and a 
forensic approach to treatment aim to reduce the victimizing activities of the pervert, 
although the former would do so indirectly, through the process of analysis.  It follows 
that, if we knew how to do effective psychotherapeutic work with perverse individuals, 
we would not only benefit the patients themselves, but society at large.   
Literature Review 
 
Literature Review of Existing Sex Offender Treatment 
Currently in the United States, nearly 1.4 million people are incarcerated in state 
or federal prisons, and more than 100,000 of those inmates have been convicted of sexual 
offenses (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2001).  Obviously, sex offending is socially 
                                               
12 I have been unable to find any forensic literature concerning how to conduct the treatment of sexual 
offenders differently in cases of psychosis.   
9 
 
problematic in our culture.  However, even from a mainstream DSM-IV-TR perspective, 
research on the standard practice of psychological treatment of sex offenders is sorely 
lacking.  It almost goes without saying that all of the literature in the United States on sex 
offenders uses DSM-IV-TR diagnostics to the exclusion of more dynamic ways of 
understanding psychological problems, such as Lacanian psychoanalytic theory.   
By and large, most efficacy studies of psychological treatment for sexual 
offenders have found that treatment has a small to modest effect on preventing future 
sexual or other criminal offenses (Hall, 1995; Hanson et al., 2002).  It is easy to find 
well-designed studies, however, that find no statistically significant effect for treatment 
(e.g., Marques, Wiederanders, Day, Nelson, & van Ommeren, 2005).  For instance, 
Proctor (1996) used a cohort design that compared all the sex offenders (including 
rapists, exhibitionists, and hands-on child molesters) who started a community treatment 
program between 1989 and 1992 with a matched group from the same jurisdiction 
released between 1986 and 1989 when no treatment was available. After a fixed 5-year 
follow-up period (the same for both groups), the sexual reconviction rate was 5.6% for 
the treatment group compared to 13.0% for the comparison group.  Even though the 
difference might be considered clinically significant, it was not statistically significant 
because of the small sample size.  It is notable that successful treatment, in this context, is 
solely measured by the extinction of the illegal behavior.   
Hanson and Morton-Bourgon (2005), in their meta-analysis of recidivism studies, 
note the following: ―A review of the core treatment targets of sexual offender treatment 
programs suggests that most programs direct considerable resources toward 
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characteristics that have little or no relationship with recidivism (e.g., offense 
responsibility, victim awareness, and empathy)‖ (Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, p. 1159).  
It is interesting both that recidivism has no relationship with empathy for a victim, 
offense responsibility, or victim awareness, and that most sex offender treatment 
professionals spend time attempting to build those characteristics.  This kind of treatment 
aims to teach, preach, and condition the patient into developing a ―higher functioning‖ 
superego.  Basically, therapists are trying to appeal to a patient‘s sense of guilt and 
empathy to make a case for why his sex offense was wrong and why he should not re-
offend; the hope is that, by making him feel bad for hurting someone, he will not commit 
the same sexual offense again.  This logic relies on the belief that the man would not have 
committed the crime had he been fully aware (in the ―moment‖ and the preceding 
moments) of the weight and impact of his sin on himself and others.  This reasoning is 
obviously fallacious.  Certainly, a thin ―moral fiber‖ might have something to do with 
why the person was able to follow through with the offense, but this leaves out the 
multitude of possible reasons why the man was motivated to commit the sexual offense.  
What of the jouissance he gained in fantasizing about or engaging in the act?  What about 
the individual‘s personal history, family context, and cultural context, in which the sexual 
offense has particular meanings? If the symptom is treated as a wart that can be removed 
if it is known to be ugly, then the symptom as a meaningful signifier will persist.   
Rubbing a sex offender‘s nose in his mess might, if done artfully, result in his 
being more motivated to defecate in the toilet instead of in a public hallway, but the 
question that arises is the following: to what degree can a therapist successfully use the 
techniques of a priest or a school principal?  The literature that Hanson and Morton-
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Bourgon (2005) reviewed suggested that playing priest in the therapy room is ineffective.  
We can only wonder what motivations or what meaningful personal signifying relations 
underpin the therapist‘s masquerade as priest.   
One might argue here that there were studies of psychotherapy with sex offenders 
that evaded Hanson and Morton-Bourgon‘s meta-analytic review that utilized moralizing 
techniques with at least somewhat more efficacy.  That might lead us to pose the 
question: in what instances, and with what kinds of sexual offenders, are moralizing 
techniques effective or ineffective?  I would hypothesize that moralizing works better 
with neurotic sexual offenders than it does with perverse sexual offenders.   Perverts, 
compared to neurotics, have a very small capacity for guilt because the Other or the 
moral law exists only shakily for them.  Guilt is a hallmark of a neurotic structure that 
corresponds to inhibition of impulses related to the firm instatement of the paternal 
function and symbolic order.  A therapist, then, is mostly wasting his time in trying to 
appeal to the pervert‘s mostly absent sense of guilt.   
Along those lines, Hanson and Morton-Bourgon (2005) also found that the two 
strongest predictive factors of sexual recidivism were sexual deviancy (d. = .30) and 
antisocial orientation (d. = .23)—the latter of which refers to Antisocial Personality 
Disorder as diagnosed by the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R) (Hare, 2003), 
antisocial traits, and a history of rule violation.
13
  Among the strongest individual 
                                               
13 It should be noted that Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD), which ―exists‖ according to the DSM-IV-
TR, is different from Psychopathy, which is not legitimated in the DSM-IV-TR. Robert Hare, the author of 
the PCL-R, suggests that APD can almost be reduced to criminality. Because, diagnostically, it is almost 
entirely based on behaviors,  Hare estimated that between 80 and 85 percent of incarcerated criminals meet 
the required criteria of APD, whereas only about 20 percent of them would qualify for a diagnosis of 
Hare‘s Psychopathy. Psychopathy is a more ―personality based‖ diagnosis. Psychopathy refers to a 
particular relationship of the patient to the law—one of being above the law or seeing through the law—and 
avoids accentuating sexually transgressive behaviors more than other potential effects of the patient‘s 
relation to the law.     
12 
 
predictors of any recidivism (sexual or non-sexual) were general problems with self-
regulation (d. = .75, 6 studies, which included measures of impulsivity, lifestyle 
instability, and Factor 2 of the Psychopathy Checklist Revised) or a history of nonviolent 
crime (d. = .68, 9 studies), Psychopathy (PCL-R total scores; d. = .67, 9 studies), and a 
history of nonsexual crime (d. = .63, 8 studies).  So, people with antisocial traits have the 
greatest risk of re-offending.  I propose that what the DSM-IV-TR calls Antisocial 
Personality Disorder—and especially what is known as Psychopathy—often falls under 
the Lacanian structure of sadistic perversion.  I hypothesize that, less frequently, 
psychopaths might be psychotically structured.  If that is the case, then Hanson and 
Morton-Bourgon‘s results could be understood as support for hypothesizing that sex 
offenders with a perverse structure are more likely to reoffend than those with a neurotic 
structure, and that diagnosing along Lacanian lines could be a very helpful component to 
sex offender risk assessment (and criminal risk assessment in general).  This question of 
risk assessment, however, is beyond the scope of this dissertation.   
By far the most common model of sexual offender treatment is the relapse 
prevention approach, which was first developed for treating people with addictions 
(Marlatt & Gordon, 1985) and was then adapted for treating sexual offenders (Pithers, 
Marques, Gibat & Marlatt, 1983).  The relapse prevention model uses cognitive-
behavioral techniques to identify situations, moods, and cognitions that are potential 
―triggers‖ for re-offending.  Then, practitioners focus on teaching offenders self-
management skills so that they can use more effective coping strategies than committing 
sexual offenses.  Most treatment programs also teach the aforementioned empathy or 
victim-awareness skills and attempt to restructure the supposed cognitive distortions that 
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contributed to the offensive behavior.  One main problem of this treatment model is that 
it is one-size-fits all.  It assumes that all sexual offenders offend for the same reasons and 
will respond to the same type of treatment.  The relapse prevention approach assumes 
that all sexual offenders commit sexual offenses because of low self-esteem, stressful life 
events, deficits in coping skills, and being in bad moods.   
Only very recently has a forensic treatment approach for sexual offenders 
attempted to correct this one-size-fits-all treatment modality.  The Self-Regulation Model 
of the Offense and Relapse Process (Ward, Bickley, Webster, Fisher, Beech & Eldridge, 
2004) differentiates between pathways to offending, ―taking into account different types 
of goals (e.g., approach versus avoidance goals), varying affective states (both initial and 
ongoing) and different types of planning‖ (p. 12). The self-regulation model involves four 
major different pathways to offending: avoidant-passive, avoidant-active, approach-
automatic, and approach-explicit.  Those within the two avoidant categories wish to avoid 
sexual offending, but lack the coping skills necessary to prevent its occurrence.  Those 
within the two approach categories have goals, values, and beliefs that make sexual 
offending a positive, enjoyable experience that they strive to repeat.  The approach-
automatic type is someone who impulsively takes up opportunities for committing sexual 
offenses, and the approach-explicit type is someone who makes ―use of careful planning 
to execute offenses‖ (p. 38).   
Both the self-regulation model and the relapse prevention model view prevention 
of re-offending as their treatment goal.  However, with the approach types, the self-
regulation model takes into account something that the relapse prevention model does 
not: some offenders view their sexual offenses ego-syntonically.  That is, the self-
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regulation model is, in part, an attempt to explain and recommend treatment for sexual 
offenders who feel entitled to ―have what they want, when they want it‖ or ―‗relish‘ their 
sexual deviance, living in a world of their own because ‗no one understands them‘‖ 
(Ward et al., 2004, p. 41).  The developers of the self-regulation model, however, see 
their four types as somewhat fluid, such that it is a common occurrence for an avoidant 
offender to become an approach offender, and vice versa.  This fluidity exemplifies the 
self-regulation model‘s lack of a structural approach.14   
Treatment for the approach-automatic offenders focuses on improving their 
deficits in ―meta-cognitive control‖ (Ward et al., 2004, p. 75) by teaching ―appropriate 
self-regulation strategies‖ (p. 75).  Furthermore, their ―significant sense of entitlement‖ 
(p. 77) is intervened with via ―the usual interventions such as cognitive restructuring for 
dysfunctional cognitions together with techniques designed to ameliorate empathy 
deficits‖ (p. 77).  In contrast, the approach-explicit type does not have deficits in meta-
cognitive control, and so treatment is oriented toward the alteration of his ―core beliefs‖ 
concerning sexual offenses (p. 78) through cognitive psychotherapeutic methods such as 
Aaron Beck‘s.  Treatment is the most difficult with the approach-explicit offender group 
(Hudson & Ward, 2000), and I hypothesize that this is the category that perverts are most 
likely to fall under, although perversion is far from synonymous with the approach-
explicit type.  Because the self-regulation model is relatively new, there has not been very 
much empirical research on its efficacy.  There have been no studies of treatment efficacy 
of the self-regulation model that include recidivism data.   
                                               
14 One might counter my argument for the superiority of structural diagnosis by the claim that the 
―phenomena‖ of categories—in this case approach and avoidant—are more relevant to diagnosis and 
treatment.  However, the categories themselves lack validity insofar as their criteria are arbitrary, and it is 
unlikely that a sex offender would always fit neatly into one category before jumping completely to another 
category.   
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One study (Bickley & Beech, 2003) found that treatment of approach types 
succeeded in significantly reducing their pre-treatment statements that minors were able 
to consent to sexual activity with adults.  However, they retained the belief that minors 
were unharmed by sexual activity with adults.  It seems to me that any changes in the 
―core beliefs‖ of sexual offenders in the course of forensic treatment might simply be the 
result of ―faking good‖ to the treatment providers so that they could terminate treatment 
and avoid other consequences of appearing to persist in their so-called cognitive and 
empathy distortions—including heckling from fellow group members or increased 
incarceration time.  Both the self-regulation and the relapse prevention model rely 
heavily upon descriptive nosology and cognitive-behavioral methods of change.  In sum, 
the self-regulation model represents only a small improvement in diagnosis and treatment 
methods over those of the relapse prevention model.  In both models of sexual offender 
diagnosis and treatment, there is a subset of individuals identified as treatment resistant; it 
is my hypothesis that many of these individuals have a perverse structure, and that 
Lacan‘s ontological structural framework will reveal why the existing methods of 
treatment fail.   
From a natural science perspective, then, those who buy into the truth of the 
existence of the disorder called Paraphilia seek to investigate the phenomena using 
corresponding methods: quantitative studies using behaviors and cognitions as criteria.  
The normal scenario of natural scientific studies of paraphilic sexual offenders is the 
following: a quantitative study is conducted on the efficacy of cognitive-behavioral 
methods with paraphilic sexual offenders.  The study defines treatment success as the 
removal of the symptomatic act from the paraphilic‘s life.  The ―data say‖ that there is 
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either a small effect or no statistically significant effect of treatment on the symptom.  
The researcher-experts find various ways of throwing up their hands, including the 
conclusion that certain people are simply resistant to treatment.  The researchers might 
say the resistance is due to ―personality factors‖ or a ―personality disorder,‖15 such as 
―Antisocial Personality Disorder.‖  I propose that one of the reasons for those treatment 
failures or ―treatment resistant‖ patients is that clinicians misrecognize a perverse 
personality as a neurotic personality.  In other words, Paraphilia is a theoretical 
construction that falls short, and perversion is a better theoretical construction.  Lacan‘s 
conception of the subject and of diagnosis is a superior alternative, not a companion, to 
the DSM-IV-TR.   
From a Lacanian point of view, the centrality of the goal of relapse prevention in 
forensic treatment not only sometimes sabotages the possibility of such success but also 
comes at the cost of other treatment aims that are more closely linked to the individual‘s 
complaints and his structural diagnosis.  For the sex offender pervert, Verhaeghe (2004) 
notes that ―[f]ocusing exclusively on relapse prevention means one removes the perverse 
subject‘s attempt at solution without addressing the underlying problem.  To the extent 
that relapses do stop, this must occur as a result of the treatment, not as the primary goal‖ 
(pp. 426-427).  When a potential victim‘s well-being is at stake, however, it can be 
difficult to push relapse prevention into the background.  One of the aims of my 
                                               
15 The DSM-IV-TR (2000) defines a ―Personality Disorder [as] an enduring pattern of inner experience and 
behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of the individual‘s culture, is pervasive and 
inflexible, has an onset in adolescence or early adulthood, is stable over time, and leads to distress or 
impairment‖ (p. 684).  A personality disorder, especially one like Antisocial Personality Disorder, is 
thought to be very resistant to treatment.   For psychotherapists, this logic serves as a defense, in which 
treatment failures are attributed to the patient‘s nature being inherently and permanently difficult.  
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dissertation is to explore this tension between forensic and psychotherapeutic goals and 
methods.   
Literature Review of Lacanian Cases of Perversion 
After having searched extensively for existing case reports of work with 
perversely structured analysands, I found only two.  One, entitled ―Fetishishization of a 
Phobic Object,‖ was written by René Tostain.  It is included in Stuart Schneiderman‘s 
How Lacan’s ideas are used in clinical practice (1980).  The other case study was written 
by Fink: ―The use of Lacanian psychoanalysis in a case of fetishism‖ (2003).  Clearly, 
like with fetishism itself, there is a lack in the literature around which little has been 
constructed.  I discuss Fink‘s case at length in Chapter IV of this dissertation. 
There are a handful of case studies published by non-Lacanian psychoanalysts, 
however, on analysands with ―perversion.‖  It remains unclear as to how much overlap 
there is between their definitions of perversion and Lacan‘s definition of perversion.  One 
such case report, Richard Tuch‘s (2008) ―Unraveling the riddle of exhibitionism: A 
lesson in the power tactics of perverse interpersonal relationships,‖ only provided a four-
page case description.  Tuch‘s case, though interesting, is insufficient to either explicate 
the possible perverse structure or make treatment recommendations.  
Another, written by Michael Good (2000), called ―Perverse defenses: A clinical 
vignette,‖ does differentiate between neurosis and what he calls ―frank or obligatory 
perversion‖ (Good, 2000, p. 199).  Good does not do a very good job of frankly defining 
―frank or obligatory perversion‖; he seems to suggest that it is a long-standing fixation on 
using ―perverse defenses,‖ which make frankly perverse patients difficult to work with in 
analysis.  Good‘s definition of perverse defenses has little to do with Lacan‘s three forms 
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of negation.  Good‘s perverse defenses ―protect against both the experience of 
psychological deadness and early, regressive, and dependent themes and their associated 
affects, including intense shame. They can include defenses against external reality, the 
patient‘s own conflicts, and relationships with others; they involve affect intolerance, 
difficulties with analytic collaboration, and analytic impasse‖ (p. 199).  So, Good‘s 
perverse defenses, whatever they are, exactly, do pretty much everything under the sun.  
The case vignette Good gives in the article does nothing to clarify these so-called 
defenses or make them into anything more than ambiguously difficult human 
experiences. Furthermore, of his definition of perversion, Good says, ―When we call 
someone perverse (a judgment), we refer to how that person seems provocatively to 
refuse to be reasonable and to act in accordance with acceptable norms in such a way as 
to evoke a counter-transference response (at least a feeling) of judgment, criticism, or 
attack‖ (p. 200).  So, a perverse patient is someone who is unreasonable, abnormal, and 
who is often subject to the therapist‘s criticism or attack.   
There is another case report that provides a somewhat detailed account—only five 
pages—of analytic treatment with an individual who might meet Lacan‘s diagnostic 
criteria for perversion.  It is by Arthur Leonoff (1997), and it is entitled ―Destruo Ergo 
Sum: Towards a psychoanalytic understanding of sadism.‖  Although Leonoff treats 
sadism as a defensive structure and a habitual way of relating to others, he is unclear on 
the ontological structure of sadism.  For instance, he uses the rather vague differentiation 
of ―serious‖ sadism versus ―commonly seen‖ sadism.  Leonoff‘s ―Mr. X‖ seems to fit the 
latter category, perhaps in part because his sadism is mostly restricted to the realm of 
fantasy.  A more detailed case report, with more of the patient‘s own speech, would be 
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necessary to determine whether or not Mr. X fit Lacanian criteria for sadism.  Obviously, 
there have been extremely few cases of perversion published.  Although perversion is not 
as common as neurosis, it is common enough that more clinical case reports should be 
made available for the purposes of better clinical diagnosis and treatment of perverts. 
A Method Suited to Madness 
 
―The unconscious is the chapter of my history that is marked by a blank or 
occupied by a lie: it is the censored chapter‖ (Lacan, 1953/2006a, p. 259). 
The existing body of qualitative research has, both in method and interpretation, 
largely ignored the unconscious (as Lacan understands it).  This avoidance is particularly 
striking within the qualitative research of clinical psychology, because most 
psychologists attribute some importance to the unconscious in human existence.  As a 
corrective to research methodologies that only reflect the conscious ego, I propose that 
Lacanian analysis is ideally situated to fill in the blanks and expose the censored chapter 
of the unconscious—which is itself a kind of knowledge.  I argue that psychoanalysis in 
general and Lacanian analysis in particular is already a valid method of inquiry; in some 
cases, the psychoanalytic interview is preferable to an interview conducted for research 
purposes.  Finally, I argue for a Lacanian qualitative clinical case study as the research 
method for this dissertation.   
As Steinar Kvale points out (2003), the practice of psychoanalysis has produced a 
wealth of important knowledge—acknowledged or not.  The method by which Sigmund 
Freud, Jacques Lacan, Carl Jung, and others have obtained the knowledge reflected in 
their books on human experience and the theory and practice of therapy has been, of 
course, what I will refer to as the psychoanalytic interview.  Our mainstream 
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psychological textbooks are filled with knowledge gained by psychoanalytic inquiry, and 
yet, paradoxically, those same textbooks deny the psychoanalytic interview as a valid 
form of research.  Insofar as psychoanalysts are interested in human experience and 
therapeutic change, why should we privilege what quantitative data ―say‖ over what 
human beings say?  Furthermore, why pretend we are sociologists and use a qualitative 
method, like conversation analysis, that eschews intrapsychic meanings?  As an 
alternative to trying to squeeze a square peg into a round hole, psychoanalysts should 
stick to their own trade rather than borrowing methods from other disciplines.   
 The practice of psychoanalysis, then, although its principal aim is therapeutic 
change, also generates significant knowledge.  Freud himself noted that ―[o]ne of the 
claims of psycho-analysis to distinction is, no doubt, that in its execution research and 
treatment coincide‖ (1912/1958, p. 114).  The analytic interview is a qualitative method 
of understanding that exists outside of natural science conceptions that seek objective 
knowledge in the form of quantifiable, unequivocal data.  Instead, psychoanalysis 
inquires in an open manner into the conscious and unconscious experience of a particular 
analysand by encouraging the analysand to speak and wonder about herself.
16
  
Psychoanalysis therefore involves an open qualitative interview method that does not use 
set questions, which would assign predetermined limits to the analysand‘s speech.   
A psychoanalytic session employs an interpretive method, seeking in the 
interview itself as well as afterward to interpret the multiple, sometimes conflicting 
meanings of the analysand‘s speech.  Unlike other methods, which view ambiguity and 
inconsistency as problems to be eliminated, psychoanalysis embraces the complexities of 
                                               
16 For simplicity‘s sake, I will refer throughout this section to the patient as a woman and the analyst as a 
man. 
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discourse as accurate reflections of what is means to be human.  In fact, an analyst listens 
not only to the intended face value of the analysand‘s speech, but also to what the 
analysand said but did not want to say.  The analyst‘s ear is tuned in to verbal and 
affective manifestations of the unconscious such as slips of the tongue, tales of bungled 
actions, surprise, overemphasis, unfinished sentences, equivocal word usage, negation, 
and unprovoked denials—all of which indicate a multiplicity of meanings.  The method 
of interpretation employed in psychoanalysis could consequently be considered a form of 
depth hermeneutics or a hermeneutics of suspicion (Habermas, 1972).   
A skilled psychoanalyst listens to the analysand‘s speech with an open mind, in a 
manner akin to Freud‘s notion of ―evenly-suspended attention‖ (1912/1958, p. 111).  He 
views all of the analysand‘s speech as significant.  This is reminiscent of Clifford 
Geertz‘s (1977) painstaking notation of all of his thoughts and experiences during his 
ethnomethodological studies.  In this way, Geertz and an analyst strive to ensure that they 
see as much as possible during the ―data collection phase‖ so that their interpretations are 
based on as much of the whole as possible.  In listening and in writing case notes (after 
the session) and case formulations, an analyst seeks to minimize that which is left out or 
avoided.  Much like what the analysand leaves, consciously or unconsciously, out of her 
account, omitted details often have something to say which might shift the bedrock of 
what we thought we comprehended.   
Furthermore, in contrast to listening for ways to fit the analysand‘s discourse into 
quantifiable research categories, the analyst attempts to be open to the particularities of 
the individual‘s being in the world.  The analyst uses theory as a malleable entity, 
keeping in mind that theory helps him see some things but blinds him to others.  Regular 
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analytic supervision helps loosen up the analyst‘s perspective, preventing him from 
falling into the sometimes attractive delusion that we possess masterful complete 
understandings.   
The type of listening practiced in a Lacanian psychoanalytic interview is anything 
but free-floating, aimless, or neutral.
17
  The analyst must be attuned to certain 
phenomena, such as previously unavowed desire, in order to move the analysis 
therapeutically forward.  A Lacanian analyst encourages the analysand to say whatever 
comes to mind, with as little censorship as possible, no matter how senseless or 
distasteful her thoughts may seem to her.  Furthermore, the analyst makes it clear, via 
punctuation and scansion, that he is particularly interested in her dreams, fantasies, 
parapraxes, ambiguous phrasings, and contradictions; in short, the analyst is more 
interested in what her unconscious has to say than what her conscious, egoic self has to 
say.  After all, her conscious attempts to alleviate her suffering have succeeded only in 
her eventual seeking of therapy.  This way of speaking and being listened to contrasts 
starkly with what an analysand is used to, and it takes her time to become more 
comfortable with it.   
The usual qualitative research interview is a situation in which the subject speaks 
more or less as she usually speaks.  She assumes—often correctly—that the interviewer 
wants to hear a coherent story about the research topic that makes sense, whether or not 
the interviewer asks open-ended questions.  Also, the subject might censor her speech in 
order to fit her standards of social desirability more than if she were speaking to an 
analyst.  Her speech, of course, will frame the possible interpretations.  The unconscious 
                                               
17 I doubt very much that an analyst practicing any form of psychoanalysis listens in an aimless manner.  
Each theoretical orientation recommends paying particular attention to certain phenomena with the belief 
that those phenomena fashion keys that will open doors in the therapeutic progression of analysis.   
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is almost always left out of a qualitative interview inquiry; the subject and interviewer 
both collude in fitting the subject‘s experience into the realm of the conscious self, 
ignoring parapraxes and ambiguous phrasings.  So it follows that the context of the 
interview as well as the interviewer‘s manner of listening and speaking highly influence 
the subject‘s speech and thus the knowledge produced by the inquiry.  Insofar as an 
analyst or clinical psychologist is interested in the kind of human being that has an 
unconscious, his method of inquiry must allow for what research methods have avoided 
to date.   
Another aspect of psychoanalysis as a qualitative research method is that it 
provides in-depth case studies.  The analyst, rather than interviewing someone a few 
times as would other qualitative interviewers, often speaks with a patient multiple times a 
week for a number of years.  The psychoanalyst, then, gets much more than a brief 
snapshot of a person‘s experience from which to formulate interpretations and explore 
psychopathology and the process of therapeutic change.  Finally, a Lacanian analyst 
works with a theory that enables him to be attuned to the cultural realm of his patients.  
When a Lacanian analyst is situated as an Other in the symbolic order, he can, via 
transference projections, for instance, lay bare the analysand‘s stances toward the various 
cultural Others such as the parental Other and the educational Other.   
As Lacan reminds us, attaining absolute objectivity and truth is an impossibility—
something that natural scientific methods do not acknowledge.  However, there are some 
senses in human science research in which objectivity of method is desirable.  As Kvale 
(2003) points out, the practice of psychoanalysis, perhaps surprisingly, meets criteria for 
research objectivity in four key senses.   
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The first sense of objectivity is relative freedom from partisan bias.  Subjectivity 
is unavoidable in all forms of research, and our human perspective is an asset, rather than 
a drawback, in our study of human phenomena.  What is problematic, however, is when 
our subjective biases lead us to assume homogeneity and ignore difference.  In the 
radically non-reciprocal relationship between a Lacanian analyst and his analysand, the 
analyst keeps his own personality out of the psychoanalytic interview, refraining from 
stating opinions, giving advice, or saying anything at all about himself.  In so doing, he 
ensures, unlike the ego psychoanalysts, that analysis will not end in identificatory love 
with the transformation of an analysand into analyst jr.  Furthermore, in order to practice 
psychoanalysis, an analyst must go through extensive academic and clinical training as 
well as his own training analysis.  In combination with regular supervision, this training 
enables the analyst to come to know about his biases and blind spots, and to strive to 
prevent them from getting in the way of his analytic work with analysands.   
The second form of objectivity has to do with intersubjective agreement.
18
  This 
can be in the form of ―member checks‖ (Kvale, 2003, p. 290) whereby the analyst checks 
the accuracy of his interpretations with the subject.  It can also be accomplished in the 
form of ―peer checks,‖ when recordings from the interviews or a case formulat ion that 
gives some verbatim quotes of the patient‘s speech allow colleagues to evaluate the 
―data‖ of the patient‘s and analyst‘s speech themselves, with an eye towards meanings 
the psychoanalyst may have missed.  The analyst should be able to justify all of his 
interpretations, if only after the fact.  By quoting verbatim the patient‘s speech and 
detailing the progression of analysis, the psychoanalyst should attempt to demonstrate 
                                               
18 For Lacan, the notion of intersubjectivity itself is problematic, because all communication is 
miscommunication.  
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step-by-step how he came to any particular understanding of the patient.  It is not, in fact, 
problematic if a colleague or reader of a case study or transcript finds evidence for an 
alternative interpretation, because there is never one true understanding of a person and 
her speech.  In fact, a different perspective adds to the nuances and depth of the 
knowledge produced.   
 A third form of objectivity that analysis meets is the ability of the method to 
reflect the nature of the research object.  Natural scientific methods assume that the best 
way to study the ―object‖ of human phenomena is in a sterile research environment where 
variables can be isolated and a person is reduced to a specimen for study and 
quantification.  Qualitative research in general and the psychoanalytic interview in 
particular assume that human phenomena are situated in discourse in a social world; as 
such, the human ―object‖ is better reflected by a methodology in which people, rather 
than numbers, speak.  Likewise, the best way to study therapy, therapeutic change, and 
psychopathology is through the practice of therapy.   
The fourth criterion of objectivity that the analytic interview satisfies is that of 
allowing the object to object.  The analysand in analysis, of course, does sometimes 
object to interpretations made by the analyst.  This brings up an interesting and oft-posed 
question: because an analyst refrains from immediately taking at face value the 
analysand‘s ―yes‖ or ―no‖—which is at the level of a ―member check‖—can an 
analysand ―really‖ object?  When an analysand confirms or rejects the analyst‘s 
interpretation, the possibilities are as follows: she is resisting acknowledging some 
unconscious phenomena, the interpretation was off the mark, or the patient accepted or 
refused the truth value of the interpretation because she wished to please or displease the 
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analyst.
19
  Freud (1912/1958) recommended solving this dilemma through the practice of 
a more indirect form of validation: the analyst should carefully observe how his 
interpretation affects the analysis, seeking to notice alterations in the analysand‘s 
symptoms, free associations, dreams, and fantasies.  Kvale (2003, p. 292) calls this 
practice ―pragmatic validation.‖  
The practice of psychoanalysis itself is thus already a sound qualitative research 
method.  Next, we must consider the realm of ethics.  Because the fields of 
psychoanalysis and research are different ethical situations with different goals—
therapeutic change and the advancement of knowledge, respectively—there are ethical 
problems to be addressed when these situations are combined.  When an analyst is 
considering whether or not to publish work based on completed cases, he must either 
substantially alter his analysands‘ identifying information or do so in addition to 
obtaining their informed consent.  If he chooses the former, he must consider the 
possibility that the analysand herself or someone she knows will read the document and 
discover the analysand‘s identity; this would constitute a breach of confidentiality and 
trust.  Even if the analyst obtains informed consent, it is perhaps not in the analysand‘s 
best interest to know how her analyst understands her and personally experienced her 
presence—especially if, as in Lacanian analysis, the analyst kept his own personal 
experience and opinions out of the analysis.  In addition, the analytic relationship is such 
that the analysand might feel compelled to give her consent when she otherwise would 
not do so.   
                                               
19 In the practice of Lacanian analysis, however, the patient‘s manifest acceptance or refusal of an 
interpretation is likely to be aimed at only one meaning of the interpretation, because Lacanian 
interpretations are polyvalent rather than unequivocal.   
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If the analyst wishes to publish work based on cases in progress, the above 
situations would have the additional ill-effect of harming the therapeutic relationship and 
analysis in progress.  Furthermore, the analyst himself, in approaching an analysis in 
progress with the additional aim of a specific research question, would have a more 
difficult time listening openly to his analysand‘s speech.  The analyst‘s research desire to 
direct the analysis toward a particular topic of inquiry might get in the way of his 
analyst‘s desire to further the analysis for the purpose of the analysand‘s Eros—which is 
particular for each person.  Letting research interests guide the analysis would go against 
Freud‘s treatment recommendation that the analyst listen with an open mind, avoiding 
scientific formulation.  Importantly, if the analysand herself knows, in the midst of her 
analysis, of its research purpose, her analysis will be altered insofar as she is able to 
attribute some other desire to her analyst than the desire for her analysis to continue.  
Although the analyst‘s expressed research desire is much more benign than other 
personal desires, it will still sully the field, and may be especially unwise with psychotic 
patients.  After all, to be the subject of a research endeavor is to be subjected to the 
possibly hostile analysis and scrutiny of others.  
Along these lines, the analyst researcher must decide whether or not to audio- or 
videotape his sessions.  The presence of recording equipment in the room will serve as a 
constant reminder to the analysand that her words are being listened to for some other 
purpose outside of the therapeutic aim of analysis.  We must recall that most of the 
knowledge gained from the practice of analysis has not involved the use of recording 
devices, and so there is no need for the analyst to jump unthinkingly into the world of 
verbatim transcripts in the name of scientific method.  Detailed case reports, including 
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excerpts from the analyst‘s notes of the analysand‘s speech, are sufficient to compile a 
text from which the reader can critically evaluate the knowledge claims made.   
The Lacanian psychoanalytic interview, like any clinical or research practice, has 
certain epistemological and ontological assumptions.  Like discourse analysis, which is 
social constructionist, Lacanian analysis is epistemologically relativistic.  This means that 
there are no objective truths, because human experience is shaped by language and by 
particular social, historical, and political conditions.  Analysis‘ medium of healing and of 
gaining knowledge is speech.  Lacanian analysis involves a certain structure and set of 
techniques that allow the analysand to articulate herself in a way that is therapeutically 
transformative.  In the process of analysis, an analysand‘s knowledge of herself shifts as 
she becomes curious about what her unconscious has to say.  The analysand sheds much 
of her egoic-realm knowledge as half-truths, and, in the process of grappling with the 
unsaid and the unknowable, paradoxically produces knowledge.   
Ontologically speaking, Lacan (1973/1998a) says that being is constituted in the 
act of speaking.  According to Lacan, we are situated in language in a way that is 
amenable to the previous discussion of Lacanian analysis as qualitative inquiry.  Neurotic 
and perverse speech provides polyvalent meanings—both on the conscious, intended 
level, and on the unconscious, unintended level.  As Lacan tells us, the unconscious is 
structured like a language, the unconscious being the Other‘s discourse.  Through the 
study of an analysand‘s speech, we can come to know about being, separation, alienation, 
cultural Otherness, the repressed, and how all of these manifest themselves differently 
according to a particular cultural context.  Therefore, epistemologically speaking, the best 
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way to go about studying the kind of speaking being that can be neurotic, psychotic, or 
perverse is through a study of the process of Lacanian psychoanalysis itself. 
Methodological Choices 
 In this dissertation, my primary method involves providing two Lacanian 
qualitative clinical case studies of work with my former patients, written using process 
notes.  One is a perversely structured exhibitionist and the other is neurotically structured 
obsessive.  Both are legally considered sexual offenders and have been diagnosed with a 
Paraphilia.  All identifying information has been disguised.  All participants have given 
their informed consent.  One patient was supervised under Federal Probation and another 
under state parole.   
 My case reports are in-depth and include as much of the analysands‘ own speech 
as possible.  I take as my models those who have written Lacanian or Lacanian-informed 
case studies that are accessible to readers who are not familiar with the work of Lacan: 
Fink, Yael Goldman (2004), and Mike Miller (2006). In particular, Fink‘s (2003) case 
study of perversion, ―The use of Lacanian psychoanalysis in a case of fetishism,‖ with its 
attunement to the linguistic signifying relations that constituted the fetish, served as a 
standard.  Throughout my case studies, I pay particular interpretive attention to the 
differences between perversion and neurosis and the corresponding differences in the 
transference and course of the treatment.  As secondary methods, I supplemented my case 
studies with material from my experiences as a group psychotherapist for male sexual 
offenders.   
 My other main method for this dissertation is a qualitative hermeneutic reading of 
Lacan‘s published work dealing with perversion. My case studies, then, reflect my 
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interpretations of Lacanian theory.  I have consulted the texts from Lacan‘s corpus that 
deal most with the subject of perversion: ―Kant with Sade,‖ ―The youth of Gide, or the 
letter and desire,‖ and Seminars I, II, IV, VI, VIII, X, XI, XVI, and XX.  Furthermore, I 
have read the sources Lacan cites on perversion, most notably works by Freud such as 
Three essays on the theory of sexuality.  From Lacan‘s texts, I have extrapolated and 
delineated what he says about working clinically with perverse analysands.   
In this dissertation, I undertake the study of perversion as it appears in clinical 
work.  Using both qualitative clinical case studies and hermeneutic readings of Lacanian 
theory, I hope to make a contribution that will benefit both clinicians and patients.  A 
main goal of mine is to clearly explicate Lacan‘s texts on perversion.  Correspondingly, I 
show how what Lacan says about perversion can be applied to clinical treatment.  In my 
case studies, I aim to clearly distinguish between neurosis and perversion, and to show 
how treatment techniques should be tailored to the different diagnoses.  Because of the 
relative lack of clinical and theoretical literature on perversion, I focus more attention on 
making treatment recommendations for work with perverse patients than for neurotic 
patients.  My dissertation promotes Lacanian diagnostic structures as an invaluable 
diagnostic framework for all clinicians—analytically-oriented or not.   
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Chapter II: Button Ties of Lacanian Theory: Language and Subjectivity 
Speech and Language 
 
―[S]ymptoms can be entirely resolved in an analysis of language, because a 
symptom is itself structured like a language: a symptom is language from which speech 
must be delivered‖ (Lacan, 1953/2006a, p. 269). 
―Yet, it will never be mine, this language, the only one I am thus destined to 
speak…And, truth to tell, it never was‖ (Derrida, 1996/1998, p. 2). 
Speech is a powerful force; it creates the meanings that structure our experience.  
Our thoughts, behaviors, and desires are shaped by the words we speak and hear spoken 
by others.  Psychoanalysis seeks to discursively translate symptoms, as phenomena that 
―insist‖ or disrupt the life of the person requesting to begin analysis, into meaning.  In his 
later years, Lacan posited that there is a kernel of the symptom that resists being made 
into meaning.
20
  Although his ideas about that kernel substantially altered his teachings 
and will be explored in what follows in this dissertation, what remained essential and 
incontrovertible was that putting the symptom into words transforms the symptom.   
Many of Lacan‘s contributions result from his emphasizing the importance of 
speech and language in psychoanalytic practice as well as in the development of the 
subject.  Speech and language, of course, are the stuff of his symbolic order.  From early 
on in his career, Lacan used the work of the structuralist linguist Ferdinand de Saussure.  
Saussure‘s Course in General Linguistics, first published in 1916, strongly influenced 
both structuralist and post-structuralist thinkers.  Lacan‘s interpretation of Saussure‘s 
linguistic theory drew from both Freud and Roman Jakobson.  Jakobson (1956/1971), in 
                                               
20 This kernel of the symptom is of the real order, the order whose contents have not been symbolized and 
even resist symbolization. 
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Fundamentals of Language, declared that metaphor and metonymy are the two axes of 
language, and that they are fundamentally opposed.  The metaphorical axis has to do with 
the substitution of one linguistic term for another, and the metonymic axis has to do with 
the sequential combination of linguistic terms.  Saussure did not use the terms metaphor 
and metonymy, but a Jakobsonian reading of Saussure reveals that metaphor corresponds 
to Saussure‘s paradigmatic relations and metonymy to Saussure‘s syntagmatic relations.  
Furthermore, Lacan, identifying displacement and condensation as the primary operations 
of the unconscious—a discovery he attributed to Freud21—equated displacement with 
metonymy and condensation with metaphor.  In Lacanian theory, because the processes 
of metaphor and metonymy are fundamental to language—which comprises the 
unconscious or the symbolic order (Lacan, 1958/2006a, p. 693)—they are ways of 
understanding phenomena that have to do with the symbolic order: symptoms, dreams, 
parapraxes, subjectivity, desire, and love.   
 Metaphor Metonymy 
Saussure paradigmatic relations syntagmatic relations 
Jakobson substitutional or vertical axis of 
language 
combinatory or horizontal axis of 
language 
Freud condensation  displacement  
 
For Saussure, language is comprised of signs, and signs consist of arbitrary but 
unbreakable relations between signifiers, or words, and signifieds, or the concepts that 
the signifiers represent.  A sign is the basic unit of language, and it refers to the pairing of 
a signifier with a signified.  Saussure represented the sign using the following diagram 
(1916/2005, p. 114): 
 
                                               
21 Lacan located Freud‘s discovery in The Interpretation of Dreams, in which condensation and 
displacement are the two major mechanisms evident in dreams.   
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The arrows in this diagram symbolize that signification, or the production of meaning, is 
reciprocally produced by the signifier and the signified.  The line between the signified 
and the signifier represents their union.   
Lacan, in his use of Saussure‘s linguistic theory, made several substantial 
modifications to the notion of the sign.  For one thing, Lacan argued against the mutual 
dependency of the signifier and the signified in favor of a relationship that is extremely 
unstable.  For another, Lacan argued that language is composed of signifiers, not of signs.  
As a result, he represented the pairing of a signifier with a signified with the algorithm: 
S
 
.  
Lacan noted that the algorithm ―written in this way should be attributed to Ferdinand de 
Saussure, although it is not reduced to this exact form‖ (Lacan, 1957/2006a, p. 497) in 
the printed version of Saussure‘s courses.  However, in Lacan‘s algorithm, the positions 
of the signifier and the signified are inverted, with the signifier now capitalized and the 
signified remaining in the lower case.  This inversion reveals the primacy of the signifier 
in Lacan‘s theory of language.  Furthermore, Lacan‘s algorithm eliminates the arrows and 
the circle, representing the absence of a stable and fixed relation between the signifier 
and the signified.  The bar between the signifier and the signified, instead of representing 
their union, now represents ―the resistance of signification‖ (p. 515) or the difficulty of 
creating meaning.   
What Lacan rather misleadingly calls the ―Saussurian algorithm‖ (Lacan, 
1957/2006a, p. 500) ―is read as follows: signifier over signified, ‗over‘ corresponding to 
Signified 
 
 
Signifier 
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the bar separating the two levels‖ (p. 497).  Read as such, it becomes clear that Lacan 
reads the sign as a metaphor, which Lacan defines as ―the substitution of signifier for 
signifier‖ (p. 515).  It is important to note that a signified is not the ―thing itself,‖ but is 
just another signifier.  By referring to his algorithm for the sign, we can understand 
Lacan‘s remark that the signifier has precedence over the signified (Lacan, 1956/2006a, 
p. 467) to mean that the word below the bar fades into the background through being 
overwritten, or re-written, by the word above the bar.  For instance, in the sentence, ―She 
has the look,‖ the signifier ―the look‖ overwrites the signified ―fashionable,‖ such that 
someone‘s gaze, her body, and her style of dress is added to the connotations of the 
signification, and her being fashionable in other ways, such as her taste in music, is no 
longer evoked by the signifier.   
A signifier, then, represents or stands in for a signified.  The pairing of a signifier 
and a signified is arbitrary insofar as it is not necessary.  For example, there is no 
necessary bond between the spelling and pronunciation of the word ―cat‖ and the 
household pet to which a speaker means to refer.  In addition, ―cat,‖ like most words, has 
more than one signified; for instance, a ―cool cat,‖ in somewhat dated slang, refers to a 
socially adept man.  A linguistic sign accrues meaning not by reference to itself or to an 
essence, but by its difference from other signs in the system of language.  For example, 
―cat‖ is a meaningful sign because it is not a ―hat‖ or a ―bat.‖  Meaning, then, is based on 
difference.  Furthermore, meaning is derived from deferral, because the definition of one 
word always points to other words in an unending metonymic process of signification.  
To use the example of the word ―cat,‖ when we attempt to find its meaning in a 
dictionary, we encounter other explanatory words such as ―animal‖ and ―tail‖ that each 
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lead us to other words ad infinitum; meaning as such never arrives.  ―The notion of an 
incessant sliding of the signified under the signifier thus comes to the fore…‖ (Lacan, 
1957/2006a, p. 502).  Because the relationship between a signifier and a signified is 
unstable and arbitrary rather than fixed and essential, pragmatic meaning relies upon 
difference and deferral.  Consequently, there is no self-evident truth or ground to 
language.   
Lacan, Jacques Derrida, and others use Saussure‘s Course in General Linguistics 
to show that the history of metaphysics, which can be seen as a search for an ultimate 
fixed meaning, a transcendental signified, or universal truth, is doomed to failure.  Both 
Lacan and Derrida remarked that people desire to believe in a transcendental signified, 
because that belief would allow a view of themselves and the world as complete and 
essentially meaningful.  Correspondingly, people prefer to pretend that they are masters 
of their own domain—that they can control their thoughts, speech, and actions.  The 
structure of language prevents this mastery from being a possibility.  On the one hand, 
there is no signifier that completely represents anything, in this case a human experience.  
This is reflected in the common complaint that one‘s words of expression—of love, for 
instance—are inadequate.  On the other hand, meaning is always ambiguous.  When we 
speak about something to someone, it is the listener who decides what s/he has heard, and 
s/he might choose to assign a different meaning to the speaker‘s words than that which 
the speaker intended.  As a result, Lacan holds that all communication is 
miscommunication. 
There are always multiple ways to read a statement.  The statement might include 
a word or phrase that has numerous meanings, might have been uttered in a spirit of 
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sarcasm, might be doubted as to its sincerity, and depends upon context.  As an example, 
not only does ―the primacy of the signifier over the signified‖ (Lacan, 1956/2006a, p. 
467)—referred to above—mean that the signifier has more influence than the signified in 
determining the meaning of the sign, but it can also mean that the signifier uttered has 
primacy over what was intended by the speaker.  In that regard, slips of the tongue are 
excellent examples of the primacy of the signifier.  If a man buying fish at a seafood store 
said, ―I‘d like a little ass‖ instead of ―I‘d like a little bass,‖ we should take him at his 
word, privileging what he actually said over what he meant to say.
22
  With parapraxes, 
then, the accidental signification, which points to Other, unconscious meanings, is 
privileged over the consciously intended meaning.  Consequently, Lacan calls the 
primacy of the signifier an ―utterly disconcerting‖ (p. 467) idea.  Our unconscious, as that 
which we would prefer not to reveal to ourselves and others, often speaks through us 
without our consent.  A Lacanian analyst listens to the letter of the analysand‘s speech 
and punctuates certain ambiguous phrases, slips of the tongue, and other common 
manifestations of the unconscious both to show the patient that his imaginary 
identifications are only the tip of the iceberg and to help the patient decipher his own 
unconscious.   
The unconscious, then, has ―the very topography defined by the algorithm: 
 
 
 ‖ 
(Lacan, 1957/2006a, p. 515).  In other words, ―[t]he unconscious is structured like a 
language‖ (Lacan, 1973/1998a, p. 149).  The unconscious consists of letters, phonemes, 
and relationships between its elements that allow for metaphor and metonymy and thus 
                                               
22 Of course, ―I‘d like a little ass‖ can signify several possible wishes on the part of the man: that he have 
sexual relations with someone, that he lose weight and reduce the size of his buttocks, or that he own or 
even eat a donkey. 
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the production of signification or meaning.  From 1957 on, Lacan often refers to what he 
called the ―signifying chain‖ (Lacan, 1957/2006a, p. 502), which refers to a series of 
signifiers that are linked together and depend upon each other for the construction of 
meaning.  Lacan describes the signifying chain as ―links by which a necklace firmly 
hooks onto a link of another necklace made of links‖ (p. 502).   
Lacan defines metonymy as the diachronic relations between signifiers in the 
signifying chain.  If a female analysand complains, ―My mother never taught me how to 
cook,‖ the word ―cook‖ might be metonymically related to ―be feminine‖ or ―please a 
man.‖23  Metaphor, on the other hand, has to do with paradigmatic or ―vertical‖ relations; 
in a metaphor, a signifier from one signifying chain is substituted for a signifier in 
another signifying chain (Evans, 1996, p. 116).  A metaphoric relation implies similarity 
between two signifiers, whereas a metonymic relation implies contiguity.  ―She is a 
dictionary‖ is a metaphor relating ―she‖ to a ―dictionary.‖  In contrast, the sentence ―She 
has a large vocabulary‖ consists of metonymic relations.   
In metonymy, one signifier always refers to another in the perpetual deferral of 
meaning inherent in language.  Importantly for Lacan, ―desire is a metonymy‖ (Lacan, 
1957/2006a, p. 528) because desire is subject to the same process of perpetual deferral, 
desire always being ―desire for something else‖ (p. 518).  Because desire is put into 
words in the form of a demand, the demand for a specific object always implies a desire 
for something more.
24
  As soon as someone obtains the object of his demand, that object 
                                               
23 Colette Soler, in her excellent book, What Lacan Said About Women: A Psychoanalytic Study (2006), 
said that an extremely common complaint encountered in the practice of psychoanalysis is the woman‘s 
complaint that her mother never taught her anything about what it is to be a woman (p. 29).  Lacan‘s 
complicated thesis, which Soler clearly explains, is that the essence of femininity defies articulation in 
language, and so female subjects will never find the words with which to express Womanhood. 
24 A more traditional definition of metonymy is the use of one concept, person, or object to refer to another 
to which it is related.  Synecdoche is a common form of metonymy, whereby a part of something is used in 
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can no longer function to cause his desire because desire springs from lack, and so he 
desires something else.  The signifying chain has a kind of indestructible memory that 
keeps track of its previous components, including desires (p. 518; Fink, 1996). 
Lacan‘s formula for metonymy (1957/2006a, p. 515) is as follows:  
  (    )      ( )   
―f (S)‖ stands for the signifying function, which is the effect of signification.  ―(S…S‘)‖ 
is the link between one signifier and another in a signifying chain.  The ― ‖ means ―is 
congruent with.‖  On the right-hand side of the equation, ―S‖ stands for the signifier, ―s‖ 
for the signified, and    ―(–)‖ for ―the maintenance of the bar‖ (p. 515) in Saussure‘s 
algorithm.  The entire formula reads ―the effect of the signification of the connection of 
the signifier with the signifier is congruent with the maintenance of the bar.‖  Lacan 
intends the Saussurean bar to denote ―the irreducible nature of the resistance of 
signification,‖ which is to say that there is an inherent resistance to the production of 
meaning.  This resistance, or the bar, is maintained in metonymy, which means that 
meaning is not created through metonymic processes.  The crossing of the bar that occurs 
in metaphoric substitution is the only way to produce meaning, but metonymy is the 
condition for metaphor.  Metonymy has to do with the ways in which signifiers can be 
linked in a single, diachronic chain, and this chain enables its signifiers to be replaced by 
signifiers in another chain, via the process of metaphor.  In other words, metonymy refers 
to the structural relations of signifiers—of which signifiers can be contiguous with certain 
other signifiers—including grammar, whereas metaphor refers to the substitutions of 
signifiers that create new meanings.   
                                                                                                                                            
order to refer to the whole.  For instance, ―All hands on deck‖ is a synecdoche  in which ―hands‖ 
metonymically refers to ―sailors.‖  The nature of desire is metonymic in this way, because the object of 
demand refers to a part of desire.  
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Lacan‘s first formula for metaphor (1957/2006a, p. 515) is as follows:  
 (
  
 
)       ( )   
On the left-hand side of the equation, S‘ over S refers to the substitution of one signifier 
for another.  The ―( )‖ ―manifests here the crossing of the bar, —, and the constitutive 
value of this crossing for the emergence of signification‖ (p. 515).  The whole formula 
can be read as follows: ―the effect of the signification of the substitution of one signifier 
for another is congruent with the crossing of the bar.‖  Metaphor is this crossing of the 
bar that is ―the condition for the passage of the signifier into the signified‖ (p. 515).  In 
other words, a new signified, a new meaning, is created through the process of metaphor.   
 For Lacan, just as desire is a metonymy, ―the symptom is a metaphor‖ (Lacan, 
1957/2006a, p. 528).  Specifically, repression results from a metaphorical process.  The 
signifier ―below the principal bar, in the denominator‖ (Lacan, 1973/1998a, p. 249) is 
―the signifier that has disappeared [and become] the repressed signifier‖ (p. 249).  
Although many psychoanalysts and psychotherapists today assume that affects are what 
are repressed, what Freud in fact said was that what is repressed are the 
―Vorstellungrepräsentanzen,‖ (p. 217) which is usually translated into English as 
―ideational representatives.‖  Correspondingly, Lacan said that the signifier is what is 
repressed, or the ―representative of the representation‖ (p. 218).  When repression occurs, 
then, a signifier (or several signifiers) becomes the hidden term in a metaphor.  The 
repressed signifier is available to conscious reflection, but it functions differently as a 
result of its repression, connecting to other repressed signifiers in the chain.  The affect 
related to the signifier is displaced, not repressed.  Although Lacan‘s conception of the 
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symptom gains in complexity in the 1970s, there remained an aspect of it that was a 
metaphor, and thereby able to be dissolved through speech.   
The Temporality of the Signifier and the Subject 
For Lacan, language, as a set comprised of signs that obey syntactical rules, is 
structure itself.  We are born into a world of language, and language has structural effects 
on us—effects that I will describe later in this section.  Within the structure of language, 
meaning is determined according to the temporality of the signifying chain.   
For the signifier, by its very nature, always anticipates meaning by deploying its 
dimension in some sense before it.  As is seen at the level of the sentence when 
the latter is interrupted before the significant term: ‗I‘ll never…,‘ ‗The fact 
remains…,‘ ‗Still perhaps…‘  Such sentences nevertheless make sense, and that 
sense is all the more oppressive in that it is content to make us wait for it. (Lacan, 
1957/2006a, p. 502)   
The signifying chain, then, has a dual temporality that is both anticipation and 
retroaction.  While someone is speaking words such as ―The fact remains…,‖ the listener 
anticipates the sentence‘s conclusion, which is the moment at which s/he can grasp the 
meaning of the speaker‘s words.  When the speaker has completed the sentence with the 
words ―that many facts are dubious,‖ for instance, the meaning of the sentence is 
retroactively constituted, such that the previous speech takes on new meaning.  ―Whence 
we can say it is in the chain of the signifier that meaning insists, but that none of the 
chain‘s elements consists in the signification it can provide at that very moment‖ (p. 502).  
The temporality of the signifier and of meaning is not, then, in the moment of the instant.  
Meaning is either about to arrive or has already arrived.   
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The dual temporality of the signifying chain structures the way in which we 
assign meaning to phenomena.  Meaning is constructed after the fact.  In psychoanalysis, 
an analysand has the opportunity to use the temporality of the signifying chain, which is 
also the temporality of the (Lacanian) subject, to her utmost advantage.  Through 
speaking about herself and listening to her speech in a new way, she changes who she 
―is‖ by creating new meanings about who she was.  The analytic subject is never static, 
however, because she is always in a process of becoming, always both anticipating and 
retroactively constituting herself.  It is inaccurate to say that the analysand recalls her past 
experiences, both because her memories are not perfectly preserved, accurate 
representations of her past, and because her speech in the analytic context reconstructs 
and rewrites her history.   
Why is the subject subjected to the temporality of the signifying chain?  Because, 
as a young child, she ―chose‖ to incorporate the structure of language into herself, 
becoming a subject in language through the process of what Lacan called ―alienation.‖  
One way of describing the subject‘s alienation is to represent it by Lacan‘s Saussurian 
algorithm: 
 
. 
The child, in coming to be a subject of language, allows a signifier, S, to stand in for her.  
In this process, the child becomes , what Lacan called the split or divided subject.  To 
make more sense of alienation and the split subject, it is necessary to understand how 
language itself is alienating.   
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Introduction to the Symbolic Order 
 
We are born into a languaged world.  This language is not our own, but comes 
from Others; it is what our caretakers use to communicate with each other.  At least one 
person has a role in assigning each of us a name, and that name is in the language of the 
Other.  As a living being, a baby has needs, such as the need to nourish her body, and a 
baby, of course, is developmentally incapable of fulfilling those needs herself.  
Consequently, her cries are interpreted by her primary caretaker, who is often a mOther, 
as early communications, asking for her needs to be met.  It is possible that the baby‘s 
wails mean nothing at all, or are not signs that the mOther should heed.  Even with the 
assumption that the baby‘s cries are meaningful, the mOther, as the one who interprets 
them, misinterprets them at least occasionally.  For instance, the mOther might be 
someone who fears she will under-nourish her baby, and so she overcompensates by 
tending to interpret her baby‘s cries as demands to be fed, instead of to be held or 
changed, for instance.
25
  The mOther‘s interpretations have effects on the infant, who 
learns to understand her bodily experience in her mOther‘s terms.  Taken to an extreme, 
the child might grow up to be a woman who seeks to stop most feelings of discomfort by 
eating, not recognizing possible other meanings to her suffering which correspond to 
other methods of attempting satiation.  The mOther‘s interpretations of the child‘s needs 
make unavoidable changes to the experience of the child; we might think of these 
changes as a kind of necessary alienation that all human beings undergo.  This necessary 
                                               
25 In psychoanalysis, a fear is often interpreted as the conscious manifestation of an unconscious desire.  In 
this case, then, the mother‘s fear might represent a wish to make her baby sickly or weak, or even to kill her 
baby.  In the latter instance, there may have been a part of her that did not want to have a child, perhaps 
because she thought the child would impede her ability to pursue her interests or career.  In the former case, 
the mother might see her daughter as a rival to weaken, perhaps just as she sensed her mother saw her as a 
rival for her father‘s attention.   
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alienation is different from the unnecessary process of alienation that occurs later in 
childhood.  It is the unnecessary process of alienation that is most central to Lacan‘s 
theory of the subject, and which I will hereafter refer to simply as ―alienation.‖ 
If a child learns to speak the language of her mOther, she gains an advantage.  
Instead of crying when she needs something, the child speaks when she wants something, 
thereby giving a specific demand to the mOther that is less prone to misinterpretation.  
For example, she might ask for a drink of water.  By communicating in the mOther‘s 
language, the child usually has more success in getting her needs met, and in getting them 
met quickly, than does a child who does not learn to speak her mOther tongue.  However, 
not only is it the case that the child has already come to interpret her wishes in 
accordance with the mOther‘s interpretations, but it is also the case that language limits 
how she can express herself.  Once a child learns to speak, her being is forever lost in 
translation.  Furthermore, as I pointed out earlier, speech is always ambiguous, and so 
both a child and a mOther must interpret each other according to their own assumptions.  
It follows that language is foreign, Other, and alienating.  The symbolic order of language 
alters our very selves.   
In Lacanian theory, the term ―need‖ refers to the requirements for survival of the 
living being.  The term ―living being‖ applies to the infant before he learns to speak and 
to living beings of the non-human order.
26
  Need implies that there is a lack of something.  
The notion of lack is central to Lacan‘s ontology of the human subject, and need might be 
considered the lowest ―level‖ at which there is lack.  Need requires its satiation, which is 
accomplished through the attainment of a specific object.   
                                               
26 Psychotics, who can speak but who have not incorporated the structure of language, are also referred to 
as living beings.  
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The term ―demand,‖ on the other hand, refers to a need that has been translated 
into speech.  Once a child has begun to speak, he is no longer considered to be a living 
being, because language has changed him and turned him into a speaking being.  The 
level of demand is the next step above the level of need.  Need may be seen as the 
motivating force behind demand.  Nevertheless, the needs of the living being become 
irrevocably altered by passing through the apparatus of language as well as through their 
dependency on the Other for their satisfaction.  The notion of the Other is introduced at 
the level of demand, insofar as the child‘s demand is addressed to an Other and is spoken 
in the Other of language (or in language as Other).  Furthermore, when a child makes a 
demand to the mOther, she is at the stage in which she is not only interested in receiving 
the object of her demand but also concerned with the fact that her mOther gives it to her.  
The child takes pleasure in receiving the attention and care of her mOther as a result of 
her communication.   
What ensues is a deviation of needs, or even an alienation.  They are found…to 
undergo a filtering, a modeling, a fragmenting, and more radically, an 
obliteration.  I say more radically because it‘s there that we‘re able, in a radical 
way, to make the negative function of language work, its annihilating function, 
and thus formulate the imposition of demand on need in terms of a substitution.  
Not only does the demand translate, transpose, and alienate needs, but, more 
radically, it replaces them. (Miller, 2009b, p. 32) 
Language can be said to effect an alienation of the living being, such that the needs of the 
living being are translated or even replaced by signifiers.  Moreover, Jacques-Alain 
Miller represented this translation as a ―metaphor of demand‖ (p. 32): 
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―D‖ stands for demand, and ―N,‖ which has been effaced or overwritten by D, stands for 
need.   
 The metaphor for alienation already mentioned,  
 
, 
represents the translation by the signifier of the living being into the split subject.  In 
alienation, the child ―agrees‖ to let a signifier transpose and alienate him or her.  It is 
through the child‘s encounter with the Other of language filled with signifiers that the 
child becomes a subject split or barred by language.  Consequently, alienation may also 
be represented by the following metaphorical schema: 
Other
     
 
After alienation, all of the child‘s previous experiences are retroactively given new 
meaning in terms of the Other.  As I pointed out in the introduction, alienation, along 
with separation, are two processes that have structural effects on the formation of a 
person into one of the three diagnostic categories.  I also mentioned that the moment of 
alienation corresponds to the moment of the birth of the unconscious, which is Lacan‘s 
symbolic order.  Thus far, I have spoken of alienation in very general terms.  
Nevertheless, before I speak in more detail about alienation, I will first describe the child 
before the instating of the symbolic order.   
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The Real Before the Letter 
 
―Of course, as it is said, the letter kills while the spirit gives life‖ (Lacan, 
1957/2006a, p. 509).   
The ―real,‖ along with the symbolic and the imaginary, is one of Lacan‘s three 
orders of experience.  Although Lacan introduced the real as one of three orders as early 
as 1953, my focus in this dissertation will be on his formulations of the real after 1964, 
which marks the beginning of what Miller designated as Lacan‘s second phase of 
teaching.  (The third phase begins in 1974 and ends with Lacan‘s death in 1981.)  The 
real does not refer to ―reality‖—a concept which is rooted in the social construction of 
meaning.  Instead, the real refers to what is radically non-discursive—to what cannot be 
translated into thought or words.  Of the real, Lacan said that it is ―the domain of that 
which subsists outside of symbolization‖ (1954/2006a, p. 388).  Consequently, the real is 
―the impossible‖ (1973/1998a, p. 167).  It is akin to the Kantian thing-in-itself, as that 
which is unknowable insofar as we cannot say anything about it.   
Non-discursivity has been a philosophical problem since Plato, but in the past 50 
years, after the ―discursive turn,‖ it has been given increased attention.  A few 
contemporary philosophers who have concerned themselves with the problem of non-
discursivity include Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, and Félix Guattari.  One related 
philosophical argument is whether or not there are limits to what can be known.  Most 
post-Kantian philosophers argue in favor of the limits to human knowledge.  Another 
related debate concerns whether or not there are limits to what can be known through 
linguistic means, and if there are any other means at our disposal.  Those who argue that 
there are limits to human knowledge tend to argue that what is beyond those limits is 
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non-discursive, and that language is the only tool of discovery that we have at our 
disposal.   
Lacan is one such thinker.  Whenever we think or speak, we do so in language.  
However, Lacan, like Deleuze and Guattari, used graphs and mathemes in his efforts to 
think at the edge of the limits of discursivity.
27
  Lacan recognized the problem inherent in 
his attempt to talk about, or symbolically represent, that which by definition eludes 
discursivity.  Nevertheless, Lacan maintained that the real suggests its presence in that 
which does not work in the symbolic.  As Fink put it,  
Lacan‘s position here is that something anomalous always shows up in language, 
something unaccountable, unexplainable: an aporia.  These aporias point to the 
presence within or influence on the symbolic of the real.  I refer to them as kinks 
in the symbolic order. (Fink, 1995, p. 30) 
These kinks can be said to appear because the lack of a transcendental signified makes 
the set of language intrinsically incomplete.  Somewhere, then, there is something that 
does not mean anything.  Lack of meaning is one way in which the real manifests itself.  
An example of a kink in the symbolic order is object a—a Lacanian concept that will be 
explained in Chapters III and IV and will figure centrally in this dissertation.   
Regarding the real, Lacan made two related suppositions: infants experience a 
presymbolic state of being and, from birth to death, there are aspects of our experience of 
ourselves and the world about which we can say nothing.  Correspondingly, Miller 
(2009b) taught that Lacan conceives of a first real, R1, a real before the letter, and a 
                                               
27 Unlike Lacan, Deleuze and Guattari viewed their graphs and usage of mathematics as successful efforts 
at non-discursive representation.  It may be argued that Deleuze and Guattari were unsuccessful, however, 
because their supposedly non-discursive representations must be spoken about or thought about in order to 
understand and interpret them (Frank Scalambrino, 2009, personal communication).   
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second real, R2, a real after the letter.  In Lacanian terminology, existence is caused by 
the ―letter‖ or the symbolic.  Something can be said to exist when it is put into words 
because speech is what constitutes social reality.  Because the real is non-discursive, it 
cannot be said to exist.  Instead, the real ―ex-sists.‖  In the notes to his translation of 
Seminar XX, Fink said that Lacan borrowed ―ex-sistence‖ from Heidegger, and 
employed it to convey something ―that stands apart, which insists as it were from the 
outside, something not included on the inside‖ (Lacan, 1975/1998b, p. 22).   The real, as 
something that is outside of the symbolic, reveals its ex-sistence through the kinks in the 
symbolic.   
When an infant is born, the infant is a living being that ex-sists entirely in the 
order of the first real.  The infant has a certain amount of what might be called real or 
bodily jouissance, which is a ―substance‖ (Lacan, 1975/1998b, p. 26) similar to Freud‘s 
libido.  ―There is no absence in the real‖ (Lacan, 1978/1991b, p. 313).  In addition, ―[t]he 
real is without fissure‖ (p. 97).  Therefore, the real is an order defined by presence, 
fullness, and lack of differentiation.  The infant‘s experience is of a fullness of 
jouissance, such that we might even say that the infant‘s entire body is an erogenous 
zone.  Initially, the infant does not differentiate between her body and the outside world.  
At the outset, therefore, the infant ex-sists in a state of pure being.     
The Imaginary Order and the Mirror Stage 
 
The infant develops a sense of self, called her ego, by beginning to differentiate 
her experience.  Whereas before there was only a unified fullness, now there are objects 
and the self, and therefore rudimentary, nebulous distinctions between inside and outside.  
At this point, the infant has developed her imaginary order.  Contrary to an English 
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connotation of the word ―imaginary,‖ the imaginary order does not refer to a realm of 
fantasy, but rather to the visual images we have of ourselves, others, and the world.  In 
addition, the imaginary realm refers to the other ways in which we perceive the world 
through our senses.  The imaginary order is closely tied to similarity and imitation—to 
development by imitating others—and therefore also to ethology and animal psychology.   
The infant‘s imaginary order predates what Lacan calls the ―mirror stage.‖  The 
mirror stage is the process by which the infant develops a solid sense of self and enters 
into the symbolic realm.  Lacan formulated and reformulated the mirror stage several 
times in the course of his career, beginning as early as 1936 in an unpublished paper he 
presented at the Fourteenth International Psychoanalytical Congress at Marienbad.  I will 
refer to the 1949 publication of ―The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Funct ion as 
Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience‖ published in the complete Écrits (2006a).  In 
this article, he drew from the work of French psychologist Henri Wallon (1931) and 
Alexandre Kojève‘s interpretation of G.W.F. Hegel‘s Phenomenology of Spirit 
(1807/1977).   
The impetus for Wallon‘s (1931) work was his disagreement with the dominant 
theory of the development of self-awareness, which held that the infant gains self-
awareness when she becomes conscious of her own embodiment.  Wallon critiqued this 
explanation for using circular logic and for being biologically reductionistic.  Wallon‘s 
explanation of the birth of self-awareness was that the infant gradually becomes self-
aware through distinguishing herself in relation to others and objects in the world.  
Wallon saw the infant‘s recognition of herself in the mirror as a difficult feat to achieve 
given that she must recognize herself in an external object (the mirror), which confuses 
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the developing differentiation between internal and external.  Lacan agreed with Wallon‘s 
explanation, but gave more importance than did Wallon to the infant‘s recognition of her 
mirror image, elevating it to a separate developmental stage.  In addition, Lacan explored 
the infant‘s motivations for recognizing herself in the mirror as well as the question of 
why she takes pleasure in that recognition.   
Lacan emphasized that the infant does not recognize her mirror image until she is 
between six and eighteen months of age.  At this age, she is highly dependent upon her 
caretakers, and has begun to associate the satiation of her needs or alleviation of her 
discomfort with the presence of her caretakers.  At six months, the bodies of all other 
animals have become sufficiently coordinated and strong to allow them to seek some of 
their own satisfactions rather than solely rely upon a caretaker.  Given that the six-month-
old infant‘s brain is more highly developed than that of all other animals of that age, we 
might also imagine that she would prefer to be able to ease her discomfort herself—
because her response would be faster than waiting for a caretaker to help her—or to 
immediately summon her caretaker or the breast, and that she is distressed by her 
inabilities to do so.   
At the beginning of the mirror stage, the infant‘s body is weak and relatively 
uncoordinated.  The infant is ―still trapped in his motor impotence and nursling 
dependence‖ (Lacan, 1949/2006a, p. 94).  The infant has only perceived her own body as 
a disunity, in terms of the parts she can visually apprehend.  The infant, prior to 
recognizing her mirror image as a representation of herself, looks in the mirror and sees a 
body that seems unified and coordinated.  This mirror image starkly contrasts with her 
visual experience of her own body as fragmented.  Consequently, this contrast in 
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perception gives rise to the infant‘s aggression toward and rivalry with her own image.  
Aggression and rivalry are hallmarks of imaginary order relations (Fink, 1997, p. 32).  
The unity of her mirror image forces her to see herself as a displeasing disunity.  In order 
to resolve her unpleasant feelings of aggression and to view herself in a more favorable 
light, the infant identifies with her mirror counterpart.   
When the infant recognizes herself in the mirror, she catches her first glimpse of 
herself as a unified, whole body.  It is in this ―moment‖ that her ego develops as a 
permanent and solid object.  She sees herself as an individual and complete ―I.‖  Lacan 
highlights the infant‘s jubilation in front of the mirror when she identifies herself with her 
reflection, which appears to her to be unified, coordinated, and powerful; her image 
seems just like that of the others in her world who can walk and care for themselves.  
Therefore, the infant‘s mirror image is captivating to her because it allows her to see 
herself as unified and physically mature long before she actually reaches that state of 
maturity.  Her identification is thus a jouissance-invested misidentification.  This 
enjoyable fiction is at the root of the ego, because the infant‘s enjoyment motivates her to 
identify with her mirror image.  At the foundations of the ego, then, is an alienation; she 
is not who she thinks she is.  As Nobus put it, ―the nucleus of a human being‘s self-image 
is a mirage, no matter how familiar it may seem‖ (1999, p. 117).  The imaginary order 
therefore has the connotations of deception and lure.    
The infant‘s mirror image is the first representation of the ideal ego (written in 
Lacanian algebra as i(a)).  The ideal ego, an imaginary order projection, is an illusory and 
beautiful self-image.  This ideal self-image is precious to the child, and she will defend it 
as a prized possession, passionately contesting anything that implies that she is not as 
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perfect as she believes.  The analytic subject may therefore respond with aggression when 
an analytic intervention exposes the mirages of the ideal ego or the ego (Lacan, 
1953/2006a).  The ideal ego changes over time, because the child‘s conception of the 
perfect self is an evolving one.  Therefore, the ideal ego is impossible to achieve, and 
―will only asymptotically approach the subject‘s becoming‖ (Lacan, 1949/2006a, p. 94).  
―Man‘s ideal unity… is never attained as such and escapes him at every moment‖ (Lacan, 
1978/1991b, p. 166) although he is unfailing in his attempts to catch up to it.   
The infant‘s identification, as the first crystallization of her ego, is the 
incorporation of what Lacan calls an ―imago‖ (1949/2006a, p. 95).  An imago is ―not an 
image or a signifier, but rather something between the two—an image erected as 
something fixed which has the role of a signifier‖ (Soler, 1996, p. 41).  Once the infant 
has incorporated (Bejahung) the initial imago, she will incorporate other pleasing imagos 
into her ego or conscious identity for the rest of her life.  The ego is a totality of 
assimilated imagos.  The ego is nothing but a series of narcissistic or libidinally-invested 
(mis-) identifications with others.   
Lacan invoked Hegel‘s master-slave dialectic with this remark on imaginary order 
relations: ―the other with a small o is the imaginary other, the otherness in a mirror 
image, which makes us dependent upon the form of our counterpart‖ (Lacan, 
1981/1997a, p. 252).  The foundation of the self is rooted in its competition with the 
other.  Just as self-sufficiency is a desirable (from a certain perspective) impossibility, so 
too is it an impossibility to develop self-consciousness without the assistance of a similar 
other.  The imaginary, then, is the order of similarity, rivalry, and aggression.   
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The formation of the imaginary, as previously stated, only enables a precarious 
sense of self and fragile differentiation of inside and outside or Innenwelt and Umwelt.  
The phenomenon of transitivism to which Lacan referred (1949/2006a, p. 98; 
1961/2006a, p. 677) demonstrates the fragility of the ego at this stage of development.  
Transitivism refers to the confusion of the self with the other, and occurs most often in 
early childhood and psychosis, in cases in which the symbolic has not been developed.  
Consider the example of very young cousins: when one of them falls on a hardwood 
floor, the other cries as if he had been the one to fall.  The psychotic may believe that the 
glass jar he just broke was actually broken by someone else who is ―out to get [him].‖   
The Symbolic Order and the Mirror Stage 
 
The ego becomes stabilized by the instituting of the symbolic order that occurs by 
way of the mirror stage.  Lacan described the infant‘s birth into subjectivity in his 1961 
reformulation of the mirror stage (1961/2006a, pp. 647-684), found in ―Remarks on 
Daniel Lagache‘s Presentation: ‗Psychoanalysis and Personality Structure.‘‖  In this 
article, Lacan emphasized the effects on the child of the presence of the parental Other, 
the Other in which the child first encounters discourse, who is holding the child up to the 
mirror.   
It would be a mistake to think that the Other (with a capital O) of discourse can be 
absent from any distance that the subject achieves in his relationship with the 
other, the other (with a lowercase o) of the imaginary dyad… For the Other where 
discourse is situated, which is always latent in the triangulation that consecrates 
this distance, is not latent as long as it extends all the way to the purest moment of 
the specular relation: to the gesture by which the child at the mirror turns toward 
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the person who is carrying him and appeals with a look to this witness; the latter 
decants the child‘s recognition of the image, by verifying it, from the jubilant 
assumption in which it [elle] certainly already was. (1961/2006a, p. 678)   
It is the child‘s relationship with the Other that facilitates his jubilant assumption of his 
mirror image in a very important way—a way that allows him to become a subject.  
Lacan posited that every human being wants to see himself as having a special place in 
the world, and becoming a subject is one method by which the child can achieve that self-
image.
28
  
In the mirror stage, the child‘s relationship to the other of the imaginary dyad is 
assured, but what is not assured is the triangulation with the Other.  Lacan‘s conception 
of the advent of the subject takes into account the failure involved in ―what is known as 
‗hospitalism,‘ in which mothering attentions are clearly seen to have no other deficiency 
than the anonymity with which they are meted out‖ (1961/2006a, p. 679).  In order for the 
child to have an encounter with the Other where discourse is situated—the parental 
Other—the child must see and hear himself as having a symbolic space in the desire of 
the parental Other.  In other words, the child must believe himself to be of special 
importance to the Other in order for the Other‘s response, in speech and gaze, to have a 
structural impact on him, shaping how he sees himself and desires to see himself.   
The child ―appeals with a look to this witness‖ (Lacan, 1961/2006a, p. 678), 
wanting his recognition of his mirror image to be verified by an approving parental 
Other.  The delighted parental figure might say ―Yes! That‘s you, isn‘t it!  Look at what a 
handsome boy you are!‖  The child internalizes his mirror image and invests it with 
                                               
28 The other method is used by the psychotic.  Roughly speaking, the psychotic‘s delusional system 
provides him with a special place of importance.  In his delusions, for example, he might be the special 
target of the surveillance of the Martians.   
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libido because of his caretaker‘s gesture29 or words of approval.  The loving Other‘s 
ratification enables the child to identify with the Other of discourse, and this is a symbolic 
identification, not an imaginary one.  This amounts to an incorporation of the symbolic 
order, such that the Other full of signifiers becomes the child‘s unconscious.   
The infant‘s enjoyment of the loving caretaker‘s approval motivates him to orient 
his future identifications according to his interpretation of his caretaker‘s ideals, goals, 
and admired qualities.  Accordingly, the child may want to be a ―good boy‖ or ―smart‖ or 
a ―fighter.‖  In this way, the child makes symbolic identifications with the Other, adding 
layers of misidentification to his ego matrix.  Each time he internalizes an admired aspect 
of an Other (caretakers, teachers, famous people, etc.), recognizing himself as having his 
father‘s wit—much admired by his mother, for instance—he becomes further alienated 
by the symbolic order.  Through this process, the child‘s perception of the ideals and 
tastes of his caretaker(s) become introjected in the ―form‖ of his ego-ideal (written as 
I(A)) such that he comes to judge himself on the basis of his interpretation of the 
perspective of his caretakers.   
The point of the ego ideal is that from which the subject will see himself, as one 
says, as others see him—which will enable him to support himself in a dual 
situation that is satisfactory for him from the point of view of love. (Lacan, 
1973/1998a, p. 268)   
―The ego-ideal is a formation that…is based on the ego‘s unconscious coordinates‖ 
(Lacan, 1961/2006a, p. 677).  The ego-ideal, as the child‘s internalization of his 
caretakers‘ view of him, allows him to see himself as lovable.  The ego-ideal, then, is a 
                                               
29 Even if the caretaker only smiles or nods, those are gestures that have already been associated with the 
caretaker‘s frequently uttered words of approval and recognition. 
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symbolic introjection whereas the ideal ego is an imaginary projection.  The ego-ideal 
solidifies the foundation of the ego, establishing firm boundaries between self and other 
and self and objects.   
The creation of the ego-ideal and the unconscious that occurs in the completion of 
the mirror stage marks the child‘s alienation by the Other of discourse and his transition 
into subjectivity.  Through our identifications with the Other, ―I‖ and ―Other‖ become 
inextricably confused in our identities.  There is no true or authentic self, but only a 
subject who is split off from its own being ―and forever tossed between eventually 
contradicting signifiers coming from the Other‖ (Verhaeghe, 1999, p. 179).  In general, 
we prefer to take our selves (egos) at face value, because of our desire to see ourselves as 
unique coherent individuals.  In so doing, we are choosing to identify with what is 
actually a ―mirage‖ (Lacan, 1953/2006a, p. 251) or a façade—not wanting to know that 
what we take to be our own thoughts and desires were actually appropriated from the 
Other.  As I will explain in Chapter III, this state of alienation is in some ways preferable 
to refusing or being denied entrance into the symbolic order altogether, as is the case in 
psychosis.   
The Imaginary and the Real After the Letter: An Alienating Narrative 
 
When the child incorporates the symbolic order, the symbolic subordinates, 
rewrites, and restructures the imaginary and the real.  Having achieved a stable ego and 
an ego-ideal, the subject has fewer occasions to experience the aggression and 
competition tied to imaginary order relationships.  In other words, now that the child has 
a permanent identity that serves to firmly differentiate Innenwelt and Umwelt and to give 
him a special place in the world, he no longer needs to fight for his identity and its 
57 
 
corresponding perks.  Instead, the stable ego becomes the new vantage point from which 
the child experiences jealousy and aggression.   
After ―the letter,‖ what is at stake in imaginary relations are things of discursive 
importance.  The things linguistically denoted as desirable become the things at stake in 
an imaginary order competition.  For instance, a child may want to have more of 
something—more toys, more Cheerios—than his brother has, because not only does he 
enjoy having toys and Cheerios, but also his having more of these things than his brother 
is evidence that his mOther loves him more than his brother.  Competition, then, is often 
a phenomenon that is both symbolic and imaginary insofar as the love or approval of the 
Other is sought.   
Lacan believes that ―the letter kills‖ (Lacan, 2006a, p. 848), which is to say that a 
child‘s entrance into the symbolic realm of language necessarily entails a loss of being 
itself.  In the process of becoming a subject, the child suffers a loss of being that leaves 
him with a basic, irrevocable lack that Lacan calls ―manque à être‖ (Lacan, 1973/1998a, 
p. 29)—translated as ―want-to-be‖ or ―lack of being.‖  Much of the real before the letter 
is annihilated by the symbolic order, being drawn into the signifiers used to describe it.  
There is always a residue or ―supplement,‖30 however, of the real that can never be 
eradicated by symbolic overwriting.  However, the real after the letter is not simply the 
remainder of the first real, because the symbolic changes its structure.  Whereas the real 
before the letter was full and unbroken, the real after the letter marks and divides the 
body into distinct erogenous zones.   
In the process of socialization, caretakers express demands to the child that 
involve and have effects on his body—for instance, ―go to the bathroom now‖ and ―don‘t 
                                               
30 I do intend the allusion to Derrida‘s différance or supplementarity.   
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touch that!‖  The body is discursively mediated, becoming alienated from the body of the 
living being.  As Fink put it, ―[i]n the course of socialization, the body is progressively 
overwritten with signifiers; pleasure is localized in certain zones, while other zones are 
neutralized by the word and coaxed into compliance with social, behavioral norms‖ 
(Fink, 1995, p. 24).  Different parts of the body take on meanings determined by the 
parental and social Others.  Our bodily pleasures and pains are therefore all tied to our 
relationship to the Other.   
Another way to talk about the symbolic order‘s effects on the real is to focus on 
the child‘s loss of some of its jouissance of the pure living being.  Lacan therefore agrees 
with this aspect of Freud‘s Oedipal Complex, in which the child must relinquish a ―piece 
of instinctual satisfaction‖ (Freud, 1905/1953b, pp. 186-187) or must give something up 
in order to enter into society.  Referring to Marxist theory, Lacan, in Seminar XVII, calls 
jouissance a ―surplus‖ that has no use-value for society.  Lacan refers to the process of 
relinquishing jouissance in exchange for pursuing the symbolic achievements one desires 
as ―castration.‖31  The jouissance that remains after the encounter with the Other is 
shaped and limited by the symbolic.   
The real after the letter is characterized by everything that is excluded from the 
chain of signification.  Accordingly, Fink says that the ―real is perhaps best understood as 
that which has not yet been symbolized, remains to be symbolized, or even resists 
symbolization; and it may perfectly well exist ‗alongside‘ and in spite of a speaker‘s 
considerable linguistic capabilities‖ (Fink, 1995, p. 25).  As part of the second real, we 
can think of trauma as being an event that presented the analysand with such difficulty 
                                               
31 The concept of jouissance provides one entry point into Lacanian diagnostics, because each structural 
position involves a different way of experiencing and managing jouissance.  Very simply put, of the three 
structures, the psychotic retains the most bodily jouissance and the neurotic retains the least.   
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that he was not able to put his experience of it into words.  Trauma, along with other 
unsymbolized phenomena, manifests itself as fixation.  The subject is stuck on 
something, and this blockage manifests itself in that which the analysand‘s speech circles 
around, but does not enunciate.  It might be a word for which the analysand can come up 
with no associations, that signifier having no connection to a signifying chain.  In 
general, the real is evident in things about which the analysand claims to have no memory 
or knowledge.  In Lacan‘s words, the real ―appears in relations of resistance without 
transference—to extend the metaphor I used earlier, I would say, like a punctuation 
without a text‖ (1954/2006a, p. 388).  The analyst, by listening for these gaps in the 
analysand‘s knowledge, begins to have a clear sense of what is missing.  Symbolization 
implies dialectical movement, and so one aim of psychoanalysis is to make 
interpretations that get the analysand to symbolize the traumatic aspects of the second 
real, thus loosening his fixations and relieving some of his suffering.   
In the next chapter, I will elucidate the processes of alienation and separation by 
way of what Lacan calls the paternal function, paternal metaphor, or the Name-of-the-
Father (Nom-du-Père).  Correspondingly, I will discuss concepts such as object a, the 
partial drives, the signifier of the lack in the Other or S(Ⱥ), the Other of desire, and the 
phallus. 
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Chapter III: The Paternal Metaphor: Alienation, Separation, and the Remainder 
 
For, if the symbolic context requires it, paternity will nevertheless be attributed to 
the woman‘s encounter with a spirit at such and such a fountain or at a certain 
rock in which he is supposed to dwell.  This is clearly what demonstrates that the 
attribution of procreation to the father can only be the effect of a pure signifier, of 
a recognition, not of the real father, but of what religion has taught us to invoke as 
the Name-of-the-Father. (Lacan, 1959/2006a, p. 556) 
The Paternal Metaphor 
 
Lacan‘s paternal metaphor (or paternal function), with its corresponding 
operations of alienation and separation, is the metaphor by which Lacan explains the 
creation of the subject out of the living being.  The Name-of-the-Father, instated by the 
paternal metaphor, serves as an authority beyond the primary caretaker that partially 
separates the child from that caretaker.  This separation gives the child as living being the 
symbolic space necessary to become a subject.   
Despite the connotations of its name, the paternal function is simply a metaphor 
or a role—albeit a very specific and significant one.  Not only does its success not depend 
upon the presence of an actual father, but it also can be carried out by a person of any 
gendered identity.  Lacan called this metaphor ―paternal‖ for two reasons.  The first has 
to do with the concept of paternity; the Name-of-the-Father is responsible for the birth of 
the subject into the symbolic order.  Without an authority beyond that of the mother, 
there would be no subject, but only a living being.  Because of the absence or failure of 
the paternal metaphor (and the mirror stage), the psychotic is someone who never 
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becomes a subject.  The second reason is that it is most often a father who carries out this 
symbolic role of prohibition in our current cultural context.   
Furthermore, in French, the Name-of-the-Father, or Nom-du-Père, suggests 
multiple meanings applicable to the paternal function.  Nom means ―noun‖ as well as 
―name,‖ and so the Nom-du-Père evokes a noun such as ―father‖ used in the mother‘s 
speech.  The mother‘s discourse has the power of endorsing or denying the authority of 
the Nom-du-Père or father.  Nom as name refers to the parts of the father figure‘s full 
proper name; he usually gives his child his last name.  Nom also suggests the function of 
the name as designating someone or something, alive or dead, present or absent, who is 
made present and important by way of the mother‘s discourse.  In addition, Nom is 
pronounced like non (―No‖ in English), and so Nom-du-Père also calls to mind the 
father‘s prohibition (of the mother-child near unity).   
For Lacan, what provokes anxiety is not so much the child‘s separation from her 
caretaker,
32
 but rather the mother‘s overproximity.  Assuming the infant is at least to 
some extent wanted and cared for by her mother, her first status (at least from her 
perspective) is of being nearly one with her mother.  Through the mother‘s breast and her 
loving words, touch, and gaze, the infant derives jouissance.  At the same time, however, 
Lacan theorizes that the baby perceives—whether accurately or not—her mOther‘s desire 
for her as threatening and potentially smothering.   
What provokes anxiety?  Contrary to what people say, it is neither the rhythm nor 
the alteration of the mother‘s presence-absence.  What proves this is that the child 
indulges in repeating presence-absence games: security of presence is found in the 
                                               
32 The concept of separation anxiety is an extremely commonly referenced form of childhood anxiety in 
psychoanalytic literature today.   
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possibility of absence.  What is most anxiety-producing for the child is when the 
relationship through which he comes to be—on the basis of lack which makes 
him desire—is most perturbed: when there is no possibility of lack, when his 
mother is constantly on his back. (Lacan, 2004, p. 67)  
Anxiety as defined here is caused by the lack of lack or the lack of a gap between the 
mother and the child.  The child experiences anxiety at the prospect of being no more 
than an extension of her mother.  The smothering mother might be no more than a 
perception of the child‘s.  (Even if the mother were not smothering from a so-called 
objective view of reality, what psychoanalysis takes to be its concern is the subjective 
reality of the individual, and of how and why her subjective reality came to be as such.)  
Nevertheless, some mothers do have a tendency to use their children as their primary 
sources of jouissance, being relatively uninterested in the satisfactions that other people 
and other pursuits have to offer.   
Even though we might think of the mother‘s desire for her child as being 
innocuous and even necessary, the mother‘s desire becomes dangerous when she does not 
respect her child as a separate person.  In analysis, psychotics sometimes describe their 
mothers as possessive and invasive.  These mothers were perceived to act as if there were 
no law or legitimate restrictions on their desires, so that they treated their children as 
property with which they could do as they pleased.   
The mother‘s desire is not something that is bearable just like that, that you are 
indifferent to.  It will always wreak havoc.  A huge crocodile in whose jaws you 
are—that‘s the mother.  One never knows what might suddenly come over her 
and make her shut her trap.  That‘s what the mother‘s desire is.  Thus, I have tried 
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to explain that there was something that was reassuring… There is a roller, made 
out of stone of course, which is there, potentially, at the level of her trap, and it 
acts as a restraint, as a wedge.  It‘s what is called the phallus.  It‘s the roller that 
shelters you, if, all of a sudden, she closes it. (Lacan, 1991/2007, p. 112)   
Although this quote from Lacan‘s Seminar XVII might be interpreted as demonizing the 
mother, making her into a crocodile who wishes to consume her child, it may also be read 
as a dramatic portrayal of the dangers of lacking a symbolic space of one‘s own.  It is 
only when the stone roller of the paternal function separates the child from her mother 
that she develops an ego-ideal that anchors and stabilizes her sense of self.  As evidenced 
by psychotic breaks, a destabilized ego and a lack of differentiation between inside and 
outside can be terrifying.  The phallus
33
 or Name-of-the-Father, then, protects the child 
from le désir de la mère, which can be translated as both the child‘s desire for the mother 
and the mother‘s desire.  The paternal function serves to block both the child‘s attempt to 
remain at one with her mother—after all, the mother is her primary source of 
jouissance—and the mother‘s attempt to keep her child as close as possible.   
 There are two other perspectives from which we can understand the living being‘s 
anxiety.  The first of these perspectives has to do with the fact that anxiety is the only 
affect that indicates a connection to the real (Lacan, 2004).  The psychotic is a living 
being who suffers anxiety because she has an unmanageable amount of real jouissance. In 
Seminar XXII, Lacan remarked that anxiety is caused when the body is overwhelmed or 
permeated by jouissance (1975, p. 104).  This conception of anxiety is similar to Freud‘s 
first theory of anxiety, in which anxiety results from excessive quantities of libido that 
                                               
33 In the late 1960s, Lacan began using the term ―phallus‖ to refer to the Name-of-the-Father.  The phallus 
is a signifier that has its own importance, however, which will be explicated in Chapter IV.   
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cannot be discharged.  As stated in Chapter II, the symbolic order sets limits to or drains 
away much of the living being‘s jouissance and organizes that which remains, such that 
the pervert and the neurotic have less jouissance and therefore less anxiety.
34
  The power 
of the word neutralizes the real, and so there is no neutralization for the living being who 
has not undergone alienation.  ―[T]he ultimate real…[is] something faced with which all 
words cease and all categories fail, the object of anxiety par excellence‖ (Lacan, 
1978/1991b, p. 164).  
The second perspective has to do with the living being‘s relationship to language.  
When the child first encounters signifiers, it is as a swarm of nonsense signifiers, or S1s, 
that are undifferentiated.   Cooing and baby talk are the stuff of this swarm.  The child‘s 
immersion in the swarm of signifiers marks the child‘s first encounter with the mother as 
Other, but the child assumes that they are unified.  When the child develops an imaginary 
order but has not yet incorporated the symbolic order, the child cultivates very tenuous 
imaginary distinctions between self and other—meaning that the swarm of signifiers is 
made into a collection.  The confusion between self and others (including the Other of 
discourse) persists, but the imaginary order facilitates a temporary reduction of that 
confusion.  Through the interdiction wrought by the paternal metaphor, the swarm of 
signifiers is permanently and firmly collectivized, creating a clear sense of differentiation 
between self and other.  Consequently, neurotics and perverts have the general sense that 
they use language like a tool rather than that they are a tool for language.   
In psychosis, the foreclosure of the paternal function results in the psychotic‘s 
sense of being ―inhabited, possessed, by language‖ (Lacan, 1981/1997a, p. 284), as if 
                                               
34 Specifically, desire and the law, two main aspects of the symbolic order, put limits on jouissance, thereby 
decreasing anxiety.   
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some external force planted it in her.  The feeling of not being in control of language 
arouses the psychotic‘s anxiety.  Likewise, psychotic individuals relate to signifiers as if 
they were things rather than representations of meanings (Fink, 1997, p. 95).  The 
successful operation of alienation results in what Lacan called a ―point de capiton‖ 
(1981/1997a, p. 303), which has been translated as a ―button tie‖ or a ―quilting point‖ (p. 
303), and button ties permanently link signifiers to signifieds, creating a number of 
anchoring points or stable meanings in the collection of signifiers.  The living being lacks 
these button ties, and so his world of meanings is structured by way of imaginary 
mimicry.  The instability of meanings, of the connection between signifiers and 
signifieds, also subjects the living being to anxiety.   
Ways of describing that which provokes anxiety in the living being 
1) The lack of a symbolic gap between child and mother 
2) Fragility of the ego and of the differentiation between inside and outside 
3) An excess of unorganized jouissance 
4) Being inhabited by language, as if it were an external force 
5) Fragility of meanings because of the lack of button ties 
 
Alienation 
 
―What must be stressed at the outset is that a signifier is that which represents a 
subject for another signifier‖ (Lacan, 1973/1998a, p. 207).   
―All that subsists here is the being whose advent can only be grasped by no longer 
being‖ (Lacan, 1961/2006, p. 678).   
Alienation (along with separation) is a developmental process that occurs in a 
time that Lacan described as a ―logical moment.‖35  That is, alienation occurs neither in a 
single instant, as if at the push of a button, nor by way of a steady, chronological growth.  
                                               
35 The explications of alienation and separation that follow are mostly based on Lacan‘s treatment of those 
operations in his Seminar XI. 
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Instead, alienation is a moment that, logically speaking, must have occurred in order for 
the subject to have achieved his present structure.  Alienation represents the moment 
when the living being incorporates the Other of discourse and becomes a subject who has 
a place in the symbolic order.   
In alienation, the first operation of the paternal function, there are three roles.  The 
child plays the first role, as a living being who chooses either to accept (Bejahung) or 
foreclose the symbolic order.  The first Other plays the second role, which is that of 
someone who has a primary part in loving and nurturing the child.  The third role, that of 
the second Other or the Name-of-the-Father, may be played by the person who is the first 
Other or by a second person.  The second Other is someone who represents a consistent 
authority or Law beyond the desires of the first Other.  An actual father is someone who 
may represent the symbolic Name-of-the-Father; the person of the father is strictly 
differentiated from the symbolic role he may play.  The stereotypical occupants of the 
roles of first and second Other are the mother and the father, respectively.  I will first 
provide an account of the process of alienation according to the stereotypical roles. 
In alienation, the father comes between the mother and the child and partially 
separates the two, allowing the child to have a sense of himself (or herself) as a person 
separate from his mother.  The child often associates the father with the mother‘s 
absences, for instance hearing the father and mother talking after being put to bed, and so 
the father is experienced as someone who obstructs access to the mother.  In the child‘s 
view, the father imposes limitations on the jouissance the child can achieve with the 
mother.  For example, the father might say, ―You‘re too old to be hanging onto your 
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mother like that!‖ or ―It‘s time for you to start sleeping in your own room like a big boy 
so I can have some time with your mother.‖  The father functions to prohibit jouissance. 
                        
                                   
 
 The first moment of the paternal function, then, has the structure of a metaphor, in 
which the term above the bar replaces the term below the bar.  In this case, the 
prohibitive father cancels out the mother as a source of jouissance.  This kind of father 
believes that there is something wrong with the mother-child dyad, and he puts himself in 
the position of master by doing and saying something to prohibit the jouissance of the 
mother-child relationship.  He might not see the need to justify his reasons, instead 
referring to his name as an indicator of his authority: ―You‘ll do it because I said so!‖  
The father need not have any special or superior qualities of judgment in order to be 
given the position of master.  Even today, many fathers are granted positions of authority 
by their family members simply because they, as fathers, are traditionally expected to 
take on that role.  In this sense, the father is a semblant; he has the appearance, at least, of 
someone with authority.  Some men gladly assume this position of unquestioned 
authority, believing in their own semblance.   
Lacan emphasized that ―we should concern ourselves…with the importance [the 
mother] attributes to [the father‘s] speech—in a word, to his authority—in other words, 
with the place she reserves for the Name-of-the-Father in the promotion of the law‖ 
(Lacan, 1959/2006a, p. 579).  It is not enough to consider only the smothering mother or 
the powerless father in relation to the child; the child, mother, and father must be taken 
into account as a triad in terms of the place the mother‘s speech gives to the authority of 
the father.  The mother‘s discourse, then, serves either to give weight to the father‘s 
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authority or to undercut it.  As examples of the former, the mother might say, ―Your 
father will give you a spanking if you keep doing that!‖ or ―What would your father say 
about this?‖ or ―Go ask your father if you can have that.‖  Using this kind of discourse, 
the mother sets up the father as an authority beyond herself—the father is the one who 
gives punishment and whose judgment should be respected and feared.  The father‘s 
name or Nom becomes associated with a prohibitive ―No!‖  The Name-of-the-Father is a 
function that is sustained by numerous statements he makes and that are said about him 
by the mother.  These statements are linked to the father‘s name, such that the paternal 
function can be instated by the father‘s name or any one of its related statements.  In this 
regard, Miller said that ―the Name-of-the-Father is only the name of a function that one 
must write NP (x), where the x in parentheses designates the variable and questions in 
each clinical case what role the Name-of-the-Father plays‖ (Miller, 2006b, p. 70).36  
Although alienation, generally speaking, metaphorizes or bars the jouissance of the 
mother, it also has specific effects in each individual case.   
If the mother‘s discourse systematically undermines the authority of the father, 
the paternal function may fail.  The mother may ignore or argue with the father‘s 
opinions and commands, never giving credence to his words and acting only according to 
her own wishes.  She may often say to her child, ―We can do whatever we want‖ or 
―Your father doesn‘t know what he‘s talking about!‖  Her derision of the father‘s 
authority must generally be almost total in order to prevent alienation.  Even in families 
in which the mother presides over the father, the father still may have enough authority to 
                                               
36 ―Names-of-the-Father‖ was the name Lacan assigned to his aborted seminar of 1963. Because Lacan 
only delivered the first lecture and subsequently refused to elaborate on his intended topic, we are left to 
conjecture as to the meanings of the Names-of-the-Father.  Miller, in his article, ―The Names-of-the-
Father‖ (2006b) guessed that the plural means not only that there are multiple possible signifiers that 
function as the Name-of-the-Father but also that there is no privileged, correct Name-of-the-Father (p. 69). 
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balance the mother‘s rule.  The mother‘s complaints about her husband, for instance, 
suggest that he has a certain strength in hampering her ability to do as she pleases.   
In other cases, the father‘s (or second Other‘s) relation to the Law itself is to 
blame.  Lacan said that failures of the paternal function  
are found with particular frequency in cases where the father really functions as a 
legislator or boasts that he does—whether he is, in fact, one of the people who 
makes the laws or presents himself as a pillar of faith, as a paragon of integrity or 
devotion, as virtuous or a virtuoso, as serving a charitable cause whatever the 
object or lack thereof that is at stake, as serving the nation or birth rate, safety or 
salubrity, legacy or law, the pure, the lowest of the low, or the empire.  These are 
all ideals that provide him with all too many opportunities to seem to be at fault, 
to fall short, and even to be fraudulent—in short, to exclude the Name-of-the-
Father from its position in the signifier. (Lacan, 1959/2006a, p. 579) 
Accordingly, the paternal function fails even in less extreme cases when a father (or 
second Other) is found inadequate or fraudulent in his relation to the Law.  A father 
might make so many exceptions to the rules he sets for himself and his child that the 
exception becomes the rule—his actions guided by the arbitrariness of his whims.  For 
instance, a father says that stealing is wrong but then brings home office supplies he stole 
from work, justifying that he earned them or that his workplace has an overabundance of 
them.  In addition, parents often set limits for their children that depend solely on their 
moods or convenience, and then lift those restrictions whenever it suits them.  The child 
notices this and other hypocrisies, and, with enough of them, may learn by imitation to 
become his own law rather than accept the authority of a law beyond his own wishes.  
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This kind of parent shows the child that he does not obey any laws above those governed 
by his own desires.   
 In other instances, the paternal function fails because the father sets himself up as 
a rival to the child, speaking and acting toward the child solely on the imaginary plane.  
This type of father is a character marked by ―unbridled ambition or authoritarianism‖ 
(Lacan, 1981/1997a, p. 204) whose unlimited demands on the son make him seem 
―monstrous‖ (p. 204).  He is a father who cannot be pleased, and he punishes his child 
(who is often a son—fathers sometimes seeing less need to compete with a girl) without 
respecting ideas like ―fairness.‖  This father ―manifests himself simply in the order of 
strength and not in that of the pact, [and so] a relation of rivalry, aggressiveness, fear, etc. 
appear‖ (p. 205).  The father who manifests himself in the symbolic pact, on the other 
hand, tells his child, ―This is mine, but you may have that instead‖ or ―You will do your 
chores, but then you will have some free time to spend as you choose.‖  A father who 
incarnates the law in the manner of the pact appeals to a distributive justice that puts 
limits on his demands.   
 Fink gave an example of his work with a psychotic patient whose father 
relentlessly competed with him.   
One of my patients said that his father wanted a girl, not a boy, and competed 
with his son in many areas: when there was cake, the father would take it all, and 
the mother would be forced to ‗split things half and half between them‘; when my 
patient went to college, his father decided to enroll in the same academic program 
as his son.  The mother‘s symbolic interventions were not sufficient to counter the 
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father‘s rivalrous relationship with his son, and the latter began having psychotic 
episodes in his twenties. (Fink, 1997, p. 251)   
When the ego-ideal does not form and the first movement of the paternal function fails, 
psychosis results.  A child becomes psychotically structured by way of the mechanism 
that Lacan translated from Freud‘s Verwerfung as ―foreclosure‖ (Lacan, 1981/1997a, p. 
321).  Psychosis is the result of the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father.  Foreclosure, 
then, is the radical rejection or exclusion of a key signifier that would ground the child in 
the symbolic order by serving as the primordial button tie between signifier and signified.  
On the other hand, the child‘s acceptance of the Name-of-the-Father through primal 
repression is constitutive; repression allows the child to become a subject with an 
unconscious.  The foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father makes subjectivity and the 
unconscious impossibilities for the child.  Unlike the linguistic mechanism of repression, 
foreclosure operates outside of the symbolic register, such that foreclosed phenomena 
―return‖ seemingly from the outside of the psychotic by way of imaginary processes 
including delusions and hallucinations.  Foreclosure indicates that the child has some 
degree of ―choice‖ as to whether or not to accept the symbolic order, although it is easier 
to conceive of the failure of the paternal function in terms of the first and second Others.  
As previously stated, the paternal function can be successful in any possible 
family constellation, although arguably some assemblages lend themselves more easily to 
the instatement of the Name-of-the-Father.  In the case of a family with a mother and a 
father, the usual course of events is that the mother is the first Other and the father is the 
second Other.  A mother is equally capable of respecting a law beyond her own desires, 
but she nevertheless tends to only play the role of first Other.  One reason for this may be 
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that it is easier for the child to perceive the two different functions (of acting according to 
one‘s own desires and of putting limits on jouissance according to a principle) when they 
are embodied by two separate people.  Another reason may be that mothers and fathers, 
like most people, are more likely to criticize each other‘s violations of the Law than to 
criticize their own.  If the father is the primary caretaker and first Other, then the mother 
may very well be called upon to act as second Other, the father also having difficulty 
playing both roles.   
In cases of a single parent, the parent can provide both a loving, nurturing 
relationship to his or her child and an appeal to a law beyond his or her own desires.  For 
instance, one parent may be dead or otherwise absent from the child‘s life, but kept 
present through the power of the other‘s discourse.  Alternatively, a single parent may 
appeal to a significant other or to his or her parents—who might have a role in caring for 
the child—to serve the function of the second Other.  Through his or her discourse, a 
single parent might assign the role of the second Other to God as seen through the 
teachings of a religion like Christianity or Judaism, to a philosopher, to a revered mentor, 
or even to the teachings of a 12-step recovery group. 
Single parents, gay couples, and couples in which the father is first Other and the 
mother is second Other can, then, provide a child with both love and Law.  However, 
these family structures lend themselves less easily to the instatement of the paternal 
function.  When a woman is called upon to be the second Other or a man the first Other, 
they sometimes have difficulty in doing so.  Even today, it is most often the case that 
women are socialized into roles of nurturance and men are socialized into roles of 
authority.  Once assumed, a person‘s socially derived sex role is resistant to change.  In 
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terms of the paternal function, it will be interesting to see the effects of the alteration of 
our dominant sex roles.  Will the incidence of psychosis rise, or will people have 
increased abilities to embody both love and the Law for their children? 
The Name-of-the-Father, then, is a signifier that Lacan usually wrote as S2.  In 
alienation, S2 intervenes in the swarm of S1s, which are nonsense signifiers, and 
collectivizes the swarm into the set of language.  Consequently, we may see S2 as an S1 
that has been chosen by the child; the Name-of-the-Father was just another S1.  The 
Name-of-the-Father does not have to be the signifier ―father‖ or even a name for it to 
fulfill its function as the signifier that intervenes between the mother and the child.  (The 
mother-child unity is another way of describing the child‘s immersion in the swarm of 
nonsense signifiers.)  Once the Name-of-the-Father is chosen and accepted by the child, it 
becomes the signifier through which all significations are meaningful to the child.  
Consequently, we may read Lacan‘s explanation of meaningful representation by 
way of the S1s and S2s I have put in brackets.   
My definition of the signifier (there is no other) is as follows: a signifier [S1] is 
what represents the subject to another signifier [S2].  This latter signifier [S2] is 
therefore the signifier to which all the other signifiers [S1…S1…S1] represent the 
subject—which means that if this signifier [S2] is missing, all the other signifiers 
represent nothing. (Lacan, 1960/2006a, p. 819)  
S2 is a signifier that the child elects to be of special importance, and its link with S1 
creates the first button tie that links a signifier to a signified, thus forming the 
foundational symbolic meaning upon which all the other signifiers in the set of language 
may represent something.   
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The paternal function, as previously stated, has the structure of a metaphor, and 
insofar as metaphor is what creates meaning, the paternal function is the metaphor that 
anchors the entire symbolic realm.  The subject‘s incorporation of the paternal metaphor 
therefore amounts to the incorporation of the structure of language, allowing him to 
create meaning by way of metaphor and metonymy.  In alienation, the Name-of-the-
Father as a prohibitive forceful signifier cancels out or replaces the (smothering) mother 
as source of jouissance.  The first movement of the paternal metaphor results in primal 
repression, in which the child‘s psychical processes are split into conscious and 
unconscious.  What becomes repressed and therefore pushed into the unconscious is the 
child‘s desire for what the Name-of-the-Father forbade: a certain jouissance with his 
mother.  The child, having made his first symbolic identification with the Name-of-the-
Father, is now a split subject—a subject who irrevocably lacks being and jouissance.   
Lacan holds that prohibition creates desire.  It is only after the child‘s access to 
the mother is restricted that the subject realizes that he longs for what he is now lacking.  
According to the time of the signifier, all linguistic meanings are determined by 
difference and deferral, such that the meaning of an event is constituted after the event‘s 
occurrence (when a comparison between at least two different states can be made).  
When the metaphor of alienation is achieved, a meaning is created regarding the child‘s 
former relationship to his mother: desiring the former, lost relationship to the mother is 
wrong.  After the fact, the subject judges his separation from his mother and his 
corresponding loss of jouissance to have been traumatic, even if it was also a great relief. 
The meaning (a signified), ―my desire for my mother is wrong‖ becomes 
permanently affixed to the words (signifiers) associated with the Name-of-the-Father.  A 
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kind of knot is thereby woven in the fundamental gap between the signifier and the 
signified.  Button ties are necessary in order to make meanings by temporarily halting the 
―incessant sliding of the signified under the signifier‖ (Lacan, 1957/2006a, p. 502).  
Using Freudian terminology, we might say that a button tie ties together the ―word-
presentation‖ (Wortvorstellungen) or signifier and the thing-presentation 
(Sachvorstellungen) or the culturally-constituted meaning.  Rather than creating an 
unbreakable false ―essential‖ meaning, a button tie allows the culturally constituted literal 
meaning(s) of a signifier to be compared to its figurative meaning(s).  ―[T]he ‗button tie‘ 
[point de capiton], by which the signifier stops the otherwise indefinite sliding of 
signification‖ (Lacan, 1960/2006a, p. 805) provides the necessary illusion of a fixed 
ultimate meaning.  (―[T]he sliding of the signified under the signifier [is nevertheless] 
always happening (unconsciously, let us note) in discourse‖ (Lacan, 1957/2006a, p. 
511).)   
The Vel of Alienation: Your Money, or Your Life! 
―‗Your money or your life!‘  If I choose the money, I lose both.  If I choose life, I 
have life without the money, namely, a life deprived of something‖ (Lacan, 1973/1998a, 
p. 212).   
Alienation consists in this vel, which—if you do not object to the word 
condemned, I will use it—condemns the subject to appearing only in that division 
which, it seems to me, I have just articulated sufficiently by saying that, if it 
appears on the one side as meaning, produced by the signifier, it appears on the 
other as aphanisis. (Lacan, 1973/1998a, p. 210)   
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 The child as living being is faced with a vel, or an either/or choice, in which he is 
forced to lose something.  The child must chose to lose either his place in the symbolic 
order or his being.  The mugger‘s threat, ―Your money or your life!‖ exemplifies the vel 
of alienation, insofar as it is clear that you are going to lose your money whatever you 
choose; the prudent choice is to give the mugger your money and hope that he will let 
you keep your life.  In the child‘s encounter with the Other of language, his choosing 
subjectivity means electing to lose his being.  In permitting a signifier to represent him, 
the subject disappears beneath the bar, losing his being and becoming a subject divided 
by language. 
  
 
 The operation of alienation is better represented, however, by the following 
diagram, found in Seminar XI (Lacan, 1973/1998a, p. 211) to which , S1, and S2 have 
been added: 
 
In the child‘s choice, the two terms at stake are meaning, represented by S2, and non-
meaning, represented by S1.  The set of being, in joining with the set of the Other, has 
become the set of the split subject—that is, of being transformed by language.  In the 
overlap produced by the combination of being and meaning, there is non-meaning.  The 
subject is represented in the Other of meaning, then, as something (S1) that does not make 
sense.  S1 and S2 are the two terms with which Lacan represented the signifying chain, 
because, as previously stated, the link between S1 and S2 creates meaning.    
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 Lacan used the term ―aphanisis‖ to refer to what he also called the subject‘s 
disappearance, fading, or loss of being that results from his entrance into the symbolic 
order.  Lacan claimed that the  
effect of aphanisis that is produced under one of the two signifiers is linked to the 
definition…of a set of signifiers.  It is a set of elements such that, if there 
exist…only two, the phenomenon of alienation is produced, in other words, the 
signifier is that which represents the subject for another signifier.  Hence there 
results that, at the level of the other signifier, the subject fades away. 
(1973/1998a, p. 236) 
In other words, in terms of the Other of meaning (S2), it is a structural necessity that the 
subject represented by S1 fade away, losing his ex-sistence in order to gain the existence 
granted by the symbolic order.  The subject is alienated insofar as he can only be known 
in the Other of language, and his means of becoming known is the Other‘s means.   
If the child chooses being, the subject disappears and falls into non-meaning.  If 
the child chooses meaning, ―the being of the subject, which is there beneath the meaning‖ 
(Lacan, 1973/1998a, p. 211), is rewritten and lost to some extent.  However, ―the 
meaning survives only deprived of that part of non-meaning that is, strictly speaking, that 
which constitutes in the realization of the subject, the unconscious‖ (p. 211).  In other 
words, there is a part of the subject that exists outside of the set of meaning, and that is 
the unconscious.  S1, as a first master signifier that is cut off from the signifying chain, is 
pure nonsense.   
Lacan said that the subject‘s representation by S1 causes Urverdrängung, or 
primal repression, which is ―the necessary fall of this first signifier‖ (Lacan, 1973/1998a, 
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p. 251).  The subject ―is constituted around the Urverdrängung, but he cannot substitute 
anything for it as such—since this would require the representation of one signifier for 
another, whereas here there is only one, the first‖ (p. 251).  The subject is petrified, so to 
speak, in his representation by the master signifier. 
Lacan represented the alienated subject by an ―X‖ or by an empty set.  The 
subject‘s existence in the symbolic order, at this stage, is a mere place-holder of the place 
where he can—by way of separation and subjectification of his alienation—come to be 
something more substantial.  The subject as empty set is related to his proper name, 
which Lacan defined as a pure signifier whose ―statement is equal to its signification‖ 
(Lacan, 1960/2006a, p. 819).  In other words, the proper name does not depend upon 
other signifiers for its meaning; the proper name cannot be counted in the set of the Other 
but resides instead in ―the sea of proper names‖ (p. 819), allowing us to imagine that 
proper names wash up against the shore of the Other.  The proper name is analogous to 
the S(Ⱥ) which is outside of language.37  The child, then, represented by a pure signifier, 
has been inscribed in the Other, but the child has not yet connected his proper name, 
which stands in for his being, with meaningful signifiers in the Other.  The subject as 
empty set has yet to define himself in terms of the Other of meaning.  Of the subject‘s 
proper name, Fink said,  
                                               
37 In Lacan‘s algebra, the Other is represented by ―A‖ because ―A‖ is the first letter of the French word 
Autre, meaning Other.  Ⱥ, then, refers to a lack in the Other (Lacan, 1960/2006a, p. 818).  The Other is 
always incomplete or lacking, but subjects sometimes mistakenly perceive the Other as complete.  The 
S(Ⱥ), or the signifier of the lack in the Other, may signify the Other‘s desire or the incompleteness of the 
set of signifiers. The signifier of the lack in the Other must, logically speaking, stand outside of the set of 
the Other.  As the signifier that designates the set of the Other, it cannot be included in that set.  When S(Ⱥ) 
is symbolized, it is ―by the inherence of a (-1) in the set of signifiers.  It is, as such, unpronounceable, but 
its operation is not, for the latter is what occurs whenever a proper name is pronounced.  Its statement is 
equal to its signification‖ (p. 819).  
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[a] priori, this name has absolutely nothing to do with the subject; it is as foreign 
to him or her as any other signifier.  But in time this signifier—more, perhaps, 
than any other—will go to the root of his or her being and become inextricably 
tied to his or her subjectivity. (Fink, 1995, p. 53)   
Proper names, of course, are made up of meaningful phonemes and words, and one way 
in which the subject can subjectify his alienating proper name is to link his proper name 
with the meanings associated with its parts.  For instance, someone with the common last 
name of ―Smith‖ may choose to identify with a trait associated with blacksmiths, such as 
manual dexterity, or he may even identify with something about The Smiths (a musical 
group). 
In alienation, the subject may be represented by a fraction in which  
zero appears in the denominator [such that] the value of the fraction no 
longer has meaning, but assumes by convention what mathematicians call 
an infinite value…In so far as the primary signifier is pure non-sense, it 
becomes the bearer of the infinitization of the value of the subject, not 
open to all meanings, but abolishing them all, which is different.  This 
explains why I have been unable to deal with the relation of alienation 
without introducing the word freedom.  What, in effect, grounds, in the 
meaning and radical non-meaning of the subject, the function of freedom, 
is strictly speaking this signifier that kills all meanings. (Lacan, 
1973/1998a, p. 252) 
The subject post alienation is a void created and named by a signifier.  The subject as 
void has gained the freedom to exist in the symbolic order—the freedom to exist in 
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relation to all meanings, but he is radically unfree at the same time, his subjectivity 
determined as it is by the S1 ―that kills all meanings‖ (p. 252). 
On the other hand, S2, the Other of meaning, is the embodiment of freedom 
insofar as meaning is always sliding under the signifier. ―The subject is not a substance; 
the subject is an effect of the signifier‖ (Soler, 1995a, p. 43).  The subject is the 
connection between S1 and S2.  ―What then is the destiny of this subject of the signifier?  
His or her destiny is vacillation between petrification and indeterminacy, petrification by 
the signifier and indeterminacy within the slippage of meaning‖ (Soler, 1995b, p. 48). 
If the subject is merely an empty X, and meaning fluctuates, then why is it that 
analytic interpretations are not open to any possible meaning?  The subject is determined 
by the repressed signifier (S1), but what is repressed has to do with the unique subject‘s 
context and perception.  The empty set, having coordinates defined by the subject‘s 
choice of repressed significations, is therefore not entirely empty.  In the subject as empty 
set, ―the things that are inscribed are significations, dialectized significations in the 
relation of the desire of the Other, and they give a particular value to the relation of the 
subject to the unconscious‖ (Lacan, 1973/1998a, p. 252).   
Importantly, the nonsense master signifier (S1) also corresponds to the symbolic 
unary trait that produces the ego-ideal by way of introjection.  The kernel of the ego-
ideal, Lacan said, ―is not in the first field of narcissistic identification‖ (Lacan, 
1973/1998a, p. 256) but is in the field of the symbolic Other.    
The [unary trait], in so far as the subject clings to it, is in the field of desire, which 
cannot in any sense be constituted other than in the reign of the signifier, other 
than at the level in which there is a relation of the subject to the Other.  It is the 
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field of the Other that determines the function of the [unary trait], in so far as it is 
from it that a major stage of identification is established in the topography then 
developed by Freud—namely, idealization, the ego ideal. (p. 256)   
The ego-ideal is the vantage point from which subject sees himself as ideal ego and 
correspondingly feels complete and loved by the Other.
38
   
 Although Lacan talked about the operation of alienation prior to Seminar XI, what 
Lacan adds in that seminar is crucial to his later theorizations of subjectivity: ―it is in this 
                                               
38 Lacan said that the non-meaning of the master signifier (S1) or unary trait has an important ―direct 
implication‖ (Lacan, 1973/1998a, p. 212) on the aim of interpretation (for those subjects who have 
undergone alienation).  ―Interpretation is directed not so much at the meaning as towards reducing the non-
meaning of signifiers, so that we may rediscover the determinants of the subject‘s entire behavior‖ (p. 212).  
Put a different way, Lacan also said, ―it is not the effect of meaning that is operative in interpretation, but 
rather the articulation in the symptom of signifiers (without any meaning at all) that have gotten caught up 
in it‖ (Lacan, 1966/2006a, p. 842).  What does it mean to say that analysts should direct interpretations 
toward non-meaning? 
Lacan‘s recommendation suggests that interpretations should be aimed at revealing a subject‘s 
master signifiers.  Those repressed signifiers are a main part of what constitutes the symptom of the subject.  
Each unary signifier represents an alienating identification with the Other.  For example, ―smart‖ may be a 
master signifier for a subject, who introjected it when her father said, ―You are so smart! Just like your 
mother!‖—indicating that the father loves the child and the mother because they are smart.  The subject 
who incorporated the unary trait ―smart‖ then continuously made efforts to try to appear smart to Others so 
that she may feel lovable.   
Of course, ―smart,‖ is a meaningful signifier insofar as it is a signifier in the Other of discourse.  
However, for this subject, ―smart‖ is repressed, and therefore a part of the non-meaning of her particular 
unconscious.  Master signifiers, in their locus in the unconscious, do not become meaningful until they are 
dialectized through interpretation—until they rise above the bar, making connections with signifiers in the 
conscious signifying chain.  When interpretation reveals a master signifier, the revelation is experienced by 
the subject as a jubilant one (paradoxically connected to the jubilation she felt at initially incorporating the 
alienating signifier), because she feels as though she has mastered a previously insistent, inexplicable 
determinant of her behavior by gaining some knowledge about it.  When a master signifier is dialectized, 
the subject knows something about why she originally admired the quality the S1 represented and for whom 
she incorporated the unary trait into herself.  Furthermore, dialectizing the master signifier may be 
understood to reduce to nothingness the problematic meaning of the S1, relieving the subject‘s associated 
suffering.  
We may also say that the master signifier is part of the real after the letter, insofar as it is a 
signifier that resists symbolization.  The following quote from Lacan‘s ―The Subversion of the Subject and 
the Dialectic of Desire‖ provides support for this perspective:  
The cut made by the signifying chain is the only cut that verifies the structure of the subject as a 
discontinuity in the real.  If linguistics enables us to see the signifier as the determinant of the 
signified, analysis reveals the truth of this relationship by making holes in meaning the 
determinants of its discourse. (1966/2006a, p. 801)   
In other words, the subject, who is an effect of the symbolic order, is the cut that forms the R2 out of the 
unbroken R1.  The subject is represented by the irruptions of the real in discourse as that which does not 
make sense, but nevertheless structure the subject and her discourse.   
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living being, called to subjectivity, that the drive is essentially manifested‖ (1973/1998a, 
p. 203).  The child‘s entrance into the symbolic order is the condition for the possibility 
of the creation of the partial drives and of object a.  In order to explain the drives and 
object a, I will first introduce the operation of separation—an operation that plays a 
major part in their formation.  
Separation 
 
Separare, to separate—I would point out at once the equivocation of the se 
parare, of the se parer, in all the fluctuating meanings it has in French.  It means 
not only to dress oneself, but also to defend oneself, to provide oneself with what 
one needs to be on one‘s guard, and I will go further still, and Latinists will bear 
me out, to the se parere, the s’engendrer, the to be engendered, which is involved 
here. (Lacan, 1973/1998a, p. 214) 
 
Whereas alienation entails the subject‘s encounter with the Other of language, 
separation entails the subject‘s encounter with the Other of desire.  Language and desire 
are two different aspects of the Other.  The Other full of signifiers is one part, and the 
Other of desire is the other part.  When put into words, the Other‘s desire may be 
represented by the phallus, which is the signifier of desire and jouissance, or by S(Ⱥ), 
which is the signifier of the lack in the Other.
39
   
In separation, the second operation of the paternal metaphor, there are three roles: 
child, first Other, and second Other.  The first Other plays almost the same role in 
separation as s/he did in alienation.  The first Other still has a primary part in loving and 
                                               
39 Insofar, however, as desire springs from what was lost in castration, the phallus is also the signifier of 
lack.   
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nurturing the child, but the child perceives the first Other differently according to his 
newly acquired symbolic viewpoint.  For the subject, the first Other is now someone who 
is clearly differentiated from him, and he has repressed his desire to return to the 
jouissance-full unity he imagines they had prior to alienation.  In addition, the subject as 
a separate being wants the Other to love him and gain jouissance from his presence.  At 
the same time, the child‘s proximity to the first Other continues to be a source of 
anxiety—although his anxiety is less than that of the living being.  The child, then, plays 
the role of the subject who chooses either to accept or reject a further split from the first 
Other.  The third role, that of the second Other or Name-of-the-Father, may again be 
enacted by the person who is the first Other or by a second person.  In separation, 
however, compared to alienation, it is much more common for the first Other to function 
as both first and second Other.  This is because in separation what is at stake is the 
symbolization of the first Other‘s desire.  The role of the second Other is none other than 
putting the desire of the first Other into words.   
Whereas psychosis is associated with certainty, subjectivity is associated with 
doubt.  ―[D]oubt, doubting we know who we are and know who the Other is, is born and 
enabled by alienation‖ (Lacan, 1973/1998a, p. 264).  The living being does not wonder or 
doubt who he is.  The subject, on the other hand, is lacking in being and unknown to 
himself.  The subject is an unknown X.  The subject, unlike the living being, has an ego-
ideal, and the ego-ideal is what ties his subjectivity to an alienating Otherness, so that he 
no longer knows himself.  The subject as manque à être wants to find his being, and so he 
asks the question ―Who am I?‖  Because a meaningful answer can only reside in the 
Other of meaning, the subject looks to the Other to provide an answer.  The subject‘s 
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ego-ideal discloses that his search has to do with his being lovable in the eyes of the 
Other.  In the search for being, the child attempts to be loved by the Other.  In love, the 
subject finds a temporary fullness of being, because love connects the subject with the 
Other, sometimes providing the illusion of oneness that the child unconsciously desires 
with his mOther.  
The subject asks ―Who am I?‖ and ―What does the Other want?‖  
The first object he proposes for this parental desire whose object is unknown is 
his own loss—Can he [afford to] lose me?  The phantasy of one‘s death, of one‘s 
disappearance, is the first object that the subject has to bring into play in this 
dialectic.‖ (Lacan, 1973/1998a, p. 214)   
The subject who arrives at the unusual conclusion that his first Other asks for or demands 
nothing but him—that he is the Other‘s object a—is a perverse subject.  (I elaborate upon 
the causes of perverse subjectivity in Chapter IV.)  At this stage, object a is the object-
cause of the Other‘s jouissance.  More commonly, what the first Other wants is 
eventually symbolized as desire for something or someone other than the subject, 
resulting in neurosis by way of secondary repression.  Secondary repression constitutes 
object a as the object-cause of the Other‘s desire.  In other words, prior to separation the 
Other‘s lack is perceived in terms of jouissance, whereas after separation it is perceived 
in terms of desire.   
 After alienation, the Other is no longer seen as complete, but is now seen as 
lacking something.  Initially, the subject encounters the post-alienation Other as the Other 
of demand, and these demands re-write the child‘s real and imaginary orders in particular 
ways.  ―In a way, S1—S2 is a representation of the Other‘s demand…The subject is 
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defined through the signifier of the Other‘s demand‖ (Brousse, 1995, p. 109).  The lack 
implicit in demand is one that has a counterpart that can plug it up; although demand 
permanently overwrites need, demand remains something that calls for a specific object 
of satiation.  Consequently, if the child believes himself to be the object that will fill the 
lack of the Other of demand—that is, satisfying the demanding Other—the child feels 
joined at the hip to the Other.  ―[H]is mother is constantly on his back‖ (2004, p.  67).  
This lack of symbolic space causes the child anxiety.  Desire, on the other hand, has no 
perfect complement, and so the child‘s encounter with the Other of desire enables him to 
further separate from the Other.  The child cannot understand the first Other to be 
desiring, however, until her desire is put into words.  In Fink‘s words, once the first 
Other‘s lack, or desire,  
has been named, the weight of her demands (her real, physically unavoidable 
demands regarding the child‘s bodily functions, for example) lifts, and a space of 
desire opens up—a space in which her desire is articulated and moves, and in 
which her child can model his desire on hers. (Fink, 1997, p. 177) 
The child‘s encounter with the Other of desire opens up a symbolic space for the child to 
move into his own subject position, with his ―own‖ desires.   
 The articulation of the mOther‘s desire enables the child to further separate from 
his mOther because of the nature of desire.  Desire has no perfect counterpart, and it 
therefore corresponds with an eternal lack.  Desire seeks its satisfaction but by definition 
is essentially unsatisfied.  Desire ―is caught in the rails of metonymy, eternally extending 
toward the desire for something else‖ (Lacan, 1957/2006a, p. 518).  Desire never ceases 
and only seeks its own continuation.  Because there is no object that completely satisfies 
86 
 
desire, it is impossible for the child to be his mOther‘s sole object of desire.  Once the 
child perceives the desire of his mOther, he realizes that he can no longer be the be-all 
and end-all of her existence, and perhaps that he never was.   
 The Name-of-the-Father in separation functions as the first signifier(s) of the 
mOther‘s desire.  In the child‘s perception, the mOther‘s demand for him has been 
replaced or neutralized to some extent by the signifier of the mOther‘s desire.   
           
                           
 
↓ 
                                  (Ⱥ)
              
 
The Name-of-the-Father might, for instance, be ―work‖ inasmuch as someone has said 
that the first Other ―wants to go back to work now that the baby is old enough for 
daycare.‖  This someone must be a person that the child grants a particular authority in 
terms of possessing knowledge about his first Other.  Therefore it is most often the first 
Other herself or another immediate family member given authority in the mOther‘s 
discourse who successfully signifies the desire of the first Other.  If the first Other seems 
to want nothing other than her child and a father signifies her desire for something other 
than the child, the child will likely discount the father‘s words if the first Other has 
discounted the father‘s authority.  The Name-of-the-Father must be credible.   
As mentioned above, there is no object that perfectly corresponds to desire, and so 
any signifier of the lack in the mOther (or the symbolic phallus) fails to symbolize the 
whole of the Other‘s desire.  In other words, there is no signifier of the mOther‘s desire 
that perfectly corresponds to her lack in being.  Today, the mOther‘s desire is to return to 
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work, and tomorrow she wishes she could see her sister again.  The typically Oedipal 
configuration of separation occurs when the mOther‘s desire is symbolized as being for 
the father.  As long as what the mOther wants is represented as changeable rather than 
static, then the mOther‘s desire has been represented.  But how can the first signifier of 
the mOther‘s desire be said to signify her desire when desire must have more than one 
object?  The answer is that the child himself was the first object (of her demand) that 
allows the second object named (work) to represent the mOther‘s desire.   
The subject has a choice in accepting or rejecting the symbolization of the 
mOther‘s desire.  The subject‘s degree of freedom in this regard is unknown.  The 
subject‘s acceptance of the Name-of-the-Father amounts to a castration or a loss of 
jouissance that corresponds to separation from the mOther.  (In Lacanian algebra, what is 
lost in castration is represented by –  .)  The subject, then, may be motivated to disavow 
his initial perception of the mOther‘s desire so that he may retain his jouissance and his 
unquestionably special place in the mOther‘s world.  It is more likely, though, as 
exemplified in the case of Little Hans, that the subject prefers to be ―forced‖ to submit to 
castration so that he may gain his own symbolic space—one that is relatively devoid of 
anxiety.  Hans consciously fears that his father is angry with him for being so close to his 
mother just as he fears that his mother will go away.  Inasmuch as fears betray an 
unconscious desire, it is more correct to say that what Hans wants is for his mother to go 
away and for his father to force separation.  (I speak more about the case of Little Hans 
and perverse disavowal in Chapter IV.)  For the mOther‘s desire to be successfully 
symbolized, the second Other of the Law must have forcefully demanded the separation 
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of the mother-child dyad.  The Name-of-the-Father is the vehicle of the Law that 
regulates the desire of the first Other and the child.   
What is repressed in secondary repression has to do with the child‘s desire to be 
the object of his mother‘s jouissance and also with the child‘s drive-related desires 
(wanting to masturbate in public, for instance).  Accordingly, secondary repression 
involves a further rewriting of the imaginary and the real by the symbolic.  One 
consequence of this rewriting is that more jouissance is drained from the body, and the 
remainder is concentrated in the genital zones.  Secondary repression therefore has to do 
with castration, because the neurotic subject has given up jouissance in the form of his 
remaining satisfactions at being the object of his mother‘s jouissance.  In exchange for 
his castration, the neurotic subject now has the symbolic space to be able to pursue 
symbolic satisfactions.  He wants to make symbolic achievements in the world, and for 
the Other to hold him in high regard.  Nevertheless, the neurotic is left with the sense that 
he got a bum deal; his substitute satisfactions, derived from abiding by the law and 
gaining love and recognition from the Other, do not measure up to what he feels he has 
lost.  Although the neurotic has the freedom to pursue his desires, he is often unaware of 
what he wants (because of repression) or is inhibited in pursuing it (because of the further 
rewriting of the drives and loss of jouissance).  Neurotics, in contrast to psychotics and 
perverts, are blocked to a large degree from pursuing their desires because of inhibitions, 
anxieties, fear, guilt, and revulsion.   
At the point of separation, once the first Other‘s desire has been put into words, 
the child generally asks ―Who am I in the desire of my mOther?‖ and ―Who am I in the 
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desire of my second Other?‖40  These questions will continue throughout the subject‘s 
life, and psychoanalysis may be seen as the process of answering them.  The subject‘s 
desire to be the object of the Other‘s desire replaces the subject‘s wish to be the object of 
the Other‘s jouissance.  The subject‘s encounter with the lack in the Other enables him to 
read Other meanings into the Other‘s discourse—Other meanings that reveal the Other‘s 
desire rather than the Other‘s demand.   
In the intervals of the Other‘s discourse, the child experiences something that is 
radically mappable, namely, He is saying this to me, but what does he want?...It is 
[in metonymy] that what we call desire crawls, slips, escapes, like the ferret.  The 
Other‘s desire is apprehended by the subject in what does not work, in the gaps  in 
the Other‘s discourse, and all the child‘s whys reveal not so much an avidity for 
the reason of things, as a testing of the adult, a Why are you telling me this? ever-
resuscitated from its base, which is the enigma of the adult‘s desire. (Lacan, 
1973/1998a, p. 214, translation modified by Bruce Fink) 
The child, in his quest to become more lovable and desirable to the Other, attempts to 
decipher the enigma of the Other‘s desire so that he can try to perfect himself 
accordingly.  The child pays great attention to the Other‘s speech and behavior in his 
attempt to ascertain the irreducible quality possessed by the phallus (Ф) that incites her 
desire.   
The subject as manque à être searches for his lost being by asking the question 
―Who am I in the desire of the Other?‖ ―Whereas the first phase [alienation] is based on 
the substructure of union, the second [phase of separation] is based on the substructure 
that is called intersection‖ (Lacan, 1973/1998a, p. 213, translation modified by Bruce 
                                               
40 In this case, the second Other refers to a person other than the first Other. 
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Fink).  Separation is an intersection defined by what is lacking in both the set of the 
subject and the set of the Other.  At this intersection, ―[o]ne lack is superimposed upon 
the other…It is a lack engendered from the previous time that serves to reply to the lack 
raised by the following time‖ (p. 215).  In other words, the subject‘s lack in being—that 
was engendered by alienation—serves to reply to the lack in desire or the Other‘s desire.  
Put yet another way, the subject answers the enigma of the Other‘s desire (―What does 
the Other desire?‖) with his being (―Who am I?‖).  In this way, the subject invents 
himself as that which the Other desires (object a as the desired object).  In embodying 
what he concludes the Other desires, the subject hopes to regain being and return to his 
imagined former state of wholeness.   
The processes of alienation and separation enable us to understand Lacan‘s 
famous dictum: ―Le désir de l’homme, c’est le désir de l’Autre,‖ (Lacan, 1973/1998a, p. 
38).  According to Fink, (1997, p. 238), this can be translated either as ―Man‘s desire is 
for the Other to desire him‖ or as ―Man‘s desire is the same as the Other‘s desire.‖  The 
meaning of the former translation is suggested by the child‘s desire to be important to and 
loved by the parental Other.  The meaning of the latter translation is evident in the child‘s 
incorporation of the desire of the parental Other into his unconscious, such that the 
Other‘s desires become his desires.  If the Other desires to be at the top of her field, so 
too might the subject desire to make a name for himself in his career—his choice of 
career also being shaped by the desire of the Other.  More importantly, though, what 
causes the subject‘s desire is not the Other‘s desire for any particular object but the 
Other‘s desirousness as such.  The Other‘s desire as pure desirousness (object a as the 
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object-cause of desire), as a desire that cannot be extinguished by any object, is what 
elicits the subject‘s desire.   
The following diagram is the illustration suggested by Miller to represent 
separation, which I use here because Lacan did not provide any such depiction.   
 
In this diagram, it is clear that object a, in separation, is situated at the intersection of the 
lack in the subject and the lack in the Other.  In Seminar XI, object a is defined as the 
remainder left behind by the intersection of the symbolic with the real.  Object a is one of 
Lacan‘s most important concepts, and it plays a key role in the operation of separation 
insofar as the subject identifies with object a.  Object a is consequently the last  
remainder of the hypothetical mother-child unity to which the subject clings in 
fantasy to achieve a sense of wholeness, as the Other‘s desire, as the jouissance 
object, as that ‗part‘ of the mOther the child takes with it in separation, and as the 
foreign, fateful cause of the subject‘s existence that he or she must become or 
subjectify in analysis. (Fink, 1995, p. 83) 
Object a: The Vital Remainder 
 
―The power of pure loss emerges from the residue of an obliteration‖ (Lacan, 
1958/2006a, p. 691).   
Out of all his concepts, Lacan‘s object a is not only one of the most central but is 
also one of the most frequently revised.  Although I shall not attempt a comprehensive 
account of object a‘s many usages, I will discuss those that are central to this dissertation.  
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From the early 1950s until Seminar VII, Lacan‘s object a was a strictly imaginary object 
equated with the ego.  In Seminar VII (1959-1960), Lacan‘s discussion of object a as das 
Ding was the inauguration of its subsequent usage as an object in the real—that is, an 
object that defies articulation in language.  Because it is in the real, object a is an object 
associated with jouissance, being, and desire.
41
  After Lacan began referring to object a 
as an object in the real, however, he sometimes used object a to refer to an imaginary 
order semblance or façade of the real order object a.   
I have so far touched upon the concept of object a as representing the object that 
causes jouissance, the object of jouissance (or the object that is enjoyed), the object that 
causes desire, the object that is desired, and as the subject‘s being (as represented in the 
symbolic).  Object a is the result of the birth of the child into subjectivity, and it plays a 
key role in both perversion and neurosis because it structures the subject‘s drives and 
desires.  Because the psychotic possesses an ego, albeit an unstable one, the psychotic 
can be said to possess object a in a certain sense, however the discussion that follows 
here will be restricted to the objects a of the pervert and the neurotic. 
Object a may be helpfully considered to be the real remainder of the process of 
alienation.  The child‘s partial separation from the Other produces object a as a remnant 
of the hypothetical mother-child unity.  Consequently, object a is a symbol indicating 
both a lack in being and the ―object‖ to which the subject clings to ignore her lack in 
being.  The subject as manque à être attempts to regain her lost being along with her 
supposed sense of unity through her relationship with object a.  Likewise, the subject‘s 
                                               
41 Although desire is commonly associated with the symbolic order, desire actually springs from the lack in 
the Other.  That lack in the symbolic is the real.   
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relation to object a is Lacan‘s definition of fantasy.  Lacan represents fantasy by the 
matheme  ◊ a: the split subject in relation to object a.42   
The subject‘s fantasy or particular relation to object a reflects the way she wants 
to be positioned with respect to the Other‘s desire.  One of the meanings of object a, as 
previously mentioned, is the Other‘s desire; the Other‘s desire serves as the cause of the 
subject‘s desire.  In her fantasy, the subject obtains jouissance for herself by orchestrating 
object a in the scenario in accordance with what is most exciting to her.  Jouissance, as 
exciting satisfaction, may be consciously associated with any number of types of 
pleasurable or painful feelings.  In fantasy, the subject simultaneously connects herself to 
the Other and clings to the real.  The subject‘s fantasy and resulting jouissance provide 
her with an illusory sense of wholeness.   
Correspondingly, one major way in which Lacan formulates object a is as the lost 
object.  Although Lacan is indebted to Freud for this conceptualization, Lacan, in typical 
form, significantly revised Freud‘s notion of the lost object (1986/1997b, p. 222).  For 
Freud, the lost object before it became lost was first an object passively encountered by 
the infant that provided satisfaction, such as the mother‘s breast.  After the infant‘s initial 
experience with the breast, he recalls the memory of his experience of satisfaction and 
attempts to refind the now lost object either by way of a primary process (such as 
hallucination) or by way of a secondary process (seeking it out in the world).  Once the 
child reaches the genital stage, his sexual object-choice is a repetition or an actual 
refinding of the lost object.   
                                               
42 The lozenge may also mean ―desire for‖ such that the formula for fantasy may be read, ―the split subject 
who desires object a.‖  This reading of the lozenge, however, loses the important connotation that the split 
subject has a particular relationship to object a that is defined by her history. 
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In contrast, Lacan‘s object a as lost object was never fully present; it was never an 
actual object, but was only constituted as an object by way of fantasy once the infant 
could differentiate between herself and objects.  In other words, because the infant 
initially knows no separation or distinction between herself and the Umwelt, an object 
such as the breast cannot yet be said to exist for the infant.  The breast and its meaning as 
the lost object of satisfaction is only constituted after the advent of the ego.  In addition, 
the infant‘s repeated experiences of the absence of the breast and hence of the absence of 
satisfaction lead her to constitute the breast as an object separate from her that she cannot 
control.  Once the child develops her sense of self as separate from the Umwelt, she 
becomes irreversibly separated from her initial object of satisfaction.   
From the very advent of object a, the object is always already lost.  ―It is in its 
nature that the object as such is lost‖ (Lacan, 1986/1997b, p. 52).  The child can never 
refind the breast as she imagines she experienced it the first time—as something 
connected to and not separate from herself.  The lost object is therefore a fantasmatic 
construction, and so any actual breast the child encounters fails to measure up to the 
breast as object a.  Object a as fundamentally lost is the cause of desire and plays a 
central role in fantasies.  
Another meaning of Lacan‘s object a is that of das Ding (―the Thing,‖ in 
English), a concept loosely based on ―neuron a‖ from Freud‘s ―Project for a Scientific 
Psychology‖ (1895/1950).  As part of the perceptual system, Freud‘s neuron a is an 
―unchanging apparatus‖ (Lacan, 1986/1997b, p. 51) in relation to the variable ―neuron b‖ 
that forms links with other neuron bs.  Lacan ―translated‖ Freud‘s ―Project for a 
Scientific Psychology‖ such that neuron bs became signifiers and Bahnungen 
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(―breaches,‖ in English) became the connections linking signifiers together (p. 39).  
Neuron a, now das Ding, is the element that is ―excluded‖ (p. 71) from the signifying 
chain, although the chain revolves around it.  In other words, das Ding is ―the beyond-of-
the-signified‖ (p. 54), an object that ex-sists in the real. 
Furthermore, das Ding serves ―a primordial function‖ (Lacan, 1986/1997b, p. 62): 
―It is then in relation to the original Ding that the first orientation, the first choice, the 
first seat of subjective orientation takes place…‖ (p. 54).  Das ding has a role in the birth 
of the subject.  Lacan said, ―[i]t is as a function of this beyond-of-the-signified and of an 
emotional relationship to it that the subject keeps its distance and is constituted in a kind 
of relationship characterized by primary affect, prior to any repression‖ (p. 54).  ―[P]rior 
to any repression‖ (p. 54), or prior to the child‘s incorporation of the symbolic order, the 
child encounters das Ding or object a in its relations with the first Other.  In the initial 
encounter with das Ding, which Lacan called the ―primal scene‖ (1973/1998a, p. 69), the 
child experiences a primary, highly jouissance-laden affect.  The child therefore wants to 
remain in a proximal relationship with das Ding, but because getting too close to it results 
in strong anxiety, ―the subject keeps its distance‖ (1986/1997b, p. 54).  The primary 
affect leads to the constitution of a particular primal position—corresponding to a 
structural subjective position—with respect to das Ding; the hysteric‘s relation to das 
Ding is one of disgust, unpleasure, or aversion (pp. 53-54), and the obsessive, who 
experiences an ―excess, too much pleasure‖ (p. 54) in relation to das Ding, feels guilty 
afterward and adopts a strategy of avoidance (p. 54).  Another way of accounting for the 
child‘s birth into subjectivity, then, is as a defense against the jouissance associated with 
das Ding (Fink, 1995, p. 95).   
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Lacan, following Freud, said that ―one goal of the specific action which aims for 
the experience of satisfaction is to reproduce the initial state, to find das Ding, the object‖ 
(1986/1997b, p. 53).  ―The pleasure principle governs the search for the object and 
imposes the detours which maintain the distance in relation to its end‖ (p. 58).  As a lost 
object in the real, object a is, of course, impossible to find.  Nevertheless, the subject 
searches for and finds approximations of object a—often in romantic relationships.  The 
subject‘s fundamental stance toward object a can often be surmised by the clinician on 
the basis of what her analysand tells her about his sexual experiences—particularly the 
early ones.
43
  The observation that those who react to das Ding with guilt and aversion 
are obsessive and that those who react to das Ding with disgust are hysterical is one of 
great diagnostic importance.  I will discuss the pervert‘s primary relation to das Ding in 
Chapter V.   
Object a is the fantasmatic substitute for the being lost in castration (-φ), such that 
object a is both behind and ahead of the subject.  Object a represents both what was lost 
and what the subject wishes to refind.  In Seminar VIII Lacan said, ―It was a find, that of 
the fundamentally partial nature of the object insofar as it is the pivot, center, key of 
human desire‖ (Lacan, 2001, p. 176-177).  Object a‘s intimate connection to the subject‘s 
manque à être is at the root of its function as the object-cause of desire.   
Because object a is part of the real, it is invisible and unspeakable.  How, then, 
does object a manifest its presence?  When the subject approaches something or someone 
that embodies her object a, she experiences jouissance in the form of an affect such as 
disgust, elation, guilt, or anxiety.  In addition, the evidence of object a’s presence in 
                                               
43 My definition of ―sexual‖ here is a very broad one: sexual experiences are those in which a subject 
experiences jouissance in relation to object a.    
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fantasy is the jouissance the subject derives from her fantasies.  Object a often plays a 
visual role in the subject‘s fantasies, and it generally appears in a veiled or dressed up 
form.  Lacan designates a visual form of object a by the formula i(a), meaning an image 
of a.   
Many of the objects a that Lacan discusses seem to be produced by a bodily 
organ.  Lacan‘s list of objects a includes ―the [breast], the feces, the phallus (as an 
imaginary object), and the urinary flow.  (An unthinkable list, unless we add, as I do, the 
phoneme, the gaze, the voice…and the nothing.)‖ (Lacan, 1966/2006a, p. 817).  The eye, 
for instance, seems to produce the gaze (object a in the scopic field).  But the gaze, as 
part of the real, is not an actual object at all.  The seeming nothingness of the gaze as 
object a is what is represented by the signifiers (including ―eye‖) associated with object 
a.  Perversion, as I will explain in Chapter V, has a special relationship to the gaze and 
the voice.   
 Objects a were forged by a number of what Lacan called ―the cut‖ (1966/2006a, 
p. 817) during the child‘s process of socialization.  The cut is a signifier inscribed on the 
body at the place where object a seems to be affixed to an organ.  Cuts are marks of 
castration, indicating the loss of jouissance resulting from the child‘s birth into 
subjectivity.  Lacan said, 
The very delimitation of the ―erogenous zone‖ that the drive isolates from the 
function‘s metabolism (the act of devouring involves organs other than the 
mouth—just ask Pavlov‘s dog) is the result of a cut that takes advantage of the 
anatomical characteristic of a margin or border: the lips, ―the enclosure of the 
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teeth,‖ the rim of the anus, the penile groove, the vagina, and the slit formed by 
the eyelids, not to mention the hollow of the ear. (p. 817)   
The cuts of castration are formed through the child‘s relation to the Other.  The mOther 
makes demands that the child eat (oral zone), listen (aural zone), look (scopic zone), go to 
the bathroom (anal zone), and so on, and the child‘s interpretation of these demands 
result in the formation of his drives.  The subject identifies with the cuts of castration, and 
her identifications involve unary traits.   
The Partial Drives 
Object a is intimately connected to the drive; the drives circle around objects a.  
Translating Freud‘s Trieb as ―drive‖ rather than ―instinct‖ (1973/1998a, p. 49) as James 
Strachey did in the Standard Edition, Lacan said that the concept of the drives was one of 
Freud‘s ―fundamental concepts‖ (p. 12).  Freud distinguished between Instinkt 
(―instinct‖), which is a purely biological function at the level of the living being, and 
Trieb, which is linked to instinct but is structured by the symbolic and is particular to 
each subject.  The drives are formed through the child‘s process of socialization by way 
of the Other‘s demands—demands which often have to do with the child‘s body.  Lacan‘s 
matheme for the drive is  ◊ D (1966/2006a, p. 817).  It may be read: the split subject in 
relation to demand.  As in the case of fantasy, the subject has a certain relation to the 
drive that mirrors the way she wants to be positioned with respect to the Other‘s demand.    
The drives unceasingly revolve around objects a (Lacan, 1973/1998a, p. 257), 
never reaching a goal but finding satisfaction in their repetitive circular path.  The drive is 
―indifferent‖ (p. 168) to the attainment of an object insofar as the oral drive, for example, 
does not stop once the individual has eaten.  ―Thus any object can be adopted as the drive 
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object, though the drive object is not just any old object.  The Other‘s demand determines 
which object is adopted‖ (Brousse, 1995, p. 112).   
According to Miller, the drive is ―the final transformation of need, and at the same 
time, it‘s the final transformation of demand beyond desire and love‖ (Miller, 2009b, pp. 
41-42).  Just as demand overwrites the needs of the living being, so too desire, love, and 
the drive have their effects on the subject.  Miller notes that need, demand, desire, love, 
and the drive all imply different ways of pursuing satisfaction.  Of the satisfaction of the 
drive, Lacan said the following: 
Between these two terms—drive and satisfaction—there is set up an extreme 
antinomy that reminds us that the use of the function of the drive has for me no 
other purpose than to put in question what is meant by satisfaction…[The 
satisfaction of the drive] is paradoxical…For if one distinguishes, at the outset of 
the dialectic of the drive, Not from Bedürfnis, need from the pressure of the 
drive—it is precisely because no object of any Not, need, can satisfy the drive.  
Even when you stuff the mouth—the mouth that opens in the register of the 
drive—it is not the food that satisfies it, it is, as one says, the pleasure of the 
mouth. (Lacan, 1973/1998a, pp. 166-167) 
The paradox of the drive is that it does not, like a need, have a specific, delimited, 
material object that would satisfy its search, but that it obtains satisfaction nevertheless—
in the repetitive movement of its circuit.  At the same time, the subject has instantaneous 
impulses for something.  Consequently, the ―temporal structure of the drive‘s satisfaction 
is the instant‖ (Soler, 1995b, p. 52) as opposed to the temporal structure of the signifier, 
which is a dialectic between anticipation and retroaction.  Nevertheless, the constant 
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pressure exerted by the drive differentiates its temporal structure from that of need, which 
is periodic.   
 The drives are the only ―pathway by which the impact of sexuality is manifested 
in the subject‖ (Lacan, 1966/2006a, p. 849).  By circling around their objects, the drives 
bring sexuality as part of the real into the symbolic and imaginary orders (Lacan, 
1973/1998a, p. 168).  Freud, in his essay ―The Sexual Aberrations‖ (1905/1953a), wrote 
that sexuality consists of Partieltriebe or partial drives which correspond to different 
erogenous zones.  For instance, the anal drive corresponds to the anus and the oral drive 
corresponds to the mouth.  Freud argued that the drives of children are partial, but that 
proper development at the latency phase affords the genital organs priority over the 
partial drives such that the drives fuse together.   
Lacan rejected the idea that the partial drives could ever fuse to form a complete 
drive.  Lacan said,  
A drive, insofar as it represents sexuality in the unconscious, is never anything but 
a partial drive.  This is the essential failing [carence]—namely, the absence 
[carence] of anything that could represent in the subject the mode of what is male 
or female in his being. (1966/2006a, p. 849)   
A drive is partial insofar as it ―merely represents, and partially at that, the curve of 
fulfillment of sexuality in the living being‖ (Lacan, 1973/1998a, p. 177).  The drives are 
only translations and modifications of sexuality in the living being.   
 Lacan also emphasized the drive‘s relation to death.  ―[T]he drive, the partial 
drive, is profoundly a death drive and represents in itself the portion of death in the 
[sexual] living being‖ (1973/1998a, p. 205).  There are four reasons for the drive‘s 
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relation to death.  One is that the drive, as the subject‘s sexuality, is linked to sexual 
reproduction and thus to the cycle of birth and death.  ―So you see, the link between sex 
and death, sex and the death of the individual, is fundamental‖ (p. 150).  Another reason 
is that the drive attempts to go beyond the limits of the pleasure principle and obtain an 
excess of jouissance.
44
  Yet another reason is that every drive, in its circuit, pursues its 
own extinction.  The final reason is that the drive, like Freud‘s death drive (Thanatos), 
involves repetition.   
 It is important for clinicians to note that the subject‘s question regarding her 
identity is partially answered at the level of the drives.  For Lacan, there is a ―subject in 
the real‖ (1966/2006a, p. 835)—which might also be called the subject of jouissance or 
the subject of the drives.  The subject of jouissance is caused by the signifier (p. 835) 
insofar as the symbolic order structures the drives.  Psychoanalysis allows the subject to 
―discover something about his or her unconscious as knowledge, but also [to] learn 
something about him or herself as a libidinal subject‖ (Soler, 1995b, p. 53).  Jouissance is 
a substance (Lacan, 1975/1998b, p. 26) that is separate from the Other (although it can 
ex-sist in the Other), and so the subject‘s identity at the level of jouissance has more 
solidity than at the level of the sliding signifier.  The successful completion of a 
psychoanalysis is contingent upon the analysand‘s subjectification of her identity as 
subject of jouissance as well as subject of the symbolic.   
 In the next chapter, I will discuss how alienation, separation, object a, and the 
drives provide crucial standpoints from which to understand neurosis and perversion.   
 
                                               
44 ―What is at issue in the drive is finally revealed here—the course of the drive is the only form of 
transgression that is permitted to the subject in relation to the pleasure principle‖ (Lacan, 1973/1998a, p. 
183).   
102 
 
Chapter IV: The Etiology of Perversion 
 
The whole problem of the perversions consists in conceiving how the child, in its 
relationship with its mother—a relationship that is constituted in analysis not by 
the child‘s biological dependence, but by its dependence on her love, that is, by its 
desire for her desire—identifies with the imaginary object of her desire insofar as 
the mother herself symbolizes it in the phallus. (Lacan, 1959/2006a, p. 554) 
The Evolution of Perversion in Lacanian Thought 
 
 In this dissertation, I am privileging the later work of Lacan (1964-1980) over his 
earlier work.  This is for two main reasons.  The first is that 1964 (Seminar XI) was the 
year that Lacan explained the two movements of the paternal metaphor, the operations of 
alienation and separation.  These operations provide a useful framework not only for 
explaining the etiology of neurosis and perversion, but also for clearly differentiating 
between the two.  Before that time, neither Freud nor Lacan had succeeded in elaborating 
a logically sound qualitative distinction between the two structures.  The second main 
reason is that Lacan‘s emphasis during that time period on the order of the real allowed 
him to arrive at more nuanced understandings of human suffering, structural positions, 
and the practice of psychoanalysis—understandings which take the unsayable into 
account.  And perversion, even more so than neurosis, has to do with real order 
jouissance and its management.  Because I am privileging Lacan‘s later work, much of 
the Écrits and Seminars I through X, when referenced, will be considered in light of 
Lacan‘s later conceptual understandings.  For instance, even though Lacan speaks at 
some length about perversion in Seminar IV, he did so before having formulated his 
concept of split subject—a concept that is crucial to understanding and treating 
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perversion.  Furthermore, although Seminar VIII will be valuable in this dissertation for 
its discussion of perversion in combination with the real-order object a, it will be 
necessary to interpret Seminar VIII in light of later works, such as Seminar XI, and later 
concepts, such as the sinthome.   
 Throughout his career, Lacan consistently maintained that perversion is most 
likely a structural diagnosis reserved for masculine subjects (1960/2006a, p. 823; 
1973/1998a, p. 192, 1975/1998b, p. 87; 1994, p. 154).  Because a consideration of the 
accuracy of this claim is beyond the scope of this dissertation, Lacan‘s hypotheses in this 
regard will be briefly explicated, but not contested.  Therefore, I will henceforth use the 
masculine pronoun when referring to an individual with a perverse structure.   
Perversion and its Etiology 
 
 A pervert, as I have said, is a subject who has undergone alienation, but who has 
disavowed separation.  The perverse structure is, like all three structures, fundamentally a 
solution to a problem.  The pervert‘s problem ultimately stems from the inadequacy of 
the paternal function.
45
  His problem is that he experiences an unmanageable amount of 
anxiety or jouissance in his relation to the Other because he lacks a signifier for the 
Other‘s desire, S(Ⱥ).  Without being put into words, the lack of the Other seems 
unbearable and horrible.  In lieu of a better solution (S(Ⱥ)), the pervert ―identifies with 
the imaginary object of [the mother‘s] desire insofar as the mother herself symbolizes it 
in the phallus‖ (Lacan, 1959/2006a, p. 554).  As object a, the object-cause of jouissance, 
the pervert plugs up the hole in the Other by providing the Other with jouissance and 
                                               
45 I agree with Fink that perversion is due to the inadequacy of the paternal function, such that the pervert 
undergoes alienation but not separation.  In addition, I follow the lead of Fink, Miller, Tostain, and others 
in highlighting the role of disavowal in perversion.   
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temporarily squelching the Other‘s desire.  Consequently, unlike for the neurotic, for the 
pervert there is no persistent question of identity at the level of being.  The question 
―Who am I?‖ has a clear answer for the pervert; he is the object that completes the 
mOther. 
Perversion is a strategy for increasing the power of the paternal function and 
thereby setting limits to jouissance.  By way of disavowal, the pervert creates a substitute 
for the insufficient Other of the Law—one that has the power and the will to separate him 
from his first Other and to force him to give up the jouissance associated with the first 
Other.  This substitute is neither permanent nor sufficient, however, and so the pervert 
continues to suffer from an excess of jouissance and a lack of subjective space of his 
own.   
After the child has successfully undergone alienation, the child‘s transformation 
into a neurotic subject—instead of into a perverse subject—depends upon two related 
processes involved in the logical moment of separation: the child‘s acceptance (instead of 
disavowal) of castration and of the Law and his perception of the Other‘s lack in terms of 
desire (instead of in terms of jouissance).
46
  A minority of subjects become perverse, and 
the topic of this chapter is to explore the phenomena that impede or prevent the processes 
of separation from occurring. 
Key Aspects of Perversion 
1) The paternal function is inadequate. 
a. The subject disavows separation. 
b. The subject refuses or is denied castration, and so he suffers from an 
excess of jouissance. 
                                               
46 These two processes should be understood as I have elaborated them in Chapters II and III.   
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c. The subject encounters the lack in the Other only in terms of jouissance 
and not in terms of desire. 
2) Perverse fantasy = a ◊ .  He is the instrument of the Other‘s jouissance. 
a. The pervert has a limited ability to desire.  His identity is determined by 
being the actual object of jouissance of the Other 
3) The lawgiving Other exists, but only precariously; the pervert fervently tries to 
make the Other whole and to give it a stable existence. 
4) The pervert has an especially close relation to the gaze and the voice. 
Castration and the Phallus: Giving Up φ for Φ 
―Castration means that jouissance has to be refused in order to be attained on the 
inverse scale of the Law of desire‖ (Lacan, 1960/2006a, p. 827). 
For Lacan, castration, generally speaking, is the renunciation of jouissance for the 
substitute satisfactions the individual obtains in subjectivity.  Castration plays a key role 
in both alienation and separation.  In alienation, the child sacrifices some jouissance in 
order to become a subject in the symbolic order.  In separation, the subject gives up some 
jouissance derived from the drives when his fantasy changes from  ◊ D, or the split 
subject in relation to the Other‘s demand, to  ◊ a, or the split subject in relation to the 
object-cause of the Other‘s desire.  The perverse subject does not undergo the castration 
involved in separation. 
A neurotic subject position is acquired when the first Other (often the mOther)‘s 
desire is named and the subject perceives the mOther‘s lack in terms of desire.  
Correspondingly, the neurotic subject‘s renunciation of some of the pleasure of the drives 
results from this shift in how he perceives the Other and his relation to the Other.  Post-
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separation, the subject no longer constitutes himself solely as the object of his mOther‘s 
demands—demands which are tied to the jouissance of the partial drives.  Instead, the 
subject attempts to become object a, the object-cause of the Other‘s desire.47  By giving 
up his position as object-cause of the Other‘s jouissance in favor of the position of object-
cause of the Other‘s desire, the subject sacrifices some jouissance associated with the 
Other‘s proximity and with the drives, which are structured by the Other‘s demand.  The 
neurotic subject, having given up some of the jouissance of the drives, gains satisfactions 
in the order of desire, by pursuing ―his‖ desires, modeled as they are after the Other‘s 
desire.   
It is important to note that becoming neurotic involves a transformation of the 
fantasy object.  Prior to separation, the object that supports the fantasy  ◊ D is an 
actual object, a presence.  After separation, the object that supports the fantasy  ◊ a is a 
real-order object, an absence, or a lack.  The perverse fantasy, resulting from refusing or 
thwarting separation, is one in which the object that fuels it is a presence. The perverse 
fantasy is a ◊  (Lacan, 1962/2006a, p. 774), and will be discussed at length in the next 
chapter.  For now, it will suffice to say that the pervert places himself in the position of 
the object, and that this object is not the object-cause of the Other‘s desire, but the object-
cause of the Other‘s jouissance.   
Our understandings of the etiology and structure of perversion rest upon our 
interpretation of the phallus.  Even though Freud makes a distinction between the penis 
and the phallus as a symbol of male desire (and of female desire), he often equates the 
two.  The same is true of Lacan—particularly in his work in the 1950s.  Because the 
distinction is an important one, I strive to make it clearly in this dissertation.   
                                               
47 It is structurally impossible for the subject to fill the lack in the Other of desire.   
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The image of the erect penis, and not a flaccid one, serves—in our current societal 
context—to symbolize desire.  The phallus as an imaginary object (rather than as a 
signifier), unlike the organ of the penis, is always erect.  The imaginary phallus (φ), 
therefore, is distinct from the penis as a biological organ.  Furthermore, because it is an 
imaginary order phenomenon, the imaginary phallus refers to the role that the penis plays 
in the child‘s fantasy and it represents the boy‘s narcissistic attachment to his penis and 
the pleasures it affords him.   
At the level of the symbolic, the phallus as a signifier (Φ) is the signifier of desire, 
of the Other‘s lack.  Its imaginary counterpart, according to both Freud and Lacan, is the 
image of the erect penis (the imaginary phallus).  Its existence in the real is designated by 
object a, although it, as real, is the unspeakable cause of the Other‘s desire, and is not a 
signifier.   
 Why is the signifier of desire represented in the imaginary by the erect penis?  
The erect penis
48
 is able to provide a universal visual symbol of male sexual desire 
insofar as an erection is generally associated with male sexual desire.  If a man does not 
have an erection in a sexual encounter, his partner might very well feel undesired by him.  
Every man‘s sexual desire can be represented by the imaginary phallus (although this 
does not exclude a particular man‘s desire from also being represented by something 
else).  The phallus is a culturally and historically contextual signifier; it is possible that 
some other signifier—such as one associated with female genitalia—may serve or may 
have served as the signifier of desire.   
                                               
48 In the clinic as well as in everyday discourse, subjects often speak about objects that metonymically 
represent the imaginary phallus for them.  For instance, objects such as skyscrapers, cigars, and tall, thin 
cacti sometimes play phallic roles in dreams, jokes, literature, and movies. 
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 However, there is no signifier of desire in widespread use that corresponds to 
female sexual desire, probably because female sexual desire is extremely difficult to 
clearly represent.  There is no one visible physiological sign of a woman‘s arousal that is 
present in the majority of sexual encounters.  In this sense, the set of women cannot be 
totalized in the same way as can the set of men, and this fact has numerous consequences 
for Lacan‘s theory on gender.  Because female sexual desire lacks an unambiguous and 
universal symbol, it too is represented by the imaginary phallus.
49
  This is likely what 
often causes women to have difficulty understanding and describing their sexuality in 
something other than in masculine terms.
 50
   
There is yet another reason why the signifier of lack is represented by the image 
of an erect penis.  In ―The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire,‖ Lacan 
says that the phallus is the signifier of the sacrifice of jouissance in the castration 
                                               
49 It is from this observation that Freud concluded that masculine libido is the only type of libido.  Even 
though Lacan agrees with Freud that there is only one symbolizable form of libido (Lacan calls it phallic 
jouissance), Lacan theorized (with the help of clinical evidence and support from literature) that there is an 
Other jouissance that is not representable within the symbolic order.  Women have access not only to 
phallic jouissance, but to this unsayable Other jouissance as well.  Men are restricted to the experience of 
phallic jouissance.   
50 Luce Irigaray, in her chapter ―Desire‖ from This Sex Which Is Not One (1977), protests against the 
representation of female desire in masculine terms, and argues, against Lacan, that it is possible to signify 
femininity and female desire in strictly feminine terms.  Irigaray recommends, as a starting point, that we 
change the way we speak of female genitalia.  Instead of talking about female genitalia in visual terms, 
Irigaray says we would talk about it in tactile terms, because she believes that the essence of femininity has 
to do with the primacy of touch.  Furthermore, Irigaray equates femininity with infinity and multiplicity, 
versus masculine finitude and singularity.  Correspondingly, Irigaray says ―woman ‗touches herself‘ all the 
time, and…her genitals are formed of two lips in continuous contact.  Thus, within herself, she is already 
two—but not divisible into one(s)—that caress each other‖ (p. 354).  Later, Irigaray describes the vagina 
and the labia as an ―incompleteness of form which allows [a woman‘s] organ to touch itself over and over 
again, indefinitely, by itself‖ (p. 355).  Therefore, Irigaray does not come up with one signifier which 
would serve as alternative to the phallus, but instead recommends a multiplicity of metaphors and phrases.   
Despite wide readership and interest in Irigaray‘s solution, it is now 33 years since the publication 
of her chapter and evidence points to the fact that her signifiers of feminine desire have failed to take root.  
The reason for this likely has to do with the necessity for a signifier of feminine desire that has a clear and 
universal imaginary counterpart.   Furthermore, Lacan theorizes that there is something essential about 
language that renders impossible putting the essence of femininity into words.  Someone with a feminine 
structure, according to Lacan, is defined by the presence of real order Other jouissance in addition to 
symbolic order phallic jouissance.  Although it may be said to be unfair that the phallus signifies feminine 
desire, it may also be said to be unfair that individuals with a masculine structure are limited to experiences 
of phallic jouissance.   
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complex,
51
 thus making the phallus the signifier of lack.  The imaginary phallus, Lacan 
says— 
that is, the image of the penis—is negativized where it is situated in the specular 
image.  That is what predestines the phallus to give body to jouissance in the 
dialectic of desire… It is thus that the erectile organ—not as itself, or even as an 
image, but as a part that is missing in the desired image—comes to symbolize the 
place of jouissance. (Lacan, 1960/2006a, p. 822) 
Although this passage, in typical Lacanian fashion, resists easy interpretation, its 
meanings are highly relevant to the topic at hand in this chapter.  What is key to 
understand here is that Lacan is referring both to castration (as the logical moment of 
separation) and to the subject‘s interpretation of its specular mirror image according to 
the Other‘s desire.   
Even though parents do, even in the present day, make literal castration threats,
52
 
what functions more commonly for the child as a ―castration threat‖ are the parents‘ 
demands that she or he give up jouissance associated with masturbation.  The parents‘ 
demands ―Don‘t touch that‖ or ―Don‘t do that in front of company‖ are interpreted by the 
child to mean that all of her or his masturbatory pleasures are prohibited by the Other.  In 
the child‘s mirror image of her- or himself as desirable to her or his parental Other, then, 
the imaginary phallus ―is negativized‖ and ―missing‖ (Lacan, 1960/2006a, p. 822) insofar 
as the genitals are seen as negative and undesirable.   
Lacan emphasizes that the imaginary phallus is particularly suited to this function 
of negativization because ―its position as a ‗pointy extremity‘ in the form predisposes it 
                                               
51 The castration complex might be considered to be part of the operation of separation. 
52 For example, ―I will cut off your penis if you do that again‖ or ―I will cut off your hand if you keep 
touching yourself with it.‖  
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to the fantasy of it falling off—in which its exclusion from the specular image is 
completed as is the prototype it constitutes for the world of objects‖ (Lacan, 1960/2006a, 
p. 822).  Therefore, it is the obvious visibility of the erect penis that lends itself to the 
fantasy of it falling off or being cut off.  This fantasy is set in motion by the child 
perceiving that his genitalia are a liability, as being subject to or having already been lost.  
Correspondingly, Lacan symbolizes the negativization of the genitals by –φ, or negative 
phi, indicating that the image of the erect penis is always threatened with loss.  The 
imaginary phallus, being threatened with loss, is perceived by the child to provide such a 
precarious source of jouissance that the ―decision‖53 to give up φ for Φ almost naturally 
follows.   
Although Lacan did not explicitly mention how girls undergo the process of 
castration in ―The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire,‖ he did so in 
other articles, for instance in his article ―On Freud‘s ‗Trieb‘ and the Psychoanalyst‘s 
Desire.‖  
(It is the fact that a woman must go through the same dialectic [of castration], 
whereas nothing seems to oblige her to do so—she must lose what she does not 
have—which tips us off, allowing us to articulate that it is the phallus by default 
that constitutes the amount of the symbolic debt: a debit account when one has it, 
a disputed credit when one does not). (Lacan, 1964/2006a, pp. 852-853)   
It follows that Lacan maintained that girls too give up jouissance and undergo castration.  
Furthermore, the process of castration for girls has just as much to do with the phallus 
                                               
53 The word ―decision‖ connotes, in our culture, a conscious choice.  To what degree the child‘s choice is 
conscious or unconscious is a matter of debate, but it not one that has dramatic consequences for the theory 
behind working with neurosis and perversion. 
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and with the penis (that she does not have), although clearly they are not forced to give 
up their jouissance in exactly the same fashion as boys.   
Returning to the issue of the negativization of the imaginary phallus in ―The 
Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire,‖ we may here assume that this 
process of negativization and castration (of giving up a narcissistic attachment to one‘s 
genitalia) is easier for girls than for boys.
54
  This is because the mirror image of a girl 
already reflects the lack of a ―pointy extremity‖ (Lacan, 1960/2006a, p. 822), so a girl 
can fantasize that her imaginary phallus has already fallen off or been cut off.  There is no 
use in protesting a loss that has already occurred.  Perhaps this is one way we can 
understand Lacan‘s statement in this article that ―the male sex [is] the weaker sex with 
regard to perversion‖ (p. 823).   
Furthermore, castration threats also commonly fall under the category of demands 
intended to separate the child from the primary caregiver.  A child‘s eroticism is related 
to the mOther insofar as it was her words, touch, care, and attention that invested the 
child‘s erogenous zones with jouissance in the first place.  A child‘s masturbatory 
behavior and corresponding fantasies are therefore always connected to the mOther.  
Accordingly, castration is considered to involve a relinquishing of jouissance related both 
to the imaginary phallus and to the primary caregiver.   
Resolving the Castration Complex 
 
―[P]erversion may be spoken of as fear of castration, fear of the Other‘s castration 
essentially‖ (Miller, 1996b, p. 317). 
                                               
54 Lacan did not equate biological sex with gender identity.  Instead, in Seminar XX Lacan explained the 
etiology and differences between masculine and feminine structures, which do not necessarily follow from 
the presence of male or female (or something outside of those two categories) genitalia.   
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Typically, especially in Freud‘s work, the child is said to fear castration because 
of the loss of jouissance it entails.  Following the psychoanalytic rule that a fear often 
betrays a wish, it might be, however, that the child to some degree wishes for castration 
for that very reason; too much jouissance is difficult to bear.  Whether the child accepts 
castration out of fear, hope, or both, the child overcomes the castration complex and 
becomes neurotic by renouncing his narcissistic attachment to his imaginary phallus and 
its associated drive-related jouissance in favor of the symbolic phallus and the 
opportunity to gain substitute satisfactions through pursuing activities and personal 
qualities valued by the parental Other.  The neurotic here takes his cues from the Other, 
and displaces some of the jouissance formerly associated with the imaginary phallus—
thought to be undesirable by the Other—to pursuits desired by the Other.  It is through 
castration, in the shift from imaginary to the symbolic, that the value that the child 
assigned to a physically present object (the genitalia) is transferred to the intangible 
object a.  The symbolic phallus (Φ) signifies ―the place of jouissance‖ (Lacan, 
1960/2006a, p. 822) and is ―the signifier of jouissance‖ (p. 823) insofar as it represents 
the determinants of the Other‘s jouissance and desire.  Often, Lacan called the phallus 
(Φ) ―the signifier of the Other‘s desire‖ (1958/2006a, p. 694).  The neurotic subject 
achieves a further separation from the Other through the process of castration which 
gives him the freedom to come into being as a desiring subject, although he models his 
desire and jouissance on that of the Other.   
According to Lacan and Freud, the pervert does not give up φ for Φ, and therefore 
retains his jouissance and his position as the instrument of the Other‘s jouissance.  What 
causes the perverse response to the castration complex?  Lacan said very little in the way 
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of direct hypotheses as to the causes of perversion.  However, Lacan‘s detailed 
elaborations of separation, castration, the phallus, and object a provide ample theoretical 
material from which to make such hypotheses.  In general, the perverse solution to the 
castration complex is due to the inadequacy of the paternal function.  Several aspects of 
the inadequacy of the paternal function will be explored in this chapter.   
One contributing factor in the ―choice‖ to retain jouissance may be that the 
pervert’s imaginary phallus fails to become negativized.  If the child‘s imaginary phallus 
does not undergo negativization, there is no motivating force influencing the child to give 
up some of the jouissance associated with it and the drives.  The minimal conditions for 
the imaginary phallus to be negativized are that the child (as split subject, post-alienation 
and pre-separation) sufficiently respects the second Other, the lawgiving Other, and that 
the person representing the lawgiving Other utters demands interpreted by the child as 
castration threats.  Frequently, what prevents these two conditions from being met is the 
great value the first Other places on the child‘s imaginary phallus and an unusually close 
relationship between the first Other and the child.  At a minimum, two people must make 
the appropriate contribution for this condition to be met: the child and at least one 
parental figure.  I will define the qualifier ―sufficiently‖ in the paragraphs that follow the 
chart. 
Reasons for the Failure of the Negativization of the Imaginary Phallus 
1) The second Other (the lawgiving Other) is not sufficiently respected by the 
child  
a. because of the child‘s refusal to sufficiently respect the second Other 
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b. because the first Other does not sufficiently respect the second Other 
(as reflected in the first Other‘s discourse) 
c. because of both of the above 
2) The child never attributes castration threats55 to the second Other 
a. because of the child‘s refusal to interpret any of the second Other‘s 
statements as castration threats (owing to Condition 1a, the child‘s 
refusal to sufficiently respect the second Other) 
b. because the child is unable to interpret any of the second Other‘s 
statements as castration threats (owing to Condition1b, the inadequacy 
of the second Other as reflected in the discourse of the first Other) 
c. because the parental figure embodying the second Other never uttered 
castration threats 
3) The child perceives the parental figure who plays the role of first Other to 
approve of and/or derive jouissance from the child‘s penis, giving the 
imaginary phallus a positive symbolic value that resists negativization.   
4) The child perceives himself to be the be-all-and-end-all of the existence of the 
first Other. 
All of these conditions relate to what was earlier referred to as the inadequacy of 
the paternal function.  Regarding Condition 1, it follows that if the second Other is not 
sufficiently respected by the child, any castration threats made will fall flat, having no 
effect on the child‘s perception of its desirable mirror image.  Conditions 2a and 2b 
logically follow from the fulfillment of Condition 1.  The child either will not or cannot 
                                               
55 The reader should remember that the term ―castration threats‖ covers a wide variety of statements, 
including the common requests that the child refrain from touching his genitals when there is company 
present or that the child be less attached to his mother. 
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interpret any of the second Other‘s statements as castration threats because the child 
believes statements made by the second Other are fraudulent, empty, and impotent.  
Condition 2c is probably rare, owing not only to the wide variety of statements that could 
logically be interpreted as castration threats, but also to the widespread social convention 
that it is inappropriate to touch or show one‘s genitalia to others.  In the event that 
Condition 2c is met but Condition 1 is not met, we might still say that that 2c is related to 
a partial failure of the paternal metaphor, insofar as its function at the stage of separation 
is to force the child to relinquish imaginary satisfactions (φ) for symbolic ones (Φ). 
If the lawgiving Other is not sufficiently given credence by the child, then, the 
child will become perverse rather than neurotic.  The child as split subject has 
successfully undergone alienation, and so he has to some degree recognized and accepted 
the second Other.  At this in-between stage, the future pervert is the child who comes to 
see the lawgiving Other as nothing but a façade.  The most likely—as well as the most 
frequently clinically reported—way in which the child attains this position with respect to 
the second Other is through the second Other‘s position in the discourse of the first Other.   
The first Other, often a mother, having superficially recognized the Name-of-the-
Father and thus having enabled the child‘s alienation by language, subsequently reduces 
the symbolic authority of the Law to a mere system of social conventions.  According to 
her, the Law is a façade that needs to be respected only for the sake of keeping up 
appearances.  Frequently, the lawgiving Other is represented by the father.  In such cases 
(such as in the clinical case presented in Chapter VIII), the mOther, with her child as 
audience, peristently pokes fun at the authority of the father, revealing the emptiness 
beneath the surface of its tricks.  Although the child recognizes the lawgiving Other, the 
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mOther‘s derision of it results in the child seeing it as without consequence.  Any 
demands uttered in the Name-of-the-Father only gain significance if they are convenient 
for the mOther.  The Law of the father is demonstrated to be insubstantial in the face of 
the mOther‘s whims. 
In the perverse Oedipal constellation, then, the lawgiving Other is found to be 
seriously lacking in credibility.  Consequently, any castration threats uttered in the Name-
of-the-Father either will not or cannot be taken seriously by the child, thus preventing the 
negativization of the imaginary phallus.  The child goes on thinking and acting as if no 
threat had been uttered.  There is no Other who can force the child to relinquish his 
jouissance and undergo castration.  Nor is there an Other who can convince the child that 
symbolic pursuits are a superior alternative to imaginary jouissance.  There is only the 
child, the first Other, and a second Other whose existence is tenuous.  This structure 
binds the child closely to the first Other. 
A common factor supporting the perverse Oedipal constellation is the first Other‘s 
interest, enjoyment, or pride in the child‘s penis (Condition 3).  The manner and quantity 
of attention the first Other pays to the child‘s penis affects the localization of jouissance.  
If a first Other attaches great value to the child‘s penis, the child will probably develop a 
large narcissistic investment in his imaginary phallus.  This narcissistic investment, 
however, should be understood in terms of the child‘s erotic relation to the first Other.  
The jouissance the child attaches to his imaginary phallus is always associated with the 
first Other, such that the two different types of castration threats
56
 function in the same 
                                               
56 One general type is the demand that the child cease masturbating, and the other type is the demand that 
the child maintain a greater distance from the first Other and not be so tied to the first Other‘s ―apron 
strings.‖   
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way and cause the same effects—regardless of whether one, the other, or both types of 
threats are uttered to the child.  A child whose first Other places immense value on the 
child‘s penis will most likely strongly resist either type of castration threat.   
Condition 4 is closely related to Condition 3—so much so that I have not yet 
encountered a clinical case of perversion (either in print or in clinical experience) in 
which only one condition was met.  It is statistically and clinically quite normal for a first 
Other to consciously or unconsciously use the child to cover up her symbolic lack of 
jouissance (rather than simply acting upon a child-rearing instinct or upon unselfish 
love).  When a parent chooses to have a child, she or he is doing so out of a certain desire 
or lack that she or he hopes the child, as a source of satisfactions, will fill.  
Correspondingly, in Seminar IV Lacan said, ―A mother always requires her child to have 
(or be) the phallus, which the child symbolizes or realizes more or less‖ (Lacan, 1994, p. 
56).   
The first Other of a pervert has such a strong and seemingly exclusive interest in 
the child that the pervert never comes to understand that he only ―more or less‖ (Lacan, 
1994, p. 56) resembles the lack in the Other.
57
  In other words, the pervert never 
interprets the symbolic phallus (as the signifier of the lack in the Other) as the signifier of 
the Other‘s metonymic, ever sliding desire—which he could never hope to satisfy.  
Instead, so perfectly does he seem to resemble what the Other wants that he believes the 
Other lacks something which is present in the world (namely, him) rather than something 
which is absent.   
                                               
57 One might think, as in Tostain‘s (1980) case of John, that a boy who is an only child is more likely to 
become a pervert than a boy who has siblings (especially siblings who live in the same home with himself 
and his mother).  However, in all three of the cases of perversion that I have encountered in my clinical 
work, the pervert had at least two other siblings.  In one of these cases, he was the youngest child, and in 
the other cases, he was the youngest son.  
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In our society, it is a statistical fact that mothers are most often in the role of 
primary caregiver (or first Other).  Moreover, it is a clinical fact that a mother is more apt 
to take a son than a daughter as her perfect complement, and it is likely that this has to do 
with the mother‘s culturally formed notions concerning the biological sex of the son.  In 
Fink‘s words, 
Insofar as mothers do not often take their daughters as their complement to the 
same extent, look to them for such intense satisfaction in life, or take such great 
interest in their genitals, the mother-daughter relationship is rarely eroticized to 
the same degree, jouissance is not usually symbolically localized for females in 
the same way, and the struggle with the father over separation from the mother 
generally does not come to a head in the same way or focus on a specific organ. 
(1997, pp. 172-173) 
This clinical fact supports Lacan‘s supposition that ―the male sex [is] the weaker sex with 
regard to perversion‖ (Lacan, 1960/2006a, p. 823).   
 The inadequacy of the paternal function is what allows the too-close mother-son 
bond to form in the first place. In support of this, Lacan said, ―But Freud reveals to us 
that it is thanks to the Name-of-the-Father that man does not remain bound [attaché] to 
the sexual service of his mother…‖ (1964/2006a, p. 852).  If the Name-of-the-Father is 
inadequate, then, the son ―remain[s] bound to the sexual service of his mother‖ (p. 852).  
―[S]exual service‖ (p. 852) does not necessarily imply what our society might consider to 
be sexual abuse, but instead implies an eroticized, jouissance-laden relationship between 
the mother and son in which the son is constituted solely as the object of the mother‘s 
demand.  The child cannot fully function as a subject in the symbolic order if he remains 
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bound to his mother as the object-cause of her jouissance.  Echoing Winnicott, we might 
say that the ―good-enough‖ Name-of-the-Father functions to separate the child from the 
first Other—a separation which irrevocably alters the relationship between child and 
Other from one of jouissance to one (primarily) of desire.
58
   
 There are numerous possible reasons why the second Other might be inadequate 
at the logical time of separation.  For instance, the person playing the role of second 
Other (often a father figure) may have become absent from the child‘s life after the time 
of alienation, the first Other did not perpetuate his role through her discourse, and no 
other person assumed the role of second Other.  Alternatively, the father might be glad 
that the mother is giving so many of her attentions to the child because this enables him 
more freedom, and thus he does not want to separate his son from his wife.  As another 
example, the father may be confused or ambivalent about his role as symbolic separator, 
shying away from making a demand such as the traditional incest prohibition: ―Your 
mother is mine, but you can have any other woman.‖  On the other hand, the father‘s 
castration threats might simply be lacking in force when compared to the will of the 
mother and her ability to undermine an authority beyond herself. 
Desire or Jouissance? Naming the Lack in the Other 
 
―If the Name-of-the-Father were to speak, it would say, ‗You are not the 
phallus!‘‖ (Miller, ―Donc,‖ June 29, 1994) 
                                               
58 Perversion cannot be considered a ―stage‖ in development that neurotics pass through because it is likely 
that many neurotics did not have such eroticized relationships with their mothers or encounter the Law as a 
façade.  Furthermore, perversion results only after the operation of disavowal of castration, and the 
symptoms and relation to the Other which follow cannot be said to have been there prior to disavowal.  The 
neurotic does not disavow castration, but accepts it and represses his desire for the mOther.   
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As I explained in detail in Chapter III, the second major process involved in 
accepting the operation of separation (the first is castration) is perceiving the lack in the 
Other in terms of desire.  Post-alienation, the child, now split subject—unlike the living 
being/psychotic—knows he has a special place in the Other.  The child knows he is 
wanted and loved by the Other, and therefore he knows that there is a lack in the Other.  
The child‘s next transformation will depend upon whether he will interpret the Other‘s 
lack (the symbolic phallus or the S(Ⱥ)) in terms of demand and jouissance (the pervert‘s 
interpretation) or in terms of desire (the neurotic‘s interpretation). 
The minimal conditions which must be present for the child to realize that the 
symbolic phallus signifies desire are that (1) there be a reputable authority concerning 
the mOther (2) who convincingly puts the mOther’s desire into words.  The conditions 
supporting the prevention of this realization are essentially the same as those responsible 
for the failure of the negativization of the imaginary phallus,
59
 with the modification of 
Condition 2.   
Obstacles to Interpreting the Symbolic Phallus as the Signifier of Desire 
1) The second Other (the lawgiving Other) is not sufficiently ―respected‖ by the 
child. ―Respect,‖ in this case, requires both love and the child‘s sense that the 
second Other makes demands of him not arbitrarily but in his ―best interest.‖ 
a. because of the child‘s refusal to sufficiently ―respect‖ the second Other 
b. because the first Other does not sufficiently ―respect‖ the second Other 
(as reflected in the first Other‘s discourse) 
c. because of both of the above 
                                               
59 The failure of the negativization of the imaginary phallus, as we have seen, signifies not only the failure 
to place a negative value on the masturbatory pleasures of the penis, but also the failure to place a 
prohibition on a too-close relation between first Other and child. 
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2) The child never hears a convincing signifier of the Other‘s desire 
a. because of the child‘s refusal to interpret any of the first or second 
Other‘s statements as signifiers of the first Other‘s desire  
b. because the child is unable to interpret any of the first or second 
Other‘s statements as signifiers of the first Other‘s desire (owing to the 
lack of credibility of the first and second Other) 
c. because neither the first or second Other utters a signifier of the first 
Other‘s desire (either in the child‘s presence or as told to the child by a 
reputable authority, such as a therapist) 
3) The child perceives the parental figure who plays the role of first Other to 
approve of and/or derive jouissance from the child‘s penis, giving the 
imaginary phallus a positive symbolic value that resists negativization.   
4) The child perceives himself to be the be-all and end-all of the existence of the 
first Other. 
Even if the mOther‘s desire is put into words for the child, the child will be likely 
to disbelieve or possibly disavow those words if the person who says them lacks 
credibility.  For example, if the child does not ―respect‖ the lawgiving Other (Condition 
1), the person representing the Other of the Law will not have the power to name the 
mOther‘s desire.  In addition (if through experience and the mOther‘s speech), the child 
has concluded that he is the perfect complement to the mOther (Condition 4) and that he 
gives the mOther a great deal of jouissance (Condition 3), he may discredit the mOther‘s 
own statements concerning the objects of her desires (for things other than the child).   
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The Positivizing Function of the Symbolic Phallus 
 As we have seen, the symbolic phallus represents the related processes of 
castration and the naming of the Other‘s desire.  Of the shift from the imaginary to the 
symbolic, Lacan said,  
The shift of (-φ) (lowercase phi) as phallic image from one side to the other of the 
equation between the imaginary and the symbolic renders it positive in any case, 
even if it fills a lack.  Although it props up (-1), it becomes Φ (capital phi) there, 
the symbolic phallus that cannot be negativized… (Lacan, 1960/2006a, p. 823) 
Lacan thus said that when the symbolic phallus is born, it is ―positivized,‖ suggesting 
three related meanings.  The first is that the symbolic phallus, as signifier (in contrast to 
the image of the phallus), is unable to be destroyed or ―negativized.‖  The second 
suggested meaning is that the symbolic phallus is associated with the qualities and 
pursuits deemed positive or desirable by the Other.  Finally, when the phallus signifies 
the imagined loss of jouissance, it both brings the loss into existence and neutralizes the 
negative value of the loss to some extent, as is often the case when something painful is 
put into words.  Consequently, the symbolic phallus signifies language‘s function of 
positivization, which amounts to the process of signification itself.
60
   
 The child cannot understand his mOther to be a desiring being until her desire is 
put into words.  At the same time, the signification of the mOther‘s desire both brings the 
Other‘s desire into existence for the child and alleviates the child‘s anxiety about his 
mOther‘s lack.  The naming of the mOther‘s desire enables the child to undergo a second 
                                               
60 ―For [the phallus] is the signifier that is destined to designate meaning effects as a whole, insofar as the 
signifier conditions them by its presence as signifier‖ (Lacan, 1958/2006a, p. 690). 
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separation from his mother.  This further shift into the symbolic realm drains more 
jouissance from the child‘s body as his ability to desire is increased.   
Fetishism, Disavowal, and the Maternal Phallus 
 
Related to the importance of putting words to the mOther‘s desire is the 
importance of assigning different names to male and female genitalia.  The fetishist is the 
child who, unable to assign a signifier to the mother‘s genitalia, disavows the perception 
of what seems to him the absence of a penis and maintains side by side two pieces of 
contradicting knowledge: the knowledge that his mother has a penis is held alongside the 
knowledge that she does not have a penis.  In the realm of belief, one piece of knowledge 
is favored: the pervert possesses a strong belief that women have penises.  A brief 
digression into Freud‘s second theory of perversion will help elucidate the fetishist‘s 
disavowal of the mother‘s lack of a penis.     
 Freud, in his paper ―Fetishism‖ (1927/1961), opined that the moment of the 
child‘s discovery of female genitalia is a traumatic one that has potentially symptomatic 
consequences.  Freud said,  
Probably no male human being is spared the fright of castration at the sight of a 
female genital.  Why some people become homosexual as a consequence of that 
impression, while others fend it off by creating a fetish, and the great majority 
surmount it, we are frankly not able to explain. (p. 154) 
In Freud‘s theory, a boy experiences castration anxiety at his first sight of his mother‘s 
genitalia, having previously assumed that she had a penis, and now believing that his 
father must have castrated her, just as he could castrate him.  ―The great majority 
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surmount‖ (p. 154) castration anxiety by giving up masturbation and the infantile object 
choice—the mother—because the child believes these to be his father‘s demands. 
The fetishist, in order to ward off castration anxiety, disavows his mother‘s 
castration (her literal lack of a penis).  Freud said that the child‘s perception of his 
mother‘s genitalia is put out of mind (via disavowal) because it provides evidence that the 
father is capable of castrating him if he does not relinquish his libidinal investment in his 
mother.  The child interprets the sight of his mother‘s genitalia to mean that the father has 
already castrated his mother, and that his father might very well do the same to him if he 
does not obey his father‘s will.  By disavowing his perception of his mother‘s genitalia, 
the child is able to avoid feeling castration anxiety and to refuse to give up his mother.   
At the same time, the mechanism of disavowal both stems from and results in ―the 
divided attitude of fetishists to the question of the castration of women.  In very subtle 
instances both the disavowal and the affirmation of the castration have found their way 
into the construction of the fetish itself‖ (Freud, 1927/1961, p. 156).  Correspondingly, 
the fetishist experiences both ―[a]ffection and hostility‖ (p. 157) toward his fetish, ―mixed 
in unequal proportions in different cases, so that the one or the other is more clearly 
recognizable‖ (p. 157).  Consequently, the child‘s fetishistic solution to castration anxiety 
is only a partial solution; some castration anxiety remains and is manifest in the fetishist‘s 
relation to the fetish.   
Disavowal, according to Freud, involves a Spaltung or split, in which two pieces 
of knowledge are maintained side by side even though they contradict each other.  The 
child may learn to repeat only what others say (―Of course women don‘t have penises‖) 
for the sake of saving face, but nevertheless at some level he maintains the knowledge 
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that women do have penises.  Alongside these pieces of knowledge is the absolute 
conviction that the child‘s mother has a penis.  This conviction is a belief so prized that it 
is defended at all costs and against any evidence to the contrary.  The fetish is a libido-
invested object that serves as substitute for the penis of the mother, and it maintains the 
disavowal and split in the child‘s ego. 
 Freud‘s second theory of perversion was an improvement on his developmental 
model of perversion (in which perversion was defined by the quantitative factors of 
fixation on the sexual object and exclusiveness of the sexual aim) because disavowal 
served as a qualitative criterion of (fetishistic) perversion.  Nevertheless, his theory is 
criticized for indiscriminance owing to his 1940 article ―Splitting of the ego in the 
process of defence‖ in which he generalized Spaltung to neurotics.  Furthermore, Freud 
did not explicate the mechanism of disavowal of castration in cases of other types of 
perversion.  In addition, Freud does not explain the causes of the fetishist‘s solutions of 
disavowal and the fetish; what makes a child ―choose‖ disavowal over repression?  
Finally, numerous theorists, including Serge André (2006, p. 112, p. 116) and Verhaeghe 
(2001a, p. 67), are not convinced by Freud‘s emphasis on the penis and on a fear of actual 
castration.   
 Lacan made use of Freud‘s second theory of perversion and solved some of its 
problems.  In Seminar VI (1959), Lacan first formulated a differentiation between 
perversion and neurosis (p. 325) that would persist until the end of his career: in the 
neurotic fantasy (  ◊ a) the accent is on the split subject, whereas in the perverse fantasy 
(a ◊ ) the accent is on object a.  Thus, ―[t]he structure of desire in neurosis is of a quite 
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different nature than the structure of desire in perversion and, after all, these two 
structures are [diametrically] opposed‖ (p. 479).  
In Seminar XI, Lacan further distinguished perversion as a separate structural 
category by beginning to make use of disavowal: object a, in perversion, ―is the 
foundation of an identification disavowed by the subject‖ (1973/1998a, p. 186).  
Whereas, in causal explanations of (fetishistic) perversion, Freud attributed the pervert‘s 
disavowal exclusively to the disavowal of the maternal phallus, Lacan extended the 
notion of disavowal as cause of (all substructures of) perversion to the Other of the Law 
and to the child‘s narcissistic attachment to his penis.  For Lacan, disavowal is a creative 
attempt to prop up the paternal function.
61
  In addition, because Lacan‘s theoretical 
framework focuses on the child‘s relation to the Other, to the Other‘s desire and Law, to 
the drives, and to his primary caregiver, this framework allows for suppositions regarding 
the etiology of perversion that may be significant improvements upon our being ―frankly 
not able to explain‖ (Freud, 1927/1961, p. 154) the ―choice‖ of perversion.62  For 
instance, whereas Freud‘s description of the child‘s discovery of his mother‘s genitalia 
depicted a largely imaginary order event (in which the child‘s perception of his mother‘s 
genitalia in contrast to his own and his father‘s took center stage), Lacan‘s theory (see, 
for instance, Seminars IV and VIII) emphasized the crucial symbolic determinants of the 
child‘s disavowal of female genitalia.   
A Lacanian interpretation of Freud‘s ―Fetishism‖ (1927/1961) might state that the 
fetishist desires to preserve his belief in the ―maternal phallus‖ because that would mean 
                                               
61 Beginning on page 138, I explain how disavowal attempts to prop up the paternal function. 
62 On the other hand, as Nobus points out (2000, p. 54), there is something compelling in Lacan‘s 1946 idea 
of an ―unfathomable decision of being.‖  Although this idea applies to the decision between psychosis and 
neurosis, it could arguably be extended to perversion. 
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that she does not wish to take possession of his penis because she already has one of her 
own.  What is more, Lacanian understandings of fetishism focus on the signifiers 
constituting each person‘s fetish and how the fetish serves to prop up the paternal 
function.  For Lacan, the fetish is thus a symbolically determined symptom, one that does 
not simply represent the ―missing‖ penis of the mother.  Lacan, then, addressed a 
weakness in Freud‘s theory of fetishism—that it focused too much on the imaginary 
determinants of the fetish.  Freud‘s theory of fetishism relies on the supposition that 
every child sees his mother‘s (or another female‘s) genitalia and that it is that sight which 
allows the child to either accept or disavow his mother‘s lack of a penis.  In contrast, 
Lacan‘s theory of fetishism is grounded in the importance of the subject‘s relation to the 
Other and of symbolizing sexual difference in language.   
Fink‟s Case of Fetishism 
Fink‘s (2003) case of the fetishist ―W‖ is one of the richest case histories of 
fetishism, and it provides good examples of disavowal and of belief in the ―maternal 
phallus.‖  Furthermore, because neither of W‘s parents provided a name for the female 
genitalia that significantly differed from that for male genitalia, for W there was a lack of 
difference between the sexes.  Lacking the signifier for sexual difference, W engaged in 
many homosexual acts and fantasies and struggled to create a gendered identity for 
himself—often preferring the socially determined feminine role over the masculine one.   
W, like most children, was curious about the difference between the sexes and 
about the origin of babies.  His mother informed him that babies came out of a ―special 
opening‖ (Fink, 2003, p. 52), and W concluded that the special opening must be a ―butt‖ 
because the women in his family had larger butts than did the men.  Two neighborhood 
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girls also explained to him that ―boys and girls were different because ‗boys have one 
thumb and girls have two thumbs‘‖ (p. 52).  Neither of these explanations of sexual 
difference utilize different signifiers for male and female genitalia, and neither 
explanation provides a firm distinction between the sexes.  The difference between the 
sexes, as explained to W, amounted to a quantitative, rather than a qualitative difference.   
When W was 5, his mother discovered that his father had never divorced one of 
his previous wives, thus reducing the symbolic value of their marriage and of the last 
Name-of-the-Father given to W and his mother.  W‘s mother began complaining about 
her husband in front of W, and W subsequently adopted a derisive attitude toward his 
father.  W, who had already had a close relationship with his mother, became even closer 
to her, and seemed to share his mother‘s opinion that his father was not a ―real man.‖  
Most often, the child needs to experience an intruding force coming between himself and 
his mOther in order to effect separation; the other factors supporting separation are 
usually not enough in and of themselves.
63
  In cases such as that of W, in which W‘s 
mother behaved and spoke in a way that showed she thought of W as her possession, the 
force of the second Other must be even stronger in order to separate the child from the 
mother.  In W‘s case, his mother‘s altered attitude and discourse about his father 
prevented his father from having the power necessary to effect the operation of 
separation.   
Amongst W‘s symptoms were impotence with his sexual partners and difficulty 
masturbating.  Through the process of analysis, W came to relate these symptoms to 
feeling as though his mother had claimed his penis as her own.  For example, W recalled 
                                               
63 It is therefore most common that, in separation, one parental figure plays the role of second Other and 
another parental figure plays the role of first Other. 
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an incident in which he, as an adolescent, was masturbating for one of the first times and 
his mother walked into the room.  She put his hand on his erect penis and then walked out 
of the room.  W ―was unable to finish masturbating and felt unable to masturbate 
thereafter for a long time.  It was as if she had claimed his organ as her own, he said.  It 
had ‗died‘ and was ‗rotting‘‖ (Fink, 2003, p. 57).  More generally speaking, W‘s mother 
tried to prevent him from having enjoyment and desires that did not have to do with her; 
if he said, for example, that he wanted to go to the park, it was certain that she would not 
allow him to go there (p. 59). 
W, then, came to believe that he and his penis were the objects of his mOther‘s 
demand.  Because W also lacked a signifier for his mOther‘s desire and lacked a signifier 
for sexual difference, W felt a great deal of anxiety related to his position of object-cause 
of his mOther‘s jouissance.  Because of the inadequacy of the paternal function, W‘s 
solution to this problem was fetishism.  The fetishistic solution involves both a fetish and 
a belief in the ―maternal phallus.‖   
Lacking a signifier for sexual difference, and not having seen female genitalia, as 
a child W formed a lasting belief that his mother had a penis.  In analysis, W said, ―‗Why 
would she cover herself up with a towel in coming out of the bath if she didn‘t have one 
to hide?‘‖ (Fink, 2003, p. 54).  ―[E]ven in his 20s he did not think women had pubic hair, 
associating such hair with men, not women‖ (p. 54).   
W developed a boot fetish.  This fetish, like any other symptom, was 
overdetermined and thus constituted by numerous signifiers and by particular memories.  
Essentially, the boot served two main functions: to serve as a substitute for himself and 
his penis, such that W could reason that it was not him that his mother wanted, but 
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something associated with boots, and to stand in for the ambiguity around sexual 
difference.  In terms of the former function, the boot, by serving as a Name-of-the-Father, 
a signifier of something W‘s mOther wanted beyond himself, temporarily propped up 
W‘s paternal function.  According to Fink (2003),  
[W] perhaps reasoned as follows: ‗What she wants is not my penis, but something 
associated with fathers, something which is a sign of their power—boots.‘  Boots 
were, after all, a representative of his mother‘s own father, whom she considered 
to be a real man and in whose boots W masturbated for the first time.  (In 
masturbating, he was perhaps symbolically ‗giving her the boot(s)‘ while he took 
back his penis.)  The boot was also associated with his own father, who had a 
thing about black boots, and with his father‘s last name. The boot could thus be 
understood as an attempt to insert a father substitute between himself and his 
mother, as if to say ‗it isn‘t me that she wants, it‘s him.‘ (p. 66) 
Consequently, the boot fetish can be said to prop up the paternal function by way of a 
metaphorical substitution.  As I have described in previous chapters, the paternal 
function, also called the paternal metaphor, has the structure of a metaphor.  The boot 
fetish works because it plays a role in fueling the metaphorical operation of separation.   
The boot fetish also represented the ambiguity concerning sexual difference.  The 
boot was related to signifiers representing masculinity and femininity for W, such as 
―butt,‖ ―thumb,‖ ―tube,‖ ―booty,‖ ―boob,‖ and ―root.‖  W first saw female genitalia when 
he was 6 years of age, but because no one had provided him with a name for what his 
sister had, W was only able to understand this sight in terms of the penis—for which he 
did have a name.  As a result, the meaning W ascribed to his perception of female 
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genitalia was that girls lack a penis.  Following Freud, we can say that W‘s interpretation 
elicited castration anxiety because his next thought was that his sister had been castrated 
and that he might also be castrated.  Fink (2003) said,  
The fetish would thus appear as a solution to this anxiety, for the term boot 
preserves a both/and structure of things by bringing both female and male 
characteristics with it, according to W.  A boot has an opening, making it vagina-
like, but it also has a shaft and a shine, making it penis-like. In other words, the 
fetish can be understood as creating a space for both lack (an opening) and its 
possible filling, for both emptiness and fullness, thereby eliminating W‘s anxiety. 
(p. 67) 
Fink‘s explanation here of the function of the fetish (and its dependence  upon the 
mechanism of disavowal) is an excellent one.  The fetishist‘s solution to castration 
anxiety, then, is not so much defensive as it is creative; the fetish, by balancing lack with 
presence, creates a symbolic space for the pervert that reaches outside of the grasp of the 
mOther.   
 In the course of W‘s analysis, his symptoms—including his aforementioned 
impotence and difficulty masturbating dissolved.  W‘s depression abated, and he reported 
improvements in all areas of his life.  W‘s analysis enabled him to gradually reclaim his 
body from the Other (Fink, 2003, p. 57).   
Fundamental Fetishism? 
Regarding the criticism of Freud that his example of disavowal of castration was 
restricted to fetishism, Lacan maintained that there is a ―fundamental fetish in every 
perversion as an object perceived in the signifier‘s cut‖ (1961/2006a, p. 610).  This 
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implies that object a as fetish is present at the foundations of every perversion.  If we 
accept this claim, the necessity to describe the mechanism of disavowal at work in each 
type of perversion is thus diminished, though not erased.  That being said, Lacan does 
not, in fact, describe the disavowal of castration in any perverse substructures except 
fetishism and male homosexuality
64—either in case material or in theoretical explanation.  
His discussions of the etiology of voyeurism, exhibitionism, sadism, and masochism are 
restricted to the drives and to the relation to the Other.   
It is clear from the case material of fetishists—including Fink‘s (2003) W, René 
Tostain‘s (1980) John, and Freud‘s (1909/1955) Little Hans—that fetishists, do, as a rule, 
disavow their mother‘s genitalia.  The fetish, as symptom, results from that disavowal 
and includes, via the overdetermination typical of symptoms, signifiers and desires 
relating both to the father figure and the primary caregiver.  Fetishists, then, lack a 
signifier for sexual difference.   
There are at least two valid ways of interpreting Lacan‘s claim that there is a 
―fundamental fetish in every perversion as an object perceived in the signifier‘s cut‖ 
(1961/2006a, p. 610).  The first, as I have mentioned, is that every pervert became 
perverse by way of a fetish—such that sadism, for instance, is considered secondary to 
the fetish.  The second is that object a as actual presence, like the fetish, versus absence, 
is common to all the perversions.  The pervert, in contrast to the neurotic, identifies with 
an object a that is tangibly present, that being the object-cause of jouissance.  The Other‘s 
lack, for the pervert, can be plugged up by an object, and that object is himself.  The 
Other‘s lack, for the neurotic, is understood to be structurally without a complement, 
because the neurotic knows the Other has desires which do not concern himself.   
                                               
64 Lacan did not consider female homosexuality to indicate a perverse structure.   
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When the Other‘s desire is not named (as in the case of perversion), the child 
experiences a great deal of anxiety in the face of this nameless, unsignified lack.  This 
constitutes the problem to which the structure of perversion provides a solution.  The 
pervert’s solution to the anxiety caused by the namelessness of the lack in the Other is to 
become the object that plugs the lack in the Other by giving the Other jouissance.  On 
occasions upon which the pervert is confronted with the lack in the Other, he experiences 
anxiety and quickly attempts to fill the Other‘s lack.  At the same time, the fetish 
functions to symbolically take the place of the pervert, so that his sacrifice to the Other is 
not total.  By ―reasoning‖ that what the mOther wants is not himself but his penis, some 
part of his body and subjectivity remain his own.   
[P]erversion may be spoken of as fear of castration, fear of the Other’s castration 
essentially‖ (Miller, 1996b, p. 317).  Take, for example, the Marquis de Sade in his 
relation to the limits of the Other of language.  Sade‘s vehement negation of God 
functions to negate the limits of language and of reason.  The limits and lack of the Other 
are experienced by the pervert as intolerable.  (This aspect of perversion will be further 
discussed in Chapter V.) 
Disavowal  
The mechanism of disavowal should be understood as a defense, not against the 
second Other‘s demand that the child sacrifice jouissance, but against the inadequacy of 
the second Other.  Disavowal is a creative attempt to prop up the Law and to set limits to 
the excess in jouissance experienced due to the child’s problematic relation to the first 
Other.  The disavowal of the lawgiving Other might be described in the following terms: 
―I know very well that my father [or father figure] hasn‘t forced me to give up my mother 
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and my corresponding jouissance, but I‘m going to make believe that the force of Law 
exists with someone or something that represents my father.‖   
 The mechanism of disavowal, as I have said, involves the maintenance of two 
contradictory pieces of knowledge together with a strongly held belief that one of the two 
pieces of knowledge is true.  In matters of superstition—in which a belief is held despite 
evidence to the contrary—therefore, disavowal is often pertinent.  For example, ―I know 
very well that if, in one breath, I blow out all the flames of the candles on my birthday 
cake, my wish won‘t really come true, but nevertheless I believe it‘s true.  Consequently, 
I make a wish every year and try my best to blow out all the candles with one breath.‖  
The superstitious person, like the pervert, so fervently wants the ―but all the same‖ or 
―nevertheless‖ clause to be true that she or he believes it strongly despite evidence to the 
contrary.  This belief presupposes the existence of the Other.  In this example, the 
superstitious person believes in some Other that hears her silently made wish and has the 
power to grant it.  Once the belief is formed through the process of disavowal, the 
person‘s belief in the Other is correspondingly strengthened.   
Little Hans and Little Widdlers 
 
In order to further elucidate the mechanism of disavowal and the structure of 
perversion, I will now briefly explicate Freud‘s case of Little Hans (1909/1955) from a 
Lacanian perspective.  Freud‘s case study, which follows Hans beginning at the time at 
which he was almost three and ending when Hans was almost five years old, provides 
ample material from which to understand the etiology of perversion.  This is not only due 
to the young age of Hans but also due to his father‘s extensive reports of his discourse, 
symptoms, and daily life.  A Lacanian reading of the case of Little Hans allows us to see 
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that Hans‘ father is incapable of separating Hans from his mother, so that Hans‘ father 
may be said to inadequately represent the second Other.  Correspondingly, in Seminar IV 
Lacan suggests that the only signifier that serves a paternal function for Hans is ―horse.‖  
Toward the end of Seminar IV, Lacan suggests that he considers Hans‘ horse phobia to 
be but a temporary Name-of-the-Father, such that his structural position is that of a 
fetishistic pervert rather than a phobic neurotic.  Hans, then, undergoes alienation, but not 
separation. 
In 1906, one year after the publication of Freud‘s Three Essays on the Theory of 
Sexuality, Freud asked his followers to send him observations of children that might 
corroborate his theory of infantile sexuality.
65
  Mr. Graf consequently sent Freud detailed 
reports concerning his son, Hans, and Freud not only corresponded with Mr. Graf about 
the case but also met with Hans and Mr. Graf on one occasion.  Freud said that Hans‘ 
―parents were both among [his] closest adherents‖ (1909/1955, p. 6).   
Hans, at ages two and three, had ―a quite peculiarly lively interest‖ (Freud, 
1909/1955, p. 7) in his penis, which he described as his ―wiwimacher‖ or ―widdler.‖  
Correspondingly, Hans and his mother had the following exchange:  
Hans: ‗Mummy, have you got a widdler too?‘ 
Mother: ‗Of course.  Why?‘ 
Hans: ‗I was only just thinking.‘ (p. 7) 
Hans also said to his mother, ―I thought you were so big you‘d have a widdler like a 
horse‖ (p. 10).  Hans thus came to believe that everyone, whether male or female, had a 
                                               
65 Clearly, Freud‘s research was methodologically flawed.  Nevertheless, there is no reason to doubt the 
reports of Hans‘ speech and behaviors described in this case. 
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penis, and he wanted to see the penis of every person and animal.  Consequently, Hans 
was unable to understand sexual difference; for him, there was only one sex.   
When Hans was three and a half years old, ―his mother found him with his hand 
on his penis‖ (Freud, 1909/1955, p. 7) and she proceeded to literally threaten him with 
castration.  She said, ―If you do that, I shall send for Dr. A to cut off your widdler‖ (pp. 
7-8).  Hans, however, remained unconcerned, neither indicating anxiety nor giving up the 
pleasure of touching his penis.  In the same vein, about a half year later,  
his mother asked: ‗Do you put your hand to your widdler?‘ and he answered: 
‗Yes. Every evening, when I‘m in bed.‘  The next day, January 9th, he was 
warned, before his afternoon sleep, not to put his hand to his widdler.  When he 
woke up he was asked about it, and he said he had put it there for a short while all 
the same. (p. 23) 
Hans, then, continued to masturbate even though his mother asked him to refrain from 
doing so.   
 When Hans was three and a half years old, Hans‘ little sister Hanna was born.  
Soon after, Hans saw Hanna being bathed, and he said, ―‗But her widdler‘s still quite 
small‘…and then added, as though by way of consolation: ‗When she grows up it‘ll get 
bigger all right‘‖ (Freud, 1909/1955, p. 11).  Hans thus believed, contrary to his 
perception of female genitalia, that Hanna had a penis, and that it only appeared to be 
different because she was young and small.  His disavowal was enabled by his mother‘s 
repeated assertions that every living animal and human had a penis.  Had his mother 
explained sexual difference and given female genitalia a name that differed from 
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―widdler,‖ then it is likely that he would not have disavowed the absence of Hanna‘s 
penis.  Hans‘ disavowal, then, was a disavowal of sexual difference. 
 When Hans‘ parents finally explained sexual difference to him, he was four and a 
half years old and Hans did not throw out his old belief in the universality of widdlers in 
favor of the new information; the information came too late and was too contrary to his 
previous experiences.  In addition, Hans and his parents still referred to female genitalia 
as ―widdlers,‖ although his parents maintained that female genitalia differed somehow 
from male genitalia.  By the end of his treatment, Hans still believed that girls and 
women had penises.  Hans also believed that boys and men could have children.  Hans 
said he wanted to have children, and he played with his imaginary children.  On one such 
occasion, his father said to him, ―‗but you know quite well that boys can‘t have children.‘  
[Hans responded,] ‗Well, yes.  But I believe they can, all the same.‘‖ (Freud, 1909/1955, 
p. 95).  Hans‘ disavowal of the knowledge that girls do not have penises and that boys 
cannot have children resulted in his unshakable belief to the contrary.   
The Inadequacy of the Paternal Function 
Hans had an unusually close relationship with his mother, who clearly derived a 
great deal of jouissance from his presence.  She was lacking in what today are called 
―boundaries‖ with Hans, as shown by her giving Hans a daily bath and afterwards drying 
and powdering him (Freud, 1909/1955, p. 19), often taking him into the bathroom with 
her (p. 57), letting him get into bed with her despite protests from her husband (p. 39), 
and giving Hans a guilt trip when he expressed a desire to separate from her (p. 17).
66
  
                                               
66 In contrast, Hans‘ mother beat Hanna (Freud, 1909/1955, p. 72, p. 79).  My analysand Ray, an 
exhibitionist, had a similar experience.  Ray‘s mother beat and threw things at his older sisters, whereas she 
never did so with him, paying instead special attention to him.  These clinical observations support the 
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Correspondingly, Hans experienced a general state of anxiety prior to the solidification of 
the horse phobia that occurred after Freud began overseeing the case.  Rather than 
understanding Hans‘ anxiety as resulting from separation from his mother, we should 
understand it as the result of his overproximity to his mother.
67
   
In this vein,  
Hans (aged four and three-quarters) woke up one morning in tears.  Asked why he 
was crying, he said to his mother: ‗When I was asleep I thought you were gone 
and I had no Mummy to coax [his expression for ‗to caress‘] with.‘ (Freud, 
1909/1955, p. 23) 
Hans‘ fear that he articulated by way of the dream revealed a wish; at some level, Hans 
wished that his mother would go away.  Correspondingly, Hans‘ father noticed that when 
Hans  
 was in bed in the evening [at Gmunden in the summer] Hans was usually in a 
very sentimental state.  Once he made a remark to this effect: ‗Suppose I was to 
have no Mummy,‘ or ‗Suppose you were to go away,‘ or something of the sort; I 
cannot remember the exact words.  Unfortunately, when he got into an elegiac 
mood of that kind, his mother used always to take him into bed with her. (p. 23) 
                                                                                                                                            
hypothesis that mothers take sons to be their complements in life more often than they do so with 
daughters.  
67 Numerous psychoanalytic (non-Lacanian) clinicians (Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1974; Glasser, 1996; 
Greenacre, 1968; McDougall, 1970; Stoller, 1976) have noted that perverts display an ambivalent attitude 
toward intimate closeness with another person.  On the one hand, they wish to merge with the Other, and 
on the other hand, they experience an ―annihilation anxiety‖ (Glasser, 1996, p. 285) that proximity to the 
Other carries with it a ―loss of self, a disappearance of his existence as a separate, independent individual‖ 
(p. 284).  According to Mervin Glasser, the pervert responds to annihilatory anxiety through a defensive 
reaction such as ―flight from the object, retreating emotionally to a ‗safe distance‘…This is expressed in 
such attitudes as placing a premium on independence and self-sufficiency.  In therapy, it may be 
encountered as a wish to terminate treatment, as a constant argumentativeness or negativism, as the 
development o an intellectual detachment, and so on‖ (p. 285).  Although Glasser notes that the wish for 
and anxiety about unity with the Other is common to non-perverse subjects, he emphasizes that annihilation 
anxiety is particularly strong with perverts.   
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Hans‘ remarks were wishes that his mother would go away and let him have symbolic 
space of his own.  In typical fashion, his mother responded to his remarks by taking him 
into bed with her and thus reasserting their especially close relationship.   
 Hans‘ close relationship with his mother may not have formed in the first place 
had his father more strongly asserted his role as second Other.  The castration threats 
made all come from Hans‘ mother rather than his father, and it is plain that Hans‘ 
mother‘s qualities as first Other prevent her from being an effective medium for the 
second Other.  Hans himself seemed to believe that his symptoms were related to his not 
having been forced to give up masturbation.  Hans said of his anxiety, ―it‘s so bad 
because I still put my hand to my widdler every night.‘‖ (Freud, 1909/1955, p. 30).   
 A dream or fantasy—it is unclear which—of Hans‘ figures centrally in the case, 
and exemplifies his problematic position within his family.   
In the night there was a big giraffe in the room and a crumpled one; and the big 
one called out because I took the crumpled one away from it.  Then it stopped 
calling out; and then I sat down on top of the crumpled one. (Freud, 1909/1955, p. 
37)  
Although symbolic productions should be interpreted in light of the patient‘s own 
associations, we have little opportunity to do so because Hans‘ father did not give Hans 
the chance to associate to his fantasy, but only asked him to give further details and to 
explain its logic (as if such phenomena were supposed to follow everyday logic!).   
That being said, the description provided by Hans‘ father of their recent family 
life is instructive.   
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The whole thing is a reproduction of a scene which has been gone through almost 
every morning for the last few days.  Hans always comes in to us in the early 
morning, and my wife cannot resist taking him into bed with her for a few 
minutes.  Thereupon I always begin to warn her not to take him into bed with her 
(‗the big one called out because I‘d taken the crumpled one away from it‘); and 
she answers now and then, rather irritated, no doubt, that it‘s all nonsense, that 
after all one minute is of no importance, and so on.  Then Hans stays with her a 
little while.  (‗Then the big giraffe stopped calling out; and then I sat down on top 
of the crumpled one.‘) (Freud, 1909/1955, p. 39) 
It is notable that their family name, Graf, is nearly a homonym of the word for ―giraffe‖ 
(giraf).  It is but a short interpretive stretch, then, to say that the big giraffe is Mr. Graf 
and the crumpled giraffe is Mrs. Graf.  In the scenario, Mr. Graf, the big giraffe, protests 
weakly, calling out in anger when Hans takes Mr. Graf‘s place.  Hans takes possession of 
Mrs. Graf, the crumpled giraffe.  The daily scene in which Hans gets into bed with Mrs. 
Graf suggests that Mrs. Graf‘s will is stronger than that of Mr. Graf and that Mrs. Graf 
prefers Hans to her husband.  Mr. and Mrs. Graf, in fact, obtained a divorce some years 
later.   
 Freud based his interpretations and recommended interventions on the faulty 
assumption that Hans‘ pre-phobic anxiety-related symptoms were caused by his fear of 
his father.  In his estimation, were Mr. Graf to appear to Hans to be still less fearsome 
and angry, Hans‘ fears would abate.  On the contrary, Hans is unafraid of his father and 
afraid of his mother.  She is the one that he would like to beat (Freud, 1909/1955, p. 81).  
Hans would have been better off if his father had forcefully played the role of symbolic 
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separator, and indeed the case study provides us with numerous instances in which Hans 
tried to believe that his father was angry with him on account of Hans‘ close relationship 
with his mother.  Unfortunately, in each instance Mr. Graf denied that he was angry with 
Hans. 
Freud‘s central intervention in the case was also marked by the downplay of Mr. 
Graf‘s symbolic role.  Consider the following scene from Freud‘s consulting room, at 
which Freud, Mr. Graf, and Hans were all present. 
 I then disclosed to him that he was afraid of his father, precisely because he was 
so fond of his mother.  It must be, I told him, that he thought his father was angry 
with him on that account, but this was not so, his father was fond of him in spite 
of it, and he might admit everything to him without any fear.  Long before he was 
in the world, I went on, I had known that a little Hans would come who would be 
so fond of his mother that he would be bound to feel afraid of his father because 
of it; and I had told his father this.  ‗But why do you think I‘m angry with you?‘ 
his father interrupted me at this point; ‗have I ever scolded you or hit you?‘ Hans 
corrected him: ‗Oh yes!  You have hit me.‘ ‗That‘s not true.  When was it, 
anyhow?‘ ‗This morning,‘ answered the little boy; and his father recollected that 
Hans had quite unexpectedly butted his head into his stomach, so that he had 
given him as it were a reflex blow with his hand. (p. 42) 
Mr. Graf is anxious to be loved and not feared by Hans—so much so that he not only 
never hits or scolds Hans but he also interrupts Freud to correct Hans‘ perception that he 
is angry with him.  Hans, on the other hand, wants his father to be angry with him such 
that he imbued intentionality to an accidental strike of his father‘s hand.  Freud, from a 
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rather god-like perspective of omniscience, educates Hans about the situation by making 
an Oedipal interpretation. 
 Hans saw Freud as a knowledgeable authority above and beyond his father, as he 
hoped that the ―professor‖ would put an end to Hans‘ ―nonsense‖ when all the facts of the 
matter were communicated to Freud (Freud, 1909/1955, pp. 42-43, p. 48, p. 61).  The 
positive effects of Freud‘s interpretation are likely due to two things: his depiction of the 
father as someone to be feared and his having drawn attention to the signifiers connecting 
the father and the feared horses.  In terms of the former, prior to Freud‘s interpretation it 
had not consciously occurred to Hans that he should be afraid of his father.  Hans had 
seen his father not as a forceful representative of the Law but as a weak bystander (in the 
giraffe fantasy) and even as Hans‘ accomplice in breaking and then getting punished by 
the Law (pp. 39-40).  After Freud‘s interpretation, Hans often insisted that his father must 
be angry with him.  Take, for example, the following exchange between Hans and his 
father. 
I: ‗What do I really scold you for?‘ 
He: ‗I don‘t know.‘ (!!) 
I: ‗Why?‘ 
He: ‗Because you‘re cross.‘  
I: ‗But that‘s not true.‘ 
Hans: ‗Yes, it is true.  You‘re cross.  I know you are.  It must be true.‘ (Freud, 
1909/1955, pp. 82-83)   
Freud‘s mistake lay in his assumption that Hans was already afraid of his father, and that 
this fear, if decreased, would correspondingly decrease Hans‘ symptoms of anxiety.  
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Freud might have succeeded in making Hans neurotic, rather than perverse, had he 
emphasized Mr. Graf‘s anger and instructed Mr. Graf to play his proper part.   
Nevertheless, the meeting with Freud had some therapeutic effect because Freud 
also revealed the connection between the kind of horse of which Hans was afraid and Mr. 
Graf.  Even though Mr. Graf was unable to take up his role as symbolic separator, the 
horse was sufficiently convincing in that role.  Hans subsequently adopted ―horse‖ as a 
substitute for the Name-of-the-Father, and this marked the development of his horse 
phobia.  Consequently, Hans experienced a sharp decrease in anxiety.  Phobia, then, is a 
strategy that bolsters an inadequate paternal function.  In Seminar IV, Lacan said that the 
phobic object is the phallic signifier (Φ), ―a phallus that takes on the value of all 
signifiers, that of the father if need be‖ (1957/1994, p. 425).  In the Écrits, Lacan defined 
the phobic object as ―an all-purpose signifier to make up for [suppléer] the Other‘s lack‖ 
(1961/2006a, p. 610).  In an individual with a phobic (neurotic) structure, the phobic 
object functions to instigate secondary repression.  The phobic‘s solution to the 
inadequacy of the paternal function is thus permanent and successful.  In contrast, Hans‘ 
paternal function was propped up only as long as his horse phobia remained.  Hans, by 
way of disavowal, attained a structural position of perversion.   
 Hans‘ horse phobia, or ―nonsense‖ [Unsinn], as he called it, began forming when 
he went on a walk with his mother and saw a big heavy black bus horse fall down.  The 
horse gave Hans ―‗a fright because it made a row with its feet‘‖ (Freud, 1909/1955, p. 
50).  Of the incident, Hans said to his mother, ―I was afraid a horse would bite me‖ (p. 
24).  Hans henceforth became afraid that a horse similar in type to the bus horse would 
fall down and bite him.   
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The phrase ―it made a row with its feet‖ had another important signification for 
Hans.  Hans himself was in the habit of kicking or making a row with his feet when he 
was angry or when he had to do ―number two‖ ―and would rather play‖ (Freud, 
1909/1955, p. 54).  Hans thus associated making a row with one‘s feet with being angry 
and wanting to have one‘s own way.  In associating to horses biting, Hans said, ―There‘s 
a white horse at Gmunden that bites.  If you hold your finger to it it bites.‘(p. 29).  It is 
perhaps significant that Hans said ―finger‖ instead of ―hand,‖ as ―finger‖ might easily 
represent ―penis.‖   
While Hans was alone with his mother on the walk, then, a horse (which 
represented his father) fell down and made a row with its feet.  Hans understood the 
horse‘s row with its feet as expressing anger towards him as well asserting the force of its 
own will.  Hans became afraid that the horse would bite him, and his fear may be read 
psychoanalytically as expressing a wish.  Hans wished for castration.  He wished to be 
forced to relinquish his mother and cease masturbating.  Hans experienced castration 
anxiety when he saw such horses, and he consequently was temporarily separated from 
his mother.   
 After the development of his horse phobia, Hans continued to try to bolster Mr. 
Graf‘s symbolic position in relation to himself, as Mr. Graf‘s claim on him was unclear to 
Hans.  In various ways, Hans asked his father, ―I belong not only to Mummy but also to 
you?‖ (Freud, 1909/1955, p. 87, p. 100) and Hans never received a satisfying answer.  
For instance, when Mr. Graf explained to Hans where babies come from—and thus the 
story of how Hans came to be—he said that children grow inside their mother and are 
then born into the world by being pressed out of her.  On two other occasions, Mr. Graf 
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gives Hans explanations in which God makes the decision to create a baby (p. 87, p. 91).  
The father has no place in any of these stories.   
Finally, Hans sides with his mother.  According to Hans, ―‗Mummy said if 
Mummy didn‘t want [another baby], God didn‘t want one either.  If Mummy doesn‘t 
want one she won‘t have one‘‖ (Freud, 1909/1955, p. 91).  Correspondingly, in Hans‘ 
understanding, himself, his father, and even God are at the mercy of his mother‘s whims.   
Disavowal in No Country for Old Men 
 
The following description of the operation of disavowal in a case of sadism is 
derived from the movie No Country for Old Men (2007).  Consequently, it should be 
considered less as a clinically valid case study and more as a clear and instructive 
example of speech and behavior indicative of disavowal.  (Even so, the subfields of 
psychoanalytic film and literary theory are based upon the assumption that it is valid to 
apply psychoanalytic theory to film and literature.)   
The perverse sadistic villain in No Country for Old Men props up his paternal 
function by way of a coin toss.  Chigurgh, the villain, is chasing a man named Moss 
because he knows Moss is in possession of a suitcase full of money that Moss took from 
the scene of a cocaine deal gone wrong.  Chirgurgh, seeing through the façade of the 
Law,
68
 has constructed his own law or moral code by which to live.  He murders, steals, 
and destroys property when he ―needs‖ to do so in order to get the money and remain 
                                               
68 This is evidenced by Chirgurgh‘s serial murdering as well as by what he says to Wells—a man who has 
been trying to apprehend Chirgurgh for years—before he kills Wells: ―If the rule you followed brought you 
to this, of what use is the rule?‖  Wells responds, ―Do you have any idea how goddamn crazy you are?‖  
Although Wells is not a representative of law enforcement, he, as a neurotic subject who desires to stop 
Chigurgh from committing murder, is firmly rooted in the symbolic order of Law, and defines craziness as 
thinking, acting, and being outside of Law.  Chigurgh‘s question served to deride the logic and existence of 
the Law.  Chigurgh prefers his own law, as discussed in the text. 
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free.  For instance, when he lacks a vehicle or wants a new one, he tricks someone into 
stopping to help him
69
 and then murders the person and steals his car.   
When Chigurgh encounters someone when he is not in need and who is not 
obstructing his hunt for the money, he appeals to his law, which might be called the law 
of fate or of chance, to decide whether or not the person will be killed.  Chigurgh takes a 
coin from his pocket and instructs the other person to ―call it.‖  If the person chooses 
correctly, then Chigurgh lets him live.  Although a coin toss operates according to the 
principle of chance, such that there is an equal chance of winning or losing, Chigurgh‘s 
law might also be said to involve fate for the following reasons.  On the one hand, 
Chigurgh sets the stakes (life or death), and he sets them so high that the choice could be 
fatal.  He is playing with the fate of his victims.  On the other hand, Chigurgh insists that 
the other person ―call it‖ rather than he, which raises the meaning of the coin toss from 
chance, in which the chance would be the same no matter which party ―called it,‖ to an 
event of fate in which the potential victim makes a choice and tests whether or not fate is 
on his side.  Demonstrating his perverse and particular sense of moral law, Chigurgh says 
to one potential victim, ―You need to call it.  I can‘t call it for you.  It wouldn‘t be fair.  It 
wouldn‘t even be right.‖  Chigurgh interprets the results of the coin toss as fate, as 
determining what must be done. 
Chigurgh‘s role in the coin toss is that of the enactor of the Other‘s will (the god 
of fate).  When his victims protest, saying, ―You don‘t have to do this‖—referring either 
to the coin toss or committing murder—Chigurgh remarks that they all say the same 
thing, and remains unconvinced by their argument.  When Chigurgh gives his final victim 
in the movie the opportunity to ―call it,‖ she refuses to ―call it.‖  He insists, becoming 
                                               
69 Chigurgh‘s lure thus involves appealing to the widely held moral law to help one‘s neighbor. 
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visibly upset.  She refuses again, remarking, ―the coin don‘t have no say.  It‘s just you.‖  
He replies, ―I got here the same way the coin did.‖  In the absence of the Other of the 
Law, Chigurgh wants the Other of fate to exist; he wants there to be a law governing his 
actions and which makes sense of the world.  He does not want to see his actions as a 
series of free choices devoid of any guiding principle.  Chigurgh becomes anxious when 
his final victim refuses to play her role in his scenario because she exposes the tenuous 
existence of the Other.  Were she to have played her role, she, as split subject, would 
have been the one to experience a moment of anxiety prior to learning whether she would 
live or die.  Chigurgh‘s role, as the one who elicited the victim‘s anxiety, would have 
been that of the instrument of the Other‘s jouissance.  Chigurgh‘s disavowal, related to 
the Other of fate, might be phrased as follows: ―I know very well that it‘s my choice 
whether or not to kill this person, but all the same, maybe it‘s fate.‖  
After one of Chigurgh‘s potential victims wins the coin toss, Chigurgh tells him to 
keep it because it‘s his ―lucky quarter,‖ but not to keep it in his pocket, ―or it‘ll get mixed 
in with the others and become just a coin.  Which it is.‖  Because it follows the logic of 
disavowal, this kind of magical or superstitious thinking is often produced by perversely 
structured individuals.  The disavowal here might be expressed as follows: ―I know very 
well that it‘s just a coin like all the rest, but all the same, maybe it‘s lucky and special.‖   
Concluding Remarks on Diagnosis  
 
 In this chapter, I have elaborated a number of aspects of perversion which should 
aid clinicians in making differential diagnoses.  These include, but are not limited to, the 
operation of disavowal, the ―family‖ roles that correspond to the structure of perversion, 
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the fetish, and a belief in the maternal ―phallus.‖  The chapters that follow will serve to 
further elaborate clinical signs of perversion.  
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Chapter V: Perverse Relation to the Other: Fundamental Fantasy, Language, and 
the Drives 
 
―Only my formula for fantasy allows us to bring out the fact that the subject here 
makes himself the instrument of the Other‘s jouissance‖ (Lacan, 1960/2006a, p. 823). 
―Perversion…is a response [to] the jouissance of the Other.  It‘s not a question 
about its desire, but a response about … what to do to ensure its jouissance‖ (Miller, 
2009b, p. 48). 
Fundamental Fantasy 
 
Perversion, like neurosis, is a strategy in relation to the Other with respect to 
jouissance.  Perversion, said Lacan, involves  
a recuperation of φ that would scarcely seem original if it did not concern the 
Other as such in a very particular way.  Only my formula for fantasy allows us to 
bring out the fact that the subject here makes himself the instrument of the Other‘s 
jouissance. (1960/2006a, p. 823) 
In this passage from ―The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire,‖ Lacan 
said that both perverse and neurotic subjects (having undergone alienation) have lost 
some jouissance (-φ) and attempt to recover or recuperate it.  The fantasized and 
impossible end result of obtaining that lost jouissance is restoration of the subjective 
fullness of complete unity with the Other.  Lacan highlighted that the difference between 
the perverse and the neurotic subject‘s attempts at recuperation is the ―very particular 
way‖ (p. 823) in which the pervert‘s attempt involves the Other.  The pervert‘s subjective 
position in relation to the Other—as the ―instrument of the Other‘s jouissance‖ (p. 823)—
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stands in stark contrast to that of the obsessive neurotic.  While the obsessive negates the 
Other in the effort to regain lost jouissance, the Other is necessary for the pervert.  This 
difference provides a main criterion for making a differential diagnosis between 
obsession and perversion.  An explication of the fundamental fantasies of the obsessive 
and the pervert will elucidate the bases for this criterion and the differences between the 
two structural positions. 
 But first, what is a fundamental fantasy and how is it different from a fantasy?  
Lacan defined fantasy as ―an image set to work in the signifying structure‖ (1961/2006a, 
p. 637).  In other words, fantasy is comprised of imaginary and symbolic order elements.  
Structured by a jouissance-producing relation to the Other and to object a, fantasy 
functions to maintain and support the subject‘s desire.  Lacan‘s conception of fantasy 
thus also involves real order phenomena such as jouissance and the traumatic real 
manifested in repetition.  In this respect, fantasy is an attempt to bind jouissance into the 
symbolic.  As defined in Chapters III and IV, a fantasy is the subject‘s attempt to achieve 
a sense of wholeness by inscribing a certain place for himself in relation to the Other—as 
object-cause of desire, for instance.   
 The fundamental fantasy is a way of representing the subject‘s myriad fantasies in 
―lowest terms.‖70  Miller (1996a) offers the following definition:  
Analysis really is a process of simplification—you call it ―shrinking.‖  I find it 
marvelous that analysts are called ―shrinks,‖ because analysis involves the 
shrinking of the libido and the progressive construction of the fundamental 
fantasy from various fantasies, the construction of the subject‘s fundamental 
                                               
70 ―Lowest terms‖ is a mathematical term referring to the form of a fraction in which the numerator and the 
denominator have no factor in common except ―1.‖  A fraction in lowest terms is therefore the simplest 
form of a fraction, and the easiest with which to work.   
151 
 
maxim, to use Kant‘s term… That is, the fundamental fantasy is essentially a 
formula that says, ―Act in such a way that your will always obeys the formula.‖ 
(p. 224) 
The fundamental fantasy is not something that exists prior to the process of 
psychoanalysis but something that is constructed within analysis.  Correspondingly, the 
fundamental fantasy is not rigid and impossible to modify.  In fact, one of the ways in 
which Lacan spoke of the outcome of a successful analysis was as a traversing of the 
fundamental fantasy (see Seminar XI, pp. 273-274).  Essentially, the fundamental fantasy 
refers to the subject‘s way of imagining himself in relation to the Other‘s desire (object 
a).   
Lacan‘s general formula for the neurotic fundamental fantasy (  ◊ a) best applies 
to the obsessive, who is most often male.  The obsessive thus tries to overcome 
separation (and recover his lost jouissance) by constituting himself in relation to the lost 
object a; at the level of fantasy, unity is restored to the split subject when he regains the 
lost object.  It is diagnostically important to note that the obsessive refuses to 
acknowledge that object a is related to the Other.  The obsessive seeks to deny his 
dependence on the Other, preferring to see himself as a complete or unbarred subject (S) 
rather than as a split subject ( ).  In the obsessive‘s relation to object a, he tries to 
annihilate the Other‘s desire and the Other‘s very existence.  This partially explains his 
penchant for masturbation and drug use.  Another common obsessive strategy for 
negating the Other involves thinking of someone or something other than his partner 
when he is having sexual intercourse.  In this sense, the obsessive‘s fundamental fantasy 
might be more correctly rendered as (S ◊ a).   
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In Seminar VIII, Lacan wrote the following matheme for obsession:  
Ⱥ ◊ φ (a, a′, a″, a‴, …) (2001, p. 299; p. 301).  The obsessive subject is 
represented by Ⱥ here because of his ―never being at the place at which he seems to 
designate himself at any moment‖ (p. 301).  For example, the obsessive says, ―I‘m a 
computer programmer, but I‘m really an artist.‖  According to Lacan, ―[t]he formulation 
of the second term of the obsessive‘s fantasy very precisely alludes to the fact that the 
objects are for him, as objects of desire, situated as a function [mis en function] of certain 
erotic equivalences‖ (p. 302).  In other words, the imaginary function of castration has 
the effect of making equivalent all of the objects of the obsessive‘s desire.  Each object a 
is fungible for another ―in the permanent metonymy for which the obsessive‘s 
symptomatology is the perfect example‖ (p. 302).  By viewing the cause of desire as an 
object detachable from an actual human partner, the obsessive refuses to recognize the 
existence of the Other.   
Another common obsessive strategy to annihilate the Other‘s desire involves the 
obsessive‘s close connection to the anal drive and to the Other‘s demand.  Concerning the 
Other‘s demand, Lacan said, ―the anal level is the locus of metaphor—one object for 
another, give the faeces in place of the phallus.  This shows you why the anal drive is the 
domain of oblation, of the gift‖ (1973/1998a, p. 104, translation modified).  The 
obsessive attempts to neutralize the Other‘s desire by meeting all of the Other‘s demands.  
He hopes that his abundant gifts will leave the Other with nothing left to desire.  
―‗Everything for the other person,‘ the obsessive neurotic says, and that is indeed what he 
does, for being caught up in the perpetual whirlwind of destroying the other, he can never 
do enough to ensure that the other remains in existence‖ (Lacan, 2001, pp. 245-246).   
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In general, desire is maintained by keeping the object that causes it, object a, at a 
certain distance.  The obsessive, however, sustains his desire not so much by avoiding 
object a as by maintaining his distance from the Other‘s desire.  Lacan said the  
obsessional‘s desire flickers, vacillates and vanishes to the degree that he 
approaches [the Other‘s desire]…That desire was approached as something to be 
destroyed because, first of all, the Other‘s desire as a reaction was presented to 
him as his rival, as something that immediately bore the mark to which he reacted 
with the style of destructive reaction that is the reaction underlying the 
relationship of the subject to the image of the subject as such, to this image of the 
other insofar as it dispossesses and ruins him.  This mark remains in the approach 
by the obsessional to his desire which ensures that every step toward it makes it 
vanish. (Seminar VI, June 18, 1958) 
Elsewhere, Lacan more simply said the subject is ―eclipsed at the precise point where the 
object a attains its greatest value‖ (1977, p. 29).  In other words, the obsessive attempts to 
avoid that which has to do with the cause of his desire because the closer he gets to 
realizing the object of his desire, the more the Other (and the Other‘s desire) eclipses him 
as a subject—making him feel as though he does not exist.  The proximity of the Other 
threatens the obsessive with what Lacan—and Ernest Jones before him—called 
aphanisis: the fading or disappearance of the subject (1973/1998a, p. 207).   
 Because of the obsessive‘s difficulty tolerating moments of aphanisis, he sets out 
to avoid the presence of the Other by making his desires impossible (Lacan, 2001, p. 
291).  The obsessive typically constructs situations in which ―the object of his desire 
becomes the signifier of this impossibility‖ (Lacan, 1977, p. 36).  For instance, he falls in 
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love with women who are or seem to be completely unapproachable.  In response to his 
fear of the Other‘s desire, obsession is characterized by impossible desires.   
The obsessive dislikes manifestations of his own desire not only because it 
threatens him with aphanisis but also because it is a sign that he, having lost jouissance, 
is already a subject lacking in being ( ).  The obsessive grapples with the question of 
being by formulating the primary question as ―Am I dead or alive?‖  Demonstrations of 
his subjective division, including desire and manifestations of the unconscious, arouse 
anxiety in him, making him feel as though he does not exist; the obsessive equates 
existence with conscious thought.  The obsessive, therefore, uses conscious thought and 
the destruction of the Other‘s desire to create the semblance of control and complete 
independence that allows him to feel aware of his constant existence.   
In contrast, the pervert does not seek to negate the existence of the Other.  The 
obsessive‘s negation of the Other is allowed by the fact that, for him, the Other 
permanently exists.  In perversion, the Other must be made to exist.  The perverse 
fundamental fantasy, then, reflects the pervert‘s commitment to making the Other exist 
by plugging up the lack in the Other.  In ―Kant with Sade‖ (1963/2006a), Lacan provides 
a matheme for perversion that is the inverse of the structure of neurotic fantasy: a ◊  (p. 
774).  The pervert occupies the role of object a in relation to the split subject.   
This matheme for the perverse fundamental fantasy is best understood when 
considered in the context of the schema in which it was introduced (Lacan, 1963/2006a, 
p. 774):   
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―The lower line accounts for the order of fantasy insofar as it props up the utopia of 
desire‖ (p. 775); ―d‖ represents desire, and the pervert‘s particular relation to  fuels his 
desire.  ―The curvy line depicts the chain‖ (p. 775) that begins at a, the place occupied by 
the perverse subject, and first links the pervert with V, which stands for volonté-de-
jouissance (p. 775) or the will-to-jouissance.  Lacan said that this V or will-to-jouissance, 
―occupying the place of honor here, seems to impose the will [volonté] that dominates the 
whole‖ (p. 775) chain.  This will is not that of the pervert but instead is his interpretation 
of the Other‘s will.   
 This schema portrays how the pervert puts himself in the position of object a so 
that he can approach his partner on behalf of the Other‘s will-to-jouissance.  The effect of 
his approach is that he reveals the lack in his partner (as a lack in jouissance), such that 
his partner‘s identity as a split subject ( ) is obvious.  The pervert brings out and then 
plugs up the lack in the Other.  At the end of the chain is S, indicating that the pervert‘s 
fundamental fantasy results in the emergence of ―the brute subject of pleasure (the 
‗pathological‘ subject)‖ (Lacan, 1963/2006a, p. 775).   
 The role of jouissance is paramount in the perverse fundamental fantasy.  The 
perverse subject, occupying the role of object a, does not play the role of object-cause of 
the Other‘s desire, as in hysteria, but instead plays the role of object-cause of the will-to-
jouissance (V) or of the Other‘s jouissance.  He locates himself as the object of the 
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[Other‘s] drive (Lacan, 1973/1998a, p. 185).  The pervert, according to Lacan, ―is the 
subject reconstituted through alienation at the cost of being nothing but the instrument of 
jouissance‖ (1963/2006a, p. 775).  The pervert believes that what the Other lacks and 
thus wants is jouissance, and he sets out to bring jouissance to the Other and thereby 
make the Other exist through being complete.  Through his endeavors to plug up the lack 
in the Other, the pervert, as instrument, gains jouissance for himself. 
 Whereas the obsessive attempts to eradicate the effects of separation on the 
subject, the pervert attempts to eradicate the effects of alienation on the Other.
71
  It is for 
this reason that, in lieu of considering the entire schema Lacan provides in ―Kant with 
Sade,‖ the perverse fundamental fantasy is better written as a ◊ Ⱥ, or the object-cause of 
jouissance in relation to the Other.  In contrast to the obsessive‘s negation of the Other, 
shown by the omission of the Other from  ◊ a, this formula (a ◊ Ⱥ) emphasizes the 
pervert‘s necessity to prop up his relation to the Other.  Furthermore, just as the obsessive 
does everything in his power to deny his own lack, such that his fundamental fantasy 
might be written S ◊ a instead of  ◊ a, so too does the pervert make every effort to 
cancel out the lack in the Other, such that his fundamental fantasy might be written a ◊ A 
instead of a ◊ Ⱥ.   
 This formula for perversion (a ◊ A) may be compared to a formula for hysteria (a 
◊ Ⱥ) in a way that usefully illustrates the similarities and differences between the hysteric 
and the pervert.
72
  The two main differences are as follows.  First, even though both the 
                                               
71 The operation of separation and its consequences are not in the pervert‘s vocabulary, so to speak.   
72 See Fink, 1997, pp. 257-258 for a clear social-psychological explanation of why obsessives are often 
men and hysterics often females.  Essentially, Fink points out evidence that mothers in our cultural-
historical epoch tend to nurture their male children more generously than their female children, and that this 
gives boys the sense that they are lacking in something which must be plugged up (by object a) and girls 
the sense that their mothers are lacking in something and that they, as objects a, should mend the lack in 
their mothers.  In Chapters III and IV, I made it clear that the pervert had a relationship with his mother that 
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hysteric and the pervert occupy the role of object a in relation to the Other, the hysteric 
positions herself as the object-cause of the Other‘s desire while the pervert positions 
himself as the object-cause of the Other‘s jouissance.  Second, despite the fact that both 
the hysteric and the pervert take as their partner an Other who is lacking—a desiring 
Other in the hysteric‘s case and an Other lacking in jouissance in the pervert‘s case—the 
hysteric aims to sustain the Other‘s lack whereas the pervert aims to transform the 
lacking Other into the complete Other (Ⱥ into A).   
In terms of a major similarity between the two structures, the hysteric‘s 
fundamental fantasy involves an Other who is at first glance the one who desires, just as 
the pervert‘s fundamental fantasy involves an Other who is at first glance the one who 
experiences jouissance.  Beneath the surface of the fantasy structure lies the fact that the 
hysteric and the pervert actively author the entire scenario.  The hysteric, for her part, 
brings the Other to desire in the fashion of her choosing, and she identifies with the Other 
and desires as if she were the Other.  Likewise, the pervert causes the Other to experience 
jouissance in a manner of his choosing, and he controls and chooses the jouissance he 
reserves for himself.
73
  For instance, the masochist demands that his partner punish him 
and ―force‖ him to do certain things—things which are particular to the coordinates of 
desire of the individual masochist and thus elicit his own jouissance.   
Although it is true that the pervert gains jouissance from his relation to the Other, 
it is more valid to emphasize that the pervert induces the Other to limit the pervert‘s 
jouissance.  Perversion is ultimately a strategy for setting limits to jouissance.  In the 
                                                                                                                                            
was similar in this respect to that of an hysteric.  The crucial difference is that the hysteric tries to overcome 
separation by making herself the object of the Other‘s desire, and that the pervert tries to overcome 
alienation by making himself the object of the Other‘s jouissance.   
73 Identification with the Other is perhaps a primary feature only in sadism, which will be discussed in the 
section reserved for the discussion of sadism in Chapter VI. 
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masochistic scenario, for example, the masochist causes the Other to experience 
jouissance in the form of a great anxiety about what is happening, such that the Other 
feels that s/he cannot tolerate it any longer and consequently forcefully commands the 
masochist to stop (and perhaps to do something else).  The masochist‘s partner thus 
becomes the lawgiving Other, voicing her or his will-to-stop-jouissance.  The 
fundamental fantasy is the (neurotic or perverse) subject‘s way of supporting the circuit 
of desire, and, as Lacan said, ―desire is a defense, a defense against going beyond a limit 
in jouissance‖ (1960/2006a, p. 825).  While the hysteric desires and makes the Other 
desire in accordance with the Law, in relation to what is prohibited, the pervert, as a 
subject for whom the Law exists only precariously, must propagate his desire and thus 
limit his jouissance by making a law be pronounced and come into being.  The perverse 
strategies to setting limits to jouissance differ according to the substructure of perversion 
involved; these various strategies are discussed in the sections of Chapter VI devoted to 
the different substructures of perversion.   
 Continuing the comparison between the fundamental fantasies of hysteria and 
perversion, the hysteric‘s partner is a masterful Other who has knowledge or power and 
thus seems to her to possess jouissance that she lacks.  Believing the Other to unjustly 
possess a surplus of jouissance,
74
 the hysteric strives to recover her lost jouissance 
through arousing the Other‘s desire for her.  Transforming herself into an enticing object 
for the Other, the hysteric causes the Other‘s desire and gains jouissance in the process.  
However, the hysteric (and the neurotic in general) staunchly refuses to be the instrument 
of the Other’s jouissance.  Corresponding to her primal relation to das Ding, the hysteric 
                                               
74 As I noted in Chapter III, through the processes of alienation and separation jouissance is drained from 
the neurotic and, in some fashion, is transferred to the Other‘s account.   
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finds the Other‘s jouissance repulsive, and so she develops strategies to avoid or deny 
being the object of the Other‘s jouissance.  When she is engaging in sexual acts with a 
man, she might remove herself, in thought, from the position of object-cause of his 
jouissance—imagining, for instance, that she is someone else.  Another such strategy is 
that of keeping the Other‘s desire unsatisfied so as to assure that she will maintain her 
role as desired object.  Rather than aiming at an unbarred Other as does the pervert, the 
hysteric strives to perpetuate the Other‘s status as lacking and thus desiring.  In fact, the 
hysteric herself is characterized by her desire for unsatisfied desires (Lacan, 2001, p. 
425). 
In analysis, an hysteric frequently talks and complains about her relationships 
with various types of Others in her life, such as her boss or husband.  She might say that 
no matter how hard she tries to be the best employee or the most desirable wife, she is 
continually undervalued and taken advantage of.  No one desires her enough or in the 
way in which she wants to be desired, and everyone seems to use her as an object for his 
own satisfaction.  For example, her husband loves her, but uses her as a sex object and 
still desires other women.  Essentially, her complaints boil down to her difficulty in 
maintaining her position as object-cause of desire while fending off being the instrument 
of the Other‘s jouissance.  It follows that, although the hysteric and the pervert have 
similar fundamental fantasies, the hysteric aims at the Other‘s castration and seeks to be 
the object-cause of the Other‘s desire while the pervert aims at a cancellation of the 
Other‘s castration and seeks to be the object-cause of the Other‘s jouissance. 
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What is more, the hysteric and the pervert seek out different types of Others.  The 
hysteric‘s partner is ―at first‖75 a masterful unbarred Other (A) in whom she then 
endeavors to inscribe lack in the form of the Other‘s desire for her.  The pervert, in 
contrast, ―at first‖ takes as his partner a barred Other (Ⱥ) for whom he then endeavors to 
fill its lack in the form of himself as instrument of the Other‘s jouissance.  Beyond 
appearing to be lacking in jouissance, who or what embodies the Other for the pervert?  
To a large degree, the pervert‘s Other is particular to the individual and his relationship 
with his childhood caregiver(s).  There are, however, a few very general patterns as to the 
type of person who embodies the Other—when the type of Other in question is a sexual 
and/or romantic partner and/or victim—for the pervert.  One such trend is that the 
pervert‘s Other is often a woman.  Another such trend, upon which I will first elaborate, 
is that the pervert‘s partner who plays the role of Other is often as fungible and as short-
term as is the obsessive‘s object a.   
The reasons why the partner the pervert chooses as his Other is often fungible and 
short-term have to do with the fact that the pervert is the object-cause of jouissance rather 
than desire.  Because the Other, having been castrated, is in reality always lacking in 
jouissance, the pervert‘s task of restoring jouissance to the Other, of making the barred 
Other complete, is structurally impossible.  The most the pervert can achieve is to create 
moments at which the Other‘s intense jouissance temporarily causes the Other to seem 
                                               
75 I have enclosed ―at first‖ in quotation marks here in order to show that the temporality involved should 
not be understood in a strict sequential sense.  Although a possibility, it is not necessarily the case that the 
hysteric‘s interest in an Other is first sparked by her recognizing in him some qualities that represent the 
Other for her and that she only afterward attempts to inscribe a place for herself in the locus of his desire.  
It is also possible that a man‘s desire for her sparked her interest in him, and that she subsequently found 
qualities in him to assign him to the place of Other such that she would continue to attempt to be the object-
cause of his desire.  Alternatively, the sequence of events might simply be unclear.  What is more important 
than temporality here is that the hysteric strives to create a lack in the Other, a lack that is uniquely and 
enduringly suited to her.   
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complete.  This, in turn, temporarily fortifies the existence of the lawgiving Other when 
the Other pronounces a law and sets limits to the pervert‘s jouissance.  The hysteric, as 
the instrument of the Other‘s desire, is able to perpetuate in the long-term her own desire 
and her position in relation to a particular Other who goes on desiring her.  Founded upon 
desire, a relationship between an hysteric and an individual Other can often last—with 
waxings and wanings of desire—long enough to fit socially constructed ideas of a long-
term relationship.  On the other hand, founded upon jouissance, the relation between a 
pervert and an individual Other more often than not measures its duration in terms of 
hours, minutes, or even seconds (in the case of the exhibitionist).   
In this vein, something of interest about what is called the perverse act or scenario 
is that, like the obsessive (Ⱥ ◊ φ (a, a′, a″, a‴, …)) in his search for objects a, the pervert 
seeks out an endless chain of metonymic Others.
76
  Although it is possible (usually 
through love—and perverts do fall in love) for a pervert to form a long-term relation or 
relationship, in which he would repeatedly incite intense jouissance in a particular Other, 
he usually is unable to or avoids doing so in favor of shorter-term relations.  Once the 
exhibitionist, for instance, exposes himself to a woman walking around a deserted street 
corner, he does not run after that woman and expose himself to her again.  He does not 
stalk her and expose himself only to her for months on end nor does he attempt to date 
her.  Indeed, there is often very little about her that appeals to the exhibitionist other than 
the fact that she is a woman; one woman victim is as good as another.  She does not have 
to have a certain hair color or a certain build or style of dress.  There are important 
exceptions to this, however, such as the common exclusion of prepubescent girls and old 
                                               
76 The fetishist is a notable exception to this.  While certainly it is possible for him to daily find a new 
sexual partner who embodies the Other for him, he does so much more rarely than do the other four 
substructures of perversion. 
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women from the set of possible female victims.  These exceptions could be explained by 
social taboos, but because a significant number (though perhaps not a majority) of 
perverts do not lend much credence to social conceptions of morality, it is more likely 
that prepubescent girls and old women do not embody the Other for the pervert because 
they are not as strongly associated with feminine sexuality or the mOther.  As I have 
established, the pervert‘s first Other is almost always a woman; it is also the case that 
victims of perverse acts tend to be women (Cavendish, 2009, p. 220).   
Why do the pervert‘s relations with the Other in his perverse scenario tend to be 
so short-lived?  One reason, already mentioned, is that the specifications for embodying 
the Other—being a woman—are so general that there is little reason for a pervert to 
expend the effort involved in maintaining a longer-term relation with a particular woman.  
Another possibility is that pursuing a particular woman (enacting the perverse scenario 
with one woman on multiple occasions) may, in cases of sadism, voyeurism, and 
exhibitionism in particular, substantially increase the pervert‘s likelihood of getting 
apprehended by the police.  Even though being arrested and charged with a crime such as 
indecent exposure is one way of propping up the paternal function, it seems—from the 
frequency with which perverts get caught by law enforcement—as though the perverse 
solution relies less upon an actual intervention of the law than upon an Other who 
enunciates the law.  A third possible reason for the short-term nature of the pervert‘s 
relation to an Other is that, in cases of sadism and masochism, the Other may initially 
have given her consent but retracted it at some point during or after her encounter with 
the pervert, deciding afterwards to avoid the pervert.   
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A fourth reason may be that the longer a pervert knows an Other, the more she 
seems to be just an other like himself.  As fleeting victim, a woman is able to embody the 
radical Otherness that connects him to her.  If the pervert gives himself a chance to see 
her difference and individuality, then his desire to enact his perverse scenario with her 
dissipates.  Related to this fourth reason is yet another possibility: the Other is defiled by 
the jouissance she experiences in the perverse scenario, such that her status is reduced to 
that of an imaginary other and the pervert loses his interest in her.  This possibility relies 
upon the assumptions that the pervert seeks out an Other whom he can degrade and that, 
once degraded, she is no longer appealing to him.  (This fifth claim will be justified and 
explicated in the next chapter.)  The above first, fourth, and fifth reasons may be 
considered ―internal‖ or structural to the pervert, while the other reasons have more to do 
with the world and with the reactions of the partner.   
A sixth possible reason is that, when enacting his perverse scenario, the pervert 
wants to provide jouissance to an Other who does not want it—or at least who does not 
want it in that particular form or to such an excessive degree, as sometimes occurs in 
sadistic and masochistic scenarios.  This often means that the pervert surprises the Other 
and that the Other is nonconsenting.  When the Other is nonconsenting, it is easier for the 
pervert to transgress the pleasure principle and cause an excess in jouissance.  So too is it 
easier to provoke the Other to pronounce the law.  A woman who seems to be asking for 
jouissance cannot appear to be the Other sorely lacking in jouissance that the pervert 
requires nor will she protest and call forth the lawgiving Other.  For example, Ray, the 
exhibitionist discussed in Chapter VII, began to commit indecent exposure to a woman 
whom he subsequently identified as a prostitute.  By way of reaction to his exposure, she 
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walked closer to him and asked, ―Do you want any help with that?‖  At that point, Ray 
lost his erection and drove off.   
Plugging Up the Lack in the Other 
Lacan‘s schema for and commentary on the structure of perversion that he 
provided in ―Kant with Sade‖ and in Seminar X (January 16, 1963) shows that the pervert 
is committed to filling the lack in the Other by offering up himself as object-cause of 
jouissance.  The Other is seen as castrated, as an entity lacking in jouissance.  The pervert 
becomes anxious in the face of the Other‘s lack, and his solution is to bring something to 
the Other that can mask the Other‘s defects.  Perverts attempt to fill the lack in the Other 
in a variety of different ways and registers.  One fundamental register is that of desire, 
concerning which the pervert identifies with the imaginary object of desire (the imaginary 
phallus, φ).  Another fundamental register is that of jouissance, which involves the 
pervert‘s being object a—the object-cause of the Other‘s jouissance.  A third 
fundamental register—overlapping with both desire and jouissance—is that of speech.   
It is in the register of jouissance that the pervert directs the bulk of his energy.  
Jouissance is the pervert‘s realm of expertise.  According to Lacanian analyst Jean 
Clavreul, ―[the pervert‘s] knowledge about eroticism [makes him feel] assured of 
obtaining the other‘s jouissance under any circumstances‖ (1980, p. 224).  The pervert, 
then, is an expert at exposing the lack in the Other and in divining how to bring about ―a 
recuperation of φ‖ (Lacan, 1960/2006a, p. 823) in the Other.  The perverse scenario is not 
the only way in which the pervert brings jouissance to the Other.  For example, Chris, an 
exhibitionist involved in one of the sexual offenders groups I co-facilitated, always 
complimented a woman on her physical appearance before sexually exposing himself to 
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her.  Chris held it to be true that women are lacking in jouissance and that they, more so 
than men, experience jouissance when complimented on their appearance.  As another 
example, Ray, an exhibitionist whose case study makes up Chapter VII, caused the 
jouissance of the Other in group psychotherapy by often joking, making outlandish 
statements, and encouraging—by word and example—the other group participants to 
speak in detail about their sexual fantasies and behaviors.   
I now turn to a discussion of how a pervert attempts to plug up the lack in the 
Other in the register of speech and language.   
Perversion and the Letter as Fetish 
The Other of language, as I emphasized in Chapter II, is fundamentally 
incomplete and in transformative flux, there being no transcendental signified, ―no such 
thing as a metalanguage‖ (Lacan, Seminar XIV, November 23, 1966), ―no language 
being able to say the truth about truth‖ (Lacan, 1965/2006a, p. 868).  As Lacan discussed 
in his essay ―Science and Truth‖ (1965/2006a, pp. 855-877), there are limits to 
knowledge and to language.  That being said, because the perverse subject is a slave to 
maintaining the fiction that the Other is complete, the pervert refuses to acknowledge that 
there is something that cannot be said or known.  Just as the pervert experienced horror at 
the nameless lack of his mOther, so too does the lack in the Other of language arouse his 
anxiety.  Confronted with a failure of language, the pervert is motivated to negate—often 
by way of disavowal—those limits.   
Ray, for example, was initially opposed to the idea of the unconscious for reasons 
that differ from those of the typical obsessive.  While the obsessive denies the existence 
of the unconscious in the effort to see himself as a complete subject with control over his 
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thoughts and actions, the pervert negates the idea of the unconscious in order to see the 
Other as unbarred.  The concept of the unconscious introduces to the pervert the 
unsettling idea that the Other is not as she or he appears, but is instead permanently and 
structurally divided into two: conscious and unconscious.   
The concept of the unconscious challenges the pervert‘s certainty that everything 
can be said or known about the Other.  Through the process of Ray‘s analysis, including 
interpreting his dreams, Ray soon came to see that the unconscious operates with a logic 
not unlike that of language.  Once Ray realized that there was a successful method of 
interpreting manifestations of the unconscious, the concept of the unconscious ceased to 
present a threat to his belief in the unbarred Other.  Nevertheless, Ray continued to 
disbelieve in what Lacan called the order of the real,
77
 adamantly maintaining that 
everything can be known and said.   
As another example, Ray became distressed when the neurotic participants in his 
sexual offenders psychotherapy group negated their relation to their own jouissance.  
Jouissance, of course, is what the pervert believes will make the Other whole.  
Consequently, the fabric of Ray‘s symbolic world threatened to tear at the seams in the 
face of the Other‘s denials of a will-to-jouissance and the temporary sense of subjective 
fullness gained by experiencing jouissance.  Taking on a fetishistic function, the words 
that Ray used in such moments to plug up this lack in the Other had to do with 
―responsibility.‖  Ray protested against every occasion when another participant evaded 
responsibility for his actions or denied deriving jouissance from his illegal behavior, 
effectively saying, ―Take some responsibility!  You did what you wanted to do!‖  Ray 
                                               
77 I did not introduce the concept of the real to Ray.  
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frequently encouraged the other participants to speak about the jouissance they gained 
from their behaviors, whether legal or not.   
A perverse subject desires to see any lack in the Other as one which can be filled.  
Concerning the Other of knowledge, André said,  
It is precisely against [the limits of reason] that the pervert protests, by upholding 
in many instances, be it only in the peculiar relationship entertained with fantasy, 
the challenge of saying everything.  This challenge of saying everything is a 
constant factor, for example, in the works of Sade and Céline, and it also explains 
the frequency of mania among perverts.  It is this challenge, which perverse 
disavowal addresses at S(Ⱥ), that explains Sade‘s virulent atheism.  The negation 
of God in Sade‘s work operates as a negation of the limits of reason. (2006, p. 
119, translation modified) 
Sade negates God, who is a metonymy for the limits of the Other of knowledge, by way 
of disavowal. 
 André referred to Annie Le Brun‘s book, Sade: A Sudden Abyss (1990), in his 
discussion of the function of Sade‘s negation of God.  André concluded that Sade‘s 
―proliferation of blasphemy‖ (2006, p. 120) functions to fill the ―gaping hole that God, as 
signifier, leaves in reason‖ (p. 120).  From this conclusion it is apparent that Sade‘s 
words of blasphemy function as a fetish to plug the lack in the Other.   
According to Miller, ―the Lacanian fetish is an image projected on the veil that 
hides the lack in being‖ (Miller, 2009a, p. 62).  Along these lines, André noted that  
Sade sees in the notion of God a revolting lack of being (manque d’être) that 
generates an even more revolting ―deficiency of human being,‖ a genuine ―want-
168 
 
to-be‖ [manque à être].  In his relationship to language, the type of speech that 
Sade proposes in order to fill this lack of being plays exactly the same role as the 
imaginary phallus with regard to the mother‘s castration. (2006, p. 120, 
translation modified) 
Given the fact that Sade goes to great lengths to blaspheme God, another interpretation is 
probable.  Rather than representing the hole in the Other of reason, God represents the 
barred Other who, according to Sade in his poem, ―La Vérité [Truth],‖ has a ―tenuous 
existence [ta frêle existence].‖  In order to make the Other‘s/God‘s existence less 
tenuous, Sade becomes the instrument of the Other‘s jouissance by bringing jouissance to 
God in the form of blasphemy.  In Sade‘s view, God, in his sacred purity, is an Other 
severely lacking in jouissance.  God‘s lack of jouissance is what makes God so ―vile‖ and 
―horror‖-inspiring to Sade.  At the very least, the lack in the Other arouses Sade‘s 
anxiety.   
 Sade‘s disavowal of God could be expressed in the following phrase: ―I know 
perfectly well that God does not exist, but all the same I can‘t help but go to great lengths 
to blaspheme God.‖  Sade‘s belief in God is solidified in his fetishistic acts of blasphemy, 
which must be repeated to excess.  Why would Sade bother to blaspheme an entity that 
truly did not exist for him?  The truth revealed in ―La Vérité,‖ then, is that Sade‘s 
blasphemy functions not as a negation of God but as a fetish which serves to make God 
exist.  Sade needs God. 
As a pervert, Sade‘s place in the symbolic order is dependent upon the existence 
of the Other.  In this regard, Lacan said, ―I will ask you to look at my article ‗Kant avec 
Sade,‘ where you will see that the sadist himself occupies the place of the object, but 
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without knowing it, to the benefit of another, for whose jouissance he exercises his action 
as sadistic pervert‖ (1973/1998a, p. 185).  Unbeknown to himself, Sade spent his life as 
the instrument of God‘s jouissance.  As Lacan said, the sadist‘s position as object-cause 
of the Other‘s jouissance is ―the foundation of an identification disavowed by the 
subject‖ (p. 186).   
The pervert‘s ignorance of his position as object a is clearly illustrated in the 
schemae for neurosis and perversion that Lacan gave in Seminar X (2004, p. 62) as 
follows:  
           A                  A 
a      $     S   a  $ 
Perverse fantasy      Neurotic fantasy 
 
The ―A‖ above the line or wall represents Autre (Other, in English) such that, for each 
schema, the side of the subject is to the left of the wall and the side of the Other is to the 
right of the wall.  The side of the Other is the only side that is visible to the subject.  
Correspondingly, the side of the subject is marked by ignorance, and so Sade, as a 
perverse subject, is blind to the fact that he occupies the position of the object a. 
Sade‘s ethical philosophy takes a surplus of jouissance as its guiding principle.  In 
his notes to ―La Vérité,‖ for example, he says, ―Give ourselves indiscriminately to all that 
our passions inspire, and we will always be happy.‖  For the neurotic, lack organizes 
desire and discourse.  In contrast, Sade‘s life and discourse is structured by an excess in 
jouissance—by fetishistic presence rather than lack.  For Sade, then, ―excess is itself a 
metaphor for the momentum of desire‖ (Le Brun, 1990, p. 181).  In André‘s (2006) 
opinion,  
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The beyond of satisfaction, which the Sadean master turns into the maxim 
governing his relationship to desire is, in this way, first of all an excess of 
language, and only subsequently a sexual excess.  That the challenge of saying 
everything is doomed to fail is beyond doubt and this is perfectly illustrated by the 
end of The 120 Days of Sodom, where one can see the fall-out of the manic 
symptom. (p. 121)   
The pervert‘s excess in jouissance often manifests itself in such excesses of language.   
The pervert devotes himself to the attempt to say everything.  Correspondingly, 
the oral drive often manifests itself as a major clinical feature of perversion.
78
  In speech 
and writing, perverts are often verbose and pay great attention to detail.  What is more, 
just as neurotic speech frequently involves negation indicative of repression, perverse 
speech frequently reveals the operation of disavowal.   
Consider the case of Chris, an exhibitionist who regularly attended one of the 
weekly psychotherapy groups for sexual offenders that I co-facilitated.  Chris was the 
only exhibitionist in a group comprised mostly of neurotic men.  Over the course of 
several years of group involvement, Chris was consistently the most verbose group 
participant.  Chris chose to speak at length about himself at numerous group sessions, 
going into such great detail that he sometimes bored the other participants.  In addition, 
when the group focused on other participants, Chris often commented exhaustively on 
their life situations, sometimes relating their situations to some of his own, other times 
giving advice, and still other times making empathic comments.  More important to the 
present discussion, however, than the content of Chris‘ words, is how his speech indicates 
                                               
78 The importance of the oral drive in understanding perversion will be further elaborated in the following 
chapter. 
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his relation to the Other.  Chris did indeed seem to be attempting to say everything, to see 
the Other of language as complete.   
Although the pervert is permanently a subject in the symbolic order, his seat in 
the symbolic order is neither as solid nor as ornate as that of the neurotic.  Compared to 
the neurotic, the pervert‘s identity, desire, and jouissance are more restricted and 
dependent upon the Other.  Consequently, Lacan said that, like the psychotic, the pervert 
may attempt to solidify his special place in the symbolic by including himself in some 
kind of linguistic network of his own creation.  For example, in Seminar IX (February 28, 
1962), Lacan suggested that the marks made by the Marquis de Sade on his bedpost 
functioned to inscribe Sade‘s jouissance in a writing system in which he could grant 
himself a special place. 
Along these lines, Chris‘ main hobby, to which he devoted time several days a 
week, was compiling, organizing, and writing a family history.  In this effort, Chris 
visited libraries and read articles on microfilm.  Chris regularly attended family reunions, 
and hoped to connect there with members of his family unknown to him (for the 
ostensible purpose of gathering information from them about their lives) as well as to 
reconnect with family members with whom he was already well acquainted.  Chris 
wanted to make their family history as complete as possible; he had already been working 
on it for years, and no end date was in sight.  In this way, as the writer of their family 
history, Chris attempted to carve out a special place for himself in the family tree.  In a 
symbolic world of his own authorship, he was more than just his mOther‘s son.    
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 Consider another example of the pervert‘s relation to the letter, that of the trial 
testimony of the infamous 15
th
-century sadist Gilles de Rais.  Gilles was a wealthy and 
powerful French nobleman who was executed at the stake following  
the testimonies of dozens of witnesses who claim that the members of Gilles‘s 
entourage kidnapped, over a period of about eight years, more than a hundred 
adolescent and preadolescent children, almost exclusively boys, whom Gilles then 
submitted to disturbing rituals of erotic torture, then summarily murdered by 
strangulation, decapitation, or dismemberment. (Penney, 2003, p. 126) 
In a well-explicated article, James Penney (2003) pointed out numerous characteristics of 
Gilles‘ testimony that are indicative of a perverse relation to the Other.   
 Penney said that, prior to the beginning of his public trial, Gilles‘ attitude changed 
with regard to the church‘s authority over his indictment after the Inquisition threatened 
him with excommunication.  Gilles greatly feared ―the consequences of being jettisoned 
from the community of God and so deprived of a chance for salvation‖ (Penney, 2003, p. 
130).  Gilles, a believer in God, may have been afraid of eternal damnation, but he may 
also have been afraid of having no relationship to the Other, for who would he be without 
the Other?   
After the threat of excommunication, Gilles ―desired to repeat his out of court 
confession in the public confines of the trial ‗to remedy its faults in the event that he had 
omitted anything, and to make more thorough declarations of the points develped 
summarily in the … articles [of indictment]‘‖ (Penney, 2003, p. 130).  In his trial, Gilles 
set about confessing his ―sins‖ in so much explicit detail that he even confessed to more 
―sins‖ than those for which he was charged.  Gilles, then, tried to say everything possible 
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on the subject of his guilt.  ―Oddly, however, Gilles did not consider the description of 
his crimes as grounds for the potential reinstitution of the excommunication.  Indeed, 
Gilles thought that his chances at absolution increased in proportion to the morbid 
completeness of his confession‖ (p. 130).  This strange way of thinking may be expressed 
in terms of disavowal: ―I know very well that the more detail I provide of my crimes, the 
more likely I am to be severely punished, but all the same I am certain that God in his 
divine clemency will forgive me all the more easily.‖     
Gilles is certain that God‘s desire is to forgive sinners like himself.  Gilles is 
certain of this knowledge because, as Miller says, ―certitude is always more on the side of 
jouissance‖ [than on the side of the authority of the Name-of-the-Father] (Miller, 2006a, 
p. 23).  Because a pervert has more jouissance than does a neurotic, the pervert has less 
doubt (which, as I said in Chapter III, is a hallmark of neurosis) and more certainty.  
Gilles does not doubt that he knows what the Other wants.  Gilles, as object-cause of the 
Other‘s jouissance, became the greatest of sinners so that he might have  
the most spectacular acts of contrition, [and would] best conform to the divine 
will to grant the grace of salvation.  Far from perverting the theological position 
on grace in late medieval Christianity, Gilles‘s confession uncovers the 
authentically perverse kernel of forms of Christian casuistry that safeguard a 
realm of illicit taboo by granting divine pardon to the believer in advance… In a 
theological framework that allows for certainty with respect to the content of the 
final judgment, the subject acquires divine forgiveness and favor by means of the 
very transgression of the terms of the covenant.  (Penney, 2003, pp. 149-150)   
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Gilles attained certainty of his role as instrument of God‘s jouissance—God gaining 
jouissance in granting His forgiveness—by engaging in such obviously sinful behavior 
and then confessing and asking for divine pardon.  Gilles went about fulfilling God‘s 
will-to-jouissance by committing crimes and then begging for forgiveness.  To Gilles‘ 
mind, the severity of his transgressions ensured that ―he will be especially forgiven for 
his particularly scandalous crimes‖ (p. 150).  Through Gilles‘ horrible crimes and 
detailed confession, he gained for himself a special position in relation to the Other: the 
instrument of the Other‘s jouissance.79   
Certainty as Magical Thinking 
As I explained in Chapters III and IV, psychosis is associated with certainty and 
subjectivity is associated with doubt.  The pervert is less plagued by doubt and more 
―plagued‖ by certainty than is the neurotic, because the pervert, as the instrument of the 
Other‘s jouissance, lacks a persistent question of identity at the level of being.  The 
pervert‘s certainty relates to matters of jouissance.  He is certain that his role is to plug up 
the lack in the Other with jouissance.  In Clavreul‘s (1980) words,  
The pervert‘s knowledge is equally a knowledge that refuses to recognize its 
insertion in a ‗not-knowing‘ that precedes it: it is a knowledge that is given as 
truth…In the end, this knowledge is rigid and implacable; it cannot be revised in 
the face of facts that belie it.  This knowledge about eroticism feels assured of 
                                               
79 According to Penney, a neurotic relation to God and to sin in 15th century France would have been 
different in the following way: ―While the neurotic subject indulges in crime as a result of an irrational, 
pathological motivation beyond its conscious control, and then chastises itself as a means of both 
intensifying the enjoyment of transgression and reconstituting the contours of its symbolic universe, the 
pervert commits the crime in order retroactively to present himself as the object-cause of redemption.  The 
pervert, in short, must commit the sin with reference to which he will subsequently rationalize his 
innocence‖ (2003, p. 151). 
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obtaining the other‘s jouissance under any circumstances. (p. 224, translation 
modified)  
Perverse certainty is evident in the second phrase in each disavowal; the claim attached to 
―but all the same‖ is the one that the pervert believes to be true despite evidence to the 
contrary.  The pervert‘s certainty bears resemblance to what has often been called 
―magical thinking‖ with regard to children.  For example, ―I know very well that my 
stuffed animals are not alive, but I can‘t help but believe that they are only pretending 
and that, at night or when I am not looking, they move and talk just as I do.‖  Such a child 
might consequently arrange his stuffed animals carefully so that they are comfortable and 
can breathe.   
Perverse certainty and the operation of disavowal in perversion is more likely to 
have to do with the lawgiving Other or the maternal phallus.  Consider the following 
example.  In a session toward the end of our analytic work—which was by no means a 
complete analysis—Ray said that when he was driving to his appointment and was close 
to the office building, he was stopped at a light and saw what he thought might have been 
my car behind him.  Then, he saw a woman crossing the street and he thought to himself, 
―Don‘t even look at her because if that‘s Stephanie, Stephanie will see and will wonder 
what I was thinking.‖  Ray said that he knew that I was probably not in the car behind 
him and he knew that I could neither see his gaze (from my vantage point) nor read his 
mind, but all the same he could not help but believe that I was there and would know if 
he thought about exposing himself to the woman crossing the street.  Despite what Ray 
knew about my limitations, he nevertheless preferred to believe that I would know were 
he to look at and consider exposing himself to a woman.  This belief, facilitated by 
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disavowal, enabled him to prop up the paternal function.  In this scenario, and, indeed, 
throughout much of our analytic work, Ray saw me as the lawgiving Other in addition to 
the subject-supposed-to-know.  Ray believed—without  me ever having confirmed, 
denied, or supported his belief—that I would know if were he to commit an act of 
indecent exposure and that I would turn him in to law enforcement officials. 
The Force of the Imaginary Order and the Drives 
 The pervert‘s certainty is but one of the numerous phenomena linked with the 
pervert‘s excess in jouissance.  In general, the pervert‘s imaginary order processes and 
drives are stronger and less under the control of the symbolic than are those of the 
neurotic.  Consequently, aggression and rivalry (related to the imaginary order) and 
impulsivity (related to the drives) are usually notable features of perversion, with 
symbolic success often being less important to perverts than to neurotics.   
It should be emphasized that, just as neurotics vary widely in their levels of 
―impulse control‖ and ―drive inhibition‖ due to factors such as family and social contexts 
(for example, the difference between neurotic teenagers who drink alcohol, do drugs, and 
take part in fights related to street gangs and neurotic teenagers who refrain from doing 
such things altogether and delay their gratification for symbolic achievements), so too do 
perverts vary widely on those levels.  Criminals such as Gilles de Rais are extremely rare 
exceptions even among perverse subjects.  The paternal function can be propped up 
without transgressing an ethical boundary, as shown, for instance, in my example of Ray 
at the stoplight. 
The pervert‘s excess of jouissance, while it may appear desirable from the 
standpoint of the neurotic, is actually at the root of a good deal of his suffering.  The 
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pervert is far from being a carefree sensualist.  Instead, the perverse subject is 
fundamentally lacking in freedom.  The pervert‘s  jouissance is either fixated to a fetish 
or he is compulsively driven to enact an almost invariable scenario; the pervert manages 
his jouissance through these compulsions, but he afterward often suffers from shame and 
may experience social, occupational, or legal consequences.   
Perversion and the Drives  
 
―Perversion does not appear as the pure and simple manifestation of a drive, but it 
turns out to be related to a dialectical context which is as subtle, as composite, as rich in 
compromise, as ambiguous as a neurosis‖ (Lacan, Seminar V [1957-58]: The Formations 
of the Unconscious, pp. 230-231). 
―It is the [perverse] subject who determines himself as an object, in his encounter 
with subjective division‖ (Lacan, 1973/1998a, p. 185; translation modified). 
―What is at issue in the drive is finally revealed here—the course of the drive is 
the only form of transgression that is permitted to the subject in relation to the pleasure 
principle‖ (Lacan, 1973/1998a, p. 183).   
Like the neurotic subject, the perverse subject has a particular way of situating 
himself in relation to the drive.  In perversion, the subject locates himself as the object of 
the Other‘s drive.  The perverse subject brings jouissance to the Other by making himself 
the object of the Other‘s drive.  In exhibitionism and voyeurism, the pervert locates 
himself as the object of the scopic drive (Lacan, 1973/1998a, pp. 182-183).  In sadism 
and masochism, the pervert locates himself as the object of the invocatory drive (Lacan, 
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2006b, p. 257).
80
  Lacan does not discuss fetishism in terms of a predominant drive.  
From what Lacan does say about fetishism, however, paired with the available case 
studies, I make two hypotheses: first, that fetishism has to do with the scopic drive, and 
second, that the fetishist‘s solution brings him more firmly into the symbolic order than 
the solutions of the other four substructures.  These hypotheses will be explored below 
and in the next chapter.   
Using the example of Alcibiades, Lacan said the pervert is he ―who pursues 
jouissance as far as possible‖ (1960/2006a, p. 826).  The pervert‘s means of doing so is 
the drive, as ―the course of the drive is the only form of transgression that is permitted to 
the subject in relation to the pleasure principle‖ (Lacan, 1973/1998a, p. 183).  Before 
further explicating the pervert‘s relation to the drive, it will be necessary to explore the 
course of the drive in more detail.   
As I explained in Chapter III, the drive, which is structured by the child‘s relation 
to the Other, is a demand that is paradoxically always satisfied.  The purpose of the drive 
is not to reach a goal but to follow its aim or path.  And it is the perpetual and repetitive 
circuit of the drive around its object a that allows the drive to produce its own 
satisfaction.  Therefore, the drive might usefully be considered as a linguistic program 
(Miller, 1996b, p. 316).   
In Seminar XI, Lacan elaborated his theory of the circuit of the drive.  In so 
doing, he referred to Freud‘s concept of the drive as a montage composed of vicissitudes: 
the source (Quelle), the object (Objekt), the thrust (Drang), and the Ziel.  Lacan translated 
―Ziel‖ into two different English words, ―aim‖ and ―goal‖ (Lacan, 1973/1998a, p. 179)—
                                               
80 The object a of the invocatory drive is the voice.  The invocatory drive involves jouissance in seeing.  It 
is explained in more detail below.   
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both of which are relevant to the circuit of the drive.  ―The aim is the way taken‖ (p. 179) 
while the goal is the completion of the circuit.  Lacan provided the following diagram to 
illustrate the drive‘s circuit (p. 178): 
 
In the drive‘s circuit, the drive originates in the source, or what Lacan calls the 
―rim‖ (Lacan, 1973/1998a, p. 179) and which is essentially the erogenous zone.81  The 
pressure of the drive moves it along its path or ―aim‖ (p. 179) of circling around the 
object a and returning to the erogenous zone and thus achieving its ―goal‖ (p. 179).  The 
drive‘s circuit is structured by three grammatical voices: active, reflexive, and passive (p. 
177).  Take, for example, Schaulust,
82
 or the scopic drive.   
 
                                               
81 Recall from Chapter III that the erogenous zones have a rim-like structure.  ―The very delimitation of the 
‗erogenous zone‘ that the drive isolates from the function‘s metabolism (the act of devouring involves 
organs other than the mouth—just ask Pavlov‘s dog) is the result of a cut that takes advantage of the 
anatomical characteristic of a margin or border: the lips, ‗the enclosure of the teeth,‘ the rim of the anus, the 
penile groove, the vagina, and the slit formed by the eyelids, not to mention the hollow of the ear‖ (Lacan, 
1966/2006a, p. 817).   
82 Freud‘s term ―Schaulust” combines the German word ―lust” (translated in English as ―pleasure‖) with 
the word rendered in English as ―looking‖ or ―seeing.‖  ―Schaulust‖ could therefore be translated into 
Lacanian terminology as ―jouissance in seeing.‖  The activity of the scopic drive may thus be particularly 
apparent in moments when a subject watches something with intense curiosity or fascination, and her 
jouissance is subjectively experienced as pleasure, shame, anxiety, or disgust.   
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Stage 1: active = to see 
Stage 2: reflexive = to see oneself 
Stage 3: passive = to be seen 
Ultimately, ―what is involved in the drive is getting oneself seen (se faire voir).  The 
activity of the drive is concentrated in this getting oneself (se faire)‖ (p. 195, translation 
modified).  This is why Lacan emphasized that the drive is fundamentally active (p. 200).  
As he said, ―it is obvious that, even in its supposedly passive phase, the exercise of a 
drive, a masochistic drive, for example, requires that the masochist give himself, if I may 
be permitted to put it in this way, a devil of a job‖ (p. 200, translation modified).  Lacan 
concluded that each of the three grammatical stages ―with which Freud articulates each 
drive must be replaced by the formula of getting oneself seen, heard and the rest of the 
list‖ (p. 200, translation modified) of partial drives given by Lacan. 
 Another way of writing the three grammatical stages is the following: he sees, he 
sees it (himself), and it (he) is seen by the Other.  ―He‖ is the subject, ―sees‖ is the verb, 
and ―it‖ is the object of the drive.  Consequently, it is apparent that the subject is reduced 
to an object in the course of the drive‘s satisfaction.  Because the pervert‘s position is that 
of object-cause of the Other‘s jouissance, the pervert is the person in whom the structure 
of the drive is most clearly revealed.  In Lacan‘s words,  
I have also shown that, in the profound relation of the drive, what is essential is 
that the movement by which the arrow that sets out towards the target fulfills its 
function only by really re-emerging from it, and returning on to the subject.  In 
this sense, the pervert is he who, in short circuit, more directly than any other, 
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succeeds in his aim, by integrating in the most profound way his function as 
subject with his existence as desire. (1973/1998a, p. 206)
83
   
Consider also the following passage:  
The object, here, is the gaze—the gaze that is the subject, which attains it, which 
hits the bull‘s eye in target-shooting.  I have only to remind you what I said of 
Sartre‘s analysis.  Although this analysis brings out the agency of the gaze, it is 
not at the level of the other whose gaze surprises the subject looking through the 
keyhole.  It is that the other surprises him, the subject, as entirely hidden gaze.  (p. 
182, my emphasis) 
Paradoxically, the object of the drive is, at the same time, the subject of the drive.   
This subject of the drive affords a kind of acephalous subjectivity in the real, as 
contrasted with the subject of the unconscious.  The subject as drive is that which pursues 
jouissance.  In the neurotic, the subject as drive is ―prior to analysis, hemmed in, kept 
down, and silenced as much as possible by the ego and the superego, by desire as it forms 
in language on the basis of the Other‘s discourse, which transmits the Other‘s desires, 
values, and ideals‖ (Fink, 1997, p. 208).  The pervert is less dominated than the neurotic 
by the Other‘s desire, and so the pervert‘s subjectivity at the level of the drive, 
manifested in the perverse act, sticks out and obscenely disrupts the neurotic‘s symbolic 
world, arousing her anxiety.   
The Gaze, the Voice, and Perversion 
The gaze and the scopic drive figure prominently in the structure of perversion, 
particularly with regard to exhibitionism, voyeurism, and fetishism.  What is the gaze, 
                                               
83 It is also possible to interpret this passage to mean that the neurotic‘s aim is more indirect than that of the 
pervert because she aims to be not the drive-object of jouissance but the object of desire, which requires her 
to go beyond the circuit of the drive to achieve her aim.   
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exactly?  ―The objet a in the field of the visible is the gaze‖ (Lacan, 1973/1998a, p. 105).  
Seminar XI marked Lacan‘s invention of the gaze as object a, which Lacan credited to 
the influence of Maurice Merleau-Ponty‘s posthumous book The Visible and the Invisible 
(1968).
84
  The gaze is a priori and subjectless.  We experience this gaze as if we were 
being looked at by the world; it is empty, indeterminate, invisible, and impossible but 
nevertheless keenly experienced.   
Let us recall the archetypal scene from Hitchcock: a heroine (Lilah in Psycho, 
Melanie in The Birds) is approaching a mysterious, allegedly empty house; she is 
looking at it, yet what makes a scene so disturbing is that we, the spectators, 
cannot get rid of the vague impression that the object she is looking at is 
somehow returning the gaze. (Žižek, 1996, p. 90) 
In this experience of the gaze, we feel looked at by some presence that we know is not 
there.  We feel anxiety at the overproximity of the object at times when the object is 
unveiled and disrupts the consistency of our reality.   
The presence of object a, of course, can also produce desire.  In Freud‘s 
(1927/1961) article ―Fetishism,‖ Freud described the case of an analysand who had lived 
                                               
84 In Seminar XI, Lacan added both the gaze and the voice to the list of psychoanalytic objects a.  Whereas 
the oral and anal drives have been supposed to correspond to chronological stages of psycho-social-
biological development, and have thus played major roles in stage theories of development for over a 
century, the scopic and invocatory drives did not appear in psychoanalysis until Lacan applied his 
structuralist and linguistic viewpoint to the topic of the drives, focusing on the development of the 
linguistic subject.  That said, the rudiments of the scopic drive did appear in Freud‘s conception of 
Schaulust, and in that sense Lacan expanded and clarified Schaulust according to his ontological 
framework.  According to Miller (2007), Lacan added the gaze and the voice to the Freudian list of objects 
a because of his clinical experience working with psychosis.  ―It is a clinical experience in which gaze and 
voice manifest themselves in separate forms, clearly characterized by their exteriority with regard to the 
subject…Lacan extracted the scopic object from the delusion of surveillance because this delusion renders 
manifest the separate and external presence of a gaze under which the subject falls.  In a similar way, it is 
from the phenomena of mental automatism…that Lacan extracted the object voice.  Here one speaks of 
voices, although these voices are all immaterial—they are nevertheless perfectly real to the subject.  They 
are even what he cannot doubt, despite the fact that nobody can record them.  Their sonorous materiality is 
not what would be at the fore here‖ (p. 140).   
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in England for some of his early childhood before moving to Germany, and who 
subsequently developed a fetish for women with ―a shine on the nose‖ (Glanz auf der 
naze) resulting from the homonymic relation between ―Glanz‖ (translated as ―shine‖ in 
English) and ―glance.‖  The Glanz auf der nase represented the gaze, making the fetishist 
feel gazed at and evoking his desire.  As a general rule, the subject‘s desire is produced 
when object a is veiled
85
 or disguised, and the subject‘s anxiety is provoked when object 
a lacks the veil‘s adornment and is experienced in its nakedness as overproximate.  The 
fetishist analysand identified with the gaze, and as such he was the object of the scopic 
drive in his relation to the Other.  The fetishist‘s jouissance was permanently fixated to 
his fetish and to the scopic drive.   
The gaze represented an important correction to Lacan‘s treatment of the scopic 
field in his theory of the mirror stage.  In the mirror stage, the mirror and the scopic self-
observation (―I see myself seeing myself‖) prop up the materialization of the image and 
imaginary identifications.  In so doing, the mirror stage obscures the distinction between 
vision—made possible by the eyes and the brain—and the gaze as object a, in which ―the 
subject sustain[s] himself in a function of desire‖ (Lacan, 1973/1998a, p. 85).  What is 
more, unlike the oral and anal drives, which operate at the level of demand, the scopic 
and invocatory drives operate at the level of desire, ―of the desire of the Other‖ (p. 104).   
Although Lacan cited Jean-Paul Sartre‘s concept of the gaze in Chapter 7 of 
Seminar XI (1973/1998a, p. 84), it was largely to differentiate Lacan‘s concept of the 
gaze as apprehended in the field of desire from Sartre‘s gaze as apprehended in the gaze 
of others.  For Sartre,  
                                               
85 In Lacan‘s terminology, the veil is a type of semblance, and a semblance is something that functions to 
mask nothingness.  The ―maternal phallus‖ is such a semblance.   
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The gaze is seen [se voit, which might also be translated as ―sees itself‖]—to be 
precise, the gaze of which Sartre speaks, the gaze that surprises me and reduces 
me to shame, since this is the feeling [Sartre] regards as the most dominant.  
(Lacan, 1973/1998a, p. 84) 
For Lacan, however,  
The gaze…is not a seen gaze, but a gaze imagined by me in the field of the 
Other… If one does not stress the dialectic of desire one does not understand why 
the gaze of others would disorganize the field of perception.  It is because the 
subject in question is not that of reflexive consciousness, but that of desire. 
(1973/1998a, p. 84; p. 89, translation modified)   
Prior to the gaze of others, then, is a fundamental subjectless gaze in the field of desire.  
The scopic drive indicates that there is an invisible gaze which aims at the subject. 
 All objects a, as objects in the real, are intangible and invisible.  The gaze, we 
might say, is veiled, hidden, or cloaked by elements of the imaginary order.   
Generally speaking, the relation between the gaze and what one wishes to see 
involves a lure.  The subject is presented as other than he is, and what one shows 
him is not what he wishes to see.  It is in this way that the eye may function as 
objet a, that is to say, at the level of lack ( - φ). (Lacan, 1973/1998a, p. 104, 
translation modified)    
Lacan‘s matheme i(a), the image of object a, implies an image or a person that dresses up 
the object a that it hides.  Object a, as an object in the real, has nothing to do with 
aesthetic beauty, but it sometimes takes on the quality of beauty when veiled by a 
beautiful image.  The veil comes between the subject and the object a.   
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When the imaginary order fails or is disrupted, the object a as real distorts the 
appearance of reality and arouses the subject‘s anxiety.  As Slavoj Žižek pointed out in 
his foreword to Henry Bond‘s Lacan at the Scene (2009), an excellent example of this 
failure may be found in Marcel Proust‘s The Guermantes Way (1952), when the narrator 
uses the telephone for the first time, calling his beloved grandmother. 
After a few seconds of silence, suddenly I heard that voice which I supposed 
myself, mistakenly, to know so well; for always until then, every time that my 
grandmother had talked to me, I had been accustomed to follow what she was 
saying on the open score of her face, in which the eyes figured so largely; but her 
voice itself I was hearing this afternoon for the first time.  And because that voice 
appeared to me to have altered in its proportions from the moment that it was a 
whole, and reached me in this way alone and without the accompaniment of her 
face and features, I discovered for the first time how sweet that voice was…but 
also how sad it was; then, too, having it alone beside me, seen, without the mask 
of her face, I noticed for the first time the sorrows that had scarred it in the course 
of a lifetime. (Retrieved from 
http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/p/proust/marcel/p96g/chapter1.html) 
The voice, object a of the invocatory drive, is described by the narrator in its unveiled 
state.  His grandmother‘s voice, a real-order object detached from its veil (previously 
always accompanying image of his grandmother‘s face), unsettled the narrator‘s sense of 
reality and altered his perceptions of his grandmother. 
A real presence indeed that voice so near—in actual separation.  But a 
premonition also of an eternal separation! ...I have known the anxiety that was 
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one day to wring my heart when a voice should thus return (alone, and attached 
no longer to a body which I was never more to see). (Retrieved from 
http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/p/proust/marcel/p96g/chapter1.html) 
The narrator‘s anxiety is the result of the voice as object a appearing in reality.  The voice 
appeared to the narrator in ―an obscene overproximity, a presence more intimate, more 
penetrating, than that of an external body in front of us‖ (Bond, 2009, p. xi). 
The Veil, Fetishism, and the Gaze 
 We return to the interpretation of the scene where the young child discovers the 
absence of the penis in his mother, since we must elucidate the very important 
question … with what eye does the mother see her child, who looks at her?‖… 
But here there is no response, there is only a question.  The look and the eye 
retain their mystery.  And it is thus that for the pervert the eye will have a 
problematic place that neurotic and normal subjects reserve for the phallus and the 
loved object…Is the eye there to see, to look, to jouir, or better yet, to seduce? 
(Clavreul, 1980, p. 226).   
 
In Seminar IV (1994, p. 156), Lacan provided the ―schema of the veil‖ (p. 156), 
which he said represented the structure of fetishism.   
 
• •         • 
Subject  Object   Nothing 
 
   Curtain 
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Referring to this schema, Lacan said, ―This is the subject, this is the object, and this over 
here is the nothing, which is also the symbol, or the phallus in as much as the woman 
doesn‘t have it‖ (p. 156).  For Freud, the nothing is the mother‘s lack of a penis, and the 
fetish object is, by way of metonymy, a substitute for the missing penis (p. 157).  For 
Lacan, the nothing is the fundamental lack in being.   
In an intermediary position between the subject and the object, the veil functions 
to disguise the fact that, behind the object ex-sists the Other‘s lack in being.  In other 
words, this schema shows how the fetish is an image projected onto a veil that conceals a 
lack in being.  This image is not fundamentally in the visual field but in the field of the 
scopic drive; Freud‘s analysand was probably the only one to notice the shine on 
women‘s noses.  Because the fetish is permanent, we can say that the veil is what allows 
the image to be permanently inscribed.   
 As previously stated, the fetish includes imaginary, symbolic, and real order 
determinants.  In other words, as in Fink‘s (2003) case of W, the boot corresponds to the 
image of a boot, to signifiers such as ―boot,‖ ―butt,‖ and ―thumb,‖ and to the gaze as 
object a.
86
  In fetishism, the fetish object is comprised of a mixture of elements having to 
do with the subject, the ambiguity around sexual difference, and the second Other.
87
  
Therefore in fetishism, unlike in voyeurism and exhibitionism, the gaze cannot be located 
either on the side of the subject or on the side of the Other, but instead is located in object 
a on the side of both the Other and the subject.  For the fetishist, the gaze is primary 
insofar as the mOther‘s gaze was focused on him, the apple of her eye, and on his penis, 
                                               
86 Fink himself, however, does not highlight the gaze or the scopic drive in his case study of W.   
87 In the case of W, for instance, the boot fetish functioned as a Name-of-the-Father or second Other.  Boots 
were a signifier of W‘s mOther‘s desire and were associated with a law outside of herself.  The boot also 
served as a substitute for W and his penis.   
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and also insofar as he, like little Hans, focused his gaze on the place where his mOther‘s 
penis should have been.  It was in his mOther‘s gaze that the fetishist took up his 
symbolic position.   
The Voice and the Invocatory Drive 
 At the scopic level, we are no longer at the level of demand, but of desire, of the 
desire of the Other.  It is the same at the level of the invocatory drive, which is the 
closest to the experience of the unconscious. (Lacan, 1973/1998a, p. 104) 
 
The voice and the invocatory drive are the object and drive that predominate in 
masochism and sadism (Lacan, 2006b, p. 257).  Just as the gaze as object a has little to do 
with vision, so too is it the case that  
the voice as object a does not in the least belong to the sonorous register… 
[Consequently, we must consider] the function of the voice as a-phonic [a-
phone], if I may say so. This is probably a paradox, a paradox that has to do with 
the fact that the objects called a are tuned to the subject of the signifier only if 
they lose all substantiality, that is, only on condition that they are centered by a 
void, that of castration. (Miller, 2007, p. 139) 
It is because of the emptiness of the voice that Miller went on to define the voice as the 
unspeakable (p. 145).   
Lacan said that the invocatory drive ―is the closest to the experience of the 
unconscious‖ (1973/1998a, p. 104) because of the voice‘s fundamental relation to speech 
and language.  (Recall that ―the unconscious is structured like a language‖ (p. 149).)  
According to Miller, the voice is ―everything in the signifier that does not partake in the 
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effect of signification‖ (2007, p. 141).  ―Speech knots signified—or rather the ‗to be 
signified‘, what is to be signified—and signifier to one another; and this knotting always 
entails a third term, that of the voice‖ (p. 141).  In other words, the voice is what ties the 
signifier to the signified.  Consequently, the Lacanian voice cannot be said to be 
something we utilize; instead, ―the voice inhabits language, it haunts it.  It is enough to 
speak for the menace to emerge that what cannot be said could come to light‖ (p. 145).   
In Seminar X on Anxiety, Lacan (2004) designated the voice as the superego (p. 
341).  The superego, ―in its intimate imperative, is indeed ‗the voice of conscience,‘ that 
is, a voice first and foremost, a vocal one at that, and without any authority other than that 
of being a loud voice‖ (Lacan, 1961/2006a, p. 684).  This voice of conscience appears 
either to lack an identity or to be the subject‘s own voice.  The voice of the superego is 
the voice of the drives.
88
   
Whereas the ideal ego is the imaginary order idealized self-image and the ego-
ideal is the symbolic introjection of the Other‘s ideals and tastes, the superego is the real 
order counterpart to the ego-ideal.  The ―obscene, ferocious figure of the superego‖ 
(Lacan, 1961/2006a, p. 619) insatiably bombards the subject with impossible demands 
that stem from the ego-ideal.  The more a subject tries (and inevitably fails) to meet the 
unreasonable demands of the superego, the more the subject feels guilty and ―bad.‖  This 
cycle, with its production of excessive guilt, leads us to raise the question of if and how 
this cycle can be stopped.   
In Seminar VII, Lacan suggests ―a reconsideration of ethics…of a kind that gives 
this question the force of a Last Judgment: Have you acted in conformity with the desire 
                                               
88 Lacan said, ―there cannot be a valid analytic conception of the superego which forgets that at its most 
profound phase the voice is one of the forms of object a‖ (2004, p. 342).   
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that is in you?‖ (1997b, p. 314).  This law of desire is a kind of fourth agency (along with 
the id, ego, and superego)—one which tells the subject to act in conformity with her 
desire.   
Opposed to this pole of desire is traditional ethics … [which involves] the 
cleaning up of desire, modesty, temperateness, that is to say the middle path we 
see articulated so remarkably in Aristotle… [which] is wholly founded on an 
order that is no doubt a tidied-up, ideal order. (pp. 314-315)   
The law of desire is opposed to traditional ethics, which is associated with the ego-
ideal—with the internalized socio-symbolic ideals and norms that seem ―good,‖ 
―mature,‖ and ―reasonable.‖  Seen within this framework, the superego is an agency that 
bullies the subject on account of her betrayal of the law of desire in favor of the 
seemingly good ego-ideal.  When the cruel ferocity of the superego increases, it confronts 
the subject with her guilt; it must be said, however, that Lacanian guilt is not defined in 
relation to the subject‘s failure to live up to her ego-ideal.  Instead, ―the only thing one 
can be guilty of is of giving up on one‘s desire‖ (1997b, p. 321, translation modified).  
This conception is similar to that of bad faith in Sartre.   
It is in this sense that a pervert experiences less guilt than does a neurotic.  The 
pervert‘s greater access to jouissance and comparative lack of drive inhibition naturally 
results in the pursuit of desires.  Furthermore, although there is a symbolic place for the 
Law in the world of the pervert, the lawgiving Other is seen as a constructor of façades.  
Because the pervert rejects the authority and validity of the lawgiving Other, his ego-
ideal is markedly different than that of the neurotic.  The pervert‘s ego-ideal is lawless.  
Nevertheless, it remains comprised of the desires, ideals, and socio-cultural norms 
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followed by the primary Others in his life.  As such, the pervert‘s ego-ideal does include 
its own kind of moral codes.  The pervert does introject commonly shared symbolic 
values and ideals.  Furthermore, the pervert, by way of identification and imitation, 
assembles his own makeshift moral ―laws.‖   
Nonetheless, insofar as the superego is the real order counterpart to the ego-ideal, 
the pervert may be considered to have an ―inferior‖ superego to the extent to which he 
has not accepted castration.  Even so, this is not to say that the pervert lacks in moral 
conscience but rather that there is a qualitative and quantitative difference between the 
superegos of neurotics and perverts.  Correspondingly, and contrary to popular 
psychoanalytic thought, Lacan emphasized that the superego can neither be equated with 
the Law nor with moral conscience.   
[T]he interiorization of the Law has nothing to do with the Law…It it possible 
that the superego serves as a support for the moral conscience, but everyone 
knows that it has nothing to do with the moral conscience as far as its most 
obligatory demands are concerned.  What the superego demands has nothing to do 
with that which we would be right in making the universal rule of our actions. 
(Lacan, 1997b, p. 310) 
The superego is best considered as a particular function or operation instead of as a set of 
specific contents.  Moral conscience and the introjected Law are contents that are taken 
up by the function of the superego.  The superego as ―a voice first and foremost‖ (Lacan, 
1961/2006a, p. 684) is the process of making an imperative: ―You must…!‖  The more 
the subject renounces jouissance in the name of socio-cultural ideals or moral conscience, 
the more jouissance is available to fuel the sadistic superego‘s imperative.  And there is 
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always some jouissance experienced in the enactment of the moral law.  In Freudian 
terms, the id refuses to be stifled.  The pervert, having refused castration, does not easily 
fall victim to the vicious cycle of the superego.  The pervert gives relatively free reign to 
his id.  This difference has major implications for making differential diagnoses between 
neurosis and perversion. 
The Quaternary Schema of Perversion 
Incidentally, how can one say, just like that, as Freud goes on to do, that 
exhibitionism is the contrary of voyeurism, or that masochism is the contrary of 
sadism?  He posits this simply for grammatical reasons, for reasons concerning 
the inversion of the subject and the object, as if the grammatical object and 
subject were real functions.  It is easy to show that this is not the case, and we 
have only to refer to our structure of language for this deduction to become 
impossible. (Lacan, 1973/1998a, p. 170)   
 
Lacan repeatedly insists that, contrary to the opinions of Freud and Krafft-Ebing, 
masochism is not the opposite of sadism and exhibitionism is not the opposite of 
voyeurism.
89
  Furthermore, Lacan held that a subject cannot alternate back and forth 
between masochism and sadism or exhibitionism and voyeurism.  Instead, Lacan 
established a non-symmetrical relationship (based on the gaze) between exhibitionism 
and voyeurism which is parallel to the non-symmetrical relationship (based on the voice) 
between masochism and sadism (Miller, 2006c, p. 26).  Based on his reading of what 
Lacan said about perversion in Seminar XVI, Miller (p. 27) provided the following 
―quaternary schema‖:  
                                               
89 Lacan said, ―Sadism is not the inverse of masochism…The structure is more complex‖ (2004, p. 207).   
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This quaternary schema shows that the exhibitionist and the masochist situate themselves 
in relation to object a in the same manner: taking up the ostensibly passive grammatical 
voice of the drive, they make the object a as gaze or voice appear in ―the field of the 
[O]ther as deserted by jouissance‖ (Lacan, 2006b, p. 254).   
Referring to the exhibitionist, Lacan said, ―The essential part is, properly and 
above all, to make the gaze appear in the field of the Other‖ (2006b, p. 254).  Then, 
referring to the masochist, he added,  
In the way in which we have seen the exhibitionist jouit, the axis of gravity of the 
masochist revolves around the level of the Other and giving the voice back to him 
as a supplement, not without the possibility of a certain derision, which appears in 
the margins of masochistic functioning. (p. 258) 
Essentially, the exhibitionist (in being gazed at by the Other, in making his erect penis be 
gazed at by the Other) and masochist (in being spoken to or commanded by the Other) 
plug up the lack in the Other by offering up themselves as the object of the Other‘s drive.   
In addition, as the schema shows, the voyeur and the sadist also situate 
themselves in relation to object a in the same manner: taking up the active grammatical 
voice of the drive, they bring their own object a to the field of the Other and make the 
Other whole by their act.  The voyeur gazes, and the sadist speaks.  The sadist, for 
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instance, tries ―to complete the Other by removing speech from him and by imposing his 
own voice, but in general this misfires‖ (Lacan, 2006b, pp. 258-259).   
The quaternary schema and the roles of the gaze and the voice in each of the 
substructures of perversion will be discussed in more detail in Chapter VI.  In this chapter 
I have attempted to illustrate the multitudinous yet structurally specific ways in which the 
pervert‘s relation to the Other may be represented by the matheme a ◊  (Lacan, 
1963/2006a, p. 774).   
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Chapter VI: The Perverse Act and Substructures of Perversion 
The Perverse Act and Woman as Other 
 
It is necessary to radically distinguish the perverse act from the neurotic act.  The 
perverse act is situated at the level of the question concerning jouissance.  The 
neurotic act, even if it refers to the model of the perverse act, has no other goal 
than to sustain that which has nothing to do with the question of the sexual act, 
namely, the effect of desire. (Lacan, Seminar XIV, June 7, 1967)   
 
As I have elaborated, the pervert‘s first Other is almost always a woman.  What is 
more, the perverse subject always has a problematic relationship with his mOther; she is 
a subject who claims his subjectivity for her own, using him as the instrument of her 
jouissance rather than allowing him the subjective space necessary to have a desire of his 
―own.‖  Although the ―blame‖ may also be assigned to the second Other and to the 
subject himself, aggression toward the mOther is a very common feature of perversion.  
Contrary to the common psychoanalytic conception of the son‘s Oedipal aggression 
toward the father, perversion is an instance in which the subject‘s aggressive feelings are 
more frequently and substantially directed toward the mother.  It should come as no 
surprise that the pervert expresses his aggression toward his mOther in the perverse act, 
in a scenario in which he supplies the Other with jouissance.  Just as the perverse 
subject‘s mother transgressed his ethical ―boundaries,‖ so too is the pervert fixated on a 
certain method of forcing jouissance on the Other.   
Repetition is one of Lacan‘s four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis, and the 
perverse act is one of the most obvious forms of repetition.  Repetition is always 
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connected to the real.  In repetition, the subject reaches for the lost object and, inevitably, 
misses it.  Of course, for perverse and neurotic subjects, the mother is the fundamental 
lost object.  It is not so much the repetition, but the real as a ―missed encounter‖ (Lacan, 
1973/1998a, p. 55) that is important.  According to Lacan, trauma was the first form of  
―the real as [an] encounter‖ (p. 55) to be noticed by Freud.  Trauma frequently appears 
unveiled (p. 55), as can be seen in nightmares—in which the dreamer awakens the 
moment before her encounter with object a—and in the perverse act.   
The essence of a symptom is repetition, and the perverse act is a major type of 
symptom found in perversion.
90
  ―Repetition first appears…in an action…As long as we 
speak of the relations of repetition with the real, this action will remain on our horizon‖ 
(Lacan, 1973/1998a, p. 50).  An act, as a symptom, ties together components of the 
imaginary, symbolic, and real orders that reflect of the subject‘s identity.91  
Correspondingly, the perverse act is the enactment of the perverse fundamental fantasy.  
―It is necessary to radically distinguish the perverse act from the neurotic act.  The 
perverse act is situated at the level of … jouissance.  The neurotic act … has no other 
goal than to sustain … the effect of desire‖ (Lacan, Seminar XIV, June 7, 1967).  The 
perverse act is a way of managing and limiting jouissance via a corrective restaging of 
the pervert‘s post-alienation relations to the first and second Others.  The perverse act 
thus exemplifies a perverse solution to the inadequacy of the paternal function.   
                                               
90 The evolution of the definition of ―symptom‖ in Lacan‘s works is deserving of a book-length study.  For 
our purposes, then, we shall define a symptom as follows: a symptom is a master signifier, a signifier that is 
not linked up to other signifiers in the symbolic order but instead is a self-referential non-sensical structure 
of jouissance.  The symptom is a kernel of jouissance that is responsible for the production of meanings.  
The symptom, or sinthome, as Lacan called it in his later works, is the fourth ring of his Borromean knot 
and, as such, ties the imaginary, symbolic, and real together.  A person‘s sinthome is therefore her or his 
core identity. ―The symptom, in essence, is jouissance‖ (Lacan, 2004, p. 148).   
91 An act is ―not mere [animal] behavior‖ (Lacan, 1973/1998a, p. 50) because a subject is ethically bound to 
assume responsibility for it—even for the unconscious desires which may have been expressed in his act. 
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As such, the perverse act involves the perverse subject, someone representing the 
first Other, and someone representing the lawgiving Other.  The perverse act, at the very 
least, involves the pervert and another person.  This other may appropriately be called a 
victim because the pervert‘s act always transgresses the limits of consent.  The victim 
plays the role of first Other, but may additionally embody the lawgiving Other.  
Alternatively, an observer may play the role of the lawgiving Other or a potential or 
imagined observer (such as a police officer or a religious official) may embody the 
lawgiving Other.  In the pervert‘s act, the pervert himself is the instrument of the Other‘s 
jouissance, and the jouissance he brings to the field of the Other causes the lawgiving 
Other to put his foot down.   
In a perverse act, the pervert elaborately stages his fantasy scene by way of a 
script that varies little over time.  (The rigidity of the perverse act is a reliable diagnostic 
criterion.)  Exhibitionists, voyeurs, masochists, and sadists each have their own 
characteristic type of perverse act.  Within each substructure, there is a great degree of 
individual variation.  The common factors are the manner in which each pervert is the 
instrument of the Other‘s jouissance and his position with respect to the gaze or the voice.  
An individual pervert, however, acts according to a fixed repetitive scenario made up of 
particular signifying elements.   
The jouissance derived from the perverse act is subjectively felt to be qualitatively 
different than sexual intercourse and quantitatively more pleasurable.  We shall focus, for 
the moment, on the exhibitionist.  In his book Sexual Deviation (1996), psychoanalytic 
forensic practitioner Ismond Rosen noted the following:  
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On exposure, the exhibitionist becomes aware of intense genital sensations and a 
sense of inner pleasure, in excess of anything else he has experienced, including 
heterosexual orgasm.  There may or may not be an erection and masturbation may 
or may not be indulged in.  The fact that neither erection nor ejaculation is 
necessary for the experience of specific pleasure is evidence of the hyper-
libidinization of the genital area.  (p. 180) 
In this particular section of his chapter ―Exhibitionism, scopophilia, and voyeurism,‖ 
Rosen neglects the symbolic order and the pervert‘s relation to the Other.92  The intense 
pleasure that the pervert experiences from his perverse act is dependent upon its 
enactment in relation to the Other. 
 Let us turn to an example of a perverse act—that of Chris, an exhibitionist.  
According to Chris, a man in his fifties, he had committed thousands of acts of indecent 
exposure.  He was charged and convicted for less than 10.  As a result of the years he 
spent incarcerated and on parole, paired with his wife having filed for divorce (on 
account of his sexual offenses), Chris decided to make the prevention of his 
exhibitionistic acts a priority; in that effort, Chris went beyond the stipulations of his 
parole and participated in once weekly individual and group psychotherapy sessions.   
 In his past, Chris often spent hours every day committing acts of indecent 
exposure.  His preferred scene was a large parking lot, such as can be found by a 
shopping mall.  Chris drove to such a parking lot, scanned the scene for police officers, 
and then parked his car if no police officers were in sight.  He then watched for women 
exiting the shopping mall.  When he saw a woman who was alone walking toward her 
car, he followed her.  Upon approaching her, he gave her a sexualized compliment of her 
                                               
92 Much of Rosen‘s text does, however, focus more on the symbolic and the pervert‘s relation to the Other.   
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body.  Then, he pulled his penis out through his open fly and masturbated in front of her 
until she walked, ran, or drove away.  At that point, Chris left the scene and committed 
indecent exposure to another woman.  (While in public, Chris almost never masturbated 
to orgasm.)   
Chris maintained that he always hoped that a woman would become aroused by 
his display and desire to have sexual intercourse with him; this occurred on only two 
occasions out of thousands.  Chris did, in fact, have sex with the woman on those two 
occasions.  In contrast to Chris‘ conscious avowal, his behavior manifested the opposite 
desire because he often refused opportunities for sexual intercourse with his wife or with 
women he briefly dated.  In the same vein, Chris said that he wanted a woman to whom 
he exposed his penis to respond with approval or pleasure, but the response that he 
actually got from his victim was predictably one suggesting surprise, anger, disgust, or 
fear.  Given the fact that Chris committed acts of indecent exposure so frequently and 
very rarely saw evidence of his consciously desired response, it is safe to suppose that his 
truer, unconscious desire was to provoke surprise, anger, disgust, or fear in his victims.  
As Fink noted, ―a person‘s concrete actions often give us a far better sense of his or her 
fundamental fantasy than the fantasies of which he or she is aware, especially at the 
beginning of an analysis‖ (1997, p. 272).   
The Perverse Act as Means to Propping Up the Paternal Function 
Even though the pervert‘s fantasies and dreams may reflect a limitless jouissance, 
the structure of reality puts limits on jouissance; a perverse act, therefore, is always a way 
to manage jouissance.  In terms of time, for instance, the duration of perverse acts is 
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limited by the pervert‘s bodily constraints.  Some of the major bodily restrictions include 
fatigue, hunger, thirst, and the need to urinate or defecate.  
In addition, perverse acts are ways of limiting jouissance because of the presence 
of a lawgiving Other—one which may be imagined or actual.  For example, the imagined 
potential presence of a police officer at the scene of the act led Chris to stop engaging in 
acts of indecent exposure to prevent himself from being arrested.  When a victim 
screamed for help or reached for her cell phone (probably to call the police), Chris left 
the scene.  Because perverse acts are repetitive and break social/ethical bonds, they are 
likely to lead to apprehension by the police.  Exhibitionists and voyeurs who have been 
arrested for their crimes speak of feeling shame and a seemingly paradoxical sense of 
relief upon their arrest by lawgiving Others.  The experience of relief in such moments is 
related to the temporary propping up of the paternal function and decrease in jouissance.   
In cases of masochism and exhibitionism, the victim of the perverse act may 
herself embody the lawgiving Other.  The victim of the masochist, having been brought 
by the masochist to a certain unbearable level of anxiety, enunciates the law in the form 
of a command such as ―Stop!‖  The exhibitionist‘s victim may embody the lawgiving 
Other by alerting others or perhaps even simply by leaving the scene. 
Defiling the Other in the Perverse Act  
The pervert‘s ambivalence toward the mOther is manifested in the perverse act: 
he is captivated by the Other for whom he experiences both ―[a]ffection and hostility‖ 
(Freud, 1927/1961, p. 157).  As I mentioned in Chapter V, the victim of a perverse act is 
almost always a woman, and this is best accounted for by the fact that the first Other of a 
pervert is almost always a woman.  In the perverse act, the pervert unconsciously 
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displaces his hostility toward his mother onto his female victim.  Women are for the 
pervert prototypical Others lacking in jouissance, and, as object a, he provides them with 
an excess of jouissance.  In stripping his victims of their consent and forcing this level of 
jouissance upon them, the pervert effaces the subjectivity of his victims—just as his 
subjectivity was disrespected by his mOther.  The pervert reduces the Other to the level 
of jouissance.   
It is instructive that the pervert‘s fundamental relation to the Other is to function 
as the instrument of the Other‘s jouissance insofar as that relation reveals that the pervert 
conceives the Other as Ⱥ—as lacking in jouissance.  According to Nobus, the fantasies of 
the pervert are oriented toward defiling ―pure and unblemished, yet deficient and 
disconcerted objects that are desperately in need of [jouissance].  On the level of the 
fantasy, the pervert does not desire lascivious and voluptuous studs (or vixens) [as the 
neurotic might], but ostensibly innocent, sexually deprived angels‖ (2000, p. 44).  In the 
perverse act, the pervert defiles his victims, shocking them and subverting their 
conventional sense of decorum and of the limits of jouissance.  Correspondingly, the 
perverse analysand, in the beginning stages of analysis, often attempts to place the 
analyst in the role of a ―pure and unblemished‖ Other and to provide jouissance to the 
analyst.   
In the perverse act, the pervert forces jouissance upon a non-consenting Other, 
and in so doing expresses aggression.  The pervert, despite what he may consciously 
believe, actively orchestrates his role as object-cause of the Other‘s jouissance.  As 
Verhaeghe suggested (2001b), the pervert’s activity is a type of corrective restaging of 
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the “trauma”93 he experienced “passively” as a child at the hands of his mOther.  In the 
perverse act, the mOther is forced to play a passive role to the pervert who actively 
constructs the scenario.  Nevertheless, the perverse act in all other respects maintains the 
roles of the pervert and the mOther.   
Because the pervert‘s existence is permeated more by the level of demand and the 
imaginary order than by the level of desire and the symbolic order, he is subjected to 
concerns related to power, control, aggression, and rivalry more so than is the neurotic.  
Verhaeghe suggested conceptualizing the future pervert‘s relationship with his mOther as 
one in which he was victimized.  As an adult, the pervert reverses these roles by taking an 
active stance and pushing the Other into the position of victim.   
The clinical descriptions demonstrate time and again that the perverse scenario 
comes down to the installation of a relationship of power; the other has to be 
mastered.  Even the masochist pulls the strings from start to finish; he or she 
dictates what the other has to do… [A]dult perverse behavior…[shows] the 
necessity of taking the active position in order to control the other. (Verhaeghe, 
2001b, p. 84; p. 87) 
Just as neurotic (usually hysteric) individuals who mutilate their bodies are often 
―actively‖ repeating and inscribing a past physical or psychological trauma, so too do 
perverse individuals reenact a traumatic relation to the mOther with the proviso that they 
are the ones pulling the strings.   
We should remember, however, that Lacan said the pervert‘s position as object-
cause of the Other‘s jouissance is ―the foundation of an identification disavowed by the 
                                               
93 The term trauma should here be understood as a broad term encompassing a wide variety and degree of 
subjectively felt pain rather than what might legally qualify as sexual or physical abuse.   
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subject‖ (1973/1998a, p. 186).  In other words, the pervert disavows his role in a perverse 
act, believing himself to be the one in control when it is more true at anOther level to say 
that he is a passive object (-cause of the Other‘s jouissance) than an active subject.  Some 
of the pervert‘s anxiety is relieved by his belief in this enjoyable fiction.   
A perverse act is fundamentally related to either the scopic or the invocatory 
drive.  As exemplified in the case of Chris, who gets himself seen by a female victim, 
―[t]he dialectic of the drive is profoundly different both from that which belongs to the 
order of love and from that which belongs to the well-being of the subject‖ (Lacan, 
1973/1998a, p. 206).  Clearly, for Chris, being a slave to the scopic drive (by committing 
perverse acts) does nothing to increase his well-being and has nothing to do with love.   
Jouissance and the Pervert‟s Fundamental Relation to the Other 
 Perverts suffer from an excess of jouissance.  Correspondingly, there are four 
major paths by which they strive to manage their jouissance.  The first two were 
mentioned above, and may be achieved—amongst other ways—through a perverse act.  
The first major path is by staging a situation in which the paternal function is bolstered.  
Because this path most directly links up with the causative problem of the perverse 
structure, this is the most effective way that the pervert has at his disposal of managing 
his jouissance.  Second, the pervert, in his role as object a in relation to the Other, can 
manage his jouissance by taking ―active‖ control, holding the reins.   
Third is the pathway of desire.  As I mentioned in previous chapters, desire sets 
limits to jouissance.  Because the state of being in love is characterized by desirousness, 
when a pervert falls in love or loves his children his excessive jouissance is temporarily 
reduced.  Given that a pervert is restricted in his subjectivity and in his ability to desire, 
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his desire fails to ―do the job‖ of limiting his excessive jouissance.  Nevertheless, just as a 
neurotic‘s desire can be fixated or repressed, so too can the desire of a pervert be fixated 
and repressed.  (This is clearly shown in Fink‘s (2003) case of W, a fetishist who became 
more in touch with his desires as the analysis progressed.)  Therefore, the process of 
psychoanalysis, which aims to set free and increase one‘s ability to desire, may aid a 
pervert in the quest to manage jouissance.  Lacanian analysis works on behalf of the 
analysand‘s Eros. 
Fourth, drugs—whether prescription or not—that slow down the central nervous 
system or reduce his sexual hormone levels can reduce the amount of jouissance 
experienced by the pervert.  This fourth path brings up a much-debated treatment 
question concerning whether or not it is clinically advantageous or ethical to prescribe 
psychotropic medication to analysands.  I will discuss this question in more detail in 
Chapter IX.   
 Each substructure of perversion has its own particular fashion of solving the 
problems caused by the inadequacy of the paternal function.  Each substructure has a 
particularly strong relationship to either the gaze or the voice, and so the quaternary 
schema (Miller, 2006c, p. 27) presented in Chapter V is reproduced below with the 
addition of the fetishist to the schema.  There is a non-symmetrical relationship between 
exhibitionism and voyeurism that is parallel to the non-symmetrical relationship between 
masochism and sadism.  In other words, the exhibitionist and the masochist relate to 
object a in the same manner, and the voyeur and the sadist relate to object a in the same 
manner.  The fetishist, on the other hand, makes the gaze appear ―in‖ the fetish itself such 
that the gaze appears in the fields of both subject and Other. 
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Before I turn to detailed discussions of each substructure of perversion and to the 
primary objects a that correspond to them, it is important to note that the superficial 
traits, behaviors, and discourse associated with each substructure are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive with the others.  In the case of a neurotic analysand, her symptoms 
and discourse sometimes make it initially difficult to distinguish between a diagnosis of 
hysteria or obsession, because it is common for a person with a substructure of obsession 
to have some traditionally hysteric complaints, such as psychosomatic symptoms, and 
vice versa.  We will notice that the same is true for perversion.  To use the example of 
Chris, while his exhibitionistic act involves both the gaze and the voice, his primary 
object a is the gaze, and his essential relation to the Other is that of the instrument of the 
Other‘s jouissance who makes the gaze appear in the field of the Other.    
―Quaternary‖ Schema 
 
Gaze  Voice 
exhibitionist    masochist 
     
  a   
    
voyeur    sadist 
 
fetishist 
    
 
 
 
 
 
The Gaze and Shame: Exhibitionism, Voyeurism, and Fetishism 
 
―You grasp here the ambiguity of what is at issue when we speak of the scopic 
drive.  The gaze is this object lost and suddenly refound in the conflagration of shame, by 
the introduction of the other‖ (Lacan, 1973/1998a, p. 182). 
206 
 
―The gaze I encounter is, not a seen gaze, but a gaze I imagine in the field of the 
Other‖ (Lacan, 1973/1998a, p. 84). 
 The gaze is intimately related to the affect of shame.  As previously stated, the 
primary drive for the exhibitionist, the voyeur, and the fetishist is the scopic drive, and so 
shame plays a prominent role in these substructures.  According to Lacan, the 
exhibitionist makes the gaze appear in the field of the Other, while the voyeur makes the 
gaze appear in himself in order to plug up the hole in the Other.  Correspondingly, the 
exhibitionist‘s aim is to produce a feeling of shame in the Other, while the voyeur himself 
experiences shame.  Following what Lacan says about fetishism, it is my hypothesis that 
the fetishist makes the gaze appear ―in‖ the fetish, which means that the gaze appears 
both in the field of the subject and in the field of the Other. 
 It is notable that the gaze and the scopic drive of a pervert differ from those of a 
neurotic insofar as their ideational representatives have only been affected by primal 
repression and disavowal rather than by both primal and secondary repression.  In effect, 
what this means is not only that the scopic drive (and the drives in general) of a pervert is 
―stronger‖ than that of a neurotic but also that the lawgiving Other has had little, if any, 
impact on his scopic drive.  When considering the function of the scopic drive as it 
functions in perversion, then, we must take into account the kind of Other under whose 
influence the scopic drive was re-written.   
 First, the scopic drive is related to a primordial Other, to an Other prior to the one 
who judges.  The primordial Other does not judge but ―only sees or [allows to] be seen‖ 
(Miller, 2006d, p. 13).  Shame is a primary affect in relation to the primordial Other.  
Within the realm of the scopic drive, nudity and the sight of genitalia are the first 
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provocations of shame.  Correspondingly, the importance in perversion of the image of 
the boy‘s penis has to do with the modesty and shame of both the boy and his mOther.   
 In contrast, ―guilt is the effect on the subject of an Other that judges, thus of an 
Other that contains the values that the subject has supposedly transgressed…guilt is 
[therefore] related to desire‖ (Miller, 2006d, p. 13).  Because perverts, in comparison 
with neurotics, have less desire and were much less impacted by the lawgiving Other, it 
follows that perverts also have much less capacity for guilt.  The importance of this fact 
should be emphasized because the current one-size-fits-all treatment for sexual offenders 
depends upon the success of methods that aim to appeal to and increase their feelings of 
guilt.  Clinicians who try to make perversely structured sexual offenders feel guilty about 
what they have done are simply barking up the wrong tree.   
In ―Kant with Sade,‖ Lacan implies that shame and modesty—antonymic terms 
which are reciprocally related to each other—have to do with jouissance.   
jouissance is that by which Sadean experience is modified.  For it only proposes 
to monopolize a will after having already traversed it in order to instate itself at 
the inmost core of the subject whom it provokes beyond that by offending his 
sense of modesty [pudeur].  For modesty is an amboceptor with respect to the 
circumstances of being: between the two, the one‘s immodesty by itself violating 
the other‘s modesty.  A connection that could justify, were such justification 
necessary, what I said before regarding the subject‘s assertion in the Other‘s 
place. (1963/2006a, pp. 771-772)   
Interpreting this passage, Miller (2006d, p. 13) said that shame and modesty are related to 
the jouissance that ―instate[s] itself at the inmost core of the subject‖ (Lacan, 1963/2006a, 
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p. 771).  When Lacan said ―modesty is an amboceptor with respect to the circumstances 
of being‖ (p. 771), he suggested that, within the ―circumstances of being,‖ which are 
constituted by the primordial relationship between the subject and the Other, modesty is 
attached to both the subject and the Other.  When the subject is immodest, the Other‘s 
modesty is correspondingly violated, and vice versa.  Jouissance is bound up in this 
amboceptive relationship.   
 And so it is that the jouissance of the exhibitionist, voyeur, and fetishist becomes 
fixated on the image of the genitalia, which is to say that the jouissance which perhaps 
most defines the pervert is an effect of his relation to the mOther mediated by the 
immodesty of the scopic drive.  Likewise, the exhibitionist, voyeur, and fetishist often 
speak about embarrassment, modesty, and shame.   
In perversion, the pervert tries to prop up the existence of the Other by appealing 
to the primordial Other, by appealing to the Other that is most firmly woven into the 
fabric of his symbolic world—the primordial Other of the gaze or the primordial Other of 
the voice.  By pushing the primordial Other beyond the limits of the pleasure principle, 
the pervert tries to ensure that the lawgiving Other will make its presence known and 
intervene.   
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Exhibitionism
94
 
 ―[A]n exhibitionist does not expose himself only to young girls, he also 
sometimes does so in front of a tabernacle‖ (Lacan, 2006b, p. 253).   
 ―It is at the level of the field of the Other deserted by jouissance that the 
exhibitionistic act situates itself to make the gaze emerge there‖ (Lacan, 2006b, p. 254). 
 The Other is necessary in perversion, and this is especially obvious in the case of 
the exhibitionist.  The exhibitionist depends upon the presence of an audience; exposing 
his genitals to the mirror is of no interest to him (Miller, 1996b, p. 318).  Neither would 
the exhibitionist be interested in exposing his genitals to women at a nude beach.  
Instead, the exhibitionist is driven to show his genitals to a series of Others because, for 
the exhibitionist, ―the jouissance at stake is the Other‘s‖ (Lacan, 2006b, p. 256).  The 
exhibitionist shows his penis to a female Other ―to try and produce shame in the Other, 
shame for not being the same.  The exhibitionist tries to make Woman exist; indeed we 
might say that Woman doesn‘t exist except for the exhibitionist‖ (Miller, 1996b, p. 318).  
In making a show for the Other of having the penis (as a biological organ) and in getting 
his possession of it seen by an Other, the exhibitionist makes object a as the gaze appear 
in the field of the first Other as deserted by jouissance.  (The first Other became deserted 
                                               
94Rosen co-led a psychodynamically-informed long-term process group for male exhibitionists, and he 
found that there were major distinctions between what he called the ―simple‖ or ―regressive‖ type of 
exhibitionist and the ―phobic-impulsive‖ type.  ―The first is the simple or regressive type, where the 
exhibitionist act follows as the result of some rather obvious social or sexual trauma, disappointment or 
loss, or as an accompaniment to a severe mental or physical illness, including the vicissitudes of old age 
and alcoholism. These people tend to the [sic] rather reserved and shy with social and sexual inhibitions 
and fear, but their personalities are on the whole relatively good ones, as seen in their intimate associations 
and work records‖ (1996, p. 176). ―Personality disturbance is much more intense in the second group 
which is the phobic-impulsive type. … In this group one finds persons who regularly exhibit and become 
recidivists.  Where the impulsive aspect predominates they are often of an amoral cast of mind, prone to 
other forms of character disorder and actual perversion such as transvestism and voyeurism, as well as the 
commission of crimes of stealing‖ (p. 176).  This method of classification is one which can aid the clinician 
in differentiating between a neurotic individual who has committed an act or several acts of indecent 
exposure and a perverse individual who, unless very young, has committed numerous acts of indecent 
exposure.   
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by jouissance through the process of castration in which s/he lost some of her bodily 
jouissance.   
 In order to provide the Other with jouissance, the exhibitionist makes the Other 
look at his erect penis, and in so doing shows her what she lacks.  During his act of 
indecent exposure, the exhibitionist‘s interest is centered upon the Other and her reaction 
to his display.  He gazes at the expression in her eyes and on her face and also listens for 
a possible vocal response.  The exhibitionist‘s aim is to provide the Other with jouissance 
in the form of a shock or feelings of shame, anxiety, or horror.  Lacan said, 
It is not easy to define what a gaze is […].  People wonder what the effects of an 
exhibition are—namely, whether or not it frightens the witness who seems to 
provoke it.  People ask themselves whether the exhibitionist intends to provoke 
the shame, fear, or echo, a ferocious or consenting reaction.  But this is not the 
crux of the scopophilic drive, which you can characterize as you wish, as active or 
passive, the choice is yours—in appearance, it is passive, since it offers up 
something to be seen.  The crux is, strictly speaking and above all, to make the 
gaze appear in the field of the Other. (2006b, pp. 253-254) 
The epiphanic moment of the exhibitionistic act occurs when the gaze appears in the 
Other: the shocked, horrified, repulsed, and anxiety-filled reaction of the victim is 
important insofar as it is the sign that she is experiencing the gaze in herself.
95
   
Furthermore, Lacan said, ―It is not only the victim who is concerned in 
exhibitionism, it is the victim as referred to some other who is looking at him‖ 
(1973/1998a, p. 183).  In addition to the gaze of the victim and the gaze of the 
                                               
95 This confirms that the fundamental aim of the pervert is not to strip the victim of her subjectivity and 
reduce her to an object, but rather to highlight her lack of jouissance that is characteristic of subjectivity 
and then to attempt to fill her lack with the gaze.   
211 
 
exhibitionist, then, there is a third gaze which is the imagined gaze of third party.  It is 
not the exhibitionist‘s gaze that makes the victim feel ashamed, but instead this third 
party‘s gaze.  In other words, ―if someone were to be watching me [the victim], what 
would s/he think?‖   
―The exhibitionist is, in effect, grabbed by the jouissance of the Other‘s [the 
victim‘s] watchful eye‖ (Miller, 2006c, p. 27).  At the moment of the appearance of the 
gaze in the field of the Other, the exhibitionist feels strongly connected to the Other.
96
  
When the victim flees the scene or calls the police, the law temporarily appears and puts 
an end to the gaze and to the over-proximate connection between the pervert and the 
Other.   
The setting for the exhibitionistic act is the public sphere, and the exhibitionist 
exposes his penis to a woman who is unknown to him.
97
  Each of these common criteria 
for an act of indecent exposure subverts social norms of morality, going against the rules 
of the neurotic‘s lawgiving Other.  This underscores the idea that the pervert‘s goal is to 
attract the attention of a lawgiving Other so that limits may be set to his jouissance.  Were 
the pervert‘s act to more subtly transgress social mores, then neither would the gaze 
appear in the Other nor would the victim or another person be sufficiently riled to invoke 
the lawgiving Other.    
                                               
96 See Chapter VII, in which the case of Ray, an exhibitionist, is presented.  Ray describes feeling a ―little 
connection‖ with his victim at the moment of the appearance of the gaze. 
97 The following is Rosen‘s explanation of the exhibitionist choosing a stranger for the victim of his 
perverse act as well as how the pervert‘s mother often held a puritanical attitude toward sex: ―Exposing to 
the stranger is still dangerous but preferable to exposing to the familiar woman who stands for mother 
because of the greater danger inherent in the castration complex.  Many patients were extremely prudish 
with their wives; they took care never to let each other be seen in the nude, and their pattern of sexual 
behavior in intercourse was rigidly conventional.  There is general agreement in the literature on the 
puritanical attitude towards sex in the families of exhibitionists as well as in themselves.  The highly 
inhibited and shy exhibitionists are therefore a result of the excessive reaction formations against 
scopophilia‖ (Rosen, 1996, p. 186) 
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Another diagnostically important difference between an act of exhibitionism and a 
―normal neurotic‖ sexual act is that, in the former, the gaze takes the place of touch.  It is 
very rare that an (perverse) exhibitionist touches his victim.  This highlights the 
importance of the gaze in exhibitionism as distinct from the exhibitionist‘s sexual and 
romantic desires.  What is more, the primacy of the gaze paired with the other highly 
controlled aspects of the exhibitionist‘s act (including choosing for his victim a stranger 
and choosing for his venue a public place where his victim‘s surprise is ensured), go a 
long way toward giving the exhibitionist a sense of ―safety‖ and being in control.   
The more the pervert (of any substructure) feels in control of the scenario and 
assured of the intervention of a lawgiving Other, the less threatening will be the Other‘s 
proximity.  By choosing for his victim a stranger, the exhibitionist keeps the Other at a 
safe distance because a stranger is less likely to consciously remind him of his mOther 
than is a woman with whom he is acquainted (on account of having less available 
information about her to compare and contrast with his mother).  The exhibitionist 
usually places himself at a significant physical distance from his victim, and this 
contributes to his sense that he will not be overwhelmed by the presence of the Other.  
Likewise, he avoids touching the victim, and this makes us wonder what the 
phenomenological experience of the exhibitionist would be were a victim to touch the 
exhibitionist in some fashion.  Finally, the exhibitionist tries to ensure his control over the 
scenario by catching the Other off guard and not giving her the opportunity to consent.  
Instead, he ―listens‖ to the ―voice‖ of the Other‘s will-to-jouissance, viewing the Other as 
a subject lacking in jouissance and obeying his inner compulsion to fill her with 
jouissance.  ―[T]he jouissance at stake is the Other‘s‖ (Lacan, 2006b, p. 256), and the 
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pervert‘s anxiety is relieved when he can, through a perverse act, transfer some of his 
surplus jouissance to the Other‘s account.  What the pervert disavows is his position as 
object-cause of the Other’s jouissance; he believes himself to be a powerful Other and his 
victim to be reduced to an object, when in fact the truth of the matter is that it is the other 
way around.   
The Pervert‟s Ambivalent Relation to the mOther 
Outside of the exhibitionistic act, the exhibitionist attempts to keep Others at a 
distance through similar strategies.  In general, perverts have ambivalent relationships 
with their mOthers.  Consequently, their various conscious efforts to gain more 
independence from their mothers often are foiled by their unconscious wishes to remain 
close to them.  In addition, the fundamental relation between the pervert and the Other is 
a qualitatively different relation than that of the neurotic and the Other that often appears 
to be a matter of quantity.  In other words, it appears to our neurotic eyes that a pervert is 
closer to his mOther than is a neurotic, but this quantitative difference masks a more 
essential qualitative difference.  The pervert, not having sufficiently internalized the 
lawgiving Other, is joined at the hip (or eyes, as the case may be) to his mOther and must 
make creative efforts to conjure up a temporary lawgiving Other.  As a result, the 
pervert‘s efforts to bring about a permanent separation from his mOther are ultimately 
doomed to fail, although some temporary solutions can be quite effective and law-
abiding.   
Fink‘s case study of W provides us with an excellent example of the lack of 
success of the pervert‘s efforts to bring about further separation from the Other.   
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After W had been with a woman for the first time at age 26, his mother asked if 
he had ―entered her.‖ He responded by yelling, ―This is none of your business.‖ 
When he told her of his first adult homosexual experience at age 36, she made it 
clear that she felt this could not possibly have been what he wanted, saying that 
―these homos have tried to recruit you.‖ Telling her at age 46 that he had a 
boyfriend, she commented, ―Still trying to get out from under your mother?‖ The 
tone of ownership seems quite unmistakable in many of her comments to him. 
(We should not, however, overlook the fact that he continued to tell her about his 
love life, thereby keeping her involved in it.) (Fink, 2003, p. 59, my emphasis) 
W‘s anger and expressed desire for separation, evident in his yelling to his mother that 
his love life was none of her business, sharply contrast with the fact that W continued to 
tell his mother about his love life.  This ambivalence is characteristic of the pervert‘s 
relationship to the mOther.   
 In the same vein, both Chris and Ray often spoke about their mothers and their 
efforts to untie themselves from their mothers‘ apron strings.  Ray all but moved out of 
his parents‘ home as a teenager, and then quickly joined the army upon turning 18.  This 
required that he move across the country from where his mother lived.  Very similarly, 
Chris joined the Air Force when he graduated high school, and correspondingly moved 
across the country from his mother‘s residence.  Nevertheless, their physical distance 
from their mothers did nothing to change their fundamental relations to the Other.  Both 
committed acts of indecent exposure throughout their involvement with the military, and 
Ray was dishonorably discharged on account of it.  Within a few years, both Chris and 
Ray moved back to their hometowns and lived in close proximity to their mothers.  In 
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another case, a sadistic analysand who was gainfully employed chose to move back in 
with his parents in his late 20s and was still living with them in his mid-40s with no plans 
or desire to move out. 
 Chris and Ray both spoke about the shame and embarrassment they caused their 
mothers as a result of their exhibitionism.  Each of them described his mother as an Other 
partially devoid of jouissance, as a prudish woman who thought it improper to talk about 
sexuality and who was especially concerned with upholding a certain appearance of 
decorum to others—whether true or not.  In committing and being charged with acts of 
indecent exposure, they shocked and embarrassed their mothers.  Ray‘s mother went so 
far as to move in order to avoid the gazes of the neighbors.  What is more, Ray said that 
he enjoyed embarrassing his mother.  Exhibitionists go a step further than their mOthers 
in deriding the lawgiving Other because they refuse, in their acts of indecent exposure, 
even to put up a façade of abiding by the social mores of the lawgiving Other.   
Chris and Ray each have loved only one woman thus far in their lifetimes, and 
each woman metonymically stood in for the mOther.  Both relationships were long-term, 
but Chris and Ray did many things to ensure that the relationships would not be 
especially close ones.  For example, Ray broke up with his girlfriend, Susan, at least two 
or three times per year, and refused to live with her until they had been dating for five 
years.  Even then, Susan moved back in with her parents several times a year.  
Furthermore, Ray assented to saying ―I love you‖ to Susan only very rarely and on his 
terms, not hers; if she asked him to tell her he loved her, he invariably refused.  
Nevertheless, Ray was dependent upon Susan.  During the periods of time in which 
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Susan and Ray were not in a relationship, Ray said that he no longer knew who he was or 
how to live his life.   
Likewise, Chris‘ marriage failed after he had been incarcerated for the third time 
on account of his exhibitionism, and Chris ostensibly did all he could to get back together 
with her.  Chris said he had ―no identity without [his wife and kids]‖ and said that they 
were what made his life worth living.  Nevertheless, he said that, even if he and his ex-
wife remarried, he would never move back in with them because he liked the 
independence of living by himself.  What is more, Chris seemed to annoy his ex-wife and 
even his children by helping out around their house without their consent—buying 
groceries and household items, embarking on home improvement projects, and re-
organizing things.   
Exhibitionism and the Oral Drive 
 As I mentioned in Chapter V, the manifestations of the oral drive are often 
primary features of perversion.  Of the two cases discussed briefly so far, both Chris and 
Ray spoke easily, often, and in great detail in their group psychotherapy sessions.  Chris 
was especially aroused by female breasts, and especially enjoyed eating.  Ray, for his 
part, smoked at least a pack of cigarettes a day.  When he tried to quit on one occasion, he 
bought several large bags of lollipops to serve as a substitute.  Rosen noted that  
certain exhibitionists seem to be fixated at the oral level.  Thus, loquacious Dick 
described himself as a ‗mouth in trousers.‘  The hostility of the oral phase, seen as 
biting and devouring, is projected on to the outside world and a similar retaliation 
is expected.  It is the strength of this fixation which gives to later objects such as 
the female genitalia their hostile oral character. (1996, p. 181)   
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Enuresis and Exhibitionism 
It is my hypothesis that enuresis is a common feature of exhibitionism and 
fetishism based on the fact that both Chris and Ray wet themselves until they were 
teenagers, as well as on the research presented in the article ―Enuresis: A Functional 
Equivalent of a Fetish‖ (Calef, Weinshel, Renik, & Lloyd Mayer, 1980).  Shortly after 
the dissolution of their symptoms of enuresis, Chris and Ray began committing acts of 
indecent exposure, and so it is likely that the two symptoms are related.  Ray‘s enuresis is 
described in detail in Chapter VII.  In perversion, enuresis is a symptom that is related to 
castration fears.  In Ray‘s and Chris‘ lives, enuresis functioned to keep them especially 
close with their mothers while at the same time expressing aggression toward their 
mothers (because their mothers had to clean up the mess left by their uncontrolled 
penises).   
Chris described his father as a monstrous figure who threw ―temper tantrums‖ and 
whipped Chris and Chris‘ siblings with a belt seemingly at random and without providing 
a good reason as to why they deserved to be punished.  When Chris saw his father take 
off his belt, Chris would become afraid and wet himself.  Sometimes, this had the effect 
of disgusting his father so that Chris was able to avoid getting beaten.  Chris‘ mother 
comforted him after his father became angry at him, assuring him that he had done 
nothing wrong. 
Chris said that his father‘s feelings toward him seemed to be characterized either 
by anger or by not wanting to have anything to do with him.  Chris reported that his 
father became angry at him and his siblings for being ―normal rambunctious kids‖ and for 
trying to get his attention and love.  Chris‘ father preferred to leave all of the child-
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rearing duties to his wife.  Correspondingly, Chris‘ father adequately filled the function 
of the Name-of-the-Father so that Chris underwent primal repression, but he was unable 
to fill the role of lawgiving Other.  Chris was keenly aware that his father was childish 
and inconsistent with his ―temper tantrums‖ and that his father preferred to let his mother 
have an especially close relationship with him.   
Chris‘ enuresis was a castration-related symptom.  Chris‘ enuresis was one way in 
which he avoided getting punished at all by his father and stood up for his right to 
jouissance—his right to be a loud, rambunctious kid.  Chris‘ enuresis was a message that 
said that Chris was a ―momma‘s boy‖ even as an adolescent.   
After Chris peed himself, Chris‘ mother washed his urine-soaked underwear, and 
so Chris‘ symptom was also a call to his mOther.  In group sessions, Chris said he felt 
angry with his mother because she never intervened on his behalf.  He felt she should 
have been alarmed that he was ―peeing [his] pants‖ out of fear.  Chris said he understood 
and empathized with his father‘s whipping him more than with his mother‘s inaction.  
One aspect of the above is a common formulation in perversion, in which the pervert 
takes the side of the father against the mother, hoping thereby to bolster the weak father 
function.  In using the phrase ―peeing [his] pants‖—a phrase used to suggest that 
someone laughed so hard and uncontrollably that he lost control of his bladder—Chris 
suggested that he was not only afraid of being whipped by his father but also at some 
level enjoyed it.  At an unconscious level, Chris did not really want his mother to wrest 
from him what little relationship he had with his father, but instead he wanted his mother 
to see that he enjoyed it.  The fact that Chris knew his mother had the dirty job of 
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washing his urine-soaked underwear corroborates the idea that Chris expressed anger at 
his mother through his enuresis, for which he held his mother responsible.   
Case Example Excerpts of Exhibitionism Considered 
 
 Rosen (1996) provided the following example of an exhibitionist patient who met 
the criteria for his ―phobic-impulsive‖ type—the type that is most likely to fall in the 
category of perversion.   
For example, Peter, a highly intelligent patient, had constant recurring fantasies 
that his genitals would be bitten off by sharks in the swimming pool, bath water, 
and bed, which was evidence of his severe phallic castration anxiety expressed in 
phobic terms. (p. 176) 
Peter‘s ―constant recurring fantasies‖ (p. 176, my emphasis) of getting his genitals bitten 
off by sharks clearly suggest that he wishes, at some Other level, to be castrated.  The 
source of his anxiety is not so much the possible presence of genital-eating sharks but 
rather their absence—or the absence of an adequately forceful lawgiving Other.  Notice 
that Peter‘s fantasy is that ―sharks‖ rather than a single shark bite off his genitals.  
Perhaps he unconsciously reasoned that just one shark could not do the job.  Instead, it 
would take several sharks to be able to castrate him.  After all, his own father was, by 
himself, insufficient to instigate the process of castration.  Peter‘s father, mother, or both 
of them may have contributed to the creation of the shark fantasies and to their locales in 
a swimming pool, a bathtub, and a bed.  Correspondingly, Peter spoke about his ―early 
memories of seeing little girls‘ genitals which had been, as it were, cut off‖ (p. 197). 
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Chris and the Letter or “What Happened to „the Customer is Always Right?‟” 
 On several occasions, Chris wrote a letter to an authority figure (representing the 
lawgiving Other) in which he complained about the care he received from one of that 
authority figure‘s employees (representing a mOther figure).  Each time, Chris hoped that 
the authority figure would see that a moral law had been broken, would enforce the rules 
more strictly on his or her employee, and would apologize to Chris.  Chris found a 
creative and law-abiding way to prop up his paternal function by lodging a formal 
complaint to someone representing a lawgiving Other against a mOther figure.   
 On one occasion, Chris dined at a chain restaurant where he had dined many 
times before and usually ordered the same dish.  This time, Chris was served by a rude 
waiter and had a problem with his meal.  The waiter argued with Chris about the 
problem, trying to tell Chris that the meal was fine the way it was.  Chris insisted that the 
meal was prepared differently than it usually was, and he finally succeeded in getting the 
waiter to take back the meal and fix it to his liking.  When the bill came, Chris found he 
had been charged extra for the alteration in the meal, and Chris hotly contested this with 
the waiter, who was unwilling to reduce the price of the meal.  Chris spoke with the 
manager, who then took the side of the waiter against Chris.  Chris paid the bill but wrote 
a lengthy letter of complaint to the head of the company.  His letter was appropriately re-
routed to the customer service department, and, about six months later, Chris received a 
generic response of apology, along with a gift certificate.  Chris was very pleased with 
this victory.  Nevertheless, years after the event, he still recounted his story with a 
considerable degree of anger.   
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On a similar occasion, Chris went to a chain fast food restaurant and ordered his 
usual meal.  The cashier overcharged him by about fifteen cents, and when Chris pointed 
out this error to her, she disagreed with him and told him she had rung the order up 
correctly.  Chris continued to argue with her to no avail, and so he asked to speak with 
the manager.  The manager spoke with Chris and refunded him his fifteen cents.  Chris 
had been sufficiently upset by this incident that he spoke about it in a group session.  In 
exploring the importance of his having been shortchanged at the fast food restaurant, 
Chris found the occasion to tell the group about the previous occasion at the chain 
restaurant.   
 Group members recalled a similar event in Chris‘ life, in which he wrote a letter 
of complaint to his psychiatrist (a woman) about the poor treatment he was receiving 
from her at a treatment facility for sexual offenders.  The letter was well over five pages 
long and detailed how he felt treated like a person without dignity and a voice of his own.  
Chris‘ chief complaints were lobbed at the psychiatrist.  Chris‘ psychiatrist read the letter 
and shared it with Chris‘ judge, with whom she was friends.  (Chris knew that they were 
acquainted.)  The psychiatrist reportedly felt ―threatened‖ by the letter, and she succeeded 
in getting Chris, who was on parole, put back in prison.   
I read the letter in question, and it seemed relatively innocuous to me.  Although 
Chris‘ anger at his psychiatrist was emphatically stated, Chris made no threats to harm 
her.  Instead, Chris emphasized that he thought his psychiatrist deserved to feel ashamed 
of the way she was running the treatment center.  In the letter, Chris said that he did not 
think that his psychiatrist was an empathic type of person who would listen to his 
complaints and make efforts to change her style of working with him—although that did 
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not stop him from writing the letter to her.  Chris perhaps felt that his verbal attack on the 
psychiatrist went much deeper than what appeared in his letter.   
In each situation, Chris was angry at someone who represented his mOther.  The 
food service workers and the psychiatrist were all in roles in which their jobs were to give 
some kind of care to Chris.  Chris was angry at each mOther figure not only for failing to 
give him adequate nurturing, but also for disrespecting him.  Chris felt that his rights as a 
―consumer‖ and as a subject were violated when a mOther figure made a mistake such as 
―short-changing‖ him and then refused to listen and agree with Chris, thereby not 
assuming responsibility for her mistake.  Chris‘ anger and frustration mounted when he 
felt that his voice and feelings did not matter to the mOther figure, and that she was going 
to act in accordance with her will and desires and not those of a lawgiving Other (such as 
the corporate rules and guidelines).   
Chris became very distressed in these seemingly minimally frustrating situations 
because they mirrored the problems he encountered with the first Other as a young child.  
The other (mostly neurotic) psychotherapy group participants wondered why Chris was 
so significantly distressed by these scenarios.  Indeed, the majority of neurotic subjects 
would not have become nearly as upset by these inadequacies in the provision of service 
as did Chris, and, in any case, would not have been upset for the same reasons.   
In these scenarios, Chris got a father figure involved in his dispute with the 
mOther figure.
98
  In so doing, Chris temporarily propped up his paternal function.  
Because the mOther figure acted as if there were no law above and beyond her own 
desires, Chris himself attracted the attention of the lawgiving Other and tried to enlist his 
                                               
98 One of the workers was a man, but he also functioned as a mOther figure just as male analysts often are 
positioned as such in the transference. 
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help.  Chris‘ complaint against the mOther figure was that he had not been treated fairly, 
had not been listened to, and had not received care that was in his best interest, but 
instead received care that served the interests of the mOther figure.  In each instance, the 
father figure was professionally obligated to respond in some way to Chris‘ call for help.   
When Chris was in the role of ―consumer‖ in relation to a company employee, 
Chris had more power to make himself seen and understood than he did in his role as a 
child in relation to his mOther and disinterested father.  Chris said he felt his anxiety and 
anger considerably decreased when he received an apologetic response to his letter and 
when the manager refunded him his fifteen cents.  Interestingly, Chris said that his 
anxiety, but not his anger, decreased when the judge sent him back to jail.  Perhaps, in 
Chris‘ case, simply being incarcerated was a way to prop up his paternal function.99  
Chris‘ anger remained because he thought that the judge, who was friends with his 
psychiatrist, had been coerced into re-incarcerating Chris by the forceful influence of the 
psychiatrist.   
Chris and Symbolic Achievements 
 Chris had been receiving Social Security Disability (SSD) payments for well over 
a decade, and that had been his sole means of income.  Chris had no physical disability 
but instead received SSD because of a diagnosis of major depression at the time of his 
application for SSD.  Since then, Chris continuously received SSD checks without having 
to undergo another evaluation.  Several of the participants in his psychotherapy group 
voiced that they did not believe that Chris met the criteria for mental health SSD, which 
amount to being unable to work because of mental health issues.  However, Chris wanted 
                                               
99 This is a conjecture on my part, and I am by no means suggesting that all perverts should be incarcerated 
for life as a way to solve the problems inherent to the perverse structure.   
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to remain on SSD, having no desire to work.  When defending himself to the group, Chris 
reasoned that, were he to get a job, he would quickly become overwhelmed with anxiety 
and might consequently commit an act of indecent exposure.  Chris was content to spend 
the majority of his time at home, watching television, masturbating (he limited himself to 
masturbating three days a week for several hours at a time), researching his family tree, 
and leaving his house to visit his children and attend his individual and group 
psychotherapy sessions.   
 On a related note, Chris spoke on several occasions about an experience at a job 
he had a few decades ago as a cook at a restaurant.  The dishwasher quit, and Chris 
volunteered to take on the duties of the dishwasher, in addition to his job as a cook, until 
a new dishwasher could be hired.  This was a great deal of extra work.  Although Chris 
did get paid for the overtime hours he put in, he complained that never once during the 
half a year that he held these two job responsibilities, did his boss thank him or give him 
positive recognition.  Feeling resentful and angry, Chris quit his job.  Chris had felt 
similarly resentful in the military when he repeatedly got passed over for promotions.  
What is more, in group, Chris often complained that he was ―bending over backwards‖ to 
help his ex-wife and children around the house, but that not only did they not thank him, 
but they often expressed annoyance at his frequent presence and his meddling in their 
affairs.   
 Chris, of course, chose to continue bending over backwards for the Other in 
situations in which he consistently received apathetic or negative reactions from the 
Other.  This, therefore, is something of a masochistic position as well as a repetition 
compulsion.  Chris, not having received his due symbolic recognition from his mOther or 
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father as a young child (despite his best efforts, probably at doing household chores for 
his parents), recreated as an adult situations that mirrored his early relations to his 
parental Others.  In addition, it is useful to consider Chris‘ phrase ―bending over 
backwards‖ in relation to the fact that his father wanted him to bend over (forwards) to 
beat him.  In this respect, ―bending over backwards‖ may be Chris‘ way of avoiding his 
father‘s punishment.   
Tom 
 The father of Tom, an exhibitionist in Rosen‘s psychodynamic psychotherapy 
group, was a man  
who was an obsessional personality [and] a moral coward, especially during air 
raids, while his mother was strong and dependable.  Tom identified with her and 
at the age of 16 he chased his father out of the house—it was at this age that his 
exposures started. (Rosen, 1996, p. 192)   
On a related note, Tom talked about a fight he witnessed between his parents when he 
was a boy.  His mother had angrily ―thrown a plate on the floor or at father, who had 
gone out to the garden and stayed there‖ (p. 200).  As an adult, ―Tom angrily despised his 
father at length for his weakness‖ (p. 196).  Clearly, Tom‘s interpretations of his father 
and mother are the ones most common to the structure of perversion.   
 After the group had met numerous times, Tom admitted to having exhibited 
himself again.  He described  
how his bicycle had turned into his usual haunt, ‗as if of its own accord‘, and he 
had partially exhibited himself to two girls.  He felt very ashamed but a new 
feature had appeared; he wanted to apologize and made to do so, but they ran 
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away.  This need for apology was accepted as a hopeful sign, attributed to the 
work of the group. (Rosen, 1996, p. 196) 
Most likely due to the influence of the group, Tom wanted to take back his exhibitionistic 
act.  It seems as though the group functioned as a stand-in lawgiving Other for Tom, 
especially because Tom felt inclined to admit to the group what he had done.  (Ray had a 
very similar experience, which I describe in detail in the next chapter.)   
Michael 
 Michael, age 19, was another exhibitionist who participated in Rosen‘s 
psychotherapy group.  Michael was described as  
the most uncontrolled member of the group, like a primitive chunk of primary 
process…Michael sat through the first meeting sprawled out in his raincoat and 
hat.  He would burst into meetings late, argue firmly and inconsequentially about 
wage rates and hold the group‘s attention by his imperturbable vigour even when 
attacked.  He settled down remarkably, came neatly dressed and showed flashes 
of helpful insight.  He claimed to be able to control his proclivities by willpower. 
(Rosen, 1996, p. 194)  
Michael had an obsessional symptom: he had to pick up all the papers in the street before 
he could commit an act of indecent exposure.  Michael‘s presentation and discourse 
obviously defied social standards of propriety and might be defined as a bit shocking.  
Rosen does not provide us with much information about Michael‘s life, however, which 
would enable us to better understand Michael‘s obsessional symptom.   
 Rosen does tell his readers, however, that Michael‘s parents separated when 
Michael was three years old and that Michael was ―shuffled thereafter between relatives 
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and boarding schools‖ (1996, p. 194).  Michael also knew that his father had made 
another woman pregnant around the time of his birth.  Michael‘s fetish object was girls‘ 
underwear, and he ―exposed himself and masturbated to girls in the dark, in cinemas, and 
on beaches‖ (p. 194).   
Voyeurism 
 
―Voyeurism involves trying to see a woman as devoted to the jouissance of her 
own body and making her realize that, even when alone, she is being watched by 
another‖ (Miller, 1996b, p. 318). 
 The voyeur brings in the gaze himself to plug up the hole in the Other and thereby 
make the Other whole.   
What occurs in voyeurism?  At the moment of the act of the voyeur, where is the 
subject, where is the object?  I have told you that the subject is not there in the 
sense of seeing, at the level of the scopic drive.  He is there as a pervert and he is 
situated only at the culmination of the loop.  As for the object—this is what my 
topology on the blackboard cannot show you, but can allow you to admit—the 
loop turns around itself, it is a missile, and it is with it, in perversion, that the 
target is reached.   
 The object, here, is the gaze—the gaze that the subject is that hits him, that 
hits the bull‘s eye in target-shooting.  I have only to remind you what I said of 
Sartre‘s analysis.  Although this analysis brings out the agency of the gaze, it is 
not at the level of the other whose gaze surprises the subject looking through the 
keyhole.  What is important is that the other surprises him, the subject, as entirely 
hidden gaze.   
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 You grasp here the ambiguity of what is at issue when we speak of the 
scopic drive.  The gaze is this object lost and suddenly refound in the 
conflagration of shame, by the introduction of the other. (Lacan, 1973/1998a, p. 
182). 
At the moment of the voyeuristic act, the voyeur is object a in the form of the gaze.  The 
pervert, recognizing himself as the gaze, experiences a conflagration of shame when his 
gaze obturates the hole in the Other.   
 The voyeur hides himself in his efforts at getting a good view of his object, and 
his object is always a woman.  But  
what is the subject trying to see? What he is trying to see, make no mistake, is the 
object as absence.  What the voyeur is looking for and finds is merely a shadow, a 
shadow behind the curtain.  There he will fantasize any magic of presence, the 
most graceful of girls, for example, even if on the other side there is only a hairy 
athlete.  What he is looking for is not, as one says, the phallus—but precisely its 
absence, hence the pre-eminence of certain forms as objects of his search. (Lacan, 
1973/1998a, p. 182, translation modified) 
The voyeur tries to discover the truth of femininity in gazing at a woman when she thinks 
she is not being seen.  The voyeur is trying to see ―the object as absence‖ (p. 182), which 
is to say that he wants to confirm that a woman lacks a penis.   
The object of desire of the voyeur … is very precisely what can only be seen there 
insofar as she props it up on the basis of something ungraspable: a simple line 
where the phallus is lacking.  (Lacan, 2006b, p. 254) 
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The voyeur‘s interest is provoked by ―what cannot be seen in the Other‖ (Lacan, 2006b, 
p. 254), by the absence of the phallus.   
At the same time, by providing the gaze himself, the voyeur ―will fantasize any 
magic of presence‖ (Lacan, 1973/1998a, p. 182).  The voyeur  
brings the gaze to the field of the Other, except that even prior to that it was as if 
the Other, in what he spies, is already manifest as being seen from the point of 
view of his ideal—the bathing woman who is already made likable under a gaze 
that still isn‘t materialized.  And in fact that is, under the ideal, so to speak, plus-
de-jouir. (Miller, 2009b, pp. 49-50) 
The voyeur‘s act is not so much about the features of a particular woman as it is about the 
object as absence that is made manifest in the voyeur‘s gaze.  In other words, the 
voyeur‘s gaze and the presence of a woman are the only elements required to turn the 
woman‘s lack into a ―magic of presence‖ (1973/1998a, p. 182).   
The voyeur, like all perverts, disavows his position as object a in the perverse act, 
fooling himself into believing that he is an active subject in control of the situation.  
According to Lacan, the exhibitionist is the  
one who succeeds in what he has to do, that is, bring jouissance to the Other, and 
an other who is only there to plug the hole with his own gaze, without letting the 
other see even the slightest bit more about what he is.  It is more or less the same 
thing in relation between the sadist and the masochist. (Lacan, 2006b, p. 256) 
Despite being, at the moment of the voyeuristic act, equivalent to the gaze as object a, the 
voyeur still manages to avoid recognizing himself as object a.   
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 The voyeur chooses to look at a woman who has not given her consent and is not 
aware that someone is watching her.  The voyeur‘s act occurs exclusively in situations in 
which he might be caught—either by the woman herself or some other person.  Going to 
a strip club or looking at pornographic pictures and videos of women who supposedly 
were ignorant of the fact that they were on camera are much less interesting to the voyeur 
than spying on an unsuspecting woman himself (sometimes with the aid of a hidden 
camera which might be discovered).  The voyeur usually desires to gaze at an 
unsuspecting woman who is in a partial or complete state of nudity.  The voyeur is often 
attracted to situations in which a woman is likely to be found undressing, going to the 
bathroom, bathing, or engaging in sexual acts.  The paternal function is temporarily 
propped up when the voyeur is caught in the act—when the voyeur becomes aware that 
someone, even the victim herself, sees him looking at the victim.  The effect is 
strengthened and prolonged if the other person hands him over to law enforcement.   
Case Example of Voyeurism Considered 
 
Noel: “You‟ve got nothing to look at!” 
Rosen (1996) described the case of Noel, a voyeur in his mid-20s who was treated 
with weekly psychodynamic psychotherapy in an outpatient forensic context.  Prior to the 
start of Noel‘s psychotherapy, he had eight convictions for watching women in public 
bathrooms, the last of which was somehow combined with theft.  Noel had previously 
been diagnosed with ―immature and unstable personality with psychopathic traits, and 
compulsive abnormal sexual behavior‖ (p. 188).  Prior to his beginning psychodynamic 
psychotherapy, he had undergone a year of non-analytic psychotherapy along with a 
course of hormone therapy intended to diminish his sexual desire.  Noel married at 23, at 
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which point the hormones were no longer prescribed to him so that he might freely 
engage in his marital sexual life.   
Much to his humiliation, Noel was bathed by his mother until he was 11 years 
old.  After that time, Noel‘s mother sometimes entered the bathroom when his genitals 
were exposed.  When Noel became angry, his mother said, ―You‘ve got nothing to look 
at!‖ (Rosen, 1996, p. 189), which led to his first acts of voyeurism in public as well as in 
his home.  ―You‘ve got nothing to look at!‖ is an important phrase open to several 
different interpretations.  One is that Noel‘s penis was inferior to other penises, such that 
Noel was inferior to other men or not a ―real man.‖  Another interpretation, one which is 
supported by Noel‘s feminine identifications, is that Noel is a girl.  Alternatively, the 
phrase suggests that Noel‘s mother, by comparison, did have something worth looking at.  
Consequently, Noel desired to discover what it was that his mother and women had by 
way of genitalia that was something at which to look.   
As a teenager, Noel at times tried to see his mother‘s genitals uncovered while she 
was in the bathroom, and she spanked him for spying on her.  Noel associated these 
memories to those of discovering his ―mother‘s soiled sanitary towels as an adolescent 
and as a small child, which aroused his disgust and the thought that if father only knew 
about these things what he would say‖ (Rosen, 1996, p. 189).  For Noel, there was 
something dirty and sexually arousing about his mother, her genitalia, and the things and 
activities associated with her genitalia (such as her going to the bathroom and her 
menstrual blood).  As a child, Noel reasoned to himself that his father was ignorant of 
Noel‘s sexual arousal caused by his mother and her toilet habits, and that, were his father 
to become aware of this, his father would disapprove and intervene.  What is more, Noel 
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assumed that his father would also become disgusted (or aroused) by his mother‘s soiled 
sanitary towels and the like, and that his father would put a stop to his mother‘s 
disgusting sexuality.  By saying to himself, ―If father only knew about these things, what 
would he say?‖ Noel attempted to strengthen his father‘s role as lawgiving Other.   
The sounds associated with going to the bathroom both fascinated and disgusted 
Noel, and he associated his corresponding fantasies of seeing and listening to women in 
bathrooms with his primal scene.  When Noel was four years old, he heard his parents 
having intercourse through the thin walls of his bedroom.  ―He was terrified, prayed they 
would stop, and later lay awake waiting for a repetition of the event, feeling left out and 
resentful‖ (Rosen, 1996, p. 189).  Noel‘s feeling left out and profoundly lonely (p. 189) 
when bearing blind witness to this primal scene may have coincided with Noel‘s logical 
moment of primal repression.  Also related to his primal scene was his experiencing 
disgust at the moment of orgasm during sexual intercourse with his wife.  Noel was then 
―compelled to think of millions of others having intercourse at the same time, like 
animals‖ (p. 189).   
Metonymically related to the sounds his mother made in the bathroom and while 
having sex with his father, Noel‘s disgust both disguised his desire to have sexual 
intercourse with his mother and his desire to be his mother.  The noises she made in the 
bathroom and while having sex with Noel‘s father aroused Noel‘s curiosity and desire to 
see what was going on within her private sphere.  Those noises must have sounded to 
Noel as though his mother were either enjoying herself or in pain or some combination of 
both.  (The menstrual blood on the sanitary napkins was evidence of the latter.)  Noel 
desired to see his mOther’s private jouissance.  In the words of Miller, ―Voyeurism 
233 
 
involves trying to see a woman as devoted to the jouissance of her own body and making 
her realize that, even when alone, she is being watched by another‖ (1996b, p. 318). 
In one of his psychodynamic psychotherapy sessions, Noel reported that he had 
had conscious  
thoughts of intercourse with mother.  He said that this was the worst kind of incest 
and he found such ideas quite intolerable, but that going into toilets was the next 
best thing to intercourse with mother.  The importance of his voyeuristic acts as a 
defence against his intense incestuous desires for his mother, as well as an 
expression of them, became clear. (Rosen, 1996, p. 189) 
Importantly, Noel‘s acts of voyeurism were also defenses against the inadequacy of the 
paternal function.  This is the case both because Noel was very likely to get caught in the 
act and punished
100
 but also because they allowed Noel to express aggression toward his 
mOther—aggression which has a temporary effect of separation.   
Noel said that spying on women while they are going to the bathroom is a way of 
degrading them.  More specifically, Noel desired to degrade, express anger at, and hurt 
his mother.  Through his offenses and court appearances, he succeeded in hurting his 
mother.  In the same vein, as a boy Noel ―dug tunnels in ponds and filled them with 
frogs, newts, eels, and adders, watched them tangling together, then would cut them to 
bits with a knife, or pour on oil and set them on fire‖ (Rosen, 1996, p. 190).  Rosen did 
not provide any information regarding Noel‘s associations to these events.  Perhaps their 
tangling together was associated in Noel‘s mind with the primal scene, and Noel‘s 
aggressive acts were meant to put an end to his parents‘ private jouissance.  Alternatively, 
the tunnels Noel dug in ponds represented the bathtub, and the painful bloodbath Noel 
                                               
100 Noel ―would frequently be caught, as it were, on purpose‖ (Rosen, 1996, p. 189). 
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inflicted upon the amphibians was akin to the harm his mother inflicted upon him by 
bathing him until he was 11 years old.  It also is quite possible that the amphibians 
symbolized Noel‘s mother, and that his torturing the amphibians reflected his taking up 
an active position and retaliating against his mother in kind.   
Amphibians were not the only objects of Noel‘s aggression, however, because 
Noel killed his own pet rabbit.  A notable exception is that Noel did not kill or hurt a bird 
under any circumstances, even to put an already injured bird out of its misery.  Noel 
thought of birds as ―tender‖ (Rosen, 1996, p. 190).  What might account for this?  In lieu 
of Noel‘s own associations, we might hypothesize that birds held a special place in 
Noel‘s psyche because their beaks reminded him of penises.  More specifically, Noel 
desired to protect birds just as he protected himself from castration.
 101
   
The following episodes provide more examples of Noel‘s repressed desires to hurt 
his mother.   
Once at school he spoiled a prize cabbage the children were growing by poking 
his finger through it—and when later an interpretation about his wish to damage 
mother‘s breast was given on different material, he associated back to the cabbage 
and said that it had to be holed exactly in the centre.  This was interpreted as 
representing the nipple…He had thoughts of cutting a woman‘s breasts right off 
where they joined the rib cage, and added that he also had fantasies of cutting 
women‘s nipples out.  He continued to describe how, when he was younger and 
was served mince meat and mash, he would mix it all up and make the food into a 
square, then make a ploughed field out of it with a fork, then cut the centre square 
                                               
101 Noel was 8-10 years of age when he ―would get resentful with his mother and express this in cruelty to 
animals‖ (Rosen, 1996, p. 189).   
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and eat it, then a square on the left, right, north and south, then other squares, but 
could not finish it like this and had to gobble it all up.  The interpretation was 
made that the squares were to take the breast shape away. (Rosen, 1996, p. 190) 
It may very well be that Noel associated women‘s breasts and nipples with femininity and 
with his mOther because he lacked a more distinctive signifier for sexual difference.  
Alternatively, women‘s nipples and breasts are related to breastfeeding and maternal 
nurturing, and so Noel‘s fantasy of cutting off a woman‘s nipples or breasts might 
symbolize a wish for independence from his mOther or an angry rejection of the kind of 
intrusive and force-feeding care he received from his mOther (exemplified in being 
bathed by her until he was 11).  Perhaps Noel, at some level, was the hole in the mOther, 
and this is the root of his compulsion to put a hole in the cabbage/woman‘s breast.   
Rosen emphasized that ―despite his nuisance value to women in toilets, the moral 
suffering inflicted on his family, and a single physical altercation with his father and 
fights with his brother, none of these oral-sadistic fantasies were acted out with women‖ 
(1996, p. 190).  A further caveat provided by Rosen is that despite Noel‘s strong feelings 
of resentment toward his mother and his complaints against his father (e.g., ―[Noel] 
craved his father‘s attention and admiration, but the latter took all his exploits and 
excellent sporting abilities quite coolly‖ (p. 189)), Noel‘s ―parents [were] eminently 
respected in their neighbourhood, and presented to legal and medical authorities as well-
adjusted responsible persons who had made great personal sacrifices in order to advance 
their son‘s education‖ (p. 190).   
Another important feature of the case of Noel was his feminine identification.  For 
example, Noel imitated the way he had seen women go to the bathroom ―by squatting and 
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arranging his clothes‖ (Rosen, 1996, p. 189).  Noel ―had to defend himself against the 
wish to become like [his] mother.  Thus, artistic sensitivity to poetry and music was a 
source of fear as this aroused a feeling of feminine identification, and was checked by his 
daring exploits‖ (p. 189).  Through his being punished by the law for his acts of 
voyeurism, not only was his faith, as it were, in the lawgiving Other strengthened, but he 
could also  
show his masculinity to [his] mother, make up for his sense of genital inferiority, 
further humiliate his parents, and counter his fears of a feminine identification.  
He felt his parents wanted a girl instead of him, and as a child he had fantasies of 
being a girl.  He said he would hate to be a woman, because of chaps like him 
frightening them in toilets, afraid of being raped or murdered. (p. 189) 
Lacking a signifier for sexual difference, Noel experienced uncertainty and anxiety 
related to his sexual identity.  Noel seemed to associate femininity with weakness and 
emotionality, and masculinity with daring exploits and strength.  Nevertheless, all of 
these qualities were made evident by Noel‘s speech and actions, but Noel continued to 
think that if he could only be aggressive and reckless enough, he would rid himself of 
vulnerability and femininity.   
 According to Rosen, Noel made progress during his first six months of 
psychodynamic psychotherapy.  During that time, Noel reported improvement in his 
relationships and ability to work.  With ―increasing insight his aberrant impulses were 
able to be resisted‖ (Rosen, 1996, p. 190) to a higher degree than prior to treatment.   
During treatment at the clinic the patient re-lived much of the original feelings 
associated with the experiences described.  He became extremely sensitive to 
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loneliness and acted out his voyeurism when he became depressed, for example, 
when a social engagement with his wife suddenly could not be kept.  His 
treatment could not be carried to a successful conclusion although he was making 
excellent progress as he had to be transferred to a new therapist after six months.  
Although the changeover was carefully handled by all concerned with his full 
knowledge and agreement, and he liked his new female therapist, stating he 
preferred her to a male doctor, this provoked a fresh burst of voyeuristic activities 
for which he was sentenced to prison. (pp. 190-191)  
Despite the premature end to Noel‘s analysis, his response to treatment was positive.   
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Chapter VII: Analysis of a Case of (Perverse) Exhibitionism 
Introduction 
 
The patient is a Caucasian exhibitionist in his late-20s with whom I worked 
individually for about a year,
102
 providing weekly variable-length sessions from a 
Lacanian psychoanalytic clinical perspective.  In addition, for a year and a half he was a 
participant in one of the weekly 90-minute psychotherapy groups I co-led for male sexual 
offenders.  The group employed a mixture of psychodynamic, relapse prevention, and 
―process‖ techniques.  I will refer to him as ―Ray.‖  All names used in this case study are 
pseudonyms and I have altered identifying information. 
 Ray was referred by his parole officer (PO) to the outpatient forensic 
psychotherapy practice of Dr. Smith at which I worked.  Ray‘s participation in individual 
psychotherapy was purely voluntary, but his participation in group psychotherapy was 
―recommended‖ by his PO.  From conversations with Ray‘s PO, Dr. Smith ascertained 
that she (the PO) would not file a warrant for Ray‘s arrest were Ray to quit 
psychotherapy altogether.  Ray met with his PO monthly, and seemed to have noticed her 
assessment of the situation but disavowed it in favor of the belief that she, the 
representative of the law, was forcing him to seek out treatment that he needed; Ray 
believed his PO would send him back to jail if he terminated his psychotherapy. 
Because I work in a forensic psychotherapeutic role, my individual and group 
patients do not have full confidentiality rights.  The degree to which each patient has 
                                               
102 After a year, I had to transfer the case to another clinician because I had to move in order to finish my 
graduate education.  Although in instances such as these—when the therapist or patient moves away and 
wishes to continue the therapeutic relationship—I practice psychotherapy over the phone, I did not do so 
with Ray because Dr. Smith and I thought it best to keep Ray in both individual and group treatment at his 
practice.   
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confidentiality rights depends upon which institution of the law is involved in his case: 
the federal government, the state government, the county government, and Children 
Youth and Family Services (CYFS).  Ray‘s confidentiality is compromised only by state 
parole, which demands only occasional communication with a psychotherapy 
practitioner—communication which can be as vague as ―he attends therapy consistently 
and, as far as we know, has not committed any new crimes.‖  That being said, the office 
policy of Dr. Smith included the requirement that each sexual offender take an initial 
history polygraph and subsequent annual maintenance polygraphs.
103
  These results are 
shared with probation and parole officers, albeit with communications regarding the 
limitations of the polygraph‘s validity.   
Although Dr. Smith has spoken to Ray‘s PO on several occasions, I have never 
had occasion to do so.  Of course, because of my role as forensic clinician, the 
transference is also necessarily affected because of the obligation to communicate, albeit 
selectively, with POs.  Based on my two-and-a-half years of experience working under 
such conditions, I found that effective psychoanalytic psychotherapy is possible in a 
forensic setting with many individuals. 
Offense History and Prior Treatment 
Prior to beginning treatment at Dr. Smith‘s office, Ray exposed his genitals to 
women on thousands of occasions, and was incarcerated in state prison on two occasions 
for a total of about four years for multiple convictions of indecent exposure and indecent 
exposure to minors.  The convictions of indecent exposure to minors had resulted from 
Ray‘s strategy of selecting girls under the age of 18 as victims because he thought they 
                                               
103 Maintenance polygraphs are generally designed to ascertain whether or not the client has committed any 
new criminal offenses since a certain date (such as the beginning of his treatment). 
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were less likely to notify the police.  Not only did that strategy not work, but it resulted in 
a more severe penalty for indecent exposure.  Ray twice served probation terms, and was 
imprisoned for violating the conditions of his probation and going on the run (AWOL).  
When Ray went AWOL, he travelled across the country to stay with a friend who was a 
drug-dealer.  After using a good deal of marijuana and cocaine, Ray turned himself in.  
Ray had reasoned that he would be unable to get employment and would eventually be 
apprehended.  That being said, if Ray had not been AWOL, he may have been able to 
avoid incarceration for that set of convictions altogether.  Ray‘s actions seem to have 
been motivated by a desire to prop up his paternal function—to be in relation to an 
authority figure whom he was forced to obey—rather than by his consciously avowed 
intentions to get away with crime.   
Shortly before starting therapy at the office of Dr. Smith, Ray had been kicked out 
of a mandated sexual offender outpatient treatment program because he missed an 
individual session.  Ray had gone through about two years of group and individual 
treatment at that program which he found to be ―useless.‖  Ray‘s treatment there was 
interrupted by serving a year in prison due to a conviction for indecent exposure he got 
while in treatment.  Ray said he was consistently dishonest with the staff at the treatment 
program, participated minimally in group therapy, and that he was committing acts of 
indecent exposure almost every day during the course of his treatment.  In comparison to 
his treatment at Dr. Smith‘s office, Ray described his treatment at the former program as 
completely lacking in confidentiality such that he could be certain that anything he said 
would be reported to his PO and potentially used against him.  Furthermore, Ray said that 
neither his group nor his individual therapist seemed adequately educated in the way of 
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psychotherapy in general or in sexual offender treatment specifically.  Ray complained 
that they did not offer him helpful knowledge or hope that he could stop committing acts 
of indecent exposure.  Ray said that his group therapist had told his mother and girlfriend, 
―people like him don‘t stop.‖  
Ray‟s Request for Psychotherapy 
At Dr. Smith‘s outpatient forensic practice, Ray initially participated in about 10 
individual and assessment sessions with Dr. Smith.
104
  Ray complained of symptoms of 
depression and anxiety
105
 and also wanted to work on improving his relationship with his 
girlfriend.  According to Ray, his first session with Dr. Smith marked the last time he 
committed an act of exhibitionism.  Prior to that and excepting his time being 
incarcerated, the longest he had ever gone without exposing his genitals to women had 
been 10 days.  Among other clinical interventions, Dr. Smith taught Ray some 
individualized techniques for ceasing to commit acts of exhibitionism.  One such 
technique involved Ray tape-recording (at home) a description of his exhibitionistic act 
and later listening to his own description.  Then, Dr. Smith asked Ray to record an altered 
description of the scenario, in which Ray stopped himself short of the act by imagining an 
alternative ―healthy‖ and legal act that afforded him intense pleasure.  Instead of doing 
the required assignment, Ray—very unusually—chose to stop himself short of the act of 
exhibitionism by making disparaging remarks about himself.  Dr. Smith made it clear that 
their work together would be temporary, because he thought it best for Ray to join a 
                                               
104 On a self-report personality style questionnaire, Ray was found to most closely resemble a psychopathic 
and histrionic personality style. In that vein, also instructive is his answer on the sentence completion stem 
―When I was growing up I spent my time…‖  Ray finished the sentence with ―lighting things on fire.‖  In a 
histrionic fashion, he highlighted one of the most shocking things he did as a child.  When asked about this, 
Ray said that, although he had lit things on fire frequently, this was by no means an everyday event and he 
never hurt anyone.   
105 One manifestation of his anxiety was his high blood pressure. 
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psychotherapeutic group and to do psychoanalytically-oriented individual therapy with a 
clinician at his practice.  In addition, given what Dr. Smith identified to Ray as Ray‘s 
―issues with women,‖ he recommended that Ray choose a female psychotherapist.   
Where previous clinicians had failed completely, Dr. Smith was able to gain 
Ray‘s trust and respect in their first session.  Not only that, but Dr. Smith served as a 
substitute lawgiving Other, temporarily propping up Ray‘s paternal function and enabling 
him to cease engaging in acts of exhibitionism.  Dr. Smith was able to embody a 
lawgiving Other for Ray because Dr. Smith gave Ray significantly more confidentiality 
rights, seemed to possess useful knowledge, to care about Ray, and to believe Ray could 
stop his acts of exhibitionism.   
 After six months of participating in the psychotherapy group that I co-led, Ray 
approached me after a session and asked if he could begin to have individual 
psychotherapy sessions with me.  When I inquired further about the reasons behind his 
request, he said that he ―liked the kind of questions [I] asked,‖ and he thought I 
understood him.  Ray referenced the times I directed my gaze at him during group 
sessions ―with a look that bored through [his] head‖ as if I knew what he wanted to say.  I 
recall what may have been a few such instances, in which a group participant was talking 
about something to which I imagined Ray had a response, and so I looked over at Ray.  
When I did so, Ray jumped in his chair, making articulations of surprise.  Clearly, object 
a in the form of the gaze was operative in these moments, but in a significantly different 
manner than that involved in his exhibitionistic act.  Instead of Ray causing my 
jouissance, my gaze caused his jouissance (in the form of surprise) and desire (in the 
form of his desire to begin individual psychotherapy).  What is more, Ray‘s surprise at 
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such moments indicated that he had placed me in the role of a kind of mind-reader 
subject-supposed-to-know—a desirable position for the psychotherapist at the outset of 
therapy.
106
   
On a related note, it is of interest to wonder why Ray requested individual 
psychotherapy at that particular time rather than at an earlier or later date.  (Again, Ray‘s 
participation in individual psychotherapy in addition to group psychotherapy was purely 
voluntary, although suggested by Dr. Smith, and Ray‘s sessions with Dr. Smith ended 
shortly after he began group work.)  Investigating the sessions prior to Ray‘s request will 
prove informative.  The session before Ray requested to begin individual psychotherapy 
with me, I had informed the group that one of the eight group participants had been 
arrested and put back in jail for violating the conditions of his probation.  A man I will 
refer to as David, who had raped an elderly woman while under the influence of 
alcohol—for which he served almost 20 years in jail—violated his probation terms by 
having consumed alcohol.  (David was arrested by the police for public intoxication.)  
                                               
106 A common and very significant type of symbolic transference projection is what Lacan calls the 
―subject-supposed-to-know‖ (Lacan, 1973/1998a, p. 233).  Because the analysand has repressed 
unconscious material, s/he can see (or be brought to see) that there is a lot about himself that s/he does not 
know. Either at the outset of analysis or shortly thereafter, the analysand begins to suppose that her or his 
analyst possesses the knowledge about her- or himself that s/he lacks. Lacan says that this signals the start 
of symbolic transference, and the analysand‘s transference love for the analyst as knowledgeable Other is 
associated with it.  
Although, of course, the analyst does know something significant in the way of technique, the 
most helpful knowledge about the analysand resides in the analysand‘s own unconscious. Consequently, an 
analyst, as an Other who is supposed to know, functions as a kind of placeholder for the analysand‘s 
unconscious by allowing her or him to project onto her and by calling the analysand‘s attention to possible 
Other, unconscious meanings of her or his speech. Moving on from the position of the subject-supposed-to-
know, the analyst then becomes ―object a‖ or the cause of the analysand‘s desire to do the work of analysis.  
Lacan says it is a mistake for the therapist, motivated by her own narcissism, to accept the 
transference projection of the subject who knows and give the analysand advice or make early or frequent 
interpretations.  For one thing, if the analysand finds a teacher in her or his analyst, s/he will put the 
responsibility of the work of analysis on her and cease to be curious about her- or himself on her or his own 
steam.  This fosters dependency on the analyst.  For another, the analyst‘s advice will necessarily entail 
making judgments about the way a person should live that may not be right for the analysand.  Finally, the 
analysand, afraid of being judged negatively by her or his analyst, might avoid speaking about certain 
topics that may be crucial to the success of the analysis. 
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The group was aware that David had been my individual patient for a short time.  The 
group participants expressed surprise at the news that David had been drinking.  The 
group concluded that David should have disclosed his drinking to us before it got out of 
hand and got him arrested because we could have helped him stop drinking and prevented 
his imprisonment.    
The next week, Ray was visibly agitated, and so I asked him to speak.  Ray 
reported that, when driving home from the prior week‘s group session, he had a ―slip‖ 
and exposed himself to a woman.  Ray had been driving through a bad neighborhood, 
was stopped at a light, and saw a woman standing by the street.  She seemed to be 
prostituting herself.  Thinking that such a woman would not be likely to tell the police, 
Ray decided to expose himself to her.  He drove around the block, anticipating the 
moment of pleasure, stopped in front of the woman, and rolled down his car window.  
She saw him and said, ―Do you want some help with that?‖ (referring to his erect penis). 
Ray immediately lost his erection and drove away from her.   
When Ray reflected upon the event, he noted that he had had similar previous 
experiences with women he later assumed were prostituting themselves in terms of his 
victim not expressing shock or disgust but instead approaching him and suggesting they 
engage in a sexual act.  On each of those occasions, Ray lost his erection, became 
anxious, and fled the scene.  Ray said that each woman‘s consent, lack of surprise, and 
desire to touch his penis were the elements of the situation that took the pleasure out of 
his act of exhibitionism and elicited feelings of not being in control.  It seems to me that 
because Ray related to his victims as to his mOther—in rigidly repetitive acts of 
exhibitionism that were both recreations of his relation to the Other and temporary 
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solutions to the inadequacy of his paternal function—Ray experienced his victims‘ desire 
just as he experienced the overwhelming and suffocating desire of his mOther.  Faced 
with the Other‘s exclusive demand for him and his penis and without the assistance of a 
lawgiving Other (otherwise supplied by the victim‘s lack of consent), Ray experienced 
anxiety and fled the traumatic scene. 
Ray said he had a difficult time in deciding to disclose the news of his ―offense‖ 
to the group, but that he believed that, by observing him, I would know what he had 
done.  Also, Ray ultimately thought telling the group would be best because it would help 
prevent him from engaging in exhibitionistic acts in the future.  This is clearly 
reminiscent of the group‘s expression of regret the former week that David had not 
disclosed the news of his drinking to them.  Ray said he felt shaken by the experience, 
because he had recently become confident in his ability to abstain from acting on his 
exhibitionistic urges.  Ray was surprised and dismayed to find that ―making the choice to 
offend‖ was still a possibility for him.  Furthermore, Ray was perturbed that there was 
seemingly no cause for his behavior, because his life was going well.   
The other group participants highlighted that his offense differed from his other 
offenses because not only had Ray lost his erection and drove away, but he also regretted 
having committed an act of exhibitionism.  In psychoanalytic terminology, committing 
acts of exhibitionism was now clearly in opposition with Ray‘s ego-ideal.  Nevertheless, 
Ray said he did not take comfort in this fact, and insisted on focusing on the fact that he 
had committed a new offense and that he now saw himself as needing more help than 
before in managing his exhibitionistic urges. 
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In the group session, I suggested the possibility that Ray‘s parole violation was 
connected to that of David.  Ray did not take up this suggestion, even though others in 
the group did so.  Ray persisted in thinking that there must be some mysterious reason for 
his ―offense‖ that he would have to continue to ponder.  Then, after group, Ray asked me 
to begin working with him individually.   
In committing an act of indecent exposure and informing me about it, Ray created 
a situation in which he felt that he needed to explore the motivations and desires behind 
his actions that were opaque to him, and that I, as a subject-supposed-to-know something 
about them, could help him do so via psychotherapy.  Ray desired to cease committing 
acts of exhibitionism not only in order to avoid be re-incarcerated but also because he felt 
ashamed.  According to Ray, indecent exposure was a ―dirty and desperate act‖ that he 
would prefer he not feel compelled to do.  Insofar as Ray presented with this lack of 
satisfaction in his life, he enabled his desire to be hystericized for genuine analytic work.  
In addition, Ray expected that participating in psychotherapy would enable him to respect 
the law and cease committing acts of exhibitionism.  Ray‘s act of exhibitionism 
inaugurated his analytic relationship with me as Other—both as subject-supposed-to-
know and as lawgiving Other.   
Nevertheless, through Ray‘s offensive behavior, so to speak, he became an unruly 
patient in need of learning how to control himself (according to Ray‘s ideas of his 
presenting problem) just like he, as a child in relation to his mOther, could not help but 
wet his bed every night until he was 11.  Ray‘s inability to control his penis and to make 
it behave properly was, in both cases, the cause of a closer relationship to the Other.  Ray 
may have wished that I, as his therapist, would try, as futilely as his mOther had, to figure 
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him out and set him straight—all the while the both of us deriving jouissance from that 
relation.  It follows that Ray‘s offense and related request for individual psychotherapy 
inaugurated his positioning me as a first Other as well as a lawgiving Other and subject-
supposed-to-know.
107
 
Ray lived with his two cats and his girlfriend of four years, Susan, who was in her 
mid-20s.  Ray was an apprentice in the construction field.  Ray‘s appearance strongly 
suggested that he was not a representative of mainstream cultural values.  Ray wore 
muscle shirts, baggy pants, and long, metal chain necklaces to sessions, and usually 
slouched very low in his chair with his legs spread open or stretched far out in front of 
him.  Ray shaved his head, and this revealed the large tattoo of a spider web on the back 
of his head.  Ray had about 15 tattoos and piercings on his tongue, lips, eyebrows, 
nipples, penis, earlobes, and ear cartilage.  Since we began psychotherapy, Ray got three 
tattoos and a tongue piercing.   
Ray’s Exhibitionism 
 
Ray began committing acts of indecent exposure when he was 12 years old.  At 
that time, he regularly raced home from school, went upstairs to his attic bedroom, and, 
in front of an uncovered window, fondled his erect penis while he watched girls walking 
home from school on the sidewalk in front of his house.  Sometimes, as an alternative, 
Ray undressed, waited by the front door until a car drove by, and then opened the door 
and pretended he was only getting the mail out of the mailbox.  Once Ray left his parental 
home at 15 to live with an older friend, he spent numerous hours at a time repeating his 
exhibitionistic scenario.   
                                               
107 Alternatively, perhaps Ray wanted to replace David, to be the patient he imagined I wished David had 
been.  In this instance, Ray would have wished to be object a for the Other. 
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Ray took care to expose himself in situations from which he could quickly and 
easily escape if the police were notified—such as being in his car or hiding in choice 
spots in familiar parks.  For instance, one of his favorite situations was to park his car in a 
particular parking lot downtown which afforded him a view of a woman walking along a 
street before she could see him.  Ray masturbated while imaginatively anticipating a 
woman‘s approach.  Then, if the woman walking by was alone, at least somewhat 
physically attractive to him, and seemed to be under the age of 50, he coughed or made 
another natural-seeming noise to get her attention as she walked by his car.  The woman‘s 
gaze was then fixed upon his ―playing with himself.‖  
Seeing the woman‘s gaze upon him is what Ray described as his primary moment 
of enjoyment.  The moment when she realized what he was doing, when she experienced 
the ethical boundary being broken, was the moment that Ray anticipated reading in her 
facial expression.  Ray said his pleasure in the act was about the moment of the victim‘s 
―surprise and recognition.‖  Ray said he liked inciting facial expressions of shock that 
corresponded to the woman‘s thinking ―Oh, my god! I can‘t believe he‘s doing that!‖  In 
describing his pleasure in seeing the gaze of the woman on his penis, he said, ―It‘s like: 
‗take that!‘‖  Not only is this an aggressively charged phrase, but it also quite literally 
suggests that Ray is offering up the sight of his penis for the woman‘s jouissance.  Ray 
said he liked ―pretty much any expression except one of horror‖ because the horrified 
expression meant a greater likelihood of her calling the police.  Ray said that he 
sometimes preferred it if a woman laughed when she saw him masturbate.  In 
psychotherapy, Ray realized that the moment of the woman‘s gaze, full of the knowledge 
of his transgression, was also a moment when he felt a brief ―little connection‖ with her, 
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which was a main part of his enjoyment.  Ray, as object a, made the gaze appear in the 
Other, making her temporarily whole. 
Then, after the woman walked away, Ray would, more often than not, stay there 
and masturbate while thinking about her and anticipating the next woman‘s arrival.  Ray 
said that he liked feeling as though he were in ―absolute control of the situation.‖  The 
only things left to chance were the particulars of the woman‘s reaction and whether or not 
she notified the authorities.  Ray usually committed acts of exhibitionism in this manner 
for hours until he got too tired or until he knew or suspected that a woman had called the 
police.   
Ray was apprehended by the police while on the scene of his offense on three 
occasions.  Ray said he felt ―some strange relief‖ on each occasion.  He recalled sitting in 
the back of a police car on the way to the police station, feeling ―strangely relieved‖ and 
―submissive—not putting up a fight.‖  Ray understood that feeling of relief in terms of 
his desire to stop his indecent exposure, which was ―exhausting.‖ Ray was ―tired of all 
the lies‖ he had to tell to those in his life to explain his absences from work and social 
commitments.   
Ray said he did not feel he could stop his exhibitionistic acts on his own, but that 
he needed the ―interference‖ of some other person or of legal consequences.  
Furthermore, Ray said that he did not feel guilty about his exhibitionism, because—
despite what he learned in therapy—he could not imagine that his victims were very 
much disturbed by their experience.  (It is no wonder that the dominant forensic methods 
of treatment are largely ineffective in treating perverse sexual offenders, because they 
focus on utilizing and increasing the client‘s feelings of guilt in order to motivate the 
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client to cease re-offending.)  Ray said that he daily felt the ―urge‖ to expose himself, but 
developed an increasing pride in being able to resist what he called the ―exhibitionistic 
drive.‖  Using the techniques Dr. Smith taught him, Ray also tried to avoid fantasizing 
about acts of indecent exposure, but he was usually unsuccessful.   
In the realm of sexual fantasy, Ray preferred looking at what he calls ―blow job 
porn.‖  In pornographic movies he found on the internet, he described ―the usual 
scenario‖ of the heterosexual couple beginning with a blow job, progressing to having 
sex, and then ―the big finale of their orgasms.‖  Ray said he really liked the blow job part, 
skipped the sexual intercourse part entirely, and then enjoyed watching the orgasms.  Ray 
wondered why watching people having sex interested him so little, and why watching a 
man get a blow job interested him so much.  When I asked him to associate to ―getting a 
blow job,‖ he said, ―In your face‖ and then laughed.  Ray said the woman ―is right up 
there in the scene and has to look at his penis when she is giving him a blow job.‖  Ray 
liked that the woman gets off on seeing and putting her mouth on the man‘s penis.  I said, 
―‗In your face‘ is also an aggressively charged phrase.‖  Ray responded by comparing ―in 
your face‖ to the words ―take that‖ that he had used to describe his jouissance at the 
moment his victim‘s gaze alights on his penis. 
Ray said that he got much more enjoyment from his acts of exhibitionism than 
from sexual intercourse.  Ray had difficulty in getting and maintaining an erection for the 
purposes of sexual intercourse.  Ray felt embarrassed and like less of a man because he 
did not enjoy sex as much as most men seemed to enjoy it.  Ray reported that Susan 
wanted to have sex more often than he did, and that they usually had sex once or twice a 
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week.  On his intake form, Ray reported that he ―loves extremely graphic sexual talk‖ 
and that he used online video sex chat rooms.   
Family Context and Personal History 
 
Ray grew up in a lower middle-class family in the suburbs of a small city.  He 
was the youngest of four children, and had two sisters and a brother.  All of his siblings 
were married and had children, and his parents were still married.  Sarah, the oldest, was 
six years older than Ray.  Ray was four years younger than Mandy and two years 
younger than Dave.  Ray recalled witnessing, as a young child, his mother sometimes 
getting into a rage and throwing household items at one or the other of his sisters.  Ray 
said that his mother ―physically and verbally abused‖ his sisters, but for some unknown 
reason, only ―verbally abused‖ him and Dave.  On one occasion when Ray had 
misbehaved, his mother gave his toys away to the children who lived next door.  As the 
youngest boy, Ray spent much of his younger years at his mother‘s side. 
Ray‘s father had a career doing skilled manual labor for an industry that suffered 
a dramatic decrease in demand during Ray‘s childhood.  Ray‘s father‘s job was to set 
type at a printing press.  Ray‘s father did not make very much money and there was little 
room for advancement in his career.  Ray‘s father lost his job when Ray was 9, when his 
workplace went out of business.  The family moved to another state where Ray‘s father 
had found a job, only to move back again a year later after the new workplace went out of 
business.  Then, for almost a year—until they bought a new house—the whole family 
stayed with Ray‘s maternal grandmother who had only a one-story, two-bedroom house.  
All four children slept on the living room floor.  Ray was told that his mother particularly 
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disliked living with her mother, whom she felt had been ―crazy‖ and ―abusive‖ to her as a 
child. 
Ray often heard his mother ―put down [his] father,‖ whom she did not seem to 
love or desire at all.  One of her chief complaints about Ray‘s father was that he did not 
make enough money.  (Ray himself was embarrassed about being poor, and was an object 
of derision at school on this account.)  Ray said his parents never kissed, embraced, or 
said ―I love you‖ to each other.  Ray recalled seeing on several occasions his father try to 
kiss his mother.  His mother always responded by laughing derisively and refusing the 
kiss.   
Ray said that, even though his mother was a housewife, it was clear that she was 
the head of the household.  Ray described his mother as cruel and demanding of his 
father, and that his father ―always let her have her way‖ without putting up any 
resistance.  Ray wished his father had ―grown a backbone.‖  Ray‘s mother was the one 
who punished him and his siblings, except for a few instances in which his father spanked 
them at her bidding.  Of those instances, Ray said, ―We all tried not to laugh when dad 
spanked us, because he spanked us so lightly that it didn‘t hurt at all.  When mom 
spanked us, she was much more thorough.‖  Ray told me that he had made it his mission 
to have ―a backbone‖ in his relationships with women, even to a fault, being too much 
like his mother—demanding, controlling, and dissatisfied with his romantic partner.   
Ray described his mother as ―a crazy bitch‖ who readily identified herself as 
psychologically ill and talked to all willing and unwilling ears about her symptoms of 
anxiety, depression, and panic attacks.  Ray felt that she wanted all her children to have 
psychological problems, too, because it validated her identity as ―fucked up.‖  Ray‘s 
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mother was fond of saying that, because of her genes, her children would inevitably 
become psychologically ―sick.‖  Ray disbelieved her rationale in favor of his theory that 
her mothering was what mostly caused their problems.  
Not for the first time, Ray‘s mother spent a few days in an inpatient psychiatric 
ward—presumably for suicidality.  Ray saw her at a family party shortly after her release, 
and did not speak to her except to say ―hello.‖  Ray imagined that she ―must have left the 
party wondering why [he] didn‘t ask her how she was doing,‖ given that she must have 
just gotten out of inpatient psychiatric hospitalization.  Ray fantasized about the event 
several times, imagining his mother‘s hurt feelings.  Since puberty, Ray‘s desired relation 
to his mOther had been one of being a bad son and of not doing what she asked of him.  
However, Ray‘s identification with his mother was also apparent, as we will see.  For 
instance, when Ray was in the military, he spent some time in an inpatient psychiatric 
ward for what Ray referred to as his ―breakdown.‖   
Ray‘s parents were Catholic, although they never consistently attended religious 
services.  Corresponding to his parents‘ Catholicism, Ray sensed that sex, which was not 
spoken about, was a taboo subject.  Ray said his mother ―thinks sex is sick‖ and that his 
exhibitionism is sicker.  Furthermore, physical affection of any kind was a rarity in his 
family.  When Ray was an adolescent, he noticed that his friends‘ family members 
hugged and kissed each other and that his family in comparison seemed to avoid touching 
one another at all—even when sitting on the living room couch watching television 
together.  In addition, the words, ―I love you‖ were seldom uttered.  Ray felt anxious if 
someone got within a few feet of him, and he felt very uncomfortable saying ―I love you‖ 
to his girlfriend. 
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As a child, Ray shared a room with his brother, Dave.  From his toddlerhood until 
he was about 5 years old, Ray showered with his father.  On one occasion in the shower 
with his father, Ray noticed that his father‘s penis was ―in between hard and not hard.‖108  
Soon afterward, Ray began taking baths with his brother Dave.  For the most part, Ray‘s 
parents were careful to segregate the girls from the boys in matters of the naked body; 
however, there was one notable exception: when Ray wet his bed, which he frequently 
did, his mother took off his clothes, washed off his penis and the rest of his body, dressed 
him again, and washed the urine-soaked bed sheets.  (Also, another early memory Ray 
recalled was of his mother changing his diapers.)  When Ray turned five or six years of 
age, he began cleaning and dressing himself, but his mother still cleaned his sheets.  After 
each time he urinated during his sleep, Ray‘s mother would thoroughly scold him.  
Ostensibly, she tried to cure him of his enuresis.  She often proclaimed, ―We‘re gonna 
have to get you tested!‖  (The implication was that Ray had something wrong with him 
that warranted a professional evaluation, although she never followed through with this.)  
Ray‘s enuresis functioned to prevent him from sleeping over at friends‘ houses, which is 
something his siblings often did.  Ray had to stay home with his mOther.  Ray wet his 
bed until he was about 11 years old.  It is notable, of course, that he started committing 
acts of indecent exposure as soon as he stopped wetting the bed.   
At age 13, Ray‘s mother found out about Ray‘s exhibitionism.  One afternoon, 
after Ray had masturbated in front of the attic window for several hours, a police officer 
came to his house along with the mother of a girl who had seen Ray exposing himself.  
The police officer spoke to Ray‘s mother and to Ray.  The officer did not file charges 
because Ray denied his guilt, but Ray was certain that his mother knew he was guilty.  
                                               
108 This phrase is evocative of the both/and logic of disavowal. 
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Ray‘s mother had been ―really shocked and embarrassed.‖  She took Ray to a 
psychotherapist, but Ray refused to admit that he had committed indecent exposure, and 
so he did not see the therapist again.  After Ray moved out of his parents‘ house, his 
mother ―made [his] dad move from that house because she felt embarrassed to be in the 
neighborhood ever since that day with the cop.‖  Also, each time Ray was charged for 
indecent exposure, he was on the news, and his mother was publicly embarrassed.  When 
Ray told me about this, I said, ―Take that?‖  Ray agreed, saying he enjoyed making his 
mother squirm.  
Beginning when he was 8 years old, Ray frequently skipped school, committed 
acts of vandalism, trespassed, started fires, lied, stole, carried weapons, got into fights, 
broke into cars, and abused drugs.  (Marijuana, cocaine, and LSD were his drugs of 
choice, although he also used mushrooms, codeine, aerosol sprays, GHB, nitrous oxide, 
ecstasy, mescaline, peyote, and ketamine.  At the time of his psychotherapy, Ray did not 
use any of those substances but he drank 3-5 units of alcohol about once a week and was 
a tobacco smoker.)  Once, he ―peeped‖ into a girls‘ locker room.  Ray was caught in his 
delinquent acts fairly frequently, and these actions caused his school and the police to 
lodge complaints about him to his mother, who would then yell at him or unsuccessfully 
try to punish him.  For example, when Ray was 8, he was caught starting fires by the 
police, and had to take fire safety classes as a result.  Ray was also apprehended at age 13 
and 16 for trespassing, and was fined on the former occasion.  (Unlike many neurotic 
patients who have criminal histories, Ray made several comments over the course of his 
psychotherapeutic treatment that suggested that he felt relieved when apprehended by the 
police.)  Ray‘s response to his mother was to yell back at her and tell her she had ―no 
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right to tell [him] what to [do.]‖  Ray mentioned that Dave, who ―did all the same shit 
with [him],‖ always managed to avoid getting caught.  Ray said his problem seemed to be 
that he ―didn‘t know when to stop,‖ and it occurred to him that he had on some level 
wanted to get caught. 
When Ray was a teenager, he ―wore all black, a trench coat, listened to Nine Inch 
Nails, and dropped a lot of acid.‖  Ray liked that self-presentation because he ―was 
looking for a reaction—to shock people.‖  After Ray graduated from high school, he 
followed the example of an older cousin and joined the army ―because [he] didn‘t know 
what else to do with [himself],‖ and was stationed for several years in another state.  Ray 
greatly enjoyed being in the army.  He was a part of the armed forces for about three 
years, and liked the ―camaraderie and respect‖ that he got while there.  During that time, 
he occasionally got blow jobs from prostitutes, and he regularly committed acts of 
indecent exposure.   
Tattoos 
The tattoo certainly has the function of being for the Other, of situating the 
subject in it, marking his place in the field of the group‘s relations, between each 
individual and all the others.  And, at the same time, it obviously has an erotic 
function, which all those who have approached it in reality have perceived. 
(Lacan, 1973/1998a, p. 206). 
Ray got his first tattoo at 19 when he was in the army.  Ray and all the guys on his unit 
each got the same tattoo: a POW insignia.  Ray greatly enjoyed getting a tattoo, and most 
enjoyed the pain involved in the process.  Soon thereafter, Ray went to a tattoo parlor on 
an impulse, without any preconceived notion of what tattoo design he wanted.  When 
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asked by the tattoo artist what he wanted, Ray, impromptu, drew his own design.  Ray 
designed a woman‘s face, and got it tattooed just below his shoulder on his arm.  It was 
no accident that a woman‘s face was an object of extreme interest to Ray in his 
exhibitionistic scenario.   
Getting tattoos was one major way in which Ray propped up the paternal 
function.  Ray himself compared his exhibitionism to his tattoos and piercings.  Ray‘s 
father was a printing press ink setter who was often out-of-work, and his trade was a 
main source of Ray‘s mother‘s lack of respect for his symbolic role as lawgiving Other.  
Ray‘s mother complained that his father was an inadequate man, husband, and father 
because he was a poor provider, and so his symbolic status, earned through ink, did not 
amount to much.  By inscribing ink into his skin Ray created a new medium (i.e., his 
body) in which his father‘s work continued to be in demand, profitable, and having 
symbolic importance.  In addition, perhaps the ink holes that comprise a tattoo function 
as significations of the lack in the Other (S(Ⱥ)).    
Ray derived satisfaction from the pain of being tattooed not because he felt 
pleasure in pain but instead because the act of being tattooed metonymically relates to the 
instatement of the paternal function via the imagined pain of castration and via the 
articulation of the mOther‘s desire.  In terms of castration, getting a tattoo involves the 
painful process of giving up a part of one‘s body (an area of the skin instead of the 
jouissance associated with the imaginary phallus) and allowing it to be permanently 
altered from its natural state and re-inscribed by that which is Other than the self.  What 
is more, when Ray got tattooed, he was naming and fulfilling his mOther‘s desire in 
relation to his father: his mother desired that his father‘s skills be in constant demand and 
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profitable.  In the form of the ink of his tattoos, Ray creatively wrote on his body a better 
marriage between his mother and his father (his first and second Others)—one in which 
his mOther respected the symbolic status of his father and desired his father rather than 
only Ray himself.   
Over the course of a decade, Ray got about 15 tattoos.  Among them were tattoos 
of a spider (placed over his heart), a spider web (placed on his head), and several fire-
breathing dragons (placed on his arms).  Ray, like spiders and dragons, evoked jouissance 
from the Other—often in the form of surprise, disgust, and anxiety.  Furthermore, the 
simple fact of having so many large tattoos on readily visible parts of his body was a bit 
shocking.  Ray‘s tattoos, then, were also symbolic inscriptions of his identity at the level 
of jouissance: Ray was the object-cause of the Other‘s jouissance. 
During the course of Ray‘s psychotherapy, he got three tattoos.  In the second 
month of psychotherapy, Ray got a tattoo which says ―devil‖ on the back of his neck.  
When viewed from above, however, the same text read ―angel.‖  Ray found the design 
for this tattoo on the internet and altered it slightly.  The original internet design read 
―angel‖ from the more commonly viewed angle and ―devil‖ from the less commonly 
viewed angle.  Correspondingly, Ray felt that only a few people knew about his ―angelic‖ 
side and his good heart, but that most people know about his ―tough guy‖ image.  Two 
months later, Ray got a tattoo of flames going up his right hand and ice going down his 
arm ―with an empty band in between.‖  Ray designed that tattoo himself.  When I asked 
for his associations, his only response was that he ―set fires as a kid.‖ 
Two months before the end of our work together, Ray expressed the desire that 
his next tattoo be more bright, colorful, and happy.  One such possibility was a large 
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tattoo, perhaps over his leg, of ―an aquarium or ocean scene.‖  Ray said that his 
personality was ―already like that‖—already bright and colorful, but that he had not yet 
inscribed that part of his personality on his body.   Two weeks before the planned 
termination of our work together, Ray got a tattoo that was bright and colorful, but was 
not an aquarium or ocean scene.  Instead, Ray said that had been inspired by the prior 
week‘s session to design the particular tattoo he got.   
The prior session began by Ray saying, ―I fucked up this weekend‖ and then 
describing how he had communicated and had sex with Susan, with whom he at that time 
was not officially in a relationship.  Afterwards, Susan said ―all the right things‖ to try to 
get him back together with her.  Ray said, ―Susan was saying ‗All I ever wanted was 
love‘ and got me to pity her.‖  In the session, Ray said he felt that ―being independent‖ 
and not being in a relationship with Susan was a good thing for him, and that he should 
not let himself get drawn back into the relationship because he realized he‘s ―never really 
had a space of [his] own.‖  First, he shared a space with his mother, then the army, and 
then Susan.  Without those things in his life and without his exhibitionism, Ray said he 
lacked a stable identity of his own.  Ray emphasized that he did not know who he was 
because he was so used to thinking of himself in relation to others.  I stopped the session 
after Ray said, ―Maybe who I am is the person who likes to say shocking things to 
people.‖  (With neurotic and perverse patients, I practice variable-length sessions, a 
Lacanian technique in which the termination point of the session is determined not by the 
clock but by something the therapist deems as a particularly important verbalization.  The 
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scansion of the session thus functions as an intervention that aims to provoke the patient‘s 
curiosity about the possible unconscious meanings of what was last said.)
109
   
Ray‘s tattoo was on the far left side of his face by his hair line and consisted of 
two sets of two bright green intertwined twisting vines.  One set of vines spanned the 
distance between the bottom of his temple and his forehead, and the other spanned the 
distance between his chin and his cheekbone.  There was a space in between the two sets 
of vines that read, in Japanese characters, ―emptiness.‖  Ray had considered just having 
an empty space there, but decided the significance of the empty space would not be 
obvious to people and that he would have to write ―emptiness‖ there to call attention to it.  
Ray said the vines represented his getting wrapped up with people and things and falsely 
identifying with them, and that emptiness is who he is without those people and things.  
Ray‘s tattoo was inspired by his realization in the previous session that his being was 
equivalent to emptiness, an idea he seemed to like.  In addition, because Ray‘s tattoo was 
bright in color and boldly positioned on his face, Ray‘s tattoo also signified that his 
jouissance was fixed in bringing the gaze as object a to the Other.  Ray was the person 
who liked to show shocking things to people.   
Loving the Other 
 
One definition Lacan gave of love is that to love is to give to the Other what one 
lacks—namely, desire.  Ray, being less subjected to the symbolic order, had less access 
to desire than a neurotic subject, and therefore less ability to love.  Furthermore, Ray 
often experienced being loved not in terms of being desired but in terms of being the 
                                               
109 In contrast, the ending of the more common fixed-length session is not used as an intervention to further 
the therapy but instead is arbitrarily determined by 50 or 45 minutes having passed in accordance with a 
capitalistic ―time equals money‖ logic.  See Fink, 1997, pp. 15-19 for more information on the practice of 
variable-length sessions. 
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object of the Other‘s demand.  As a child, being the sole object of his mOther‘s demand 
was traumatizing; consequently, as an adult, Ray was both drawn to and repelled by the 
Other‘s love which was at the same time attractive and dangerous.  The moments in 
which Ray did succeed in loving the Other enabled him to feel more desire than usual and 
thus limited his excessive jouissance, pulling him temporarily further into the symbolic 
order.  Correspondingly, one of the aims of psychotherapy with perverse patients should 
be on behalf of Eros. 
A major focus in Ray‘s psychotherapy was his relationship with his girlfriend, 
Susan.  Susan was Ray‘s first girlfriend. They began their relationship in Ray‘s mid-20s, 
soon after he returned to his home town from being incarcerated.  Ray met Susan at the 
pizza shop at which they worked.  Susan was three years younger than Ray.  Ray 
described her as attractive with a slender physique and brown hair.  At the time, Susan 
was in a relationship, and Ray, never having been interested in a committed or long-term 
romantic relationship, intended to have only a brief sexual relationship with her.  After a 
few weeks, however, Susan broke up with her boyfriend, whom she described as being 
verbally abusive, and persistently pursued a romantic relationship with Ray.  After 
several months of spending a good deal of time with her, Ray fell in love and finally 
relented to be monogamous with her—with the arguable exception of his indecent 
exposure victims.   
Ray told Susan about his exhibitionism a few months into their relationship.  Ray 
appreciated that Susan knew about his sexual offense history and accepted him in spite of 
that.  He felt that, over the years, she became the only person, other than a childhood 
friend who moved overseas, with whom he felt close.  Ray‘s acts of indecent exposure 
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got him re-incarcerated during his relationship with Susan.  While he was in prison, his 
Christmas present to Susan was to tattoo a ring on his ring finger that said ―Susan.‖   
Ray disliked a number of things about Susan, which he described as her ―low self-
esteem,‖ her ―dependency, clinginess, and constant demands for proof of [his] love and 
[his] desire for her,‖ her ―lack of self-reliance,‖ and her being so ―self-conscious and 
unadventurous‖ that she did not derive much pleasure from their sexual acts.  Ray found 
one way to increase Susan‘s jouissance in sexual intercourse: he bought some toy 
handcuffs and ―played rape with her,‖ which ―really [got] her going.‖ 
Ray frequently complained about Susan.  Often, he lamented that she never 
bothered to get her driver‘s license, which results in him having to drive her around.  At 
his insistence, Susan took the test to get her driver‘s license permit twice, and failed each 
time.  Ray said that it took him several years to convince Susan to quit her job at the 
pizza place and get a more rewarding job.  Ray felt pleased that she finally did so and 
much preferred her office desk job to her former position.   
In Ray‘s relationship with Susan, he often adopted characteristics of his mother 
and relates to Susan as to his father.  Identifying with his mother, Ray described Susan as 
his mother might have described his father: in particular, he characterized her by ―low 
self-esteem…dependency, clinginess, and [makes] constant demands for proof of [his] 
love and [his] desire for her.‖  Furthermore, Ray‘s complaint that Susan was content to 
stay at a low-paying grunt-work job echoed his mother‘s complaint against his father 
with regard to his job.  However, Ray‘s efforts to get Susan to obtain a better job and get 
her driver‘s license may in part have been reflective of his desire to improve what he saw 
as her deficiencies and not simply to complain.  In this vein, Ray was trying to turn Susan 
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into a better Other, just as he wished he could have turned his father into a worthy 
lawgiving Other.   
Ray and Susan dated for three years before they moved in together.  Four months 
after that, Ray broke up with Susan and she moved back in with her parents.  Ray did so 
because he found himself too frequently annoyed and angered by her presence and by her 
demands for love and affection.  They got into fights almost every day, and Ray felt 
―angry and suffocated.‖  To the psychotherapeutic group, Ray remarked that he felt that 
Susan‘s only ambition in life was to be his wife, and he wished that she wanted other 
things or other people.  Another very common complaint of Ray‘s was that Susan did not 
want anything in life but him, and this was a complaint Ray also had against his mOther.  
Ray became anxious when Susan‘s demands, like his mOther‘s, seemed fixated on him, 
leaving no room for him to desire. 
Only a few days after their breakup, the two of them resumed their relationship, 
but in a different form.  Ray described the shift in their relationship as resulting from his 
―setting some firm ground rules‖ and ―laying down the law.‖  Mostly, he became ―strict 
about not letting Susan spend any time with [him] or spend the night on weekdays.‖  This 
enabled Ray to keep to a very regular schedule during the workweek and to get enough 
sleep.  Even so, Ray said, ―she knows the rules, but still asks during the week anyway if 
she can sleep over.‖  When she did so, he often became angry at her, yelled, and hung up 
the phone.  Then, Susan called repeatedly until he turned off his cell phone.  In contrast, 
the two of them almost always spent the entirety of every weekend together.  By Saturday 
evening or Sunday, Ray felt annoyed by her, and was ready for her to leave.   
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Ray knew it was unfair for him to ―be dangling Susan on a string,‖ and he wished 
―she‘d grow some balls, say she‘s had enough, and leave.‖  This statement 
metonymically related Susan to his father.  Ray wished his father would have and could 
have become a ―real‖ man by growing some balls, standing up to his mOther, and leaving 
her.  At the same time, Ray‘s ―firm ground rules‖ and ―laying down the law‖ were 
indicative of Ray‘s efforts to be what his father was not—a lawgiving Other capable of 
being respected by the first Other.  In that sense, Ray was in the position of his father and 
Susan in the role of his mother.   
Soon after Susan moved out of their apartment, Ray began using a video chat 
internet site.  He found a circle of ―cool people around the world to talk to‖ and also used 
the adult chat rooms to engage in sexual acts with women.  On this site, Ray began 
frequently talking to and masturbating with Abby, a woman in her late 30s who lived in 
another state.  Ray exclusively spoke with her on weeknights, and enjoyed the fact that, if 
he wanted to stop interacting with her, he could simply ―click the x at the corner of the 
screen.‖  However, Ray developed a kind of intimate relationship with her over the 
course of six months to the point of Abby booking a plane ticket to meet and visit Ray for 
five days.  A few days prior to her trip, she drunkenly told him over the phone, ―you 
don‘t even know how much I like you; if all goes well when I visit, there will be no 
holding me back.‖  Her statement made Ray feel anxious, and so he ended their 
relationship two days prior to her scheduled departure, offering to pay for her plane 
ticket.   
After the first time that Ray broke up with Susan during psychotherapy, he said he 
felt ―hollow.‖  In the following week‘s session, Ray said he had ―filled [his] weekend‖ by 
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getting his tongue pierced—something he anticipated would increase the pleasure of his 
future sexual partners.  The hole created by Ray‘s piercing may have signified his own 
hollowness or lack of being.  Likewise, the tongue stud, in covering over the hole/lack, 
served a fetishistic function for Ray.  Also, quite literally, Ray planned that the tongue 
stud would cause the jouissance of future Others.  Notably and unusually for Ray, he also 
spent an entire day during the weekend with his mother.  When Susan did not play the 
role of Other, Ray sought out his mOther.   
Ray said that without Susan and without committing acts of indecent exposure, he 
felt lost and hollow.  For Ray, Susan and his exhibitionism were similar insofar as they 
both could serve to prop up his paternal function as well as to provide opportunities for 
him to be the object-cause of the Other‘s jouissance.  Further drawing a parallel between 
Susan and his exhibitionism, Ray said that in relation to Susan he is ―a controlling prick.‖  
Ray said that being a controlling prick helps prevent him from committing acts of 
indecent exposure—from being an uncontrolled prick. 
After Susan moved out, Ray refused to say that they were boyfriend and 
girlfriend—labels he found oppressive and restricting—despite Susan‘s pleas to the 
contrary.  In addition, although Ray wanted to be romantically involved with Susan for 
the foreseeable future, he was loathe to make any promises of commitment to her beyond 
the following week.  Ray felt angry whenever Susan ―test[ed] [his] love‖ and asked him 
to say ―I love you‖ or make promises of fidelity or commitment.  When Susan asked for a 
proof of love during the workweek, Ray usually denied it to her, responded angrily, and 
then did not speak to her until the weekend.  Ray thought that picking her up at her house 
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on Friday night served as sufficient apology for having lost his temper and was also 
sufficient proof of love.
110
   
In individual therapy, Ray wondered about his difficulty in saying ―I‘m sorry‖ or 
―I love you.‖  Ray said his ―actions should speak for themselves,‖ by which he meant that 
his spending time with her every weekend, never getting involved with other women, and 
doing things like buying her presents communicated a clear message of love, fidelity, and 
commitment.  I pointed out, though, that his actions, such as his refusal to see her five 
days out of the week, also communicated a contrary message.  Ray realized that it was 
easier for him to say he loved Susan if he did not feel that Susan, like his mOther, was 
demanding it.  Ray said, ―If she would just give me the space to say ‗I love you,‘ I‘d get 
around to saying it.‖  Alternatively, it may have been that Ray was rejecting Susan so as 
to incite her jouissance. 
It may be that Ray could not express his love for Susan when he experienced her 
demands as divesting him of what little symbolic space he had.   In addition, their 
relationship was often conflict-ridden because Ray was a pervert and Susan was an 
hysteric.  Both Susan and Ray wanted the other person to play the role of Other, and both 
wanted to occupy the position of object a.  It was therefore rare that one of them offered 
the other what she or he desired.  What is more, Susan operated primarily on the level of 
desire, and Ray operated primarily on the level of demand.   
                                               
110 Predictably, Ray got back together with Susan a few weeks later, resuming his ―ground rules‖ with her.  
A few months afterward, Ray decided ―to let‖ Susan move back in with him.  As a condition of his 
permitting her to live with him again, though, he told her she had to get her driver‘s license permit first.  
Susan jumped at the opportunity to move in with him, but said, ―I‘m moving in and I‘ll get my license 
whenever I get around to it!‖  Ray was surprised at just how pleased he was that Susan stood up for herself 
and asserted her own desire.   
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As an example of the interpersonal conflicts produced by their different 
ontological structures, consider one of Ray and Susan‘s fights.  The fight began when 
Susan asked Ray, ―Would you come after me if I left you?‖ Susan‘s intended meaning 
was to ask Ray if he would ardently attempt to get her back into a relationship with him if 
she were to break up with him.  She wanted to know that she was important to Ray—that 
he loved her and would miss her so much if she left that he would seek her out.  
However, her question, ―Would you come after me‖ also reflects her wondering if Ray 
would ―come‖ or enjoy himself anymore after having lost Susan and his opportunity to 
―come with her.‖  In addition, ―coming after someone‖ refers to someone seeking a fight 
with another who was in the wrong and who aroused passionate anger.  Consequently, 
Susan‘s request revealed her possible desires to be loved, to be the exclusive object-cause 
of desire and jouissance, to be at fault, and to be harmed by the Other in the name of love.   
At a conscious level, Ray did not hear any of those meanings.  Ray said that 
Susan frequently addresses this sort of question to him, and he described always 
answering at face value.  In this instance, Ray answered, ―No.  If things were at a point at 
which you wanted to leave, I wouldn‘t stop you.‖  Ray said he had ―an inkling that what 
Susan really wants to hear was ‗yes‘‖ and that he loved and needed her.  Ray said, ―She 
should just say what she really means.‖  Sometimes, after Susan asked such a question, 
Ray recognized a desire behind her demand, felt angry that she did not say what she 
really meant, and chose to answer at face value, making her upset until she made explicit 
her demand for love.  Susan‘s explicit demands for love, however, fared no better.   
Ray‘s use of the signifier ―inkling‖ suggested that he was speaking not only about 
Susan but also about his father.  Ray‘s father wanted but did not receive the love and 
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desire of Ray‘s mother.  Perhaps Ray‘s mother lodged the same complaint against Ray‘s 
father that Ray lodged against Susan; his mother may have wished that her husband 
would stop ―beating around the bush‖ and just say what he wanted.  Ink, furthermore, 
connected Susan to Ray‘s father insofar as Ray tattooed her name into a tattoo of a 
wedding ring on his ring finger.  Signifying the strength and permanence of their 
relationship, the tattoo represented the marriage Ray wished his parents had.  In addition, 
it was not a coincidence that Ray got that tattoo in prison, a place that forced him to 
respect the law. 
Recall that to Susan‘s question, ―Would you come after me if I left you?‖ Ray 
replied, ―No.  If things were at a point at which you wanted to leave, I wouldn‘t stop 
you.‖  Because Ray‘s ―No‖ accurately described what Ray intended to do in the event 
that Susan left him, Ray may have disavowed Susan‘s desire, mishearing Susan‘s speech 
at the level of demand (S(A)) rather than at the level of desire (S(Ⱥ)).  At the same time, 
however, Ray‘s speech constituted Susan‘s desire as a desire to leave him, rather than as 
a desire for his love.  In this sense, Ray heard what he wanted to hear: Susan wanted 
something other than him, something that he could not provide for her.  Heard in this 
way, Susan‘s articulation of her desire (for something or someone other than Ray) 
temporarily opened up a small space for Ray‘s desire and subjectivity.  In the same vein, 
when Susan occasionally temporarily moved back in with her parents (of her own 
accord), Ray could breathe easier, having the subjective space to want her or something 
else.  Consequently, what Ray disavowed in instances such as these was his knowledge 
that Susan loved and wanted to be close with him as well as his own love and desire for 
Susan.   
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Furthermore, Ray‘s answer to Susan effectively functioned to cause her 
jouissance.  Ray‘s response made Susan feel unsettled, distressed, and devalued.  
Although Susan was not my patient, I imagine that, on some level, these are all feelings 
that Susan wanted (because she stayed in an ostensibly unsatisfying relationship with Ray 
for five years).  Ray ensured that she experienced such jouissance frequently.  In making 
Susan upset, Ray‘s response to Susan‘s query perpetuated his position as object-cause of 
the Other‘s jouissance.  
Ray‘s mother, like Susan, was most likely a hysterical subject with masochistic 
tendencies.  Ray, as object a, was joined at the hip to his mOther: he was her offensive 
little object, her incurably unruly son, her uncontrollable ―controlling prick.‖  Even if, at 
face value, Ray‘s mother said she wanted Ray to behave, that she wanted his prick to 
behave, Ray knew better.   
In his relationship with Susan, there was sometimes love.  More often, however, 
Ray experienced Susan‘s presence and demands for love as a recreation of the traumatic 
relationship between himself and his mOther.  Susan, like his mOther, only seemed to 
want him.  Susan did not want another man, did not want a better job, and did not want to 
spend time away from Ray.  Feeling suffocated and overwhelmed with the anxiety caused 
by her overproximity, Ray tried to set ―firm ground rules‖ and to ―lay down the law‖ in 
order to prop up the paternal function and gain some symbolic space for himself.  
Lacking a blueprint for a loving relationship to the Other that is mediated by the signifier 
of the Other‘s desire, Ray was stuck at the level of demand and jouissance.  The only 
methods at his disposal of creating space between himself and the Other were anger, 
refusing to fulfill the demands of the Other, and creating a temporary lawgiving Other.   
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Course of Treatment 
 
Group Therapy 
Ray participated in weekly group psychotherapy sessions for a year and a half, 
and never missed a session.  The other individuals in the group were neurotically 
structured.  Ray was always an active part of the group process, and seemed to be an 
expert at discerning lies and omissions in matters of jouissance.  Ray frequently made 
jokes and provocative comments.  For instance, when the group became a little dull, Ray 
introduced the following new topic: ―So, who thinks sex offenders are treated unfairly?  
Because I don‘t!‖  Of course, Ray knew very well that all the group participants felt 
themselves to be the objects of discrimination.  In addition, Ray was sitting next to a man 
who was an ardent sexual offender rights activist and from whom Ray, predictably, 
elicited a strongly affect-laden response.  On this occasion and others, Ray admitted to 
enjoying saying ―rude or offensive things.‖   
On another occasion, Ray said, ―No one ever talks about sexual fantasies here!  
This is a group for people with deviant sexual problems, but people rarely speak about 
sex.  If they do, they talk about it as if it were an issue in the past.  Am I the only one who 
has an active problem?‖  Then, Ray tried to encourage people to talk about the enjoyment 
they got from their offenses.  To a particularly closed-mouthed new person in the group, 
in trouble for attempting to meet a 14-year-old girl and have sex with her, Ray said the 
following: ―It‘s okay!  I saw a girl walking down the street the other day and she couldn‘t 
have been more than 14, but she had a nice ass on her!  If you‘re attracted to underage 
girls, it‘s okay, just admit it!‖  Clearly, then, Ray played object-cause of the jouissance 
and anxiety of the others in the group.   
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Individual Therapy 
Analytic Technique and Aims 
The Lacanian analytic technique I practice most closely resembles that of Bruce Fink, 
which he described clearly and in detail in his books Fundamentals of Psychoanalytic 
Technique: A Lacanian Approach for Practitioners (2007) and A Clinical Introduction to 
Lacanian Psychoanalysis: Theory and Technique (1997).  My approach to working with 
Ray involved encouraging him to speak about and associate to dreams, fantasies, and 
parapraxes (e.g., slips of the tongue and bungled actions) and to complete sentences he 
began but did not seem to want to finish.  Also, in prolonged moments of silence, I asked 
Ray to tell me what he was thinking.  I listened for negations and suggested that they 
were ways of denying a possibly unsettling truth—an unconscious truth that warranted 
exploration.  Likewise, in the transference I aimed to serve as placeholder for his 
unconscious.  In other words, I attempted to get Ray to talk about aspects of his 
experience that he deemed unacceptable.  What is more, I accepted Ray‘s transference 
projections without confirming or denying them, and this acceptance allowed Ray to 
begin working through his issues with his first and second Others.  These techniques and 
guiding principles are as applicable in work with perverts as with neurotics.   
I tried to keep my own personality, opinions, and feelings out of Ray‘s 
psychotherapy as much as possible and correspondingly avoided self-disclosure and 
adopted somewhat of a ―blank screen‖ facial expression.  When I did speak, it was to 
make analytic punctuations and interpretations or to encourage him to continue speaking 
and doing the work of psychotherapy.  I have found that listening carefully and speaking 
primarily to make interventions (including asking questions) are more than adequate to 
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build what psychotherapists of other orientations call the ―therapeutic alliance.‖ Patients 
are often touched by my ability to recollect what they have told me, especially exact 
words they used in earlier sessions. 
 Because I had to move to a different city, after only about 50 sessions I 
transferred Ray‘s case to another psychodynamically-oriented psychotherapist.  From a 
psychoanalytic framework, 50 sessions placed Ray in about the fourth month of analysis, 
and analysis with neurotic analysands often lasts between 5 and 10 years.  There are very 
few documented cases of psychoanalytic work with perverse analysands, but those that 
are available support the idea that analysis with perverse analysands should be at least as 
long as analysis with neurotic analysands.  In general, analytic work with perverts should 
be conducted with the same aforementioned techniques and guiding principles that are 
used with neurotics.   
Because Ray‘s psychotherapy was so short, the amount and degree of therapeutic 
benefits evident at the time of transferring his case were not reflective of the therapeutic 
benefits Ray could have achieved were he to continue his analytic work.  Initially, Ray 
desired for psychotherapy to help him cease committing acts of indecent exposure and 
improve his relationship with Susan.  At the end of our analytic work, Ray reported 
improvements in both of those areas that he attributed to psychotherapy.  Ray said 
therapy helped him stop committing acts of indecent exposure and become a better and 
more loving partner to Susan.  Soon after beginning psychotherapy, Ray added to his 
therapeutic goals a desire to learn about himself and to discover how his exhibitionism is 
still manifest in his personality regardless of whether or not he commits acts of indecent 
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exposure.  In his psychotherapy, Ray began to be curious about himself at a level beyond 
that of the ego.
111
   
Ray said, ―I like your technique, it‘s helped me more than any of my other 
therapists.  Like that way you stare at me makes me think of things to say.  And how 
you‘ve trained me to say whatever comes to mind rather than planning what to say first.  I 
keep seeing myself in new ways.‖  Additionally, variable-length sessions worked well for 
Ray such that Ray often began a session by speaking more about the questions raised for 
him by the prior week‘s session.  The question of who he was, of his identity at the level 
of being, had taken root in Ray.  Ray was finding, in psychotherapy, a way to be 
something other than a real penis for someone—namely, me.   
Relationship with the Mother and Father 
Ray‘s relationship with his mother was one marked by avoidance and anger.  
Even though they lived within a 10-minute drive of one another, Ray spoke to her and 
visited her very little.  When he did communicate with her, he found himself becoming 
easily annoyed and mad at her.  For instance, when he saw her at a family birthday party, 
the only thing he said to her was ―hello.‖  Later, when she asked him for a ride home, he 
felt very annoyed at her demand, although he agreed to drive her home.  In the car, his 
mother complained, as she often did, about her psychological ―ailments,‖ for which Ray 
has ―no sympathy.‖   
Ray told me about a daydream he had after a friend‘s mother died.  That friend 
had said she wished she had had the chance to tell her mother how much she loved her 
before she died.  In Ray‘s fantasy, his mother was ―on the brink of death,‖ and he was 
                                               
111 Prior to his psychotherapy, Ray believed that his acts of indecent exposure were purely the result of 
conscious choices, that unconscious motivations did not exist, and that it was irrelevant to explore his past.   
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yelling at her in protest of her ―mistreatment‖ of him as a child.  Ray said that he ―has an 
enormous amount of anger at [his] mother,‖ but that he did not know why.  After a few 
seconds, he said, ―I don‘t like her facial expressions!‖ I punctuated this, and Ray 
responded that he was imagining his mother‘s facial expression of ―irritation and disgust 
whenever [his] dad said anything.‖  I commented on the link between the facial 
expressions of his mother and those of his victims.  Ray probably was the object-cause of 
his mother‘s facial expressions of ―irritation and disgust‖ when she discovered his bed-
wetting, delinquent activities, and indecent exposure.   
When he committed an act of indecent exposure, Ray provoked his female victim 
to display a facial expression of ―irritation and disgust.‖  In so doing, he was re-creating 
and solidifying the affective link between his mother and father.  Ray‘s mother‘s facial 
expressions of ―irritation and disgust‖ were proof that his father mattered to her and had 
symbolic importance at least at the level of getting under her skin, if not at the level of 
inspiring respect and love.   
Correspondingly, Ray pitied his father.  Several years ago, Ray‘s father lost 
another job and was struggling financially.  In response, Ray pretended he needed a 
vehicle and bought his father‘s old truck so as to stop some of his mother‘s complaints 
about their lack of money.  Ray did so despite having just bought a new car.  Because 
Ray could not afford both vehicles, he returned the new car to the dealership, incurring a 
heavy fine and significantly lowering his credit score.  In pretending he needed 
something from his father and in giving his father money, Ray attempted to make his 
father into a more powerful phallic figure for his mother.    
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Lack of a Signifier for Sexual Difference 
Because of the brevity of Ray‘s analytically-oriented psychotherapy, Ray did not 
explore the ambiguity around sexual difference that is the hallmark of perverse 
individuals.  Nevertheless, Ray talked about two dreams in which homosexual feelings
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and ambiguous sexual identity were at issue.  The first dream occurred in the middle of 
the fourth month of psychotherapy, and is as follows:  
Ray had special powers and could switch back and forth between being himself 
and being a fly or a small bug.  There was an alien invasion, and a huge alien who 
was in the form of a tank was slowly going down the street.  There was a smaller 
alien ―dude‖ who was walking in front of the tank.  Ray was afraid they would 
find him, and so tried to hide behind the microwave, attempting to turn into a fly.  
Ray was unable to do so, and so the aliens caught him.  Then, he was being held 
captive in the living room of a regular-looking house.  Ray felt that he had to 
stroke the ―dude‘s‖ hair until the dude fell asleep so that he could escape.  Ray did 
so and was able to escape.   
In recounting the dream, Ray had paused before saying that he had stroked the ―dude‘s‖ 
hair until the dude fell asleep.  Before he continued recounting the dream, Ray laughed 
nervously and said he was embarrassed by the last part because it ―was kind of gay.‖  
Ray‘s laughter, embarrassment, and minimizing (i.e., ―kind of‖) of the ―gay‖ aspect of his 
relation to the ―dude,‖ all highlight that Ray repressed homosexual inclinations.   
 Among Ray‘s associations to the dream, the house reminded him of the house of 
his childhood friend Greg.  When they were 13 years old, they spent a lot of time together 
                                               
112 Also consider the possible importance of Ray‘s memory of showering as a young boy with his father 
and seeing his father‘s penis become ―in between hard and not hard.‖ 
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at Greg‘s house—often using drugs (mostly smoking marijuana).  Ray also remarked that 
it was odd that he felt trapped in the living room because there was nothing tying him 
down and there were no weapons.  Together, these associations pointed to the conclusion 
that Ray was captivated, so to speak, by Greg.  Ray stroked the dude‘s/Greg‘s hair as if 
stroking the hair of a woman.
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  This dream, therefore, had to do with Ray‘s homosexual 
feelings for Greg. 
 In the seventh month of psychotherapy, Ray discussed a dream that had to do with 
the ambiguity around sexual difference.  The dream was as follows:  
Ray was with a group of people.  Someone had a ―girl gecko,‖ and it became 
known that the person was going to have to give it up.  Ray did not want this to 
happen, so he gave the person his ―boy gecko so the two geckos could be 
together‖ and the girl gecko wouldn‘t have to be released.  The geckos were green 
and larger than usual ―like the gecko on the Geico car commercial.‖  Also, the girl 
gecko had a wider neck than the boy gecko, and on the underside of her neck 
there was a strip of brown.   
In the process of associating to the dream, Ray said that geckos were everywhere in the 
prison where he served three years.  Ray used to catch them and keep them as pets in a 
cage he constructed out of torn-apart cigarettes boxes.  Unlike in the dream, the geckos 
had been mostly pinkish in hue or matched the color of the wall.   
The Geico (pronounced ―guy-co‖) gecko was personified as a man (a guy), and so 
the geckos in Ray‘s dream represented human beings.  The boy and girl geckos looked 
almost exactly the same except for a difference in the size of their necks and the color of 
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 Alternatively, Ray‘s mother may have stroked his hair when he was a boy in order to lull him to sleep.  
Ray‘s boyhood enuresis kept him his mother‘s captive.  If Ray‘s mother had, in fact, stroked his hair in this 
manner, then the dream might also point to Ray‘s identification with female sexuality.     
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the underside of their necks.  Because Ray lacked a signifier for sexual difference, sexual 
difference for him was a matter of a small difference in appearances (the female gecko‘s 
neck was a different color) and of quantitative (the female gecko‘s neck was wider) rather 
than qualitative difference (as in men have penises and women have vaginas).  In reality, 
it is difficult to distinguish between male and female geckos, and the differences between 
the two amount to the presence of pores and bulges in certain places on the underside of 
the male, and the absence of those pores and bulges on the female.  In Ray‘s dream, 
however, it was the girl who was distinguished by the presence versus the absence of 
additional characteristics found on her ―underside‖—an ambiguous term used to refer to 
genitalia without announcing sexual difference.  Through Ray‘s childhood disavowal of 
the ―maternal phallus,‖ Ray knew that his mother did not have a penis but nevertheless 
persisted in believing that she had one.   
In the session, I said, ―On the surface, the boy and girl are alike, but the girl is 
different underneath?‖  In response, Ray said he‘s always thought of women as different 
sorts of creatures parading as the same.  Later in the session, Ray said something which 
suggested the inverse meaning: that he thinks of women as the same sort of creatures 
parading as different (e.g., their makeup).  This inversion is suggestive of the logic of 
disavowal.  Ray knew very well that women are different from men, but nevertheless he 
could not help but believe that women are the same.   
Ray said that geckos blend in with their background and all look alike, but that he 
had painted his identity in opposition to ―blending in.‖  Indeed, from Ray‘s perspective 
that men and women are alike, his defense against homosexuality and femininity 
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involved standing out as different.  In exposing his penis to women, he paraded and made 
a show of his masculinity.   
Via condensation, the geckos in Ray‘s dream also represented Ray‘s pet geckos 
who were doubly imprisoned in the prison and in the cigarette box cage.  Ray identified 
with the boy gecko in the dream.  Geckos are one of the few lizards who talk to each 
other, and Ray is rather talkative.  Also, Ray‘s identification with the boy gecko is 
informative insofar as geckos lack eyelids; the gaze, therefore, is always operative.  Ray 
sacrificed his boy gecko (i.e., himself) for the sake of the girl gecko such that the geckos 
were caged together, and this suggests that Ray felt he must always be connected to a 
woman because of her need for him.  Ray perceived that both his mother and Susan 
seemed to need him.   
Interestingly, both male and female geckos, when frightened, will drop off their 
tails.  (Ray did not talk about this, but his three years around geckos must have made him 
aware of this fact.)  Transferring this fact to the human register, the process of giving up 
one‘s tail to potentially save one‘s life translates to the process of castration, in which an 
outside threat causes the subject to relinquish the jouissance associated with the 
imaginary phallus in exchange for the relative safety of the symbolic order.  Both male 
and female geckos, of course, have the tails which are related to the human penis.  Here, 
then, is another representation of men and women being the same.
114
   
 
                                               
114 Also of interest is the fact that some species of gecko are parthenogenic, which means the female is 
capable of reproducing without copulating with a male.  However, if the female copulates with a male, she 
will create a healthier baby with more genetic variation than if she were to utilize asexual reproduction.  If 
Ray was aware of this fact, then perhaps Ray was wondering to what degree his father played a role in his 
birth and wishing the role had been stronger.   
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Ray’s Relationship with Susan 
 
Susan was a frequent focus in Ray‘s psychotherapy.  In the eight months of 
psychotherapy, Ray shared the following dream with me:  
Susan and I were driving in a flashy red sports car.  I was driving really fast down 
a curvy country road.  All of a sudden, I saw a cliff, and it was too late to stay on 
the road.  We were in the air crashing, and I knew we would probably die.  I 
tucked my head in (he showed me the gesture, touching his chin to his chest) so it 
wouldn‘t hurt as much.  Then, we crashed and I woke up.   
In the process of association, Ray first said that he and Susan crashing might either 
represent their ending their relationship altogether or starting anew.  Ray said, ―the idea 
of being connected to Susan for the rest of my life is a lot scarier than the idea of us being 
finished.‖  (Recall that Ray used the word ―mini-connection‖ in describing the moment of 
the realization of the gaze in his exhibitionistic act.)  Then, Ray said that a few days prior 
to the session Susan had thought she was pregnant.  Susan had expressed a mixture of 
apprehension and pleasure at the possibility of having a child with Ray.  Although her 
impression turned out to be mistaken, Ray spent an entire day thinking otherwise.  (Ray 
told me that they did not and had never used ―protection‖ of any sort, because Susan‘s 
medical issues prevented her from taking a birth control pill and Ray did not want to 
suffer the loss of pleasure involved in using a condom.)   
In response to Susan‘s possible pregnancy, Ray was surprised that he had spent 
the day fantasizing about having a child with Susan.  In his fantasies, the child was a boy.  
Ray had made up his mind that, were Susan pregnant, they would immediately go down 
to city hall and ―make it official‖ by getting a marriage license.  This idea was 
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represented in Ray‘s dream in terms of the ―‘til death do us part‖ spoken in marriage 
vows.  In the dream, only their death would put an end to their relationship.   
For Ray, cars were highly cathexed with jouissance because he has often used 
them to commit acts of ―flashing.‖  The flashy red sports car was on a crash course, and 
even though Ray knew he ―would probably die‖ he still tried to protect his head.  The 
phrase ―I tucked my head in‖ suggests that he tucked in the head of his penis in the 
attempt to make the pain of castration less painful.  In becoming a father, Ray imagined 
he would finally be forced to give up his excessive jouissance.   
In the next two sessions, Ray continued to speak about his desire to have a son 
with Susan.  Ray said that ―the right way to do things‖ would be to make sure he wanted 
to spend the rest of his life with Susan and to get married before thinking about getting 
her pregnant.  Nevertheless, Ray‘s fantasy was a compromise between the ―right way‖ 
and his desire to make Susan pregnant as soon as possible: Ray fantasized about getting a 
marriage license ―so Susan could be taken care of [in terms of health insurance], getting 
pregnant, and then doing a ceremony later.‖  However, Ray noted that he had difficulty 
going through with his compromise fantasy because he kept thinking that Susan‘s parents 
would disapprove of the plan.   
Ray imagined Susan‘s parents would see through the plan and realize that he 
intended to marry Susan just so he could have a child.  Ray said that the approval of 
Susan‘s parents mattered to him because they had considerable influence over Susan and 
would be in their lives for a long time.  In contrast, the approval of his parents did not 
matter to him.  Ray‘s concerns with ―mak[ing] it official,‖ ―the right way to do things,‖ 
and the authority of Susan‘s parents reflected attempts to bolster the paternal function.  In 
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desiring to be a more legitimate symbolic authority than his father, Ray thought it best to 
mimic Susan‘s parents because Susan clearly respected their authority.   
Somehow, then, the idea of having a baby boy with Susan turned the anxiety-
provoking idea of being connected to Susan for the rest of his life into the acceptable idea 
of being married and having a family with her.  The baby boy would be the third term in 
his relationship with the Other, effecting a separation.  For Ray, Susan‘s desire to have a 
child signified her lack (S (Ⱥ)) in a manner that Ray was able to recognize and embrace, 
making his relationship to the Other more bearable.   
Transference 
 
  ―Transference is the enactment of the reality of the unconscious‖ (Lacan, 
1973/1998a, p. 149).   
Ray‟s Polygraph 
In considering Ray‘s transference to me and to Dr. Smith, it is important to note 
that we are, in actuality, representatives of the law because of our association and 
communication with his parole officer.  One way in which we put ourselves in the role of 
the law is to request that patients take annual maintenance polygraph examinations after 
an initial history polygraph examination.  When Dr. Smith initially broached the subject 
with Ray, Ray said that not only did he think taking the polygraph was a good idea, but 
that he should have two or three a year instead of just one.  After almost a year of 
participating in therapy at Dr. Smith‘s office, Ray was administered a maintenance 
polygraph examination.   
On the day of the polygraph, the polygraph examiner, as usual, had travelled to 
Dr. Smith‘s office to administer the exam.  Ray was aware that Dr. Smith had a 
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professional rapport with the polygraph examiner, who often gave polygraphs to Dr. 
Smith‘s clients.  In accordance with protocol, the examiner gave Ray a pre-test, and the 
results suggested that Ray was a near-perfect test subject; in other words, the results of 
the polygraph were likely to be valid.  The examiner informed Ray of the four ―yes‖ or 
―no‖ questions he would be asked during the polygraph, and then gave Ray the polygraph 
examination.  The questions were as follows:  
1) ―Regarding you exposing yourself, do you intend to answer truthfully each 
question about that?‖  
2) ―Not including the incident this summer [when Ray exposed himself to the 
woman who asked ―Do you want some help with that?‖], did you expose yourself 
this year?‖  
3) ―Not including the incident this summer, did you deviantly expose yourself this 
year?‖ 
4) ―Other than the incident this summer, have you exposed yourself to someone 
without their consent this year?‖  
Ray answered ―yes‖ to the first question and ―no‖ to the remaining three questions—all 
of which are essentially the same question with variations in wording.   
Ray failed all of the questions at a ―strong deception indicated‖ level.  I attended 
the results meeting with Ray, Dr. Smith, and the polygrapher, during which time the 
polygrapher shared his opinion that the results may have been due to Ray‘s webcam 
activity in sexual chat rooms, although Ray said that that activity had been consensual.
115
  
When we wondered about the possibility of gray areas that had influenced Ray‘s results, 
                                               
115 I also wonder if perhaps Ray‘s active fantasies about exhibitionism and his very conscious identity and 
structural position as exhibitionist accounted for the polygraph results.  Personally, I tend to believe that he 
has ceased his exhibitionistic acts.   
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such as the question of whether or not his internet sexual activity counted as 
exhibitionism, Ray was dismissive.  Ray said there were no gray areas in his mind, and 
no ―what if?-type thoughts flashed through [his] mind while [he] was answering the 
questions.‖  Ray said, ―This would be a lot easier if there were a simple reason for why I 
failed the polygraph, like if I had been out there exposing myself every other day.‖  Ray 
said he felt ―guilty for not passing‖ and that he let us down.  Clearly, Ray was relating to 
us as lawgiving Others.   
After the meeting, Ray and I had an individual session.  At the beginning of the 
session, Ray cried (for the first time in treatment).  Prior to the examination, Ray had 
been very confident and relaxed, and his fellow group participants also had faith in his 
ability to pass the polygraph.  Ray had taken pride in his ability to cease engaging in 
exhibitionistic acts.  After the polygraph, Ray said, ―My words don‘t mean shit anymore.  
I lost the ground I really needed!  I really needed you guys to believe me.‖  Ray noted 
that the fact of his failure put him in an impossible position: he had to defend himself 
despite the fact that his very words of defense must now be called into question and heard 
with suspicion.  Ray said he assumed from our position that we would trust the polygraph 
results over what he says.  This is not necessarily true, but it is interesting that Ray said 
so.  At some Other level, this is exactly what Ray desired; Ray wanted us, as lawgiving 
Others, to keep a close watch on him, insist that he continue therapy, and to hear his 
words with suspicion.  Correspondingly, Ray said that, rather than defend himself, his 
best tactic was simply to continue with the therapeutic process and schedule another 
polygraph as soon as possible to clear his name.   
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A few days later, at our next session, Ray said he had just had a daydream while 
he was in the waiting room.  Looking at Dr. Smith through the office window, he thought 
Dr. Smith looked ―cynical.‖  Ray imagined a scenario in which Dr. Smith spoke to him, 
saying, ―Well?  Come out with it! [referring to the truth that Dr. Smith thought Ray was 
holding back].‖  Ray responded, angrily, saying ―I can‘t, because I have nothing to tell!  
And if you don‘t believe me I‘ll go somewhere else!‖  The daydream ended there, and 
Ray said he had immediately thought that he did not want to go anywhere else for 
therapy. ―This place has changed me,‖ he said.  ―I stopped exposing myself when I came 
here.‖ (This last sentence has a meaningful double entendre, suggesting Ray got some 
kind of substitute jouissance from his treatment.)  Ray wanted Dr. Smith to be a cynical 
representative of the law who forcefully demanded the truth from Ray.   
In that vein, Ray wondered whether he had somehow wanted to fail the 
polygraph.  Ray said, ―This would fit into the pattern of everything else in my life if I 
somehow made myself fail the polygraph, taking away the ground I was standing on.‖  
From my perspective, Ray certainly did have unconscious motivations for failing the 
polygraph.  Ray‘s failing the polygraph served to bolster his paternal function.   
In this regard, there is some additional background information to consider.  
Recently, two other group participants had taken polygraph examinations.  One man 
passed his examination, requested to end treatment and probation early, and we granted 
his request.  In contrast, a man who failed his polygraph continued his treatment 
involvement beyond the required term of his probation.  Ray may have been anxious that 
his success in treatment so far, paired with passing the exam, would have caused us to let 
down our guard or to terminate our therapeutic relationship with him.  Ray‘s unconscious 
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orchestrated his failing the polygraph and communicated that termination was not what 
he wanted or needed—that the best position for him in relation to us was as someone we 
mandated to be in therapy, listening ―cynically‖ to his discourse and limiting his 
jouissance by propping up his paternal function.   
Transference Relationship  
 At many times, Ray thought of me as the object-cause (object a) of his desire to 
do the work of psychotherapy.  For example, I was positioned as the cause of Ray‘s 
desire to remember his dreams and daydreams and associate to them.  Ray also had 
several ―transference dreams‖ that he explored in the course of his psychotherapy.   
 At other times, Ray thought of me as a subject-supposed-to-know things about 
him of which he remained unaware.  On occasion, Ray referred to me as ―teaching him‖ 
something about himself.  Especially at the beginning of our work together, Ray 
sometimes asked me what an aspect of his dream meant—as if I rather than he were the 
expert on his unconscious.   
 As is common with perverse patients, there were also occasions upon which Ray 
tried to position himself as object-cause (object a) of my jouissance.  For example, Ray 
often joked and sometimes succeeded in getting me to laugh, which he seemed to enjoy.  
As another example, in our last session Ray said, ―You get a smiley face on your chart 
because I only flashed one person since we started or maybe that makes it a winking 
smiling face or something.‖  (Actually, as discussed, Ray flashed a woman before we 
began our individual sessions.)  A ―smiley face‖ is something grade school teachers often 
give the children in their class, and a chart is something patients have.  By using the 
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words ―you get a smiley face on your chart,‖ Ray put himself in the position of an 
evaluator or teacher who might, through a positive evaluation, cause my jouissance.   
As a final example of Ray‘s desire to serve as object a for me, Ray said that he 
wanted me to see him as someone who had ―attractive qualities.‖  Ray said, ―Like I‘m the 
male peacock lifting his feathers.  You know, like there are some male peacocks with 
broken feathers and I don‘t want to be like that.‖  With these words, Ray revealed his 
desire to be positioned as the object-cause of my gaze, as an impressive and healthy 
(versus broken) peacock.  When Ray was in the shower with his father, he had perhaps 
felt as though his penis was the size of a pea in comparison to his father‘s penis.   
 Ray‘s transference projections very often placed me in the role of a lawgiving 
Other or of being associated with his father.  Frequently, Ray related to me as a 
combination of the subject-supposed-to-know and a lawgiving Other—as a subject-
supposed-to-No!, if you will.  Magical thinking and disavowal were usually involved in 
such transference formulations.  For instance, after Ray told me about numerous fantasies 
he had of badly ―beating up‖ a co-worker who had spread gossip about him, Ray 
fantasized that were he to commit that violence I would see it on the local news and 
identify him to the police.  (The logic of disavowal might be phrased in the following 
way: ―I know very well that if I were to beat up my co-worker that it might not end up on 
the news and Stephanie might not see the news, but all the same I believe that Stephanie 
would find out about my transgression and report me to the police.‖)  Ray said that belief 
prevented him from hurting his co-worker.  Of course, I did not mention that I did not 
own a television.   
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 Another example was when Ray admitted to the group that he had committed an 
act of indecent exposure; Ray did so because he believed that I was able to read his mind 
and would have known about his offence.  Ray‘s operation of disavowal in this instance 
was, ―I know very well that Stephanie can‘t read my mind (and wouldn‘t necessarily 
have known about my offence), but all the same I prefer to believe that she can (and 
definitely knows about my offence)‖.  Ray‘s disavowal led him to an admission that 
made him appear to need individual psychotherapy and brought him under suspicion by 
the law.  In both of these examples, Ray bolstered his paternal function through 
transferentially placing me in the positions of omniscient subject-supposed-to-know and 
lawgiving Other.   
 I also functioned as subject-supposed-to-No! in the situation I recounted in 
Chapter V: ―Ray said that when he was driving to his appointment and was close to the 
office building, he was stopped at a light and saw what he thought might have been my 
car behind him.  Then, he saw a woman crossing the street and he thought to himself, 
―Don‘t even look at her because if that‘s Stephanie, Stephanie will see and will wonder 
what I was thinking.‖  Ray said that he knew that I was probably not in the car behind 
him and he knew that I could neither see his gaze (from my vantage point) nor read his 
mind, but all the same he could not help but believe that I was there and would know if 
he thought about exposing himself to the woman crossing the street.  Despite what Ray 
knew about my limitations, he nevertheless preferred to believe that I would know were 
he to look at and consider exposing himself to a woman.  This belief, facilitated by 
disavowal, enabled him to prop up the paternal function.    
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 At times, Ray struggled between his desire to be object a for me and his desire to 
do the work of psychotherapy.  Ray produced several dreams having to do with this 
theme.  In one dream, Ray and I were having a session.  Via condensation, we were both 
in our session room and on his bed.  I was sitting on the far corner of his bed and he was 
laying on his back under the covers with his head on the pillow.  Ray felt himself falling 
asleep, and tried to ―fight off‖ his sleepiness, thinking ―Oh, shit!  Stephanie‘s never going 
to let me get away with this.‖  Ray, however, did fall asleep, and awoke to me saying, 
―We only have 20 minutes.‖   
 The setting of the dream was both the locus of psychotherapeutic work and the 
site of Ray‘s jouissance.  Ray was ―falling asleep on the job‖ and hoping I would play the 
role of subject-supposed-to-No! to return him to the work of ―trying to figure himself 
out.‖  Ray‘s association to my saying ―We only have 20 minutes‖ was both to our 
sometimes short sessions, which he wished were longer in duration,  and to our only 
having five remaining sessions.  Three weeks prior to the dream, I had informed Ray 
about the necessity to transfer his case to a colleague.  Ray received the news by saying, 
―So, I‘ve got a month and a half.  How are we going to fit in all the work we were going 
to do in the next two years in the next month and a half?‖  Not only was the remainder of 
the length of our treatment insufficient for Ray, but he also desired to sabotage the 
treatment by being a bad patient (i.e., by falling asleep) and by letting his jouissance get 
in the way of the work of psychotherapy.  It is also noteworthy in terms of transference 
that I was sitting on the corner of Ray‘s bed, much like his mother had sat on the corner 
of his bed when he was a boy.   
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 Consider also a dream Ray presented in the fifth month of psychotherapy: ―You 
discharged or discontinued me from therapy.  You were telling me there was something I 
wasn‘t doing, like not allowing the process of therapy to work, and that I would have to 
be discharged from therapy because of it.  You told me I was untreatable.  I forget why, 
exactly.  I think, in my defense, I was telling you about the thing that‘s been pointed out 
to me twice in group about my defensiveness, about how when people tell me things 
about myself that I disagree with, I‘m defensive.  I was saying that if I disagreed with 
something, I wasn‘t just not going to say anything about it.  I was going to try to show 
them how I thought of it.  So, my response to you in the dream was to be defensive.‖   
In the session, I said, ―You wanted me to discharge or discontinue you from 
therapy?‖  ―Discharge‖ was associated with a release in tension, with sexual discharge, 
and Ray‘s having been discharged from the military and ―discontinue‖ with discontinuing 
a product.  Then, Ray remembered that there was more to the dream.  At the end of the 
dream, Ray said he ―came onto [me].‖ In the dream, because I was no longer his 
therapist, Ray felt free to pursue me sexually.   
Ray told me that soon after I became his therapist and I asked him to tell me his 
dreams, Ray ―hoped [he] would not have a sex dream about [me], because then [he] 
would have to tell [me] and that would be weird‖ and he ―feared it would ruin [his] 
therapy.‖  The negation and fear/wish Ray articulated pointed to his unconscious wish to 
sabotage his psychotherapy by way of jouissance—even though at another level that was 
not what he wanted to do.   
Correspondingly, via Ray‘s dream he unconsciously expressed the wish that I 
would discharge or discontinue him from therapy and tell him he was untreatable because 
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he was defensive.  Ray said he could not help but be defensive, and therefore he could 
not help but be untreatable.  Likewise, Ray‘s mother wanted him to be untreatable; his 
boyhood bad behavior, enuresis, and exhibitionism all positioned him as constitutionally 
ill in relation to his mother.  Unconsciously, Ray wished I would discharge him (as from 
the military) from the burden of doing the work of psychotherapy.  In this respect, instead 
of having to explore the question of his identity, I relieved him of that anxiety and told 
him: he was my untreatable object a.  I had had enough of him and was discontinuing 
him as if he were a product (as if I had produced him somehow in psychotherapy).  This 
dream exemplified Ray‘s conscious and unconscious struggle to desire to continue the 
work of psychotherapy instead of letting his jouissance get in the way.   
Concluding Statements 
 
 Ray positions himself as the object-cause of the Other‘s jouissance, plugging up 
the lack in the Other with himself for lack of a signifier for the Other‘s desire.  Ray‘s 
exhibitionism can be understood as his attempt to signify the Other‘s desire and bolster 
his inadequate paternal function.  When Ray was a young boy, his mother did not 
articulate her desire for people or things other than Ray.  Clearly, she did not desire Ray‘s 
father, complaining that he was not a real man.  Instead, Ray was the sole object of her 
interest and of her demands.   
Ray‘s penis was a frequent object-cause of her jouissance (e.g., his enuresis).   
Even though Ray‘s mother protested that Ray‘s enuresis was a nuisance, Ray perceived 
that behind the façade of her excessive protests lay her jouissance.  Ray‘s mother enjoyed 
his symptom.  In attending to the offensive, immoral organ, Ray‘s mother got to see it.  
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Ray‘s mother made a show out of trying to get Ray‘s penis to behave.  Ray‘s mother was 
both upset and pleased by her unruly son.  She wanted him to be a ―bad boy.‖ 
Without a signifier for her sexual difference or her desire and without the 
intervention of a lawgiving Other, Ray was led to believe the worst: his mother wanted 
his penis for her own.  Disavowing this horrible truth, Ray arrived at the belief that what 
his mother really wanted was to gaze at his penis.  Ray reasoned that his mother wanted 
him to violate her modesty.  Ray was the object-cause of his mother‘s jouissance—
shameless, shocking, dirty, offensive, embarrassing, unruly, sick, and untreatable.  In the 
act of exhibitionism, Ray‘s cough functioned to surprise the Other and bring out object a 
in the form of the Other‘s gaze at his immodesty.  Ray coughed because his mother 
wanted him to be sick.  Contrary to his conscious beliefs, Ray‘s ―take that!‖ and ―in your 
face!‖ only perpetuated his position as object a.   
 The name of Ray‘s father, his family name, was literally associated with 
something dirty and unwanted.  Ray‘s exhibitionism was one major way in which he 
bolstered his inadequate paternal function.  In his exhibitionistic act, Ray caused the 
jouissance of unconsenting women (representing his mOther) by making himself appear 
―dirty.‖  And the women put a stop to his jouissance when they either fled the scene or 
called a police officer (a lawgiving Other).  Being incarcerated as a result of his indecent 
exposure was another way in which Ray‘s actions forced him to respect the authority of a 
lawgiving Other.   
 Prior to his psychotherapy, Ray created alternative solutions to propping up his 
paternal function—namely, body piercings and tattoos.  The holes created by his 
piercings and the ink holes (bolstering the importance of his father‘s work) in his tattoos 
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functioned like a fetish as significations of the Other‘s lack.  Because Ray was 
structurally forced to attempt to signify something (the lack in the Other) that was not 
signified at the crucial time of his structural development, the work of signification was 
much more difficult and only yielded temporary results.  The materiality and permanence 
of the holes created by his piercings and tattoos were one fashion in which Ray signified 
the lack in the Other.  Ray used piercings and tattoos, then, in a similar way as 
exhibitionism.   
 Within his treatment, Ray also constructed numerous creative solutions to the 
problems of the perverse structure.  Via the mechanism of disavowal, I often came to 
function in the transference as a subject-supposed-to-No!, knowledgeably putting a stop 
to Ray‘s excessive jouissance.  In psychotherapy, Ray was beginning to find a way to be 
something other than object a for the Other.   
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Chapter VIII: Analysis of a Case of Obsessive Neurosis and Pedophilic Sexual  
Interest 
Introduction 
 
 The patient was a Caucasian male in his mid-30s with a Ph.D. in a research-
related field, with whom I worked individually for about four months.  During that time, I 
provided weekly sessions from a Lacanian psychoanalytic clinical perspective.  I will 
refer to him as ―John.‖  All names used in this case study are pseudonyms, and I have 
altered identifying information.  The work was prematurely terminated when John moved 
to another state in order to live with his girlfriend and finish out his probation term and 
treatment at that location.  John was referred to Dr. Smith‘s office by the probation 
system for mandated group and individual psychotherapy.  John had recently finished 
serving a year in prison for possession of about 75 images of child pornography.   
I assisted Dr. Smith in conducting John‘s initial assessment by administering and 
scoring a Rorschach and presenting my findings collaboratively to John.
116
  John‘s 
assessment included a Rorschach, an MCMI-III (Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory), 
an Abel Assessment for Sexual Interest, and a Brief Symptom Inventory.  The structural 
summary from John‘s Rorschach is presented in Appendix I.  John‘s MCMI-III results 
indicated avoidant and dependent personality traits and dysthymia.  On the Abel Visual 
Reaction Test, John‘s results indicated his sustained significant sexual interest in the 
following types of individuals, in order from greatest to least interest: 8-10-year-old girls, 
2-4-year-old girls, adolescent girls, and adult women.  John‘s Cognitive Distortion Score 
                                               
116 I have been trained by Constance Fischer, PhD, ABPP, in her method of collaborative assessment.   This 
method is presented in Fischer‘s book Individualizing Psychological Assessment: A Collaborative and 
Therapeutic Approach (1994).  
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on the Abel was 10%, which means that John did not openly espouse the types of 
rationalizations that child molesters are known to utilize to justify their actions.   
Presenting Problems 
 John was diagnosed, in DSM-IV-TR (2000) terms, with pedophilia, non-exclusive 
type—meaning he is also attracted to adults.  Pedophilia is a diagnosis that would suggest 
to sex offender treatment professionals and parole and probation authorities that John 
might not only be at risk for future child pornography usage, but also for a ―hands-on 
offense‖ with an actual child.  In Lacan‘s diagnostic system, John was an obsessive 
(neurotic).  When taking into consideration Lacanian diagnostics and the fact that John‘s 
only criminal conviction was possession of child pornography, the likelihood of John‘s 
recidivism (either by committing the same type of offense again or of committing a 
―hands-on offense‖) is an interesting question beyond the scope of this dissertation.  
Aside from questions of risk assessment, John‘s obsessive structure necessitates a 
different treatment approach than that suitable with perverse clients.  Although my work 
with John was limited to about 20 sessions, it was sufficient to outline the major 
components of a case formulation, including my position in the transference and how his 
diagnosis informed the direction of the treatment.  This case formulation should be 
compared with that of the perverse patient Ray presented in Chapter VII in terms of 
differential diagnosis and the course of the treatment.   
Prior to serving his prison sentence and after his criminal charges, John 
participated in individual psychotherapy for over a year with a psychologist who treated 
sexual offenders.  John described his former therapist as supportive and as someone who 
gave him ―tidbits of advice.‖  John found the experience to be mostly unhelpful, 
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especially because he ―went crazy‖ and went to strip clubs every day for two months 
prior to his incarceration and did not tell his therapist, who did not suspect anything.  In 
our first session, John noted that I looked ―very perceptive‖ and he imagined that he 
―could not get away with that sort of thing with [me].‖   
 Even though John was mandated to participate in psychotherapy, he himself 
wanted to pursue psychotherapeutic treatment.  John‘s initial complaints included 
symptoms of anxiety, insomnia, and feelings of inadequacy and guilt.  Furthermore, John 
wanted to question his sexuality due to of his interest in underage girls.   
John’s Sexual Interest in Minors and Sexual History 
 
John began looking at (online) child pornography in his early 20s, and did so until 
he was criminally charged six years later.  In general, John‘s pornographic tastes led him 
to seek out novelty, socially-prohibited images or acts, and pictures of girls or women 
who looked like girls.  In the latter category, John liked pictures in which the girls were 
bending over so that he could see their underwear.  He preferred the underwear to be 
shiny, sheer and see-through.  John also liked the girls to be wearing pigtails tied with 
large ribbons.   
 Prior to his criminal conviction, John ―led a model life in public,‖ excelling in 
graduate school and working long hours at a research lab.  John‘s colleagues and 
superiors liked him and asked him to attend outside social events, but he usually refused.  
During this period of his life, John spent several of his free hours each day looking at 
child and adult pornography online, an activity which he kept secret and which felt like 
―some other John were doing it.‖  Via pornography and strip clubs, John felt he had ―a 
smörgåsbord of women.‖  John initially went to strip clubs with friends, and felt 
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embarrassed to be there, but progressed to going alone and feeling much less shame and 
guilt.  John described the pleasure he got from ―a click here, a click there‖ in the privacy 
of his home as ―completely guttural, base, and free.‖  ―Lower-brain John,‖ he said, 
―could have an orgasm that‘s a ‗10‘ with only a few clicks versus an average orgasm 
that‘s a ‗5‘ or ‗6‘‖ with a woman.   
In addition, John participated in online sexual chat rooms where he spoke with 
adult women who liked to play the role of girls.  What John desired in the plot structure 
of the fantasy in the chat was the following: the woman uses child-like words indicating 
her interest—a ―naïve curiosity‖—in John‘s penis, John protests mildly, and the girl 
insists, calling him things like ―daddy.‖  ―Daddy‖ is a word that John found highly 
arousing.  Then, they touch each other‘s genitals and John penetrates the girl, who enjoys 
herself all the while.  John noted a strong connection between his preferred sexual chat 
scenario and his ―original experience‖ with Sally.   
The first time John remembered feeling sexually interested in a child was when he 
was 14 and babysitting four young girls.  The youngest was three or four and the oldest, 
Sally, was 7.  John had babysat for them on several prior occasions before the time when 
Sally said to him, ―Show us your pee-pee.‖  John was shocked and hesitated for a few 
seconds while thinking how to respond.  In the meantime, she said, ―I bet you have a big 
one.‖  John said, ―That‘s not okay.  That‘s private and we don‘t ask people to do that.‖  
Nevertheless, John was secretly pleased when Sally‘s next words were ―We‘ll show you 
ours!‖  When John refused to comply and told Sally that they should not undress, Sally 
―tried to rally the other girls‖ to help her, but only the second oldest girl showed any 
interest.   
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Soon afterwards, John masturbated while fantasizing about that event with Sally.  
In his masturbation fantasy, the same words were spoken, but he and Sally actually did 
engage in exposing their genitals to one another.  John continued to fantasize about this, 
but ―kept pushing the fantasy farther‖ to the point of ending with his achieving orgasm 
with his penis inside her vagina.  John said he enjoyed a number of aspects of that 
fantasy.  One was that Sally was ―curious‖ and assertively spoke about her sexual interest 
in him.  Sally‘s interest let him feel that he ―was the pursued rather than the pursuer.‖  
(Not only did John enjoy feeling desirable, but his status as the pursued person was the 
condition for the possibility of the fantasy.  Without it, John‘s guilt would get in the 
way.)  Sally‘s saying she thought his ‗peepee was a big one‘ ―was a very big 
compliment,‖ and that, in addition to their discrepancy in size and age, made him feel like 
a large, sexually potent and experienced male.   
In terms of his fixation on shiny sheer underwear, John said he ―slowly replaced 
[his girlfriend‘s] entire collection of underwear with shiny, satiny underwear.‖  John 
believed his preference for such underwear began when he was on the school bus in 4
th
 or 
5
th
 grade and saw a girl‘s ―shiny blue underwear‖ because she was sitting with her legs 
open near him.  She was ―like the 3rd most sought-after girl‖ in the school and he had 
already had a crush on her.  John said ―it never would have worked because she was 
popular and I was a nerd.‖  John found it ―gratifying, verifying, and validating‖ that ―she 
knew [he] was looking, didn‘t close her legs, and even smiled.‖  John recalled another 
such memory of a girl with ―shiny white underwear‖ that he caught sight of during a 
study hall in the 7
th
 grade (although the girl was unaware of his gaze).  Correspondingly, 
John sought out ―up the skirt pornography‖—pornography that showed girls ―posing and 
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pretending they didn‘t know their skirts were being looked up.‖  John also liked that 
―underwear is the last barrier,‖ and preferred ―sheer underwear because it‘s like you‘re 
almost there but not quite.‖ 
John noted that he has ―always been attracted to the forbidden.‖  This is, in fact, 
quite typical of neurotics, because the desire of neurotics is structured in relation to the 
moral law (as well as to the Other‘s desire).  Lacan said, ―Law and repressed desire are 
one and the same thing‖ (1963/2006a, p. 782). In other words, prohibition has an 
eroticizing function.  In Fink‘s words (1997), when pleasure is  
prohibited by the parents, [it] takes on a further meaning, a meaning that involves 
the parents and the parents‘ desire.  ―Naïve,‖ ―simple‖ bodily pleasure is 
transformed into jouissance—something far more erotic, dirty, bad, and evil, 
something really exciting—thanks to prohibition…The stronger the prohibition, 
the more erotically charged the act becomes. (p. 67)  
As we will see in the next section, John‘s parents played a key role in the organization of 
John‘s jouissance and desire.    
Family Context and Personal History 
 
John grew up in an upper-middle-class family and is the eldest of three siblings.  
Rachel is three years younger than John, and he described her as ―very smart and 
successful.‖  Rachel also had ―a temper and some emotional problems‖ such that she 
―splits people into all good or all bad categories.‖  John said he felt lucky to have been in 
the all good category for most of his life—especially after she learned about his child 
pornography viewing.  Comparatively speaking, John said Rachel ―has always been the 
screw-up‖ and he has always ―been momma‘s little golden boy.‖  John‘s other sibling, 
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Theresa, is seven years his junior.  John said that they were not very close and that 
Theresa was ―not as smart and successful as me and Rachel.‖   
John‘s parents ―have always had extremely high expectations for [him].‖  John 
always received top grades in school.  John‘s mother said he was ―destined by God to 
become a doctor.‖  John credits his father for giving him his ―drive to be top-
performing.‖  As an undergraduate student, John chose between pursuing a Ph.D. in the 
research-related field and pursuing a career in creative writing.  John wanted to choose 
creative writing, but neither of his parents supported this plan.  John‘s father did not even 
think that creative writing deserved to be called a career.  As usual, John chose the path 
in line with his parents‘ desires.  John‘s father used to brag to friends about John‘s latest 
achievements.  After his release from prison, John noticed that his father has ceased 
talking about John at all to friends, ―as if [John] were nothing without a career.‖   
John recounted a memory of having just told his father about his child 
pornography charges.  The two of them were standing in front of the window in the living 
room of John‘s parents‘ house.  The neighbors walked by, and John‘s father immediately 
shoved John out of sight.  John said that his father‘s actions ―were totally irrational, 
because the neighbors couldn‘t possibly have known what had happened,‖ but that it 
indicated how his father felt about him and what he had done.   
John described his parents‘ relationship in terms of his father‘s dependency on his 
mother.  John‘s father, he said, ―is the breadwinner, but he is completely helpless—silly 
helpless—around the house; he even wants her to help him pick out his clothes in the 
morning!‖  John said his mother ―runs the household and keeps everything clean‖ and 
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that his father is ―completely dependent upon her and she loves it.‖  John did not wish to 
be as dependent upon his future wife as his father is on his mother.   
John grew up attending a conservative Protestant church service every week with 
his family.  John mentioned that the most ―pallorful‖ person—he meant ―powerful‖ but 
slipped—in his church had been the ―one with the least skeletons in his closet.‖  In 
exploring the meaning of his slip, John equated religious power with a moral uprightness 
imbued with ―pallor‖ or a ―sickly whiteness.‖  John said his parents ―chose to associate 
themselves with very conservative people.‖  John‘s parents taught him that sex is 
immoral when outside of the bonds of marriage.  John rationalized having sex for the first 
time—a time when he was unmarried—by telling himself that he was going to marry the 
girl later, so that ―in the eyes of God‖ they would have always been married.   
John‘s road to making masturbation morally and religiously permissible was 
given to him by his mother.  She gave him a book when he was 12 by James Dobson, an 
evangelistic Christian writer, called Preparing for Adolescence.  John thought his mother 
had intended it as a religious guide for him to use in his upcoming years.  John recalled 
―flipping right to the section on sex and discovering with delight and relief that Dobson 
said masturbation was normal and permissible.‖  John did not look at any other section of 
the book.   
John also remembered watching an Oprah episode on masturbation and 
asphyxiation with his mother when he was 14 or so and deciding to directly ask her if she 
thought masturbation was acceptable.  She said, ―Of course, that’s not normal! [referring 
to asphyxiation] But masturbation is a normal part of a boy‘s life.‖  John noted that she 
had said it was normal for a boy, but did not mention that it was normal for a girl.  John 
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then recalled that, when his sister Rachel was 9, his mother saw her touching herself 
under the sheets and said, ―Nice girls don‘t do that!‖  It seems likely that this event 
(which occurred prior to the babysitting event with Sally) had something to do with 
John‘s desire for a nice girl who did do that.   
In high school, John was only allowed to date ―nice girls.‖  John‘s mother 
expressly forbade him to date a particular girl, Laura, who had a ―bad reputation‖ who 
had expressed interest in him.  John regretted not having been allowed to date Laura, 
because he knew ―she would have wanted to have sex‖ with him.  None of the ―nice 
girls‖ he dated were objects of his desire, but instead were ―kind and sweet.‖  Much to his 
embarrassment at the time, it was not until he was 18 and in college that he lost his 
virginity.   
 John said his sexuality was at first a ―kernel‖ which then became a larger ―ball‖ of 
himself that was ―secret,‖ ―pleasure-seeking,‖ and ―shameful.‖  John recalled having 
always thought he was more interested in sex and seeing pornography than other boys his 
age.  Initially, though, he was ―the good boy who occasionally hung out with the bad 
boys.‖  John thought of himself as different and good because he had higher career 
aspirations, even as a pre-teen.  Between the ages of 10 and 13, John and his friends 
would often go to the bookstore in the mall.  His friends flipped through dirty magazines 
while he stood behind them, pretending to read ―something like Popular Mechanics‖ and 
looking over their shoulders—hoping they would turn the pages at his pace.  In 
psychotherapy, John often spoke in terms of what he calls his ―higher brain‖ in 
juxtaposition with his ―lower brain‖—the latter being responsible for all of his sexual 
desires, and which he wishes he ―could push down and turn off with [his] higher brain.‖   
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Course of Treatment 
 
 John often positioned me in the transference as the object-cause (object a) of his 
desire to do the work of psychotherapy.  For example, I was positioned as the cause of 
John‘s desire to recall his dreams and daydreams and associate to them.  As is typical for 
the beginning stage of psychotherapy, John also thought of me as a subject-supposed-to-
know—as an Other who possessed knowledge about his unconscious.   
The only significant people in John‘s life upon release from prison were Rachel, 
his parents, and his girlfriend of seven years, Cassie.  John said Cassie is ―intelligent, 
successful, and very detailed and organized.‖  John liked for Cassie to make ―big picture 
decisions‖ for them, like where they would go on vacation.  John described Cassie as 
being ―very warm, caring, and stable‖ and he intended to marry her.  Physically, he said 
she is ―a little overweight‖ and a ―bit matronly.‖  John‘s descriptions of Cassie were quite 
similar to his descriptions of his mother.   
John said he ―never want[s] to have sex with just Cassie‖ but desires her to wear 
something special or role play with him to make her more sexually appealing.  Cassie, 
however, did not like to role play, and would engage in it very infrequently and not very 
convincingly.  John usually desired her to play the part of a prostitute or a virginal young 
girl—although he has ceased asking her to play the part of the latter since his criminal 
conviction.   
John had a dream in which Cassie said, ―You need to pull your weight!  I can‘t 
support both of us.‖  In interpreting this dream, John talked about feeling guilty and 
ashamed with regard to the current state of his career in comparison to Cassie‘s career.  
John was preparing to move in with Cassie, and he anticipated being a significant 
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financial burden to her for the foreseeable future.   John said he was afraid of relying too 
heavily on Cassie and that she might get tired of him.  John said he already felt like he 
was turning into his father, whom he said was too dependent upon his mother.   
While in psychotherapy with me, John worked for minimum wage at his father‘s 
company.  Due to his felony and Megan‘s law status, John had very little success in his 
job search.  John frequently worried about this, and felt ―directionless and despondent.‖  
John said he felt like ―a moocher‖ who was ―out of place‖ residing with his sister and 
staying occasionally with his parents.   John said he was able to ―throw [him]self into 
work during the day‖ and ―compartmentalize [his] anxieties‖ but that ―the second the 
lights turn off‖ he stayed awake thinking about his ―ruined career,‖ his ―inadequacy‖ in 
terms of his professional and income level, and his fears of himself and his family being 
socially ostracized or publicly shamed.   
John avoided telling any of his friends about his criminal charges, and 
consequently avoided communicating with them for years.  While in psychotherapy, John 
decided to get back in contact with a former close friend, and he was anxious about his 
friend‘s judgments of his child pornography conviction.  John said his family was very 
supportive—especially Rachel and his mother.  The past several years had been difficult 
for John and his family.  John told me that his ―family has decided to keep [his] sex 
offense a secret.‖  John said that he had no part in making that decision but that he 
―tend[s] to take a passive role in relationships so [he] just was happy to go along with 
whatever [his] family wanted.‖  John concluded that his family wanting to keep his 
criminal conviction a secret perpetuated the sense that who he is and what he has done is 
shameful and unspeakable.   
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John recounted a dream in which he was in his bed at his parents‘ house calling 
for his mother, but she turned her back on him and walked away, leaving him to ―feel 
shunned.‖  During the process of interpretation, John came to realize that he felt ―needy 
and dependent‖—the very traits he wished he had not inherited from his father.  
Furthermore, John said it would be ―a relief, in a way‖ if she did turn her back on him 
because he felt he deserved her disapproval for having ―sullied her name‖ (my emphasis) 
by going against her ―code of morality.‖  John said he ―cannot bear either [his parents‘] 
disapproval or their support‖ and wished he could move away and ―bear the burden on 
[his] own.‖   
A week prior to his first major job interview, John reported a dream in which he 
was interviewing for a job.  In the dream, John was in a windowless room being 
interviewed by a panel of 12 women.  The women were sitting behind three high wooden 
desks that were all in a row at the front of the room.  Four women sat behind each desk.  
The women were ―matronly and unattractive‖ looking.  They all had very severe facial 
expressions.  John was sitting on a very small chair in the middle of the room behind a 
desk that was comparatively huge.  The desk obstructed everything but his eyes such that 
he was ―peeping over it to see.‖  The women noticed his predicament, and offered to get 
him another chair.  John insisted, however, that he was fine and did not need another 
chair.   
Via condensation, the 12 female job interviewers stood for the 12 disciples and 
the 12 jurors in a traditional jury.  The word ―matronly‖ also connected them to John‘s 
mother and to Cassie.  As a ―panel‖ they were also positioned as experts, as in a panel 
discussion.  The women were expert judges on John‘s worthiness.  Matronly and severe, 
305 
 
they were figures of religious righteousness and morality, and John was clearly guilty and 
unworthy in their eyes.  Furthermore, they were women because it is against women that 
John committed his crimes; not only did John feel that his looking at child pornography 
was a crime, but John also felt guilty about sexualizing women by going to strip clubs, 
using pornography, and even just thinking about women as sexual objects.  The 12 
women were in roles of Others who judge,
117
 and they outnumber and overpower John.   
John was a pathetic figure who was sitting in a tiny chair as if he were a young 
boy—perhaps hearkening back to a time when he felt similarly in relation to his mOther 
as a boy.  This dream symbolism represented how inadequate and small John felt in his 
life, as well as how he would prefer to remain hidden (he refused a bigger chair) from the 
gazes of Others who judge him.  John‘s body and crotch were hidden from the women so 
as to hide that which was associated with his sexual desires.  In addition, John said he 
was sustaining his position as a sinner in his relationship to Cassie and his mother.  The 
women in his dream, like his mother and Cassie, offered him a chance to be seen and sit 
in his proper place as a grown man, but John refused their offer.  John felt he deserved 
and at some level even wanted the scorn and punishment of his mOther.   
Like many neurotics, John‘s desires were inhibited.  For example, it was rare that 
John directly expressed anger at or frustration with someone.  John said that he usually 
showed his anger to others only by gritting his teeth.  As a teenager and young man, for 
instance, John was so loathe to cause possible feelings of rejection or hurt that he tried to 
make girlfriends break up with him so that he did not have to do it himself.  During 
psychotherapy, John spoke about his feelings of anger and frustration at having so many 
                                               
117 This dream and the previous dream, in dealing with Others who judge, stand in stark contrast to the 
phenomena made present in Ray‘s psychotherapy.  Ray, comparatively speaking, was not anxious about 
where he stood in the eyes of the Other who judges.   
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aspects of his life controlled on account of his sex offense.  Correspondingly, John said 
he had daydreams about being pulled over by a cop and venting his anger at the cop by 
yelling obscenities at him.  Although John found such daydreams cathartic, he said, 
―They are silly; it‘s absurd that I would ever throw a tantrum like that.‖   
One way in which John‘s aggression escaped was in the privacy of his car.  
Beginning when he was a boy, John invested some of his libido in cars, associating them 
with power and sexual desirability.  At the beginning of psychotherapy, John told me 
about his efforts to drive at the speed limit rather than over it as part of his ―new John‖ 
efforts.  Prior to his incarceration, John sometimes got ―road rage‖ and regularly 
exceeded the speed limit and sometimes got pulled over by cops and got speeding tickets.  
John‘s ―new John‖ efforts also included his not downloading child pornography and not 
going to strip clubs.  By extension, through the way he talked about what he hoped were 
―old John‖ activities, John drew a connection between aggression and sex.   
When John told his family about his child pornography charges, Rachel placed 
more blame on their father than on John.  Rachel said that, at the very least, their father 
was responsible for transmitting a low opinion of women on John.  (It should be noted 
that John‘s father‘s name was also John.)  Soon afterwards, Rachel called John and told 
him that she felt a strong conviction that she had been molested as a child, and that she 
suspected their father, although she could not recall any memory of being sexually 
victimized by their father.   
In this vein, John remembered from multiple occasions of ―people-watching‖ with 
his father that his father was clearly more interested in young teenage girls than in the 
other sorts of people who passed by.  John also remembered his father saying, the day 
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after John was criminally charged with possession of child pornography, ―Maybe this is 
all my fault.‖  In addition, later in the judicial process, his father said, ―Maybe they could 
take me to jail instead of you.‖  John‘s father did not elaborate on either of these 
comments, but they stuck in John‘s mind as possibly corroborating his father‘s sexual 
interest in minors. 
John found further evidence for this hypothesis in the occasion upon which his 
father shoved him out of view of the neighbors.  John felt that his father had vicariously 
experienced John‘s guilt and shame for his crime so strongly that it seemed John‘s father 
did take some responsibility for John‘s crime.  John felt that, at an unconscious level, his 
father had wanted to shove out of sight that part of himself that he felt was guilty of the 
crime of sexual interest in minors.   
Case Formulation 
 
John‘s desire, then, was fixated on the sexually desirous women and children 
portrayed in pornography. Because of his assumptions about his father‘s sexual interest in 
minors, John desired like his father desired.  Furthermore, John loved like his father 
loved, because both of them chose maternal (matronly) women upon whom they feel 
dependent. 
Unprovoked, John said, ―The idea of touching an actual child and especially of 
incest is revolting.‖  This statement, alongside his obtaining jouissance by being called 
―daddy,‖ suggests that John repressed his desire to touch a young girl, and perhaps more 
notably that he repressed his desire for his sister or mother.  Recall that his mother told 
Rachel, ―Nice girls don‘t do that!‖—Rachel was, perhaps, the original ―nice girl‖ who 
wanted to do dirty things—and that Theresa (his youngest sister) was the same age as 
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Sally (the oldest girl he babysat) at the time of John‘s ―original experience.‖  (It is not 
uncommon—indeed, it is perhaps universal—for neurotic individuals to have incestuous 
desires.)  In this sense, John desired to be his father in relation to his mother or sister—
desirable as ―an experienced man with a large penis.‖  John‘s fantasy about Sally or 
another young girl (who perhaps stands in for one of his sisters) allowed him to imagine 
that he is a subject in ―control‖ who, as ―daddy‖ with his big ―peepee,‖ was never 
castrated.   
John‘s ego-ideal is clearly at odds with many of his sexual desires.  For one thing, 
John said that he did not wish to be an aggressive person (and his negation indicated a 
desire to be aggressive), but his aggression and sexuality sometimes went hand in hand.  
For another, his mother wanted his desire to be for a ―nice girl‖ (who, by extension, was 
highly sexually inhibited).  Believing ―naughty‖ girls to be prohibited by his parents, 
such girls became highly eroticized for John.  However, John made a compromise: he 
desired girls who appeared to be ―nice‖ but were really ―naughty‖—in other words, 
―innocent,‖ naïve girls who were curious and adventurous in matters of sexuality.  John‘s 
desire became fixated on this type of forbidden girl.   
John attempted to ascertain the demands behind his parents‘ desires and, for the 
most part, has spent his life acting in accordance with them.  John interpreted his parents‘ 
desire as demands for him to get a Ph.D. and to have a successful intellectual career and 
to date and marry a ―nice‖ girl relatively devoid of sexual curiosity.  John was on his way 
to achieving both, and was thus able to see himself as approaching his ego-ideal.  In 
Freudian terms, John loved Cassie both anaclitically, insofar as she was similar to his 
mother, and narcissistically, insofar as she resembled his own ego-ideal.   
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As a boy, John learned to hide his ―lower brain‖ urges from the outside world, 
and he felt guilty for having his ―ball‖ of sexuality that was not in accordance with who 
he thought he should be.  When he got caught with child pornography, it became public 
knowledge that he had failed to live up to his internalized symbolic standards.  Feeling 
that he had lost, to some degree, the approval and love of his parents, John began to have 
depressive symptoms.  
John preferred (legal) online pornography and going to strip clubs to having sex 
with Cassie.  This is likely due to some extent to the fact that when John was online or at 
a strip club, he was able to partially hide from the judgment of the Other.  Guilt, shame, 
and anxiety were prominent features of John‘s case, as well as desiring in relation to the 
law and desiring symbolic success.  A perverse patient might feel some shame and 
anxiety, but would not share the experiences of guilt and desiring in relation to the law 
and desiring symbolic success. 
Unsurprisingly, after being told (not by me) he should not frequent strip clubs or 
masturbate to online pornography, John told me that his impulses to go to a strip club or 
to look at pornography had increased.  There is a strip club near the office where John 
attended group psychotherapy sessions, and after group one week John said he ―drove 
there just to see where it was‖ but did not go inside.  In work with neurotics, prohibition 
only increases the strength of their desires.  The proper role of the psychotherapist, 
therefore, is not one of judgment, but as the placeholder for the patient‘s unconscious and 
as the object-cause of the patient‘s desire to continue the work of psychotherapy.  I hope 
that John continued his psychotherapeutic work with his next psychotherapist. 
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Chapter IX: Conclusions, Limitations, and Suggestions for Future Research:  
 Treatment Recommendations for Work with Neurotic and Perverse Sex Offenders 
 
The success of treatment for sex offenders hinges upon making a differential 
diagnosis between neurosis and perversion.  In the preceding chapters in this dissertation, 
I compared and contrasted with neurosis my elucidation of the etiology of perversion and 
the pervert‘s relation to language, the Other, and the drives.  In this concluding chapter, I 
will discuss the clinical implications of my findings and correspondingly make 
recommendations to clinicians who work with sex offenders.   
Mandated Treatment  
 
Compromised Confidentiality 
In many cases, work with sex offenders is mandated or ―suggested‖ by the 
government, and in those cases the confidentiality of the patient is compromised to 
varying degrees.  In general, individual treatment (regardless of theoretical orientation) 
will be maximally effective in situations in which the greatest possible amount of 
confidentiality and respect for the patient‘s privacy can be maintained.  When individual 
psychotherapy is conducted in a forensic context, the necessity to communicate the 
patient‘s involvement and attendance in treatment to the parole or probation officer (PO) 
is one basic way in which standard confidentiality rights must be decreased.  Beyond that 
basic compromise of standard confidentiality rights, it is largely up to the judgment of the 
PO and the clinician to decide to what further degree the standard rights to confidentiality 
and to privacy will be compromised.  Clinicians should be reflective about this decision 
and speculate how their communications with POs might affect the treatment. 
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In situations in which the clinician and PO grant no rights to confidentiality or to 
privacy to the treatment participant, the patient‘s rights as a citizen are violated.  
Essentially, the message to the patient is the following: ―Everything you say can and will 
be used against you; you must speak, but you do not have the right to have a lawyer 
present.‖  When the patient is afraid to speak his or her mind, no real psychotherapeutic 
progress can be made.  The patient will be motivated to lie and to say what s/he thinks the 
therapist and the law want her or him to say.  It will also be difficult for the patient to 
trust that the therapist is on his side, so to speak.  Uncensored speech and trust in the 
therapist are two of the fundamental elements of a successful psychotherapy.  If the 
patient knows that his speech will be shared with his PO, then he will be unable to 
thoroughly question his identity and choices and therefore largely unable to benefit from 
individual therapy.   
The forensic rationale for compromised confidentiality and privacy is that the 
patient has committed a criminal offense and that, in order to best protect the public 
(from the risk of recidivism), a) the patient needs treatment and b) the PO has a right to 
know about the patient‘s ―treatment progress‖ related to his or her offense in order to 
assess the patient‘s level of risk for a future offense or to take action if the patient reveals 
to the therapist that s/he has violated the terms of her or his probation or parole.  It is my 
contention that for the benefit of the patient‘s treatment goals in addition to those of the 
government, standard confidentiality and privacy rights should only be compromised in 
two ways: one, that the therapist inform the PO about the patient‘s attendance to sessions, 
and two, that the therapist inform the PO if and when the patient admits to re-offending.   
312 
 
The relapse prevention treatment model is the only model whose goals of 
treatment are not almost completely destroyed by full disclosure to the PO about the 
patient‘s speech and participation in treatment.  This is because the relapse prevention 
model is an educational model that aims to teach sex offenders coping skills for the 
prevention of committing another crime.  However, as I argued in the introductory 
chapters of this dissertation, the relapse prevention model has only a small to moderate 
effect on preventing recidivism, and there is inevitably a subset of each treatment group 
for whom treatment fails entirely.  A significant number of individuals in these subsets 
are likely perversely structured. 
Treatment efficacy for work with both perverse and neurotic sex offenders would 
be improved if the following conditions were met:  
a) Deviating from standard patient rights to privacy and to confidentiality 
for the purpose of communicating with POs should be kept to a 
minimum (i.e., informing POs that the patient is continuing her or his 
treatment and if she or he has committed a new offense) and clearly 
shared with the patient at the outset of treatment.  There is often a 
significant amount of discretion left to forensic clinicians as to what 
degree of confidentiality to give to the patient‘s treatment, but in cases 
in which the PO demands more information, every effort should be 
made to collaboratively inform the PO about the benefits of confidential 
treatment that respects the privacy of the patient. 
b) POs should not incarcerate their patients for things like missing a few 
sessions or failing a polygraph.  Instead, POs should consider the 
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benefits of letting the clinician handle such things within the treatment 
itself.  As another option, in certain cases the PO might consider 
extending the probation or parole sentence of the patient as an 
alternative to incarceration.  From the perspective of a cost/benefit 
analysis, treatment and probation are much less costly than incarceration 
and much more likely to result in the prevention of recidivism.   
Prevention of Recidivism: The Primary Goal of Forensic Individual Psychotherapy? 
Somewhat paradoxically, I argue that if prevention of recidivism was not viewed 
as the primary goal of individual treatment
118—pride of place being given, instead, to the 
goals the patient makes him- or herself (including the larger goal of completing a 
psychotherapy)—then treatment would be more effective in preventing recidivism.  
Clinicians should consider that sex offenses are very often symptomatic behaviors.  And 
a symptom—for both neurotic and perverse individuals—is the subject‘s attempt at a 
solution to a problem.  Exclusive focus on avoidance of recidivism means that the 
clinician tries to remove the patient‘s attempt at a solution without addressing the 
underlying problems.  Each person‘s symptom—no matter how much resemblance it may 
bear to that of others—is highly individual and grows out of a particular family and social 
context.  In exploring the symbolic and real order determinants of the patient‘s symptom, 
the patient can be assisted in the process of calling his whole self into question and 
finding alternative (hopefully legal) ways of being in the world.  In this way, relapse 
prevention will be an effect or benefit of treatment rather than the primary aim. 
                                               
118 The patient‘s individual psychotherapy in which avoidance of recidivism is not the primary goal will not 
get in the way of the patient‘s participation in a psycho-educational group treatment in which avoidance of 
recidivism is the primary stated goal.   
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What is more, if the clinician demands that prevention of recidivism be the focus 
of the patient‘s individual treatment, then the patient may feel that other—probably 
related—problems in his life are unworthy of discussion.  For example, if I had insisted 
to Ray (Chapter VII) that his relationships with his parents were secondary to and 
separate from his exhibitionism, then he may not have spoken about his parents as much 
and realized the many ways in which his relationships with his parents were intimately 
related to his acts of indecent exposure.  Finally, if the patient is able to choose his own 
issues to work on in psychotherapy, he is more likely to continue his therapy (and take 
personal responsibility for working on his problems) after it ceases to be mandated.   
Group psychotherapy without individual psychotherapy is much less effective 
than the two in conjunction.  Group treatment leaders and participants tend to assume 
homogeneity amongst participants‘ problems.  In some psychoeducational-based (relapse 
prevention or dialectical behavior therapy) groups, the unstated (often erroneous) 
assumption is that if participants had learned better empathy, coping, and communication 
skills before their offenses they would have never committed sex offenses at all.  
Individual psychotherapy is essential to giving sex offenders the chance to explore their 
individual identities and histories as they relate to their offenses.   
Regardless of how much government and even patients themselves would like 
treatment for psychological problems that result in criminal offenses to be as quick and 
clearly-defined as is most Western medical treatment, it is not.  There is no substitute for 
intensive long-term individual psychotherapeutic work.  There is no quick fix.  
Psychotropic drugs are only temporary solutions, but may sometimes be useful in 
enabling the patient to begin the work of psychotherapy and build an alliance with the 
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psychotherapist.  On the other hand, psychotropic medications can sometimes be barriers 
to effective psychotherapeutic treatment.  For example, feelings of anxiety or sadness are 
human experiences that need not necessarily be shied away from or deemed pathological; 
if anything, the success of working through one‘s suffering (which includes combinations 
of thoughts and affects) depends upon having an affective experience within the 
therapeutic setting.
119
  Ultimately, the decision of whether or not to take psychotropic 
medication should be left up to the patient.  
Guilt-based Treatment Interventions 
As I elucidated in Chapters V and VI, perverse individuals experience 
significantly less guilt and have significantly less capacity for guilt than do neurotic 
individuals, and this is a permanent structural fact.  Therefore, forensic treatment 
interventions that are based on increasing the patient‘s sense of guilt (in the hope that 
guilt will prevent them from re-offending) will most likely be ineffective in work with 
perverse sex offenders.  Repeated efforts to appeal to the pervert‘s sense of guilt are 
likely to cause the pervert to lose faith in the therapist and will undermine the therapy.   
On the other hand, in work with neurotic offenders, it will probably be somewhat 
effective to increase ―victim awareness‖—empathy for the victim—so as to increase 
guilt.  Even so, increased feelings of guilt do not necessarily translate to the prevention of 
recidivism, and the possible causal link between the two is beyond the scope of this 
                                               
119 In long-term work with a sadistic patient, psychotherapy had seemed ―stuck‖ for a period of a few 
months during which the patient recalled very few dreams, lacked curiosity about himself, and presented 
with much less anxiety and discontent than he had previously.  He revealed that he had been taking 
(without the knowledge of his psychiatrist) twice his usual dose (400mg) of Seroquel, an anti-psychotic 
drug with a sedating effect.  The patient had a previous (mis)diagnosis of bi-polar disorder with psychotic 
features, given to him by the psychiatrist who continued to prescribe him Seroquel.  The patient thought 
beneficial the sedating effect of the drug, and had gradually increased his dosage in his attempt to feel 
content and to decrease his sexual desires and feelings of anger.  The patient decided, however, that 800mg 
was too much, and so he informed his psychiatrist of his current dosage and weaned himself back down to 
400mg a day.  The progression of the psychotherapy improved as a result. 
316 
 
dissertation.  Furthermore, if there is a proper place for provoking guilt in patients it is in 
group work—not in individual psychotherapy.  No matter how abhorrent the crimes 
committed by the sex offender, the individual psychotherapist should not play the role of 
judge or priest.  This is because providing judgments is likely to have a detrimental effect 
on individual psychotherapy.  When an individual therapist tells patients that certain 
behaviors or fantasies are bad or abnormal—that what patients thought or did was 
morally reprehensible (even if, by common ethical standards, this was the case), those 
patients are likely to stop talking about them in psychotherapy even though those 
behaviors and fantasies persist in their lives.  Because speech is the primary vehicle of 
psychotherapy, when a patient stops talking about something the therapist will be unable 
to foster any change in that area of the patient‘s life.   
Prohibitions as Treatment Interventions 
Furthermore, when a therapist prohibits something to a neurotic patient it often 
increases the patient‘s desire to do the forbidden thing.  For example, after John was 
advised to avoid looking at online pornography for a while, his desire to do so amplified.  
Because of the strength of the transferential bond between patient and individual 
therapist, this effect is potentially magnified when an individual therapist prohibits 
something to his or her patient.  Nevertheless, the duty of the psychoeducational group 
therapist and the PO is to place prohibitions on certain of the patient‘s activities; fears of 
re-incarceration, the desire to be a good person, and the desire to avoid future social and 
personal repercussions should, in the vast majority of cases, suffice to outweigh the 
potential increase in the patient‘s desires to re-offend.   
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In contrast, prohibition has no such desire-increasing effect on a perverse patient.  
A perverse patient will be especially likely to heed prohibitions if they are given by a 
trusted group psychotherapist whom the patient has put in the position of symbolic Other.  
In many cases, perverse patients are looking for ways to bolster their paternal functions, 
and a group therapist whom the pervert ―elects‖ to the position of symbolic Other can 
have a good deal of influence on the patient as the subject-supposed-to-No!  This will 
only be possible, however, if the patient puts the therapist in the position of symbolic 
Other; if the patient relates to the therapist on the imaginary plane—as an other like 
himself—then the group therapist‘s prohibitions will have no therapeutic effect.  
Consequently, the therapist should look for signs that the patient is speaking to her or him 
as a symbolic Other before advising the patient to abstain from doing something.  Such 
signs often include the patient‘s admissions that there is some kind of knowledge—
namely, unconscious knowledge—that is at work in her or him of which s/he her- or 
himself is ignorant, but about which the therapist is a knowledgeable authority.  So too is 
symbolic transference evident when the patient thinks of the therapist as being the cause 
of her or his desire to be curious about himself and put his understandings of his life into 
question.  It is also best if the patient expresses the desire to stop doing that activity on 
his own before the group therapist enunciates her or his prohibition.  That way, the 
patient takes what is considered in the forensic field to be personal responsibility for the 
desire to stop doing something. 
In contrast to an individual psychotherapist, then, a group psychotherapist may 
accept the position of the subject-supposed-to-No! and occasionally give individualized 
advice to a perverse patient.  It is best, however, that the group therapist mainly facilitate 
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the patient‘s work in group (perhaps highlighting manifestations of the patient‘s 
unconscious) so that s/he does not diminish the authority of his symbolic position and so 
that the patient also feels encouraged to question his own thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviors.  In other words, group therapist can make the majority of her or his helpful 
interventions for the sake of the perverse patient from the position of someone 
encouraging the patient to do the work of group psychotherapy. 
The paternal function-bolstering effects of the interventions of the group therapist, 
however, will only last as long as the perverse patient has a therapeutic relationship with 
the therapist.  For that reason, the group should be long-term in nature, and the patient 
should be encouraged to continue attending group sessions well beyond the duration of 
his probation or parole sentence.  Because relapse prevention is a finite subject, long-term 
groups should be psychodynamic or process-oriented in nature, for they may 
consequently assist patients in a more individualized manner by attuning to more than 
superficial behaviors and thoughts.   
Individual Psychotherapy with Perverse Patients 
 
In individual therapy with a perverse patient, the therapist should take care to 
neither accept nor reject the position of subject-supposed-to-No!  The patient‘s 
projections that the therapist is a subject-supposed-to-No! will suffice to engender the 
temporary therapeutic effect (that is, the propping up of the paternal function).  If the 
individual therapist accepts this position, s/he will run the risk of keeping the therapy of 
the pervert stuck at that level—the level of demand rather than desire.  Being stuck at the 
level of the Other‘s demand was what engendered the pervert‘s structural position.  
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Working at the level of demand results in the patient remaining very closely tied to the 
Other rather than moving toward separation.   
Because the pervert is to some extent a subject in the symbolic realm, every effort 
should be made to work on behalf of the patient‘s Eros.  In other words, the therapist 
should situate the therapeutic work at the level of desire, striving to increase the pervert‘s 
ability to desire so as to limit the pervert‘s excessive jouissance and enable the pervert to 
reclaim his body and subjectivity from the Other.  In practice, this means that the 
therapist will strive to orient the treatment in much the same way as s/he does with 
neurotic patients.  The treatment will bear the most similarity to work with hysterics 
because of the structural similarities between the pervert‘s and the hysteric‘s position in 
relation to the Other as object a.  Dreams, fantasies, free association, talking about the 
past, and parapraxes are the fundamentals of psychodynamic psychotherapy with both 
neurotic and perverse patients.   
Situating the work at the symbolic level of desire means, for one thing, that the 
therapist should avoid responding to the patient‘s requests for advice and interpretation.  
Although it is common for patients at the beginning stages of their psychotherapy to see 
their psychotherapists as subjects-supposed-to-know, the psychotherapist should not fall 
prey to the trap of believing that s/he holds privileged knowledge about the patient and 
what is good for him (or that if s/he does not give him advice, no one else in the patient‘s 
life will do so; in the vast majority of cases, the patient gets plenty of advice from his PO, 
his group therapist and fellow participants, and his friends and family).  Interpreting from 
the position of subject-supposed-to-know incites an imaginary order relationship of 
rivalry with the patient in which the patient sooner or later tries to disprove the therapist‘s 
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theories and interpretations.  Working at the level of demand means giving knowledge to 
the patient and fostering a relationship which is based on the patient‘s dependency on that 
knowledge.  In providing the patient with ready-made interpretations, the therapist puts 
words into the patient‘s mouth and stymies the patient‘s own curiosity about himself.   
Working at the symbolic level of desire, however, involves the therapist‘s 
expressions of desire that the patient do the work of psychotherapy.  Correspondingly, the 
therapist should aim to be positioned in the transference as the object-cause of the 
perverse patient‘s desire to participate in psychotherapy and as the placeholder for the 
patient‘s unconscious.  This transferential position enables the patient to work through 
(via emotive speech) his issues with the Other. 
Another way in which Lacan described the analytic progress of a subject is ―the 
constant culmination of the subject‘s assumption of his own mirages‖ (Lacan, 
1953/2006a, p. 251).  One of the functions of the analytic method is to enable the subject 
to discover something about his unconscious, realizing that what he took to be his own 
individual thoughts and desires are actually ones he appropriated from the Other.  The 
subject calls who he thinks he is—the sum total of his ego misidentifications—radically 
into question.  The therapist aims to get the patient to speak about his experiences, 
fantasies, and dreams, to associate to them, and to be interested in possible Other, 
unconscious meanings of his utterances.   
A difficult and delicate stage of the pervert‘s treatment is the beginning stage.  It 
is more difficult to get mandated a perverse patient than a mandated neurotic patient to 
question who he is and why he has become who he is.  This is the question that 
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psychodynamic psychotherapy aims to answer.  This question, when unanswered, is what 
drives the patient to undergo psychotherapy.   
Individuals usually request to begin psychotherapy when there are in the middle 
of what Fink (1997) called a ―jouissance crisis‖ (p. 9).  In other words, a person‘s 
symptom has ceased to provide him with the amount of jouissance to which he was 
accustomed, and he wants therapy to help him repair his symptom to its former 
functionality.  The person who requests therapy is suffering and wants to feel better.  
Instead of giving the patient what he thinks he wants (which is to return to the way things 
were before), the therapist‘s job is to increase the patient‘s curiosity about himself and to 
show him that his current answers to the question of being (of identity) are inadequate.  
In so doing, the therapist offers the patient a substitute satisfaction derived from the 
transference relationship and from deciphering manifestations of the unconscious.  A 
jouissance crisis, then, opens the door for the patient to begin asking the question of who 
he is.   
Perverse individuals request therapy significantly less often than do neurotic 
individuals because they tend to experience subjective state of satisfaction associated 
with their greater amount of jouissance.  It is comparatively rare that perverts undergo a 
jouissance crisis.  Mandated treatment is one common way in which a pervert finds his 
way into a consultation room.  Because the patient usually needs to see himself as lacking 
in satisfaction in order to begin doing therapeutic work, it is very important that the 
therapist of a perverse patient help the patient isolate problematic areas of his life and talk 
about them.  Without experiencing some kind of lack in himself or his life, the perverse 
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patient will not get much benefit out of treatment.  The therapist must help inscribe this 
lack in the perverse patient in the form of a complaint or a question of being. 
Without being faced with his own lack, the pervert will attempt to play his usual 
role with the therapist: the role of the object-cause of the Other‘s jouissance.  In this role, 
the pervert effectively gains jouissance from the therapy and circumvents facing his own 
subjective lack.  The role of object-cause of the Other‘s jouissance might take 
―innocuous‖ forms, such as persistently trying to make the therapist laugh or even trying 
to be a model patient.  The pervert might also attempt to bring jouissance to the therapist 
by causing the therapist anxiety.  Sometimes, the pervert might do so by reducing the 
therapist to a passive observer of the pervert‘s crimes.  If at the beginning of a 
psychotherapy the pervert plays this role with the therapist for very long, it will likely 
ruin the therapist‘s chance of ever being placed as object a for the pervert‘s desire to do 
the work of psychotherapy.  In cases in which this has occurred, the therapist should refer 
the patient to another therapist.   
The therapist‘s position in the transference as the subject-supposed-to-know 
commonly results from the patient‘s jouissance crisis.  It is from the experience of 
suffering that the patient, half out of hope, sees the therapist as someone who is an expert 
on suffering and can help him.  Thus, another way of stating the difficulty involved at the 
beginning of the pervert‘s treatment is that it is harder for the individual or group 
psychotherapist of a pervert to be placed in the position of subject-supposed-to-know.  
Neither the individual nor the group psychotherapist will succeed in obtaining this 
position (in the eyes of the perverse patient) if s/he is found to be somehow fraudulent 
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with respect to the law (bending the rules of therapy, for instance)
120
 or if s/he appears to 
gain jouissance from her or his work with the perverse patient.   
In terms of the latter, perverts have a keen eye for jouissance and will usually try 
to accentuate the jouissance of Others.  As a result, it is very important that the group 
therapist and individual therapist alike maintain a stance of analytic neutrality or 
abstinence.  In other words, in work with perverse patients, group and individual 
therapists should maintain neutrality as much as possible and refrain from any position 
of enjoyment.  The therapist thus steps entirely outside of the pervert’s game of providing 
the Other with jouissance.  Toward this end, the therapist should not self-disclose at all.  
It will be detrimental to the work if the therapist shares personal information or thoughts 
and feelings s/he has about the experience of working with the perverse patient.  The 
pervert could potentially use all of this information to ascertain how best to bring 
jouissance to the therapist.  (What is more, the therapist‘s self-disclosure often leads the 
patient to position the therapist on the imaginary plane as an other like himself.  
Imaginary order work does little to help the patient.)  When the pervert plays the role of 
object a, it gets in the way of the treatment and of letting the therapist play object a as 
cause of the patient‘s desire to do the work of therapy.  The therapist‘s neutrality is a 
condition for the possibility of the pervert facing his own lack and relinquishing his role 
in the therapy as object a. 
Importantly, the therapist‘s refusal to let the patient cause her or him jouissance 
(or to use the patient for her or his own enjoyment) avoids a recreation of the traumatic 
relationship between the patient and his mOther.  When the therapist practices analytic 
                                               
120 Perverts are especially good at identifying the hypocrisies of those who pose as symbolic authorities but 
do not consistently adhere to well-established rules.  
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neutrality, the pervert‘s expectations of the Other will be subverted to some extent.  The 
therapist who practices analytic neutrality allows and encourages the pervert to begin the 
long and never complete
121
 process of separating from the Other.  Once the therapist 
attains the position of subject-supposed-to-know in the transference with a perverse 
patient, s/he will be able to transition to serve as cause of the pervert‘s desire to do 
therapy if s/he neither refuses nor accepts the position of subject-supposed-to-know.   
In work with perverse patients who have committed crimes
122
 and are mandated 
to treatment, it is essential that the therapist clearly define her or his relationship to the 
law at the outset of treatment.  The therapist should define exactly what degree of 
confidentiality the patient has in the treatment (i.e., when and how often the individual 
therapist will communicate with the PO and what information will be revealed).  It is 
crucial that the therapist avoid violating the waiver of confidentiality in this regard in the 
course of the treatment.  If the therapist goes back on her or his word, there is a danger 
that the perverse patient will see the therapist as fraudulent with respect to the law, and 
this will undermine the treatment.   
Sometimes, even after the perverse patient has begun to do the work of 
psychotherapy, the pervert might try to provoke the therapist to manifest jouissance.  The 
equanimity with which the therapist responds might only lead to the escalation of the 
pervert‘s efforts.  If it becomes necessary, the therapist might have to make a transference 
interpretation.  Beyond that, the psychotherapist might have to make the continuation of 
the therapy contingent upon the patient‘s ceasing to engage in behaviors outside of the 
therapy (such as engaging in sadistic sexual acts).   
                                               
121 It is structurally impossible for neurotic and perverse patients to completely separate from the Other, 
because they are permanently subjects in the symbolic order—the order of the Other. 
122 It is a common occurrence that neither fetishists nor masochists become involved in the legal system.   
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Common Countertransference Reactions 
 
 Sex offenders are an almost universally hated and feared population.  The 
homogenizing effect of prejudice does not escape them, as people tend to view sex 
offenders as all being child molesters or rapists even though a variety of offenses can 
cause a person to show up on the national registry for sex offenders.  Corresponding to 
the ―victim awareness‖ that is often taught to sex offenders in order to increase their 
empathy for their past and potential victims, perhaps ―offender awareness‖ should be 
taught to some forensic clinicians who work with sex offenders.  Of course, the crimes 
perpetrated by sex offenders are harmful to others, morally and legally wrong, but hatred 
of and moral repugnance for sex offenders should not orient the way in which 
psychological treatment for sex offenders is conducted.  If clinicians who work with sex 
offenders find themselves regularly overwhelmed by feelings of disgust and hatred and 
notice that their treatment interventions are affected by these feelings, then measures 
should be taken to correct this.  Those measures might range from ―offender awareness‖ 
to supervision to undergoing analysis to working with different types of patients.   
 Another common countertransference pitfall is when neurotic clinicians become 
fascinated by the jouissance of perverse sex offenders.  Neurotics often assume or 
fantasize that the pervert has access to immense amounts of pleasure in comparison to 
their own restricted jouissance.  In reality, as I have illustrated in this dissertation, the 
excessive jouissance of perverts is not as good as it seems.  If the perverse patient 
suspects that the therapist is deriving jouissance from listening to him talk about his 
exploits, then the therapeutic work will be compromised.  A clinician should listen to and 
punctuate the speech of a perverse patient not with his ego, not on the imaginary plane of 
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fascination and jealousy, but from a symbolic position of desiring the patient to do the 
work of therapy.  If the patient talks about certain things solely to provoke the interest 
and jouissance of the therapist, then the therapist should indicate that s/he is not 
interested in such material.   
Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research 
 
Fink‘s and Tostain‘s rich case studies of fetishism and my case study of an 
exhibitionist patient provide solid foundations from which to explore the topic of clinical 
work with fetishists and exhibitionists.  However, a major limitation of this dissertation is 
that I was not able to include case studies of clinical work with a voyeur, a masochist, 
and a sadist.  Likewise, although I presented a hermeneutic reading of what Lacan said 
about fetishism, exhibitionism, and voyeurism, future qualitative research should focus 
on hermeneutic readings of what Lacan said about masochism and sadism.  Finally, I 
addressed only briefly the question of whether or not women can be perverts, and so a 
more in-depth exploration of the topic is warranted.   
Results of Treatment with Perverse Patients 
 
 Long-term psychotherapy, perhaps in combination with a long-term group 
therapy, will yield the most benefits to the perverse patient.  In that regard, 
psychoanalysts and psychodynamic psychotherapists should consider doing contract 
work with state parole and federal probation so as to provide improved treatment for sex 
offenders.  Many patients are likely to continue their psychotherapy beyond their parole 
or probation sentence.  Lacan‘s various definitions of the endpoint of analysis would 
warrant a book-length study, and so I will restrict myself here to making a few key points 
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with regard to the benefits of undergoing psychoanalysis.  These benefits are much the 
same for the pervert as they are for the neurotic.   
 The process of analysis allows the analysand to further separate from the Other 
and, as much as possible, to live his life in accordance with his desires rather than those 
of the Other.  Dialectization of the subject‘s desire decreases anxiety and fixations, and, 
in the case of the pervert, limits his jouissance.  In general, the analysand‘s suffering is 
decreased as an effect of the analysis and he feels able to fully enjoy and derive meaning 
from life.  The endpoint of analysis for neurotics also entails a kind of ultimate 
assumption of responsibility for one‘s life.   
 Therapeutic work with perverse patients is likely to be significantly longer in 
duration than therapeutic work with neurotic patients.  Psychotherapy with a perverse 
patient will involve assisting the client in creating solutions to bolster his paternal 
function.  In that vein, through the process of psychotherapy the pervert will find 
signifiers that will temporarily function to signify the Other‘s desire and bolster his 
paternal function.  Clinical work with perverse patients can not only result in vast 
improvements in diverse areas of the subject‘s life but can also result in the prevention of 
recidivism.   
 
 
 
328 
 
Appendix 1 
329 
 
 
330 
 
References 
 
American Psychiatric Association (1980). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental  
 
disorders (third edition).  Washington, D. C.: American Psychiatric Publishing.   
 
American Psychiatric Association (2000). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental  
 
disorders (fourth edition, text revision).  Washington, D. C.: American  
 
Psychiatric Publishing.   
 
André, S. (2006). The structure of perversion: A Lacanian perspective. In D. Nobus and  
 
L. Downing (Eds.), Perversion: Psychoanalytic perspectives/perspectives on  
 
psychoanalysis (pp. 109-125). Karnac: London. 
 
Bickley, J., & Beech, A.R. (2003). Implications for treatment of sexual offenders of the  
 
Ward and Hudson model of relapse. Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and  
 
Treatment, 15, 121-134.  
 
Bond, H. (2009). Lacan at the scene. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.   
 
Brousse, M.-H. (1995). The Drive (II). In R. Feldstein, B. Fink, & M. Jaanus (Eds.),  
 
Reading seminar XI: Lacan’s four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis (pp.  
 
109-118). Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. 
 
Bureau of Justice Statistics (2001). Prisoners in 2000 (NCJ-188207). Washington, D.C.:  
 
U.S. Government Printing Office. 
 
Calef, V., Weinshel, E., Renik, O., & Lloyd Mayer, E. (1980). Enuresis: A functional  
 
equivalent of a fetish. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 61, 295-305. 
 
Cavendish, M. (2009). Sex and society, volume 1. Tarrytown, NY: Marshall Cavendish  
 
Reference.  
 
 
331 
 
Chasseguet-Smirgel, J. (1974). Perversion, idealization and sublimation. International  
 
Journal of Psychoanalysis, 55, 349. 
 
Clavreul, J. (1980). The perverse couple. In Schneiderman, S. (Ed.), How Lacan’s ideas  
 
are used in clinical practice (pp. 215-233). New Jersey and London: Jason  
 
Aronson.  
 
Coen, E., Coen, J., Diliberto, D., Graf, R., Roybal, M., & Rudin, S. (Producers), & Coen,  
 
E. & Coen, J. (Directors). (2007). No country for old men [Motion Picture].  
 
United States: Paramount. 
 
Derrida, J. (1998). Monolingualism of the other or the prosthesis of origin.  (P. Mensah,  
 
Trans.). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. (Original work published 1996) 
 
Dor, J. (2001). Structure and perversions. (S. Fairfield, Trans.). New York: Other Press. 
 
Evans, D. (1996). An introductory dictionary of Lacanian psychoanalysis. London and  
 
New York: Routledge. 
 
Fink, B. (1995). The Lacanian subject: Between language and jouissance. Princeton, NJ:  
 
Princeton University Press. 
 
Fink, B. (1996). The nature of unconscious thought or why no one ever reads Lacan‘s  
 
postface to the ―seminar on ‗the purloined letter.‘‖ In R. Feldstein, B. Fink, & M.  
 
Jaanus (Eds.), Reading seminars I and II: Lacan’s return to Freud (pp. 173-191).  
 
Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. 
 
Fink, B. (1997). A clinical introduction to Lacanian psychoanalysis: Theory and  
 
practice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Fink, B. (2003). The use of Lacanian psychoanalysis in a case of fetishism. Clinical Case 
 
Studies, 2, 1, 50-69. 
 
332 
 
Fink, B. (2007). Fundamentals of psychoanalytic technique: A Lacanian approach for  
 
practitioners. New York: W.W. Norton & Co. 
 
Fischer, C. (1994). Individualizing Psychological Assessment: A Collaborative and  
 
Therapeutic Approach. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
 
Foucault, M. (1990). The history of sexuality volume I: An introduction. (R. Hurley,  
 
Trans.). New York, NY: Vintage Books. (Original work published 1976) 
 
Freud, S. (1950). Project for a scientific psychology. In J. Strachey (Ed.  
 
and Trans.), The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund  
 
Freud (Vol. 1, pp. 281-391). London: Hogarth Press. (Original work published  
 
1895)  
 
Freud, S. (1953a). Three essays on sexuality: I: The sexual aberrations. In J. Strachey  
 
(Ed. and Trans.), The standard edition of the complete psychological works of  
 
Sigmund Freud (Vol. 7, pp. 135-172). London: Hogarth Press. (Original work  
 
published 1905)  
 
Freud, S. (1953b). Three essays on sexuality: II: Infantile sexuality. In J. Strachey (Ed.  
 
and Trans.), The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund  
 
Freud (Vol. 7, pp. 173-206). London: Hogarth Press. (Original work published  
 
1905)  
 
Freud, S. (1955). Analysis of a phobia in a five-year-old boy. In J. Strachey (Ed. and  
 
Trans.), The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund  
 
Freud (Vol. 10, pp. 3-149). London: Hogarth Press. (Original work published  
 
1909)  
 
 
 
333 
 
Freud, S. (1958). Recommendations to physicians practicing psycho-analysis. In J.  
 
Strachey (Ed. and Trans.), The standard edition of the complete psychological  
 
works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 12, pp. 111-120). London: Hogarth Press.  
 
(Original work published 1912)  
 
Freud, S. (1961). Fetishism. In J. Strachey (Ed. and Trans.), The standard edition of the  
 
complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 21, p. 149). London:  
 
Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1927)  
 
Freud, S. (1964). Splitting of the ego in the process of defence. In J. Strachey (Ed.  
 
and Trans.), The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund  
 
Freud (Vol. 23, p. 273). London: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1940)  
 
Geertz, C. (1977). The interpretation of cultures. New York: Basic Books Classics. 
 
Glasser, M. (1978). The role of the super-ego in exhibitionism. International Journal of  
 
Psycho-Analysis and Psychotherapy, 7, 333-353. 
 
Goldman, Y. (2004). Neurosis and Fantasy: Lacanian Theory and Case 
 
Conceptualization Though Three Case Studies. (Doctoral Dissertation, Duquesne 
 
University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 2004) 
 
Good, M. (2000). Perverse defenses: A clinical vignette. Modern Psychoanalysis, 25, 2,  
 
199-205.  
 
Greenacre, P. (1968). Perversions: General considerations regarding their genetic and  
 
dynamic background. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 23, 47. 
 
Habermas, J. (1972). Knowledge and human interests. (J. Shapiro, Trans.). Boston:  
 
Beacon.  
 
 
 
334 
 
Hall, G. C. N. (1995). Sexual offender recidivism revisited: A meta-analysis of recent  
 
treatment studies. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 63, 802–809. 
 
Hanson, R. K., Gordon, A., Harris, A. J. R., Marques, J. K., Murphy, W., Quinsey, V. L.,  
 
& Seto, M. C. (2002). First report of the collaborative outcome data project on the  
 
effectiveness of psychological treatment for sex offenders. Sexual Abuse: A  
 
Journal of Research and Treatment, 14, 169–194. 
 
Hanson, K. R., & Morton-Bourgon, K. E. (2005). The characteristics of persistent sexual  
 
offenders: A meta-analysis of recidivism studies. Journal of Consulting and  
 
Clinical Psychology, 73, 6, 60022-006X.   
 
Hare, R. D. (2003). Manual for the Revised Psychopathy Checklist (2nd ed.). Toronto,  
 
ON, Canada: Multi-Health Systems. 
 
Hegel, G.W.F. (1977). Phenomenology of Spirit. (A. Miller, Trans.). Oxford: Clarendon  
 
Press. (Original work published 1807) 
 
Hudson, S. M., & Ward, T. (2000). Clinical implications of the self-regulation model. In  
 
Laws, D.R., Hudson, S.M., & Ward, T. (Eds.), Remaking relapse prevention with  
 
sex offenders: A sourcebook (pp. 102-122). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.  
 
Irigaray, L. (1977). This sex which is not one. (C. Porter with C. Burke, Trans.). Cornell,  
 
NY: Cornell University Press.  
 
Jakobson, R. & Halle, M. (1971). Fundamentals of language (2
nd
 ed.). The Hague:  
 
Mouton. (Original work published 1956) 
 
Kernberg, O., & Michels, R. (2009). Borderline personality disorder. The American  
 
Journal of Psychiatry. 166, 5, 505-508. 
 
 
 
335 
 
Kinsey, A. (1998). Sexual behavior in the human male. Bloomington, IN: Indiana  
 
University Press. (Original work published 1948) 
 
Klein, R. (2007). Gaze and representation. In V. Voruz and B. Wolf (Eds.), The later  
 
Lacan: An introduction (pp. 180-190). Albany, NY: State University of  
 
New York Press.  
 
Krafft-Ebing, R. (1922). Psychopathia sexualis. (F. Rebman, Trans.). New York:  
 
Physicians and Surgeons Book Co. (Original work published 1886) 
 
Kvale, S. (2003). The psychoanalytical interview as inspiration for qualitative research.  
 
In P. Camic, J. Rhodes, & L. Yardley (Eds.), Qualitative research in psychology:  
 
Expanding perspectives in methodology and design (pp. 275-297). Washington  
 
D.C.: American Psychological Association. 
 
Lacan, J. (1975). Le séminaire livre XXII: R.S.I., 1974-1975. (Ed. J.-A. Miller).  
 
Ornicar?, 2, p. 104. 
 
Lacan, J. (1977). Desire and the interpretation of desire in Hamlet. Yale French Studies,  
 
55-56. 
 
Lacan, J. (1991a). The seminar of Jacques Lacan, book I: Freud’s papers on technique,  
 
1953-1954. (J.-A. Miller, Ed.; J. Forrester, Trans.). New York: W.W. Norton &  
 
Co. (Original work published 1975) 
 
Lacan, J. (1991b). The seminar of Jacques Lacan, book II: The ego in Freud’s theory  
 
and in the technique of psychoanalysis, 1954-1955. (J.-A. Miller, Ed.; S.  
 
Tomaselli, Trans.). New York: W.W. Norton & Co. (Original work published  
 
1978) 
 
Lacan, J. (1994). Le séminaire livre IV: La relation d’ objet, 1956-1957. Paris: Seuil.  
 
336 
 
Lacan, J. (1997a). The seminar of Jacques Lacan, book III: The psychoses, 1955-1956.  
 
(J.-A. Miller, Ed.; R. Grigg, Trans.). New York: W.W. Norton & Co. (Original  
 
work published 1981)  
 
Lacan, J. (1997b). The seminar of Jacques Lacan, book VII: The ethics of psychoanalysis,  
 
1959-1960. (J.-A. Miller, Ed.; D. Porter, Trans.). New York: W.W. Norton & Co.  
 
(Original work published 1986)  
 
Lacan, J. (1998a). The seminar of Jacques Lacan, book XI: The four fundamental  
 
concepts of psychoanalysis. (J.-A. Miller, Ed.; A. Sheridan, Trans.). New York:  
 
W.W. Norton & Co. (Original work published 1973)  
 
Lacan, J. (1998b). The seminar of Jacques Lacan, book XX: On feminine sexuality, the  
 
limits of love and knowledge: Encore, 1972-1973. (J.-A. Miller, Ed.; B. Fink,  
 
Trans.). New York: W.W. Norton & Co. (Original work published 1975) 
 
Lacan, J. (2001). Le séminaire livre VIII: Le transfert, 1960-1961. Paris: Seuil. 
 
Lacan, J. (2004). Le séminaire livre X: L’angoisse, 1962-1963. Paris: Seuil.  
 
Lacan, J. (2006a). The mirror stage as formative of the I function as revealed in  
 
psychoanalytic experience. In Lacan, J., Écrits: the first complete edition in  
 
English. (B. Fink, Trans.). New York: W.W. Norton & Co. (Original work  
 
published 1949) 
 
Lacan, J. (2006a). The function and field of speech and language in psychoanalysis. In  
 
Lacan, J., Écrits: the first complete edition in English. (B. Fink, Trans.). New  
 
York: W.W. Norton & Co. (Original work published 1956) 
 
 
 
 
 
337 
 
Lacan, J. (2006a). The situation of psychoanalysis and the training of psychoanalysts in  
 
1956. In Lacan, J., Écrits: the first complete edition in English. (B. Fink, Trans.)  
 
New York: W.W. Norton & Co. (Original work published 1956) 
 
Lacan, J. (2006a). The instance of the letter in the unconscious or reason since Freud. In  
 
Lacan, J. Écrits: the first complete edition in English. (B. Fink, Trans.). New  
 
York: W.W. Norton & Co. (Original work published 1957) 
 
Lacan, J. (2006a). The signification of the phallus. In Lacan, J. Écrits: the first complete  
 
edition in English. (B. Fink, Trans.). New York: W.W. Norton & Co. (Original  
 
work published 1958) 
 
Lacan, J. (2006a). On a question prior to any possible treatment of psychosis. In Lacan, J.  
 
Écrits: the first complete edition in English. (B. Fink, Trans.). New York: W.W.  
 
Norton & Co. (Original work published 1959) 
 
Lacan, J. (2006a). The subversion of the subject and the dialectic of desire in the  
 
Freudian unconscious. In Lacan, J. Écrits: the first complete edition in English.  
 
(B. Fink, Trans.). New York: W.W. Norton & Co. (Original work published  
 
1960) 
 
Lacan, J. (2006a). The direction of the treatment and the principles of its power. In  
 
Lacan, J. Écrits: the first complete edition in English. (B. Fink, Trans.). New  
 
York: W.W. Norton & Co. (Original work published 1961) 
 
Lacan, J. (2006a). Kant with Sade. In Lacan, J. Écrits: the first complete edition in  
 
English. (B. Fink, Trans.). New York: W.W. Norton & Co. (Original work  
 
published 1963) 
 
 
 
338 
 
 
Lacan, J. (2006a). On Freud‘s ‗trieb‘ and the psychoanalyst‘s desire. In Lacan, J.  
 
Écrits: the first complete edition in English. (B. Fink, Trans.). New York: W.W.  
 
Norton & Co. (Original work published 1964) 
 
Lacan, J. (2006a). Position of the unconscious. In Lacan, J. Écrits: the first complete  
 
edition in English. (B. Fink, Trans.). New York: W.W. Norton & Co. (Original  
 
work published 1966) 
 
Lacan, J. (2006b). Le séminaire livre XVI: D’un Autre à l’autre, 1968-1969. Paris: Seuil.  
 
Lacan, J. (2007). The seminar of Jacques Lacan, book XVII: The other side of  
 
psychoanalysis, 1969-1970. (J.-A. Miller, Ed.; R. Grigg, Trans.). New York:  
 
W.W. Norton & Co. (Original work published 1991) 
 
Le Brun, A. (1990). Sade: A sudden abyss. San Francisco, CA: City Lights Publishers. 
 
Leonoff, A. (1997). Destruo ergo sum: Towards a psychoanalytic understanding of  
 
sadism. Canadian Journal of Psychoanalysis, 5, 1, 95-112.  
 
Marlatt, G., & Gordon, J. (1985). Relapse prevention: Maintenance strategies in the  
 
treatment of addictive behaviors. New York, NY: Guilford.  
 
Marques, J. K., Wiederanders, M., Day, D. M., Nelson, C., & van Ommeren, A. (2005).  
 
Effects of a relapse prevention program on sexual recidivism: Final results from  
 
California's Sex Offender Treatment and Evaluation Project (SOTEP). Sexual  
 
Abuse: A Journal of Research and Treatment, 17, 79–107. 
 
McDougall, J. (1970). Homosexuality in women. In J. Chasseguet-Smirgel (Ed.) Female  
 
sexuality: new psychoanalytic views. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan  
 
Press.  
 
 
339 
 
 
McDougall, J. (1995). The many faces of eros: A psychoanalytic exploration of human  
 
sexuality. New York: W.W. Norton & Co. 
 
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1968). The visible and the invisible: followed by working notes. (A.  
 
Lingis, Trans.) Chicago, IL: Northwestern University Press. 
 
Miller, J.-A. (1996a). A discussion of Lacan‘s ‗Kant with Sade.‘ In R. Feldstein, B. Fink,  
 
& M. Jaanus (Eds.), Reading seminars I and II: Lacan’s return to Freud (pp. 212- 
 
237). Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. 
 
Miller, J.-A. (1996b). On perversion. In R. Feldstein, B. Fink, & M. Jaanus (Eds.),  
 
Reading seminars I and II: Lacan’s return to Freud (pp. 306-320). Albany, NY:  
 
State University of New York Press. 
 
Miller, J.-A. (2006a). Introduction to reading Jacques Lacan‘s seminar on anxiety II. (B.  
 
Fulks, Trans.). Lacanian Ink, 27, 8-63.  
 
Miller, J.-A. (2006b). The names-of-the-father. (B. Fulks, Trans.). Lacanian Ink, 27, 64- 
 
79.  
 
Miller, J.-A. (2006c). A reading of the seminar from an Other to the other. (B. Fulks,  
 
Trans.). Lacanian Ink, 29, 8-61.  
 
Miller, J.-A. (2006d). On shame. In J. Clemens and R. Grigg (Eds.), Jacques Lacan and  
 
the other side of psychoanalysis (pp. 11-28). Durham and London: Duke  
 
University Press.  
 
Miller, J.-A. (2007). Jacques Lacan and the voice. In V. Voruz and B. Wolf (Eds.), The  
 
later Lacan: An introduction (pp. 137-146). Albany, NY: State University  
 
of New York Press.  
 
 
340 
 
 
Miller, J.-A. (2009a). The phallus and perversion. (B. Fulks, Trans.). Lacanian Ink, 33,  
 
57-71.  
 
Miller, J.-A. (2009b). The divine details. (D. Collins, Trans.). Lacanian Ink, 34, 28-51.  
 
Miller, M. (2006). Following the letter: Case studies in the application of Lacanian  
 
theory to psychotherapy. (Doctoral Dissertation, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh,  
 
Pennsylvania, 2006) 
 
Money, J. (1988). Gay, straight and in-between. The sexology of erotic orientation. New  
 
York: Oxford University Press.  
 
Nobus, D. (1999). Life and death in the glass: A new look at the mirror stage. In D.  
 
Nobus (Ed.), Key concepts of Lacanian psychoanalysis (pp. 101-138). New York:  
 
Other Press.  
 
Nobus, D. (2000). Jacques Lacan and the Freudian practice of psychoanalysis. London  
 
and Philadelphia: Routledge. 
 
Penney, J. (2003). Confessions of a medieval sodomite. In M.A. Rothenberg, D. Foster,  
 
& S. Žižek (Eds.), Perversion and the social relation (pp. 126-158). Durham and  
 
London: Duke University Press. 
 
Pithers, W., Marques, J., Gibat, C., & Marlatt, G. (1983). Relapse prevention: A self- 
 
control model of treatment and maintenance of change for sexual aggressive. In J.  
 
Greer & I. Stuart (Eds.), The sexual aggressor: Current perspectives on treatment  
 
(pp. 292-310). New York, NY: Van Nostrand Reinhold.  
 
PDM Task Force (2006). Psychodynamic Diagnostic Manual. Silver Spring, MD:  
 
Alliance of Psychoanalytic Organizations. 
 
 
341 
 
 
Proctor, E. (1996). A five-year outcome evaluation of a community-based treatment  
 
program for convicted sexual offenders run by the probation service. Journal of  
 
Sexual Aggression, 2, 3–16. 
 
Proust, M. (1952). The Guermantes Way. Retrieved from  
 
http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/p/proust/marcel/p96g/chapter1.html 
 
Rosario, V. (1997). The erotic imagination: French histories of perversity. New York:  
 
Oxford University Press.  
 
Rosen, I. (1996). Sexual deviation (3
rd
 Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Saussure, F. (2005). Course in general linguistics. (R. Harris, Trans.). Chicago and La  
 
Salle, IL: Open Court.  (Original work published 1916) 
 
Schneiderman, S. (1980). How Lacan’s ideas are used in clinical practice. New Jersey  
 
and London: Jason Aronson.  
 
Soler, C. (1995a). The subject and the other (I). In R. Feldstein, B. Fink, & M. Jaanus  
 
(Eds.), Reading seminar XI: Lacan’s four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis  
 
(pp. 39-44). Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. 
 
Soler, C. (1995b). The subject and the other (II). In R. Feldstein, B. Fink, & M. Jaanus  
 
(Eds.), Reading seminar XI: Lacan’s four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis  
 
(pp. 45-53). Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. 
 
Soler, C. (1996). The symbolic order (I). In R. Feldstein, B. Fink, & M. Jaanus (Eds.),  
 
Reading seminars I and II: Lacan’s return to Freud (pp. 39-46). Albany, NY:  
 
State University of New York Press. 
 
Soler, C. (2006). What Lacan said about women: A psychoanalytic study. (J. Holland,  
 
Trans.). New York: Other Press. 
342 
 
 
Stekel, W. (1964). Peculiarities of behavior; wandering mania, dipsomanis, cleptomania,  
 
pyromania and allied impulsive acts. (J. Van Teslaar, Trans.). New York: Grove  
 
Press. (Original work published 1924)  
 
Stoller, R. L. (1976). Perversion: the erotic form of hatred. Hassocks, Sussex, UK:  
 
Harvester Press. 
 
Stoller, R. (1991). The term ―perversion.‖ In G. Fogel & W. Myers (Eds.), Perversions  
 
and near perversions in clinical practice: New psychoanalytic perspectives (pp.  
 
36-56). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
 
Tuch, R. (2008). Unraveling the riddle of exhibitionism: A lesson in the power tactics of  
 
perverse interpersonal relationships. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 89,  
 
143-160. 
 
Verhaeghe, P. (1999). Causation and destitution of a pre-ontological non-entity: On the  
 
Lacanian subject. In D. Nobus (Ed.), Key concepts of Lacanian psychoanalysis  
 
(pp. 164-189). New York: Other Press.  
 
Verhaeghe, P. (2001a). Perversion I: Perverse traits. The Letter, 22, 59-75. 
 
Verhaeghe, P. (2001b). Perversion II: The perverse structure. The Letter, 23, 77-95.  
 
Verhaeghe, P. (2004). On being normal and other disorders: A manual for clinical  
 
psychodiagnostics. New York: Other Press.  
 
Wallon, H. (1931). Comment se développe, chez l‘enfant, la notion du corps propre.  
 
Journal de Psychologie normale et pathologique, XXVIII, 705-748.  
 
Ward, T., Bickley, J., Webster, S.D., Fisher, D., Beech, A., & Eldridge, H. (2004). The  
 
self-regulation model of the offense and relapse process: A manual. Volume 1:  
 
Assessment. Victoria, BC, Canada: Trafford Publishing.  
343 
 
 
Žižek, S. (2009). ‗I hear you with my eyes‘: or, the invisible master. In R. Salecl and S.  
 
Žižek (Eds.) Gaze and voice as love objects (pp. 89-126). Durham and London:  
 
Duke University Press. 
